respect to accident, since nothing is accidental
ON THE TRINITY. 89 Cuap. VI.]
yet the feather loses that color, not indeed so long as it is a feather, but because the feather is not always. Wherefore the matter itself is changeable; and whenever that animal or that feather ceases to be, and the whole of that body is changed and turned into earth, it loses certainly that color also. Although the kind of accident which 1s called separable may likewise be lost, not by separation, but by change; as, for instance, blackness is called a separable accident to the hair of men, because hair continuing to be hair can grow white; yet, if carefully considered, it is sufficiently apparent, that it is not as if anything departed by separation away from the head when it grows white, as though blackness departed thence and went somewhere, and whiteness came in its place, but that the quality of color there is turned and changed. Therefore there is nothing accidental in God, because there is nothing changeable or to the Son and the Son in relation to the Father, which is not accident; because both the one is always Father, and the other is always Son: yet not *' always,'? meaning from the time when the Son was born [xatus], so that the Father ceases not to be the Father because the Son never ceases to be the Son, but because the Son was always born, and never began to be the Son. But if He had begun to be at any time, or were at any time to cease to be, the Son, then He would be called Son according to accident. But if the Father, in that He is called the Father, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Son; and the Son, in that He is called the Son, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Father; then both the one would be called Father, and the other Son, according to substance. But because the Father is not called the Father except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance; because each of them is not so called in relation to Himself, but the terms are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other; nor yet according to accident, because both the being called the Father, and the being called the Son, is eternal and unchangeable to them. Wherefore, ; although to be the Father and to be the Son is different, yet their substance is not differ- | ent; because they' are so called, not accord- | ing to substance, but according to relation, | which relation, however, is not accident, be-— cause it is not changeable.
that may be lost. But if you choose to call that also accidental, which, although it may not be lost, yet can be decreased or increased, —as, for instance, the life of the soul: for as long as it is a soul, so long it lives, and because the soul is always, it always lives; but because it lives more when it is wise, and less when it is foolish, here, too, some change comes to pass, not such that life is absent, as wisdom is absent to the foolish, but such that it is less;—nothing of this kind, either, happens to God, because He remains altogether unchangeable.
CHAP. 5.—-NOTHING IS SPOKEN OF GOD ACCORDING TO ACCIDENT, BUT ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE OR ACCORDING TO RELATION.
CHAP. 6.—REPLY IS MADE TO THE CAVILS OF THE HERETICS IN RESPECT TO THE SAME WORDS BEGOTTEN AND UNBEGOTTEN.
6. Wherefore nothing in Him is said in respect to accident, since nothing is accidental to Him, and yet all that is said is not said according to substance. For in created and changeable things, that which is not said according to substance, must, by necessary alternative, be said according to accident. For all things are accidents to them, which can be either lost or diminished, whether magnitudes or qualities; and so also is that which is said in relation to something, as friendships, relationships, services, likenesses, equalities, and anything else of the kind; so also positions and conditions, * places and times, acts and passions. But in God nothing is said to be according to accident, because in Him nothing is changeable; and yet everything that is said, is not said according to substance. For it is said in relation to something, as the Father in relation
", But if they think they can answer this reasoning thus,—that the Father indeed is so called in relation to the Son,and the Son in relation to the Father, but that they are said to be unbegotten and begotten in relation to themselves, not in relation each to the other; for that it is not the same thing to call Him unbegotten as it is to call Him the Father, because there would be nothing to hinder our calling Him unbegotten even if He had not begotten the Son; and if any one beget a son, he is not therefore himself unbegotten, for men, who are begotten by other men, tiiemselves also beget others; and therefore they say the Father is called Father in. relation to the Son, and the Son is called Son in relation to the Father, but unbegotten is said in relation to Himself, and begotten in relation to
Himself; and therefore, if whatever is said in relation to oneself is said according to subt Habitus.
gO THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN. [Boox V.
