cidentally to God in time, because He is in-
ON THE TRINITY. 95
CHAP. XVI.]
He is also called ours, who have received Him: as '' The salvation of the Lord,''? who gives salvation, is said also to be our salvation, who have received it. Therefore, the Spirit is both the Spirit of God who gave Him, and ours who have received Him. Not, indeed, that spirit of ours by which we are, because that is the spirit of a man which is in him; but this Spirit is ours in another mode, vzz. that in which we also say, '' Give us this day our bread.'"'? Although certainly we have received that spirit also, which is called the spirit of a man. '' For what hast thou,'' he says, '' which thou didst not receive?''3 But that is one thing, which we have received that we might be; another, that which we have received that we might be holy. Whence it is also written of John, that he 'came in the spirit and power of Elias;''4 and by the spirit of Elias is meant the Holy Spirit, whom Elias received. And
Son, by being born, has not only this, that He is the Son, but that He is absolutely; and so also the Holy Spirit, by being given, has not only this, that He is given, but that He is absolutely—whether therefore He was, before He was given, but was not yet a gift; or whether, for the very reason that God was about to give Him, He was already a gift also before He was given. But if He does not proceed unless when He is given, and assuredly could not proceed before there was one to whom He might be given; how, in that case, was He [absolutely] in His very substance, if He is not unless because He is given? just as the Son, by being born, not only has this, that He is a Son, which is said relatively, but His very substance absolutely, so that He is. Does the Holy Spirit proceed always, and proceed not in time, but from eternity, but because He so proceeded that He was capable of being given, was already a gift even before there was one to whom He might be given? For there is a difference in meaning between a gift and a thing that has been given. Fora gift may exist even before it is given; but it cannot be called a thing that has been given unless it has been given,
the same thing is to be understood of Moses, when the Lord saysto him, ''And I will take of thy spirit, and will put it upon them;"' 5 that is, I will give to them of the Holy Spirit, which _I have already given to thee. If, therefore, that also which is given has him for a beginning by whom it is given, since it has received from no other source that which proceeds from him; it must be admitted that the Father and the Son are a Beginning of the
CHAP, 16.—WHAT IS SAID OF GOD IN TIME, IS SAID RELATIVELY, NOT ACCIDENTALLY.
| Holy Spirit, not two Beginnings; but as the
17. Nor let it trouble us that the Holy Spirit, although He is co-eternal with the Father and the Son, yet is called something which exists in time; as, for instance, this very thing which we have called Him, a thing that has been given. For the Spirit is a gift eternally, but a thing that has been given in time. For if a lord also is not so called unless when he begins to have a slave, that appellation likewise is relative and in time to God; for the creature is not from all eternity, of which He is the Lord. How then shall we make it good that relative terms themselves are not accidental, since nothing happens accidentally to God in time, because He is incapable of change, as we have argued in the beginning of this discussion? Behold! to be the Lord, is not eternal to God; otherwise we should be compelled to say that the creature also is from eternity, since He would not be a lord from all eternity unless the creature also was a servant from all eternity. But as he cannot be a slave who has not a lord, neither can he be a lord who has not a slave. And if there be any one who says that God, indeed, is alone eternal, and that times are
Father and Son are one God, and one Creator, and one Lord relatively to the creature, so are they one Beginning relatively to the Holy Spirit. But the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one Beginning in respect to the creature, as also one Creator and one God.°®
CHAP. I5.—-WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT WAS A
GIFT BEFORE AS WELL AS AFTER HE WAS GIVEN.
16. But it is asked further, whether, as the
3.1,Cor.tivs.7,
TPs, iii. 8. 2 Matt. vi. 11. 4 Luke i. 17. 5 Num. xi. 17. 6 [The term ' beginning"' ( principium), when referring to the relation of the Trinity, or of any person of the Trinity, to the creature, denotes creative energy, whereby a new substance is originated from nothing. This is the reference in chapter 13. But when the term refers to the relations of the persons of the Trinity to each other, it denotes only a modifying energy, whereby an existing uncreated substance is communicated by generation and spiration. Thisis the reference in chapter 14.
