On Charity: Article 9: Whether there is some ordering within charity
Article pleasurable and the useful sorts of friendship.In their case, we love a friend as something good for us, not because we are seeking something pleasurable or useful for the friend, but because we are seeking something from the friend that is pleasurable or useful for us. That is also the way that we love other things that are pleasurable or useful to us, such as food or clothes. By contrast, when we love others on account of virtue, we want what is good for them; we do not want them for us. This occurs especially in friendship based on charity.
() It is better to love an enemy than a friend only because it reveals a fuller charity, as I have explained. But if we consider the two activities simply speaking, it is better to love a friend than an enemy, and better to love God than a friend. For the difficulty of loving an enemy only relates to the idea of merit in that it reveals the fullness of the charity in question, which overcomes that difficulty. It follows, though, that if the charity were so full as to overcome the difficulty entirely, that would be even more meritorious. But now we are talking about someone who loves a friend out of the fullest charity, and this will also extend to loving an enemy; however, it will be more intensively at work in loving the friend. Per accidens, though, loving an enemy might need more intensive effort, in that resisting something may require a greater effort, just as in natural things warm water needs to be frozen more intensively than cold.
This makes clear the answers to () and ().
Article : Whether there is some ordering within charity Objections It seems not, because:
() Charity is related to things we should love in the way that faith is related to things we should believe. But faith believes everything we should believe to an equal degree. Therefore charity loves everything we should love to an equal degree.
() Ordering relates to reason. However, charity is found not in the reason but in the will. Therefore ordering is unrelated to charity.
Aquinas follows Aristotle in identifying three sorts of friendship: those based on pleasure, those based on the friends' usefulness to each other, and those based on the virtuous or honourable character of the friends.
On Charity () Whenever there is order, there are degrees. Bernard says [SermSS ..], however, that 'Charity knows no degrees and takes no notice of status.' Therefore there is no ordering within charity.
() The object of charity is God, as Augustine tells us [CT ..].
For charity loves nothing in our neighbour except God. However, God is not greater in himself than he is in our neighbour, nor greater in one neighbour than in another. Therefore charity does not love God more than our neighbour, nor one neighbour more than another.
() The reason for loving is likeness, according to Ecclesiasticus :, 'Every animal loves what is like it.' But one human being is more like a neighbour than like God. Therefore the ordering within charity that Ambrose gives, whereby God is loved first,must be incorrect.
() John :says, 'If you do not love your brother, whom you see, how can you love God, whom you do not see?' He argues from the love of neighbourtotheloveofGodbynegation.Anargumentbasedonnegation, though, begins from what is greater, not from what is less. Therefore our neighbour should be loved more than God.
() Love is a force that unites, as Dionysius says [DivNames .]. But nothing is more united to anything else than to itself. Therefore we ought not to love God out of charity more than we love ourselves.
() Augustine says [CT ..] that all human beings are equally to be loved. Therefore one neighbour ought not to be loved more than another.
() We are instructed to love our neighbours as ourselves. Therefore all neighbours are equally to be loved.
() We love someone more if we want a greater good for them. But out of charity we want the same good for all our neighbours, i.e. eternal life.
Therefore we ought not to love one neighbour more than another.
()Iftheorderingisafeatureofcharity,itoughttofallunderaprecept.
But it does not seem to do this, because provided that we love each person as much as we ought, it does not seem to be a sin if we love someone else more. Therefore this ordering is not a criterion of charity.
() Charity on our journey imitates charity in our homeland. But in our homeland, we will love more those who are better, not those more closely related to us. Therefore it seems that if there is in fact an ordering within charity, while we are on our journey too we ought to Cf. Origen, Homilies on the Song of Songs ..
Article love more those who are better rather than those who are more closely related to us. This contradicts Ambrose,who says that we ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, then members of our household.
() God is the reason why we love someone out of charity. But sometimes non-relations are closer to God than our relations, and even our parents. Therefore they ought more to be loved out of charity.
() As Gregory says [HomGosp .], 'The proof of love is its being shown in what we do.' But sometimes the practice of charity, i.e. doing good, is shown more to a stranger than to a neighbour, as is clear in the distribution of ecclesiastical benefices.Therefore it does not seem that in charity we should have more love for those close to us.