Father, it is not according to that which is* said in relation to the Father that the Son is equal to the Father; and it remains that He is equal according to that which is said in relation to Himself. But whatever is said in relation to self is said according to substance: it remains therefore that He is equal accord-| ing to substance; therefpre the substance of. both is the same. But when the Father is) said to be unbegotten, it is not said what He is, but what He is not; and when a rae term is denied, it is not denied according to substance, since the relative itself is not affirmed according to substance.
stance, while to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different, then the substance is different:—if this is what they say, then they do not understand that they do indeed say something that requires more careful discussion in respect to the term unbegotten, because neither is any one therefore a father because unbegotten, nor therefore unbegotten because he is a father, and on that account he is supposed to be called unbegotten, not in relation to anything else, but in respect to himself; but, on the other hand, with a wonderful blindness, they do not perceive that no one can be said to be begotten except in relation to something. For he is therefore a son because begotten; and because a son, therefore certainly begotten. And as is the relation of son to father, so is the relation of the begotten to the begetter; and as is the relation of father to son, so is the relation of the begetter to the begotten. And therefore any one is understood to be a begetter under one notion, but understood to be unbegotten under another. For though both are said of God the Father, yet the former is said in relation to the begotten, that is to the Son, which, indeed, they do not deny; but that He is called unbegotten, they declare to be said in respect to Himself. They say then, If anything is said to be a father in respect to itself, which cannot be said to be a son in respect to itself, and whatever is said in respect to
CHAP. 7.—THE ADDITION OF A NEGATIVE DOES
NOT CHANGE THE PREDICAMENT.
8. This is to be made clear by examples. And first we must notice, that by the word begotten is signified the same thing as is signified by the word son, For therefore a son, because begotten, and because a son, therefore certainly begotten. By the word unbegotten, therefore, it is declared that he is not son, But begotten and unbegotten are both of them terms suitably employed; whereas in Latin we can use the word '"° filius,'' but the custom of the language does not allow us to speak of ''infilius.'' It makes no difference, however, in the meaning if he is called ''non filius;" just as it is precisely the same thing if he is called ''non genitus,'' instead of *'ingenitus.'' For so the terms of both neighbor and friend are used relatively, yet we cannot speak of '' invicinus'' as we can of self is said according to substance; and He is said to be unbegotten in respect to Himself, which the Son cannot be said to be; therefore He is said to be unbegotten according to substance; and because the Son cannot be so said to be, therefore He is not of the same substance. This subtlety is to be answered by compelling them to say themselves according to what it is that the Son is equal to the Father; whether according to that which is said in relation to Himself, or according to that which is said in relation to the Father. For it is not according to that which is said in relation to the Father, since in relation to the Father He is said to be Son, and the Father is not Son, but Father. Since Father and Son are not so called in relation to each other in the same way as friends and neighbors are; for a friend is so called relatively to his friend, and if they love each other equally, then the same friendship is in both; and a neighbor is so called relatively to a neighbor, and because they are equally neighbors to each other (for each is neighbor to the other, in the same degree as the other is neighbor to him), there is the same neighborhood in both. But because the Son is not so called relatively to the Son, but to the
Wherefore, in speaking of this thing or that, we must not consider what the usage of our own language either allows or does not allow, but what clearly appears to be the meaning of the things themselves. Let us not therefore any longer call it unbegotten, although it can be so called in Latin; but instead of this let us call it not begotten, which means the same. Is this then any-) thing else than saying that he is not:a son?! Now the prefixing of that negative particle does not make that to be said according to substance, which, without it, is said rela~ tively; but that only i is denied, which, without it, was affirmed, as in the other predica, ments. When we say he is a man, we denote substance. He therefore who says he is not aman, enunciates no other kind of predicament, but only denies that. As therefore I affirm according to substance in saying he is a man, so I deny according to substance in saying he is nota man. And when the question is asked, how large he is? and I say he is quadrupedal, that is, four feet in measure,
CuHapP. VIII.] ON THE TRINITY. gi
I affirm according to quantity, and he who says he is not quadrupedal, denies according to quantity. I say he is white, I affirm according to quality; if I say he is not white, I deny according to quality. I say he is near, I affirm according to relation; if I say he is not near, I deny according to relation. I affirm according to position, when I say he lies down; I deny according to pasition, when I say he does not lie down. I speak according to condition,* when I say he is armed; I deny according to condition, when I say he is not armed; and it comes to the same thing as if I should say he is unarmed. I affirm according to time, when I say he is of yester_ day; I deny according to time, when I say he is not of yesterday. And when I say he is at Rome, I affirm according to place; and I deny according to place, when I say he is not at Rome. I affirm according to the predicament of action, when I say he smites; but if I say he does not smite, I deny according to action, so as to declare that he does not so act. And when I say he is smitten, I affirm according to the predicament of passion; and I deny according to the same, when I say he is not smitten. And, in a word, there is no kind of predicament according to which we may please to affirm anything, without being proved to deny according to the same predicament, if we prefix the negative particle. And since this is so, if I were to affirm according to substance, in saying son, I should deny according to substance, in saying not son. But because I affirm relatively when I _ say he is a son, for I refer to the father; begotten and unbegotten are diverse, they do not denote a different substance; because, as son is referred to father, and not son to not father, so it follows inevitably that begotten must be referred to begetter, and notbegotten to not-begetter.?
