all other things, of which the mind 1s certain they are one life, one mind, one essence; and
ST. AUGUSTIN. [Book X.
142 THE WORKS OF some one of them. But if it were any one of them, it would think this one in a different manner from the rest, vzz. not through an imaginary phantasy, as absent things are thought, which either themselves or some of like kind have been touched by the bodily sense; but by some inward, not feigned, but true presence (for nothing is more present to it than itself); just as it thinks that itself lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills.
whether it refer them to anything further, or rest satisfied with them as an end. For to use, is to take up something into the power of the will; and to enjoy, is to use with joy, not any longer of hope, but of the actual thing. Accordingly, every one who enjoys, uses; for he takes up something into the power of the will, wherein he also is satisfied as with an end. But not every one who uses, enjoys, if he has sought after that, which he takes up into the power of the will, not on account of the thing itself, but on account of something else.
For it knows these things in itself, and does not imagine them as though it had touched them by the sense outside itself, as corporeal things are touched. And if it attaches nothing to itself from the thought of these things, so as to think itself to be something of the kind, then whatsoever remains to it from itself, that alone is itself.
18. Since, then, these three, memory, understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor three minds, but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three substances, but one substance. Since memory, which is called life, and mind, and substance, is so called in respect to itself; but it is called memory, relatively to something. And J should say the same also of understanding and of will, since they are called understanding and will relatively tosomething; but each in respect to itself is life, and mind, and essence. And hence these three are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else they are severally called in respect to themselves, they are called also together, not plurally, but in the singular number. But they are three, in that wherein they are mutually referred to each other; and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each, but also each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each. other; for not only is each contained by each, but also all by each. For I remember that I have memory and understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I will that I will, and remember, and understand; and I remember together my whole memory, and understanding, and will.
CHAP, II,—IN MEMORY, UNDERSTANDING [OR INTELLIGENCE |, AND WILL, WE HAVE TO NOTE ABILITY, LEARNING, AND USE, MEMORY, UNDERSTANDING, AND WILL ARE ONE ESSENTIALLY, AND THREE RELATIVELY,
17. Putting aside, then, for a little while all other things, of which the mind 1s certain concerning itself, let us especially consider and discuss these three—memory, understanding, will. For we may commonly discern in these three the character of the abilities of the young also; since the more tenaciously and easily a boy remembers, and the more acutely he understands, and the more ardently he studies, the more praiseworthy is he in point of ability. But when the question is about any one's learning, then we ask not how solidly and easily he remembers, or how shrewdly he understands; but what it is that he remembers, and what it is that he understands, And because the mind is regarded as praiseworthy, not only as being learned, but also as being good, one gives heeck not only to what he remembers and what he understands, but also to what he wills (vedz?); not how ardently he wills, but first what it is he wills, and then how greatly he wills it. For the mind that loves eagerly is then to be praised, when it loves that which ought to be loved eagerly. Since, then, we speak of these three—ability, knowledge, use—the first of these is to be considered under the three heads, of what a man can do in memory, and understanding, and will. The second of them is to be considered in regard to that which anyone has in his memory and in his understanding, which he has attained by a studious will, the will, which handles those things that are contained i in the memory and understanding
For that of my memory which I do not remember, is not in my memory; and nothing is so much in the memory as memory itself. Therefore I remember the whole memory. Also, whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; but whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember the whole of my understanding, and the whole of my will. Likewise, when I understand these three things, I understand them together as whole. For there is none of things intelligible which I do not understand, except what I do not know; but what I do not know, I neither remember, nor will. Therefore, whatever of things intelligible I do not understand, it follows also that I neither remember nor will. And whatever of
But the third, vzz, use, lies in.
, | things intelligible I remember and will, it fol-
ON THE TRINITY. ole
Cuar. XII.]
lows that I understand. My will also embraces my whole understanding and my whole memory, whilst I use the whole that I understand and remember. And, therefore, while all are mutually comprehended by each, 'and as wholes, each as a whole is equal to each as a whole, and each as a whole at the same time to all as wholes; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence," chiefest and highest essence, of which the human mind is an inadequate image, yet an image? Or are these same three things to be yet more distinctly made plain in the soul, by means of those things which we receive from without, through the bodily sense, wherein the knowledge of corporeal things is impressed upon us in time? Since we found the mind itself to be such in its own memory, and understanding, and will, that since it was understood always to know and always to will itself, it was understood also at the same time always to remember itself, always to understand and love itself, although not always to think of itself as separate from those things which are not itself; and hence its memory of itself, and understanding of itself, are with difficult discerned in it. For in this case, where these two things are very closely conjoined, and one is not preceded by the other by any time at all, it looks as if they were not two things, but one called by two names; and love itself is not so plainly felt to exist when the sense of need does not disclose it, since what is loved is always at hand. And hence these things may be more lucidly set forth, even to men of duller minds, if such topics are treated of as are brought within reach of the mind in time, and happen to it in time; while it remembers what it did not remember before, and sees what it did not see before, and loves what it did not love before. But this discussion demands now another beginning, by reason of the measure of the present book.
IMAGE OF THE UNDERCHAP, I2.—-THE MIND IS AN TRINITY IN ITS OWN MEMORY, AND STANDING, AND WILL, 1g. Are we, then, now to go upward, with whatever strength of purpose we may, to that
1 [This Scie A of memory, understanding, and will, isa better analogue to the Trinity than the preceding one in chapter IX— namely, mind, knowledge, and love. Memory, understanding, and will have' equal substantiality, while mind, knowledge, and love have not. The former are three facudties, in each of which is the whole mind or spirit. The memory isthe whole mind as remembering; the understanding is the whole mind as cognizing; and the will is the whole mind as determining. The one essence of the mind is in each of these three modes, each of which is distinct from the others; and yet there are not three essences or minds. In the other ternary, of mind, knowledge, and love, the last two are not faculties but single acts of the mind. A particular act of cognition is not the whole mind in the gezeral mode of cognition.
This would make it a faculty. A particular act of loving, or of willing, is not the whole mind in the gexera/ mode of loving, or of willing. This would make the momentary and transient act a permanent faculty. This ternary fails, as we have noticed ina previous annotation (IX. ii. 2), in that only the mind is a substance.
The ternary of memory, understanding, and will isan adequate analogue to the Trinity in respect to equal substantiality. But it fails when the separate consctousness of the Trinitarian distinctions is brought into consideration. The three facultiesof memory, understanding, and will, are not so objective to each other as to admit of three forms of consciousness, of the use of the personal Father and of the personal actions that are ascribed to the ather, Son, and Holy Spirit. It also fails, in that these three are not a7 the modes of the mind. There are other faculties: e. g., the imagination. The whole essence of the mind is in this also.—W. G. T. S.]