you should give me a reason, that, wherever true religion: this the command of God: this
ST. AUGUSTIN.
358 THE WORKS OF so. What, then, is the case of those, (of whom I already believe you to be one,) who are able most easily to receive divine secrets by sure reason, will it, I ask, be to them any hindrance at all, if they so come as they who at the first believe? Ithink not. But yet, you say, what need to delay them? Because although they will in no way harm themselves by what is done, yet they will harm the rest by the precedent. For there is hardly one who has a just notion of his own power: but he who has a less notion must be roused; he men affirming any thing on the matter of religion itself. For it would be unbecoming you to make any other answer. Wherefore now suppose him present, who is about to deliver to you a religion, in what way shall you assure him, that you approach with a true mind, and that, so far as this matter is concerned, there is in you no fraud or feigning? You will say, your own good conscience that you are no way feigning, asserting this with words as strong as you can, but yet with words. For you cannot lay open man to man the hiding places of your soul, so that you may be thoroughly known. But if he shall say, Lo, I believe you, but is it not more fair that you also believe me, when, if I hold any truth, you are about to receive, I about to give, a benefit ? what will you answer, save that you must believe?
who has a greater notion must be checked: that neither the one be broken by despair, nor the other carried headlong by rashness. And this is easily done, if even they, who are able to fly, (that they be not alluring the occasion of any into danger,) are forced for a short time to walk where the rest also may walk with safety. This is the forethought of true religion: this the command of God: this what hath been handed down from our blessed
24. But you say, Were it not better that you should give me a reason, that, wherever that shall lead me, I may follow without any rashness? Perhaps it were: but, it being so great a matter, that you are by reason to come to the knowledge of God, do you think that all are qualified to understand the reasons, by which the human soul is led to know God, or many, or few? Few I think, you say. Do you believe that you are in the number of these? It is not for me, you say, to answer this. Therefore you think it is for him to believe you in this also: and this indeed he does: only do you remember, that he hath already twice believed you saying things uncertain; that you are unwilling to believe him even once admonishing you ina religious spirit. But suppose that it is so, and that you approach with a true mind to receive religion, and that you are one of few men in such sense as to be able to take in the reasons by which the Divine Power' is brought into certain knowledge; what? do you think that other men, who are not endued with so serene a disposition, are to be denied religion? or do you think that they are to be led gradually by certain steps unto those highest inner recesses? You see clearly which is the more religious, For you cannot think that any one whatever in a case where he desires so great a thing, ought by any means to be abandoned or rejected. But do you not think, that, unless he do first believe that he shall attain unto that which he purposes; and do yield his mind as a suppliant; and, submitting to certain great and necessary precepts, do by a certain course of life thoroughly cleanse it, that he will not otherwise attain the things that are purely true? Certainly you think forefathers, this what hath been preserved even unto us: to wish to distrust and overthrow this, is nothing else than to seek a sacrilegious way unto true religion. And whoso do this, not even if what they wish be granted to them are they able to arrive at the point at which they aim. For whatever kind of excellent genius they have, unless God be present, they creep on the ground. But He is then present, if they, who are aiming at God, have a regard for their fellow men. Than which step there can be found nothing more sure Heavenward. I for my part cannot resist this reasoning, for how can I say that we are to believe nothing without certain knowledge? whereas both there can be no friendship at all, unless there be believed something which cannot be proved by some reason, and often stewards, who are slaves, are trusted by their masters without any fault on their part. But in religion what can there be more unfair than that the ministers? of God believe us when we promise an unfeigned mind, and we are unwilling to believe them when they enjoin us any thing. Lastly, what way can there be more healthful, than fora man to become fitted to receive the truth by believing those things, which have been appointed by God to serve for the previous culture and treatment of the mind? Or, if you be already altogether fitted, rather to make some little circuit where it is safest to tread, than both to cause yourself danger, and to be a precedent for rashness to other men ? 25. Wherefore it now remains to consider, in what manner we ought not to follow these,
I Vis divina.
2A ntistites.