When it is said that the Father is the '* beginning "' of the Son, and the Father and Son are the "' beginning "' of the Spirit, it is not meant that the substance of the Son is created ex mzhzlo by the Father, and the substance of the Spirit is created by the Fatherand Son, but only that the Son by eternal generation receives from the Father the one uncreated and undivided substance of the Godhead, and the Spirit by eternal spiration receives the same numerical substance from the Father and Son. 'The term " beginning'' relates not to the essence, but to the personal peculiarity. Sonship originates in fatherhood; but deity is unoriginated. The Son as the second person '' begins'' from the Father, because the Father communicates the essence to him. His sonship, not his deity or godhood, '' begins'' from the Father. And the same holds true of the term ' beginning" as applied to the Holy Spirit. The "' procession"' of the Holy Spirit 't begins'"' by spiration from the Father and Son, but not his deity or godhood.—W. G. T. S.]
96 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN. [Book V.
ceases to be so spoken of, does any change take place in that nature or form of it, whereby it is money; how much more easily ought we to admit, concerning that unchangeable substance of God, that something may be so predicated relatively in respect to the creature, that although it begin to be so predicated in time, yet nothing shall be understood to have happened to the substance itself of God, but only to that creature in respect to which it is predicated? '' Lord,'' it is said, ''Thou hast been made our refuge.''? God, therefore, is said to be our refuge relatively, for He is referred to us, and He then becomes our refuge when we flee to Him; pray does anything come to pass then in His nature, which, before we fled to Him, was not? In us therefore some change does take place; for we were worse before we fled to Him, and we become better by fleeing to Him: but in Him there is no change. So also He begins to be our Father, when we are regenerated through His grace, since He gave us power to become the sons of God.3 Our substance therefore is changed for the better, when we become His sons; and He at the same time begins to be our Father, but without any change of His own _ substance. Therefore that which begins to be spoken of God in time, and which was not spoken of Him before, is manifestly spoken of Him relatively; yet not according to any accident of God, so that anything should have happened to Him, but clearly according to some accident of that, in respect to which God begins to be called something relatively. When a righteous man begins to be a friend of God, he himself is changed; but far be it from us to say, that God loves any one in time with as it were a new love, which was not in Him before, with whom things gone by have not passed away and things future have been already done. Therefore He loved all His saints before the foundation of the world, as He predestinated them; but when they are converted and find Him, then they are said to begin to be loved by Him, that what is said may be said in that way in which it can be comprehended by human affections. So also, when He is said to be wroth with the unrighteous, and gentle with the good, they are changed, not He: just as the light is 'troublesome to weak eyes, pleasant to those not eternal on account of their variety and changeableness, but that times nevertheless did not begin to be in time (for there was no time before times began, and therefore it did not happen to God in time that He should be Lord, since He was Lord of the very times themselves, which assuredly did not begin in time): what will he reply respecting man, who was made in time, and of whom assuredly He was not the Lord before he was of whom He was to be Lord? Certainly to be the Lord of man happened to God in time. And that all dispute may seem to be taken away, certainly to be your Lord, or mine, who have only lately begun to be, happened to God intime. Or if this, too, seems uncertain on account of the obscure question respecting the soul, what is to be said of His being the Lord of the people of Israel? since, although the nature of the soul already existed, which that people had (a matter into which we do not now inquire), yet that people existed not as yet, and the time is apparent when it began to exist. Lastly, that He should be Lord of this or that tree, or of this or that corn crop, which only lately began to be, happened in time; since, although the matter itself already existed, yet it is one thing to be Lord of the matter (materz@), another to be Lord of the already created natute (zature).* For man, too, is lord of the wood at one time, and at another he is lord of the chest, although fabricated of that same wood; which he certainly was not at the time when he was already the lord of the wood. How then shall we make it good that nothing is said of God according to accident, except because nothing happens to His nature by which He may be changed, so that those things are relative accidents which happen in connection with some change of the things of which they are spoken. As a friend is so called relatively: for he does not begin to be one, unless when he has begun to love; therefore some change of will takes place, in order that he may be called a friend. And money, when it is called a price, is spoken of relatively, and yet it was not changed when it began to be a price; nor, again, when it is called a pledge, or any other thing of the kind. If, therefore, money can so often be spoken of relatively with no change of itself, so that neither when it begins, nor when it that are strong; namely, by their change, not its own.
1 ('*Matter"' denotes the material as created ex nzh7lo; ''nature'' the material as formed into individuals. In thisreference, Augustin speaks of ''the nature of the soul" of the people of Israel as existing while ''as yet that people existed not' individually— having in mind their race-existence in Adam.—W. G. I. S.
2 Ps, xc, 1. 3 John i. 12.