Chapter XIII
Concerning Truth
Chapter XIII That the truth in all things is one truth.
T. Since we are talking about rightness perceptible to the mind alone, let's go back to that rightness, or truth
(these are two names for the same thing), which is the genus of justice. And let's ask whether there is one truth in all the many things in which we say there is truth, or whether there are as many truths as there are things in which there is truth.
S. rd very much like to know the answer to this.
It's evident that regardless of what things truth is in, truth is nothing other than rightness.
I don't doubt this.
T. Then, if there were as many truths as there are things, there would also be many rightnesses.
S. This is equally certain.
T. And if there had to be as many different rightnesses as there are different kinds of things, then these rightnesses would exist in accordance with these various things; and just as the things in which there is rightness vary, so too there would have to be a variet)^ of rightnesses.
S. Show me what I may understand to hold true in all cases by explaining an example of rightness in one case.
I mean that if the rightness which is in signification [i.e., correctness] were different from the rightness which is in the will
[i.e., uprightness] simply because the former rightness is in the signification and the latter in the will, then the former rightness would owe its existence to signification and would be changed in accordance with it.
S. But isn't this the case? For when a sign signifies the existence of what does exist or the non-existence of what does not exist, then its signification is correct, and it is evident that the correctness exists without which the signification could not be correct. But if a sign signifies the existence of what does not exist, or the non-existence of what does exist, or if it signifies nothing at all, then there will be no correctness of signification, since that correctness could only be in the signification itself. ^^ Hence, this 15 At this point Anselm returns to the discussion of the second truth of signification, which he promised to do at the end of Ch. 2.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil correctness has its existence through the signification and changes with it—just as color has its existence or non-existence through a material object. For as long as a material object exists it is necessary that its color exist, but when a material object perishes, it is impossible for its color to remain.
T. Your analogy is faulty, for correctness belongs to signification in a different way from color s belonging to a material object.
S. Show me the difference.
If no one wanted to signify by means of a given sign what that sign itself was supposed to signify, then would that sign still have any signification?
S. No.
T. But wouldn't that sign still be correct, so that it is able to signify what it ought to signify?
Yes, it would; and correctness would still put a demand on it even when the sign was not being used.
T. Then even when a sign's accidental signification does not exist, the correctness by which that sign is correct and by which it is required to signify as it ought, does not perish. ^^ S.
If this correctness, or rightness, had perished, then the sign would not be correct and correctness would place no demand upon it.
T. When a sign signifies as it ought to signify, then don't you think that its signification is correct because of, and in accordance with, this very correctness?
I can't think any differently. For if its signification were correct by virtue of some other correctness than the correctness by which it signifies as it ought to, then should this correctness, by which it signifies as it ought to, perish, the signification would still be correct by virtue of that other correctness. But no signification is correct which does not signify as it is correct to signify [i.e., as it ought to signify], or which does not signify as correctness demands. r. So no signification is correct by virtue of any other correctness than that which still remains after its accidental signification has perished.
^^ "accidental" is supplied in order to distinguish between the two truths of signification: one which a proposition always has, and one which a proposition does not always have.
Concerning Truth 1 19 S. Clear enough.
T. Therefore, don't you see that correctness is in a signification not because that correctness began to be when the sign first signified that what existed did exist, or what didn't exist did not exist, but because that signification accords with a correctness which never perishes? So correctness is not absent from a signification because correctness perishes when a sign does not signify as it ought or when there is no accidental signification; but correctness is absent from the signification only if the signification lacks this correctness which never perishes. Don't you see this?
I can't help seeing it.
T. Then the correctness by which a signification is correct neither exists from nor changes with the signification, regardless of how the signification changes.
S. Nothing is more clear to me.
T. Can you now show that correctness belongs to a signification in the same way that color belongs to a material object?
I can rather show that the two cases are quite unlike.
I think you now know what must be thought about the will and its rightness, and about the other things which ought to have rightness.
I see that you have proven by your argument that their rightness always remains, no matter how they may change.
T. So what conclusion do you think follows? Are these many rightnesses of things as diflFerent as the things themselves, or is one and the same rightness in them all?
I have conceded above that if there were as many rightnesses as there are many things in which rightness is considered to be, then it would be necessary for these many rightnesses to vary with the number and kinds of things in which they exist.
But you have shown that this never happens. Therefore, the mere fact that there are many things in which there is rightness does not mean that there is a plurality of rightnesses.
