Chapter IV
On Freedom of Choice
Chapter IV How Satan and Adam have the abiHty to keep an uprightness which is no longer theirs.
T. The fourth thing we mentioned above [i.e., 3b] is called a "power" improperly. For we say that the removal of a thing which impedes our sight will give us "the power to see" only because it can obstruct our seeing, not because it can aid our sight.
And, with respect to seeing light itself, we enumerate not four, but only three terms; for in this case, the thing to be seen
[i.e., 2] and the thing which aids our sight [i.e., 3a] are one and the same. Doesn't everyone know this?
S. Certainly no one is ignorant of it.
Finally, even if we were not in the presence of an object which could be seen, and if we were placed in darkness and had our eyes closed or covered, we would still have the ability
( as far as we ourselves are concerned) to see any visible thing. So I ask, what prevents our also having the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake—even in the absence of this uprightness— as long as we have the reason by which to recognize it and the toill by which to hold it fast? For the above-mentioned freedom of choice is constituted by this reason and this will.
S. Your arguments have convinced me that the ability to keep uprightness of will always belongs to a rational nature; and I agree that this ability was free in the choice of the first man and the first angels, whose uprightness of will could not be removed against their will.
Chapter V That no temptation compels one to sin against his will.
S. But in what way is the choice of the human will free by means of this ability, since oftentimes a man who has an upright will deserts uprightness by the pressure of temptation, and so against his will?
Truth, Freedom, and Evil T. No one deserts uprightness except by willing to desert it.
If "against one's will" means "unwillingly," then no one deserts uprightness against his will. A man can be bound against his will because he can be bound unwillingly; a man can be tortured against his will because he can be tortured unwillingly; a man can be killed against his will because he can be killed unwillingly.
But a man cannot will against his will because he cannot will unwillingly to will. For everyone who wills, wills willingly.
S. Why, then, do we sometimes say that a man who lies in order not to be killed lies against his will, if, as you say, he can only do this willingly? For if he lies against his will, he wills to lie against his will. And whoever wills to lie against his will, unwillingly wills to lie.
T. Perhaps he is said to lie against his will because he so much wills the truth that he lies only to save his life. For he wills a lie for the sake of his life and not for the sake of the lie itself— since he wills the truth. In this case, he lies both willingly and unwillingly. For there is one will by which we will something for its own sake, as when we will health for its own sake; and there is another will by which we will a thing for the sake of something else, as when we will to drink absinthe for the sake of health. Therefore, perhaps it can be said that a man lies both against his will and not against his will, in accordance with these two wills. ^ For insofar as a man wills the truth and not a lie, we say that he lies against his will; yet this statement would not contradict my assertion that no one deserts truth and uprightness of will against his will. For a man, by means of lying, wills to desert truth and uprightness in order to save his life; and in accordance with this will, by which he wills a lie for the sake of his life and not for its own sake, he deserts truth and uprightness willingly and not against his will. This is the will we are now discussing. To be sure, he does tell this lie "unwillingly" since, against his will, he is faced with the choice of either lying or being killed; i.e., against his will he finds himself in such straits that one or the other alternative must necessarily occur.
But although it is necessary that he "either lie or be killed,"
3 On the distinction between these two wills, see V.
Bourke, "Human Tendencies, Will and Freedom,"
Actes du premier congres interrmtional de philosophic medievale: L'homme et son destin
( Louvain/Paris, 1960).
On Freedom of Choice
neither one of these is necessary: for (1) it is not necessary that he be killed, since he can avoid being killed if he lies; and (2) it is not necessary that he lie, since he can avoid lying if he lets himself be killed. Neither one of these is necessarily determined, because either option is in his power. And so he may be said "either to lie or to be killed against his will," but it doesn't follow from this that he either "Hes against his will" or "is killed against his will."
We commonly hear another reason explaining why it can be said that a man does something by necessity, or against his will, or unwillingly, even though he is doing what he wants to do.
