or one who knows is a substance, and|commingled: and they are all substances,
128 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN. [Book IX, they exist each severally in their own sub-| knows itself perfectly, then the knowledge of stance. Nor are they so mutually predicated | it extends through the whole of it; and when relatively as color and the colored subject | it loves itself perfectly, then it loves itself as are; so that color is in the colored subject, |a whole, and the love of it extends through but has not any proper substance in itself,|the whole of it. Is it, then, as one drink is since colored body is a substance, but color}made from wine and water and honey, and is in a substance; but as two friends are also| each single part extends through the whole, two men, which are substances, while they |and yet they are three things (for there is no are said to be men not relatively, but friends| part of the drink which does not contain relatively. these three things; for they are not joined as 6. But, further, although one who loves|if they were water and oil, but are entirely or one who knows is a substance, and|commingled: and they are all substances, knowledge ts a substance, and love is aj|and the whole of that liquor which is comsubstance, but he that loves and love, or, | posed of the three is one substance),-—is it, I he that knows and knowledge, are spoken|say, in some such way as this we are to think of relatively to each other, as are friends:|these three to be together, mind, love, and yet mind or spirit are not relatives, as|knowledge? But water, wine, and honey are meither are men relatives: nevertheless he | not of one substance, although one substance 'that loves and love, or he that knows and/| results in the drink made from the commin-
'knowledge, cannot exist separately from each | gling of them. And I cannot see how those other, as men can that are friends. Although|other three are not of the same substance, it would seem that friends, too, can be sepa-|since the mind itself loves itself, and itself rated in body, not in mind, in as far as they | knows itself; and these three so exist, as that are friends: nay, it can even happen that a|the mind is neither loved nor known by any friend may even also begin to hate a friend, | other thing at all, These three, therefore, and on this account cease to be a friend, | must needs be of one and the same essence; waile the other does not know it, and still|and for that reason, if they were confounded loves him. (But if the love with which the| together as it were by a commingling, they mind loves itself ceases to be, then the mind|could not be in any way three, neither could also will at the same time cease to love.\jthey be mutually referred to each other. Likewise, if the knowledge by which the mind | Just as if you were to make from one and knows itself ceases to be, then the mind will|the same gold three similar rings, although also at the same time cease to know itself. | connected with each other, they are mutually Just as the head of anything that has a head | referred to each other, because they are simiis certainly a head, and they are predicated/lar. For everything similar is similar to relatively to each other, although they are|something, and there isa trinity of rings, also substances: for both a head is a body,|and one gold. But if they are blended with and so is that which has a head; and if there | each other, and each mingled with the other be no head, then neither will there be that|through the whole of their own bulk, then which has a head. Only these things can be|that trinity will fall through, and it will not separated from each other by cutting off, | exist at all; and not only will it be called one those cannot. gold, as it was called in the case of those 7, And evenif there are some bodies which | three rings, but now it will not be called three cannot be wholly separated and divided, yet| things of gold at all. they would not be bodies unless they consisted of their own proper parts. A _ part then is predicated relatively to a whole, since every part is a part of some whole, and a whole is a whole by having all its parts. But i since both part and whole are _ bodies, | these things are not only predicated rela-
CHAP. 5.—-THAT THESE THREE ARE SEVERAL IN
THEMSELVES, AND MUTUALLY ALL IN ALL.
8. But in these three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there remains a
'trinity: mind, love, knowledge; and this trintively, but exist also substantially. Perhaps, lity is not confounded together by any comthen, the mind is a whole, and the love with|'mingling: although they are each severally which it loves itself, and the knowledge with | in themselves and mutually all in all, or each which it knows itself, are as it were its parts, | severally in each two, or each two in each. of which two parts that whole consists.| Therefore all are in all. For certainly the Or are there three equal parts which make| mind is in itself, since it is called mind in up the one whole? But no part embraces the} respect to itself: although it is said to 'be whole, of which it is a part; whereas, when| knowing, or known, or knowable, relatively the mind knows itself as a whole, that is,|]to its own knowledge; and although also as be