Chapter VIII
Concerning Truth
Yes, all things are what they ought to be.
T. But whatever is what it ought to be, rightly is.
It couldn't be otherwise.
T. Therefore, everything which exists, exists rightly.
S. Nothing follows more logically.
T. Now, if truth and rightness are in the essence of things because they are what they are in the Supreme Truth, then it is certain that the truth of things is their rightness.
S. No conclusion is clearer.
Chapter VIII On the various meanings of "ought'' and "ought not," "can" and "cannot."
S. But suppose we consider the facts of the matter. How can we say that whatever exists ought to exist, since there are many evil occurrences which certainly ought not exist?
T. But why should it be strange to think that the same thing ought both to exist and not to exist?
S. How can this be?
I know you believe that nothing at all exists except by God's causing it or by His permitting it.
S. I'm certain of that.
T. Would you dare suggest that God might unwisely cause or permit something to exist? Or would you dare suggest that His doing so might not be good?
I would say, rather, that God's doing or permitting something is always wise and good.
T. Would you say that what such a good and wise God causes or permits to exist should not exist?
S. What thinking person would dare think this?
T. Then whether God causes a thing to exist, or whether He permits it to exist, it ought to exist.
Yes, this seems clear.
T. Well now, do you think that the effect of an evil will ought to exist?
S. This is the same as asking whether an evil deed ought to exist; and no one with any sense would concede this.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil T.
Nonetheless, God permits some men to do the evil which they evilly desire.
S. Would that He allowed it less often!
T. Then here is something which both should and should not be. It ought to be, since it is permitted by the wisdom and goodness of God, without whose permission it could not have happened; yet it ought not be, insofar as it is conceived by one whose will is evil. In this way, for example, the Lord Jesus ought not to have suffered death, because he alone among men was innocent, and no one ought to have inflicted death upon him.
Yet, in another sense, he ought to have suffered death, because he wisely and graciously and usefully willed to suffer it. So we see that opposite terms may be predicated of the same subject as long as these terms are applied in different respects and for different reasons. This is frequently the case when the subject is an action. For example, consider a "beating" (percussio)}^ Now, a beating refers both to one who gives it and to one who gets it; i.e., both to an agent and to a patient. For this reason, a beating may be called both an action and a passion, though in different respects. Now, if we analyze the Latin word percussio (i.e., beating), we see that its grammatical form does not fully admit these opposites. For this word is built on the stem of the past participle of percutere; and therefore its form is passive, even though we can use it with an active signification. However, although we can use the word with this active signification, it seems, because of its passive stem, to refer more to the patient
10 Because the passage which follows depends upon distinctions present only in Latin, it has been rendered paraphrastically. The Latin: "Quamvis secundum ipsiim nomen actio vel percussio et quae similiter dicta a passivis in activa significatione dicuntur, magis videantur esse patientis quam agentis. Quippe secundum id quod agit, magis proprie videtur dici agentia vel percutientia; et secundum id quod patitur, actio et percussio. Nam agentia et percutientia ab agente et percutiente dicitur, sicut providentia a providente et continentia a continente, quae scilicet agens et percutiens, providens et continens activa sunt; actio vero et percussio ab acto et percusso quae passiva sunt derivantur. Sed quoniam—ut in uno dicam quod in ceteris intelligas— , sicut percutiens non est sine percusso nee percussus absque percutiente, ita percutientia et percussio sine invicem esse nequeunt, immo una et eadem res est diversis nominibus secundum diversas partes significata: idcirco percussio et percutientis et percussi esse dicitur." S-187 (I).
Concerning Truth
who gets a beating than to the agent who gives it.
If our grammar corresponded to the actual character of a beating, we would have not only the word percussio, (which seems to refer more to the patient who gets a beating), but we would also have a word for beating which was built on the active stem of the verb percutere and which would refer especially to the agent who gives it. Then, we would call the giving of a beating a percutientia and the receiving of a beating a percussio, and we would describe that one beating by two different words which signified its different aspects. But, of course, we don't use such a word as percutientia ordinarily. We simply understand that the word percussio signifies both an action and a passion, and we understand that it must signify both, because there can be no givinga-beating without getting-a-beating, and vice versa.
Therefore, a beating is said to be both an action and a passion—an action with respect to the one who gives it, and a passion with respect to the one who gets it.
I will give only this one example, but the same thing holds true for many other words.
Now, actions may be judged oppositely with respect to an agent and a patient, or they may be judged similarly.
(1) For when the one who gives a beating does so rightfully and the one who gets that beating does so rightfully, then the beating is judged fully right, because there ought to be a beating in both respects. For example, this holds true when someone who does wrong is punished by someone who should punish him.
(2) In an opposite case, when someone who ought not to get a beating is beaten by someone who ought not to give a beating, then that beating is judged to be fully wrong, because there ought to be a beating in neither respect. For example, this holds true when a just man is beaten by an unjust man. (3) But when someone who does wrong is beaten by someone who shouldn't beat him, then the beating is judged to be both right and wrong, for the one man ought to get a beating, but the other man ought not to give it.