()John:says,'Letusnotloveinwordsorspeech,butindeedsand truth.' But sometimes we ought to show the deeds of love to others more than to our parents. For example, a soldier obeys his military commander more than his father; and a son ought to pay back his benefactor rather than his father if there is an equal degree of need. Therefore we ought not to love our parents more.
() Gregory says that we ought to love those we have received from holy baptismmore than those we have produced from our own flesh.
Therefore there are some who are unrelated to us whom we ought to love more than our relations.
() If it is more blameworthy to break off a friendship, then the friend in question must be more worthy of love. But it seems to be more blameworthy to break off those friendships where we chose the friends of our own accord than those with our relations, whom we acquired by the lot of nature rather than our own choice. Therefore we ought to love certain other friends more than our relations.
() If we ought to love more someone who is closer to us, then a wife, who is of one flesh [Gen :], or a child, who is part of its parent, is closer to us than our parents. Therefore it seems that we ought to love a wife or child more than a parent. In that case, we ought not to love our parents most of all. Therefore the ordering within charity indicated by the saints seems incorrect.
See note .
That is, positions of responsibility within the Church, particularly those that are remunerative.
I.e. our godchildren.
On Charity But on the other hand Song of Solomon :says, 'The king led me into the banqueting-room and ordered charity within me.'
My reply There is no doubt that according to all teaching and to the authority of scripture we ought to preserve an ordering within charity such that God is to be loved above everything else in both how we feel and what we do. As for loving our neighbours, here some used to be of the view that the ordering within charity concerns how we feel rather than what we do. They were inspired by Augustine's saying [CT ..] that we ought to love everyone equally, but 'since you cannot help everyone to the same degree, you ought to care most for those who are closest to you in place and time and opportunity in whatever way, as if they have been linked to you by lot'.
This position, however, seems unreasonable. For God provides for each person what his situation requires. That is why God bestows upon things that tend towards a natural end the love of and desire for that end, in accordance with the way that their condition requires them to tend towards that end. In this way, if something has a stronger natural movementtowardsacertainend,itwillhaveastrongerinclinationtowards it; this is known as natural 'desire', and it can be seen in both light and heavy objects.
Desire or natural love, then, is an inclination placed in natural things towards their own natural ends; similarly, love in the sense of charity is an inclination infused into rational natures to make them tend towards God.
Inasmuch as it is necessary for something to tend towards God, this inclination arises out of charity.
Now those things that tend towards God as their end stand in need above all of God's help; secondly, of help that comes from themselves; and thirdly of cooperation from their neighbour. Again, in this last category, there are degrees of cooperation. Some cooperate with us in a general way; others who are more closely connected with us, in a particular way: for everyone could not cooperate with everyone else in particular ways.
Our body also assists us, though only in an instrumental way, as does whatever the body needs.
Article All this explains why our human feeling ought, through charity, to make us tend to love God first and chiefly; then secondly ourselves; then thirdly our neighbours; and, among them, those especially who are more closely connected to us and are apt by nature to help us more. (Those who hinder us, however, whoever they are, qua hindering us should be hated. Hence the Lord's words in Luke :, 'Anyone who comes to me and does not hate his mother and father, cannot be my disciple.') Last of all, we should love our bodies.
Thus, too, when it comes to acting in a way drawn out by charity, here too we ought to observe the order that corresponds to our feelings in loving our neighbours. But we also ought to consider, as I have said above
[articles and ], that other lawful and honourable types of love which arise from other causes can also be ordered towards charity. This allows charitytocommandtheactivitiesoflovesofthatsort.Inthisway,whatever one loves more on the basis of a love of that sort, one also loves more out of charity, when charity is commanding this.
It is clear too that natural love leads us to have stronger feelings of love for our relations, while social love does the same for our close friends, and so on for other types of love. This makes it clear that from the point of view of feeling, one neighbour is to be loved more than another out of charity also, when that is commanding the activities of other lawful types of love.