T. Do you have any other reason for supposing that there are many rightnesses except that there is a plurality of things in which there is rightness?
S. Well, I see that the argument from the plurality of things is faulty, and I think that a better one than that can't be found.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil T. So Tightness is one and the same in all things.
I'll have to agree.
T. And what's more: if it is only when things are what they ought to be that righ-tness is in things that ought to have it, and if their being what they ought to be is the only reason for their being right, then it is evident that there is only one rightness for all these things.
I can't deny it.
T. So then, truth is one in all these things.
It's also impossible to deny this. Nevertheless, if truth is not something different in each thing, show me why we speak of "the truth of this or that thing" just as if we were distinguishing different truths.
For many persons will be quite reluctant to concede that there is no difference between the truth of the will and what we call the truth of action, or the truth of something else.
T. We speak improperly when we speak of "the truth of this or that thing." For truth has its own being and is not really in or from or on account of the things in which it is said to be. But when things are in accordance with that truth which is always present when they are as they ought to be, then we say "the truth of this thing" or "the truth of that thing." (For example, we speak of "the truth of the will" or "the truth of an action.") In the same way, we speak of "the time of this thing" or "the time of that thing," although there is one and the same time for all things that are in time at the same time. Time would be the same even if this thing or that thing did not exist; for we do not say "the time of this" or "the time of that" because time is in things, but because things are in time. Now time, when considered in itself, is not called the time of any particular thing; but when we consider things which are in time, we say "the time of this thing*' or "the time of that thing." So too, Supreme Truth, subsisting in and of itself, is not the truth of any particular thing; but when some thing is in accordance with Supreme Truth, then we speak of the truth, or rightness, of that thing.
On Vtzzdotn of Choice (De Libertate Arbitrii) CHAPTERS I.
That the ability to sin does not belong to freedom of choice.
II.
That, nevertheless, Satan and Adam sinned through this ability to sin and tlirough free choice; and although they were able to serve sin, sin could not master them.
III.
How, after they had made themselves servants of sin, Satan and Adam still had free choice; and what free choice is.
IV.
How Satan and Adam have the ability to keep an uprightness which is no longer theirs.
That no temptation compels one to sin against his will.
VI.
How our will is the power against temptations although it appears to be powerless against them.
VII.
How the will is stronger than temptation, even when it is overcome by temptation.
VIII.
That even God is not able to remove the uprightness of will.
IX.
That nothing is more free than an upright will.
In what sense someone who sins is a servant of sin; and that it is more miraculous when God gives uprightness back to one who has deserted it than when He gives back life to the dead.
XL That servitude to sin does not destroy freedom of choice.
XII.
Why we would rather say "A man is free even when he does not have uprightness, because it could not be taken away from him if he had it" than say "A man is a servant even when he has uprightness, because he could not recover it by his own power if he did not have it."
Truth, Freedom, and Evil XIII.
That "the abihty to keep uprightness of will for its own sake" is the complete definition of freedom of choice.
XIV.
The distinctions appropriate to freedom.
Chapter I That the ability to sin does not belong to freedom of choice.
Student. Since free choice seems to be opposed to the grace, predestination, and foreknowledge of God, I desire to know what freedom of choice is, and whether we always have it. For if freedom of choice consists in being able both to sin and not to sin
( as some men say ) and if we always have free choice, how is it that we sometimes need grace? But if we do not always have free choice, why is sin imputed to us since we sin without a free choice?
Teacher.
I don't think that freedom of choice is the ability either to sin or not to sin. Indeed, if this were its definition, then neither God nor the angels who are not able to sin would have free choice. But to say that they have no free choice is blasphemous.
S. What if we were to say that the free choice of God and of the good angels is different from ours?
T. Although the free choice of men differs from that of God and the good angels, nevertheless the definition of this freedom ought to be the same in both cases in accordance with the name
"freedom," which is used in both. For example, although animals differ from one another either accidentally or essentially, the definition is the same for all animals insofar as it defines animal.^ For this reason, we should give a definition of "free choice" which is neither too broad nor too narrow. Now, since God and the good angels are unable to sin by free choice, the "ability to sin" does not belong to the definition of free choice. Therefore, neither freedom nor a part of freedom consists in having the ability to sin. Pay attention to what I'm going to say in order that you may understand this clearly.
S. I'm here to learn.
1 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, I'lO.