ON THE PROFIT OF BELIEVING. 359 who profess that they will lead by reason. 'that are injurious, it is not the understanding, For how we may without fault follow those who bid us to believe, hath been already said: but unto these who make promises of reason certain think that they come, not only without blame, but also with some praise: but it is not so. For there are two (classes of) persons, praiseworthy in religion; one of those who have already found, whom also we must needs judge most blessed; another of those who are seeking with all earnestness and in the right way. The first, therefore, are already in very possession, the other on the way, yet on that way whereby they are most sure to arrive.*. There are three other kinds of men altogether to be disapproved of and detested. One is of those who hold an opinion,? that is, of those who think that they know what they know not. Another is of those who are indeed aware that they know not, but do not so seek as to be able to find. A third is of those who neither think that they know, nor wish to seek. There are also three things, as it were bordering upon one another, in the minds of men well worth distinguishing; understanding, belief, opinion. And, if these be considered by themselves, the first is always without fault, the second sometimes with fault, the third never without fault. For the understanding of matters great, and honorable, and even divine, is most blessed. But the understanding of things unnecessary is no injury; but perhaps the learning was an injury, in that it took up the time of necessary matters, But on the matters themselves but the doing or suffering them, that is wretched. For not, in case any understand how an enemy may be slain without danger to himself, is he guilty from the mere understanding, not the wish; and, if the wish be absent, what can be called more. innocent ? But belief is then worthy of blame, when either any thing is believed of God which is unworthy of Him, or any thing is over easily believed of man. But in all other matters if any believe aught, provided he understand that he knows it not, there is no fault. For I believe that very wicked conspirators were formerly put to death by the virtue of Cicero; but this I not only know not, but also I know for certain that I can by no means know. But opinion is on two accounts very base; in that both he who hath persuaded himself that he already knows, cannot learn; provided only it may be learnt; and in itself rashness is a sign of a mind not well disposed. For even if any suppose that he know what I said of Cicero, (although it be no hindrance to him from learning, in that the matter itself is incapable of being grasped by any knowledge;) yet, (in that he understands not that there is a great difference, whether any thing be grasped by sure reason of mind, which we call understanding, or whether for practical purposes it be entrusted to common fame or writing, for posterity to believe it,) he assuredly errs, and no error is without what is base. What then we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority; what we have an opinion on, to error.+ But every one who understands also believes, and also every one who has an opinion believes; not every one who believes understands, no one who has an opinion understands. Therefore if these three things be referred unto the five kinds of men, which we mentioned a little above; that is, two kinds to be approved, which we set first, and three that remain faulty; we find that the first kind, that of the blessed, believe the truth itself; but the second kind, that of such as are earnest after, and lovers of, the truth, believe authority. In which kinds, of the two, the act of belief is praiseworthy. But in the first of the faulty tcf. Retract. b. i. ch. xiv. 2. '* Ialso said, 'For there are two &c.' In these words of mine if ' those who have already found'' 'whom we have said to be 'now in possession,' are in such sort understood to be ' most happy,' as that they are so not in this life, but in that we hope for, and aim at by the path of faith, the meaning isfree from error: for they are to be judged to have found that which isto be sought, who are now there, whither we by seeking and believing, that is by keeping the path of faith, do seek tocome. But if they are thought to be or to have been such in this life, that seems to me not to betrue: not that in this life no truth at all can be found that can be discerned by the mind, not believed on faith; but because it is but so much, what there is of it, as not to make men ' most blessed.' For neither is that which the Apostle says, We see now through a glass ina riddle and now I knowin part (x Cor. xiii. 12), incapable of being discerned by the mind. It is discerned, clearly, but does not yet make us most blessed. Forthat makes men most blessed which he saith, but then face to face, and, then l shall know evenaslam known. They that have found this, they are to be said to stand in possession
of bliss, to which leadsthat path of faith which we keep, and whither we desire to arrive at by believing. But who are those most blessed, who are already in that possession whither this path leads, is a great question. And for the holy Angels indeed, there is no question but they be there. But of holy men already departed, whetherso much may yet be said of them as that they stand already in that possession, is fairly made aquestion. Forthey are already freed from the corruptible body that weigheth down the soul (Wisd. 9.), but they still wait for the redemption of their body (Rom. 8.), and their flesh resteth in hope, nor is yet glorified in the incorruption that is tocome. (Ps. 16.) But whether for all that they are none the less qualified to contemplate the truth with the eyes of the heart, as it is said, Mace to face, there isnot space to discuss here."
4cf. Retract. b. i. ch. xiv. 3. '' And what I said, 'that there is a great difference whether anything be grasped by sure reason of mind, which we call knowing, or whether for practical purposes it be entrusted to common fame or writing, for posterity to believe it, and presently after, 'what therefore we know, we owe to reason; what we believe to authority;' is not to be so taken as that in conversation we should fear to say we ' know' what we believe of suitable witnesses. For when we speak strictly we are said to know that only which by the mind's own firm reason we comprehend. But when we speak in words more suited to common use, as also Divine Scripture speaketh, we should not hesitate to say we know both what we have perceived with our bodily senses, and what we believe of trustworthy witnesses, whilst however between one and the other we are aware what difference exists,"
2 Opinantium. 3cf. Retract. b. i. ch. 14. 2. '' Also what I said, ' for to know great and noble and even divine things,' we should refer to the same blessedness. For in this life whatsoever there be of it known amounts not to perfect bliss, because that part of it which remains unknown is far more without all comparison."'