Replies to objections () The object of faith is truth. Something ought to be believed more, therefore, insofar as it happens to be more true. Now truth consists in the intelligence's becoming equal with the thing. If we consider truth with reference to the character of equality, which does not admit of more or less, then something cannot be more or less true. On the other hand, if we consider it with reference to the thing's actual being, which gives the truth its character, as Aristotle says [Met ., b], then things are disposed in the same way in respect of being and of truth. Thus things that are greater in respect of being are greater in respect of truth.
For this reason even in the demonstrable branches of knowledge principles are believed more than their conclusions. This also happens in the area of faith. That is how St Paul in Corinthians :–proves the future resurrection of the dead from the resurrection of Christ.
On Charity () The ordering by reason is the ordering of the one that orders; the ordering of the will is the ordering of the one being ordered. It is in this latter way that it is appropriate for charity to be ordered.
() Charity does not recognise different degrees between the one who loves and the one who is loved, because it unites the two. However, it does recognise different degrees among things that are to be loved.
() Although God is not greater in one thing than in another, it is true that he exists more fully in himself than in some creature, and in one creature than in another.
() Wherever one loves oneself as the principal object of one's love, then the likeness between lover and beloved will indeed increase the love; this is the case for natural love. But for love in the sense of charity, the principal object is God himself. That is why we ought to love more out of charity whatever is more closely united to God, other things being equal.
() St John's reasoning is based on those who cling particularly to what they can see, for they love what they can see more than what they cannot see.
() By nature, nothing is more united with us than we are ourselves.
However, through feeling, which has good as its object, we ought to be united more closely with the supreme good than with ourselves.
() All human beings are to be loved equally in the sense that the good that we ought to want for them is equal, i.e. eternal life.
() We are told to love our neighbour as ourselves, but not as much as ourselves; consequently, it does not follow that all neighbours are to be loved equally.
() We are said to love more not only when we want for others a greater good, but also when we hope with a more intensive feeling that they will have that good. In this way, although we hope for the same good for everyone, i.e. eternal life, we do not love everyone to an equal degree.
() It is not possible to bestow on one person what out of love we ought to, when there is someone else whom we ought to love less than this person, but whom in fact we love more. For in a situation of serious need we might end up helping the second person more, to the disadvantage of the first, whom we ought in fact to be loving more.
() Those who are in the homeland are already joined to the ultimate end. For this reason their love is governed only by that end itself. For them, then, the ordering of charity need only take notice of someone's degree of closeness to God. That is why those who are closer to God will
Article belovedmore.Butwhenweareonourjourney,weneedtodirectourselves towards our end; for this reason the ordering of love also responds to the degree of assistance that we are given by others in directing ourselves to our end. Consequently, it is not always the case that those who are better should be loved more; the degree of closeness must also be taken into account. Reasoning about the relative degree of love must be based on both of these considerations taken together.
This makes clear the reply to ().
() A prelate does not distribute benefices qua Peter or Martin, but qua a teacher in the Church. For this reason, when distributing benefices, one ought to take notice not of a person's closeness to oneself, but of his closeness to God and of his usefulness to the Church. Similarly, when someone is responsible for distributing the goods of a household, he ought to distribute his master's property with an eye to service rendered to his master rather than to himself. With his own property, on the other hand, as for example with goods he has inherited or acquired for himself through his own labours, he ought to make distributions with an eye to the order of closeness, and of benefits, to himself.
() (i) With respect to things that relate to you strictly as a private person, you ought to do more out of love for a parent than for someone unrelated;theonlyexceptionwouldbewherethecommongooddepended on the latter's good, since one ought to prefer that even to oneself. (So, you might expose yourself to danger of death in order to save the commander in a war, or the city's ruler in a city, because the safety of the whole community depends on them.) (ii)Bycontrast,withrespecttothingsthatrelatetoyoubyreasonof something additional, for example, insofar as you are a citizen or a soldier, you have more obligation to obey the city's ruler, or the commander, than your father.
() The authoritative text from Gregory should be interpreted with respect to matters relating to spiritual rebirth, where we are obliged to those whom we have received from holy baptism.
() The argument works with regard to things relating to social life, which is the basis of friendship with those outside the family.
() (i) With respect to the love by which someone loves himself, he loves a wife or children more than parents, for the wife is a part of the husband,
The text is problematic at this point.