Terminology and glossary: Terminology
Terminology and glossary Terminology The extent and precision of philosophical and semi-technical words in Aquinas poses a problem for translators, and particularly for those translating into languages such as English which do not contain close equivalents of many of his common terms. The situation is further complicated by the development of English, which has meant that many words, in particular in the field of ethics and psychology, have changed their meaning, often in a way that impoverishes their sense. For this reason, to use what looks like the nearest English equivalent of, say, habitus or temperantia can be extremely misleading. Scholars and translators working in an age where most of their readers knew Latin often ignored this risk, trusting their readers to recognise that, for example, 'habit' was being used in its 'Latin' rather than its English sense. Wherever possible, I have tried to avoid such near-transliterations, as their collective effect seems to me likely seriously to distort a contemporary reader's impression of Aquinas's ideas.
Glossary actus: actualisation, activity, activeness, action, act; potentia: capacity, potential.
These two terms encapsulate one of the most fundamental differences between an Aristotelian-Thomist view of the world and a modern one: the idea of directed potential. For Aquinas, each thing has certain capacities or potentialities which are made to be actualised in specific ways, as the
Glossary eye has a capacity that is actualised in the act of seeing. The range of senses of actus is due to the fact that actions are thought of precisely as actualisations of capacities. A capacity is completely actualised when it reaches its ultimum or upper limit. perfectus: complete, perfect, fully developed, elevated; sometimes the word is translated with a paraphrase using full.
The possession of directed capacities is a part of the orientation of each thing towards its natural goal or fulfilment, towards what, in some sense, it is meant to be or become. The participle perfectus is used to describe something that is a complete specimen of its kind, which in cases of things that grow and develop means a mature specimen. It has nothing essential missing; its potential is fulfilled. In the case of things that change and develop, the word conveys the sense that a process has been completed.
Unlike the English 'perfect', perfectus does not normally convey the sense of 'flawless'. Again, a specimen that is perfectus need not be rare or unusual of its type. The word does not imply a relation as in 'perfect for'. For these reasons, 'complete' is often the least misleading translation. 'Developed' is helpful in particular in contexts where the idea of change is important.
The abstract noun perfectio can mean (a) the state of being perfectus; (b) an element that makes something complete; for example, Aquinas describes the soul as the perfectio of a human being. I have used a paraphrase to translate this sense of the word.
The English 'perfect' or 'complete' are normally used by comparison with other things of the same type: an apple is perfect or imperfect as an apple, by comparison with other apples. Aquinas, because of his wider philosophical commitments, may also rank different types of thing as comparably 'perfect': a human being, he might argue is more perfectus as an animal than a sheep, an apple, maybe, more perfectus as a fruit than a gooseberry. We would normally use terms such as 'better' or 'higher' in making comparable comparisons. I have usually translated perfectior in this sense as 'more elevated'.
Aquinasalsousestheverbperficeretomeantomakecompleteorperfect. ratio: reason, character; other translations include argument, description, meaning, respect.
Ratio covers a very wide range of senses, including: (a) the faculty or the virtue of reason; (b) the argument or process of reasoning; (c) a reason
Glossary for something; (d) the definition, or more generally description of the distinctive elements, of a thing; Aquinas uses ratio frequently to refer to (e) the intelligible structure of a thing, that which can be picked out by the definition or, more generally, by a description. Here 'nature' or even 'essence' would often be the most natural translations, but it is best to keep them for natura and essentia; the English words 'identity' or 'intelligibility' are also sometimes used in a similarsense.Ihavetranslatedthissenseofratiowiththeword'character'. habitus: disposition; dispositio: tendency; inclinatio: inclination; inchoatio: predisposition.