CHAP. 8.—WHATEVER IS SPOKEN OF GOD ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE, IS SPOKEN OF EACH PERSON SEVERALLY, AND TOGETHER OF THE TRINITY ITSELF. ONE ESSENCE IN GOD, AND THREE, IN GREEK, HYPOSTASES, IN LATIN, PERSONS.
g. Wherefore let us hold this above all, that whatsoever is said of that most eminent and divine loftiness in respect to itself, is said in respect to substance, but that which is said in relation to anything, is not said in respect to substance, but relatively; and that the effect of the same substance in Father' and Son and Holy Spirit is, that whatsoever is said of each in respect to themselves, is to be taken of them, not in the plural in sum, but in the singular. For as the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, which no one doubts to be said in respect to substance, yet we do not say that the very supreme Trinity itself is three Gods, but one God. So the Father is great, the Son great, and the Holy Spirit great; yet not three greats, but one great. For it is not written of the Father alone, as they perversely suppose, but of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, '* Thou art great: Thou art God alone.'?3 And the Father is good, the Son good, and the Holy Spirit good; yet not three goods, but one good, of whom it is said, '* None is good, save one, that is, God.''? For the Lord Jesus, lest He should be understood as man only by him who said, '*Good Master," as addressing a man, does not therefore say, There is none good, save the Father alone; but, '* None is good, save one, that is, God.''4 For the Father by Himself is declared by the name of Father; but by the name of God, both Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the Trinity is one God. But position, and condition, and places, and times, therefore I deny relatively if I say he is not » a son, for I refer the same negation to the | father, in that I wish to declare that he has ' not a parent. But if to be called son is precisely equivalent to the being called begotten _ (as we said before), then to be called not begotten is precisely equivalent to the being called not son. But we deny relatively when. we say he is not son, therefore we deny rela- "tively when we say he is not begotten. Further, what is unbegotten, unless not begotten? We do not escape, therefore, from the relative predicament, when he is called unbegotten. For as begotten is not said in relation to self, but in that he is of a begetter; so when one is called unbegotten, he is not so called in relation to himself, but it is declared that he is not of a begetter. Both meanings, however, turn upon the same predicament, which is called that of relation. But that which is asserted relatively does not denote substance, and accordingly, although
2 The terms '' unbegotten "' and ''begotten"' are interchange~ able with the terms Father and Son. 'his follows from the relation of a substantive to its adjective. In whatever sense a substantive is employed, in the same sense must the adjective formed from it be employed. Consequently, if the first person of the Trinity may be called Father in a sense that implies deity, he may be called Unbegotten in the same sense. And if the second person may be called Son ina sense implying deity, he may he called Begotten in the same sense. The Ancient church often employed the adjective, and spoke of God the Unbegotten and God the Begotten (Justin Martyr, Aol. i. 25, 53; H. 12, 13. Clem. Alex. Stromata v. xii.). This phraseology sounds strange to the Modern church, yet the latter really says the same thing when it speaks of God the Father, and God the Son.—W. G. T. S.]
3 Ps, 1xxxvi. 10, 4 Luke xviii. 18, 19.
1 Habitus.