For whenever we would be able to do something only with diflBculty and therefore don't do it, we say that we are not able to do it, or we say that we are abandoning it out of necessity or against our will. And whenever we are able to stop doing something only with difficulty and so continue to do it, we often say that we are doing it against our will, or unwillingly, or out of necessity. From this point of view, a man who lies in order not to die is said to lie by necessity or against his will, or unwillingly
—because he cannot avoid a lie except on the pain, or difficulty, of death. Moreover, just as it is improper to say that a man who lies to save his life lies against his will (since he lies willingly), so it is even improper to say that a man wills to lie against his will, since he only wills this willingly. For just as he wills to lie when he Hes, so he wills to will when he wills to lie.
I can't disagree with anything you say.
T. So why isn't this will free—since another power cannot bring it into subjection without the will's own consent?
But wouldn't this definition of freedom also apply to the will of a horse? For the will of a horse is willingly subject to appetities of the flesh; hence it is a free will.'*
T. No, this isn't a similar case. For the will of a horse doesn't subject itself to the appetite of the flesh, but always serves it by necessity since it is naturally subjected to it. But in the case of a man, as long as he has an upright will, he neither serves what he ought not nor is he subjected to it; and he is not turned away from his uprightness by any alien force, unless he willingly * Cf. DV, Ch.
12. "Shall we say, then, that a horse is just when he wills to eat, because he willingly does what he ought?"
Truth, Freedom, and Evil consents to do what he should not. A man's consent is clearly seen to come from himself, and not from necessity or natm-e
( as in the case of a horse ) S. You have satisfied me with your example about the will of a horse; so let's return to what we were talking about.
T. Will you deny that a thing is free from another if it cannot be forced or restrained by that other thing except as it wills to be?
S. I don't see how I can deny this.
Tell me, then, how an upright will overcomes and how it is overcome.
S. To overcome is for it to will uprightness constantly; and to be overcome is for it to will what it ought not.
T. Therefore, temptation can drive an upright will from uprightness, or can compel it to do what it should not, only if that will itself consents, so that it is not willing what is right, but willing what it should not will.
I don't see anything wrong with this argument.
T. Can anyone deny that his will is free to keep uprightness, and free from both temptation and sin, if no temptation can turn his will, against his will, from uprightness to sin, i.e., to willing what it ought not? If the will is free to this extent, then when it is overcome, it is by no other power than its own.
S. What you have said proves this.
T. Don't you see it follows from these considerations that no temptation can conquer an upright will? For if temptation can conquer the will, it has the power to conquer it, and conquers the will by its own power. But temptation cannot do this because the will can be overcome only by its own power. Therefore, temptation is not at all able to overcome an upright will; and when we say that it can, we are speaking improperly. For it makes sense to say only that the will is able to subject itself to temptation. Notice that in the converse case, we aflSrm the opposite. For example, when a weak man can be overcome by a strong man, we don't say that the weak man is able to be overcome by his own power; rather we say that he is able to be overcome by the power of another. This is the case since it only makes sense to say that a strong man has the power to overcome a weak man.
On Freedom of Choice
Chapter VI How our will has power against temptations although it appears to be powerless against them.
S. You make our will superior to all attacks and do not grant that any temptation may master it, so that I am unable to rebut your position.
Nevertheless, I cannot refrain from mentioning that particular powerlessness of the will which we usually experience when we are overcome by the force of "irresistible" temptation.
Therefore, unless you can show that the power of the will, which you are establishing, is consistent with this powerlessness of the will which we all feel, my mind cannot be at rest.
T. What do you think this powerlessness of the will is?
It is the wilFs not being able constantly to cling to uprightness.
If because of this powerlessness, the will does not cling to uprightness, then it is turned away from it by means of an alien force.
I'll have to admit as much.
T. What is this force?
S. The force of temptation.
T. This force does not turn the will from uprightness unless the will wants what the temptation suggests.
S. That's right. But the temptation, by its own force, compels the will to want what it is suggesting.
T. How does temptation compel the will to want?
( 1 ) Does it compel the will conditionally, so that the will can keep from wanting only with the consequence of suffering injury?
(2) Or does it compel the will unconditionally, so that the will can in no way keep from wanting?
S. Well, I'm prepared to admit that at any given time we may be so sorely pressed by temptations that only with diflBculty can we keep from wanting what they suggest; but I'm not really prepared to say that temptations sometimes so oppress us that we are utterly unable to resist willing what they urge.
I agree with you. For if a man wills to lie in order to save himself from physical death, who will say that it is impossible for him to will not to lie so that he might avoid eternal death and