Aristotle's Categories distinguishes four kinds of 'quality'. One of these kinds includes habitus and dispositio, which are are distinguished by the fact that a habitus is more stable and harder to dislodge than a dispositio (for example, knowledge is a habitus, but illness a dispositio). The English 'disposition' usually refers to something stable in precisely this way, whereas a 'tendency' is weaker and more easily overridden. (It has occasionally been necessary, however, to translate the verb dispono with dispose.) An inclinatio is more temporary still. Inchoatio refers to an innate predisposition to develop a tendency or full-blown disposition. A virtue, for example, courage, when fully developed, is a disposition. Someone may be born with a predisposition to act in a brave way, and then develop this through practice until it becomes a tendency to act bravely, and finally a fully developed disposition of courage. genus:class,category;species:type,species;differentia:distinguishing feature.
The modern biological categories of 'genus' and 'species' are a relic of a wider, Aristotelian, division, of all types of thing into bigger classes. Different types within a class were distinguished by differentiae; for example, sofas might be distinguished within the class of seats by the distinguishing features of 'comfort' and 'capacity-to-seat-more-than-one'. Modern translations often transliterate species as 'species', but this seems to me misleading in most cases. Aquinas also uses genus to mean 'category' in the technical, Aristotelian, sense. patria: homeland; via: journey.
The image of the Christian life as a journey or pilgrimage, taken from the New Testament, via Augustine, dominates the structure of Aquinas's
Glossary ethical thought. In this life we are in via, on our journey, towards our homeland of 'heaven' or the enjoyment of the presence of God after death.
The saints in heaven are possessors (comprehensores) of that homeland, for which at present we can only hope. Only Christ himself, as both God and man, was able to be both 'on the journey' and 'in possession of the homeland' at the same time (DQChar rep.). passio: emotion, passive experience.
A passio is a state of being affected by something or being acted upon, the opposite of an actio or 'action'. Often the word refers to those experiences we call 'emotions', which Aquinas categorises under seven main types: love, hate, joy, sorrow, fear, hope, anger. amor: love; dilectio: love, affection; caritas: charity.
Amor and dilectio are used fairly interchangeably by Aquinas to refer to love in a broad sense. Caritas refers specifically to love that involves God: either God's love for himself or his creatures, or human love for God, or human love for other creatures that is ordered towards the love of God.
Although the English word 'charity' is often used nowadays with an impoverished sense, it was necessary to keep the word in the translation in order to preserve this fundamental distinction between the two senses of love. proprium, proprie: distinctive, peculiar, strictly speaking.
A quality that is proprium to a subject is distinctive of it in the sense that it constitutes part of what makes that subject complete as the type or species that it is, in a way that differentiates this from other types of thing. Words are used proprie when they are used in a strict sense rather than loosely, that is, when they are used of a thing that possesses all, rather than only some, of the distinctive elements to which the word refers. principium, principalis: principle, origin, basis; principal, fundamental.
A principium is something that comes first, whether in causality, in authority, or in logic, and which is the source of what follows from it. It is both the beginning or starting point of other things, and thereby more valuable or important than them.
Glossary delectatio: pleasure; voluptas: sensual pleasure.
Voluptas refers specifically to the pleasures of the senses. Delectatio strictly refers to non-sensual pleasures, but is also used more loosely to include pleasure, delight, or enjoyment in the wide sense. medium: mid-point.
Aquinas uses medium to translate Aristotle's meson, often rendered in English as 'mean'. I have preferred the more literal and idiomatic
'mid-point'. subiectum: subject.
It has sometimes been clearer to render subiectum using the noun possessor (of attributes) or the verb possess. materia: matter, domain.
The materia of a virtue is the area or domain of life with which it deals; the 'domain' of courage, for example, is things that are frightening or difficult. moveo, motus: move, movement, change.
It is important to remember that the Latin makes no distinction between 'move' and 'change'. virtus: virtue, power; vis: power.
Virtus means both 'virtue' and 'strength' or 'power'. A vis is a power in the sense of a capacity or ability; a plant, for example, has a nutritive vis, which enables it to acquire nourishment. Aquinas not infrequently uses virtus where one would expect vis, even in potentially confusing contexts.