(4) But if we consider any beating from the point of view of divine judgment, which is both wise and good, and if we ask whether it ought not to have happened at all, or ought not to have happened either with respect to the agent or with respect to the patient, then who will dare to assert that what is permitted by such wisdom and goodness ought not to have happened?
Truth, Freedom, and Evil S. Let him say it who dares. I'm not that bold.
T. Now, let's consider the problem from the point of view of the nature of things, and let's take as our example the driving of iron nails into the body of the Lord. Will you say that His frail flesh ought not to have been penetrable by nature, or that his body ought not to have felt pain when pierced by sharp iron?^^ S.
If it weren't this way, then it would have been against nature.
T. So it is possible that with respect to nature, there ought to be either an action or a passion which, with respect either to the agent or to the patient of that action, ought not to be—since either the agent ought not to do it or the patient ought not to suffer it.
I can't deny any of this.
T. So you see that it very often is the case that the same action both ought and ought not to happen, though in different respects.
S. You present this so clearly that I can't help seeing it.
T. Now there's one last point that I want you to learn; namely, that we sometimes say "ought" and "ought not" improperly. For example, I use "ought" improperly if I say that I ought to be loved by you. For if I truly ought, then I have an obligation to fulfill, and so I wouldn't fulfill my obligation if I were not loved by you.
It follows.
T. But if I ought to be loved by you, then love should not be demanded from me, but from you.
I must agree.
T. So when I say that I ought to be loved by you, it does not mean that I have some obligation, but that you ought to love me.
Likewise, if I say that I ought not to be loved by you, then the only thing I mean is that you ought not to love me.
This same mode of speaking also occurs in conjunction with notions of ability and inability. For instance, we say, "Hector could be overpowered by Achilles" or "Achilles could not be overpowered by Hector." But there is no ability in Hector, who is conquered, but only in Achilles, who conquers him. And there
11 I.e., it is the nature of a human body to be capable of being pierced and to feel pain when pierced.
Concerning Truth
is no inability in Achilles, who cannot be overpowered, but only in Hector, who cannot overpower him.
S. What you say is both useful and pleasing.
That's right.
Chapter IX That every action signifies what is either true or false.
Let's return to the topic of the truth of signification.
I previously took up this topic to lead you to the less familiar by way of the more famihar; for everyone speaks about the truth of signification, but few consider the truth which is in the essence of things.
S. Your approach has helped me to understand the problem.
T. Then let's see how extensive the truth of signification is.
For there is not only a true or false signification in those things which we ordinarily call "signs," but also in the other things we have discussed up to this point [e.g., actions]. Now since a thing ought to be done by someone only because that person ought to do it, then by the very fact that someone does something, he signifies and declares that he ought to do it. And if he does a thing which he really ought to do, then he tells the truth; and if he does what he really ought not to do, then he lies.
S. Well, I seem to understand what you mean; but show me more clearly, since I've never heard these views before.
T. Suppose you were in a place where you knew there were edible herbs and poisonous ones, but you didn't know how to tell them apart; suppose too, that another person were with you, whose ability to discriminate between the two you trusted. Now suppose that you asked him which ones were edible and which were poisonous, and he pointed to one kind, but then, himself, proceeded to eat the other kind. Which would you believe the more : his word or his deed?
S. His deed more than his word.
T. So then, by his action he would be telling you more about which herbs were edible than he would by his word.
Yes, that's right.
T. Now, if you didn't know whether or not lying were wrong
Truth, Freedom, and Evil and if someone lied in your presence, then even though he were to say to you that he ought not to he, his very act of lying would outweigh this.
Similarly, if someone thought or willed something, and if you didn't know whether he ought to will or think it, then if you could see his will and thought, he would signify to you by this very act that he ought to will and think this thing. Now, if this person really ought to be willing and thinking this, then by this willing and thinking he would be telling the truth; and if he really ought not be willing and thinking this, then he would be lying. There is also a true and a false signification in the existence of things, since by the very fact that they exist, they declare that they ought to exist.
S. I now see clearly what I had not noticed before.
Let's go on to the remaining topics.
S. Lead the way.
I'll follow.
Chapter X On the Supreme Truth.
T. You won tdeny that the Supreme Truth is Tightness, will you?
S. No. I admit it couldn't be anything else.
T. Although all the different kinds of Tightness which we mentioned above are what they are because the things they are in either are as they ought to be or else do what they ought to do, nevertheless the Supreme Truth is not Tightness because it is under any obligation. All other things are obligated to it, and it is obligated to nothing else. So it has no other reason for being what it is except that it is.
I understand.
T. Do you also see how this Rightness is the cause of all other truths and Tightnesses, but that nothing is the cause of it?
Yes, I do. And I notice among these other truths that some are only effects, but some are both causes and effects. For example, although the truth which is in the existence of things is the effect of the Supreme Truth, this same truth is the cause of the truth which is in a thought and which is in a proposition; but the truth which is in a thought and the truth which is in a
Concerning Truth
proposition are not themselves causes of any other truth.
That's a keen observation. On the basis of it, you can understand how in the Monologion I proved by means of the truth of a proposition that the Supreme Truth has neither beginning nor end. For when I asked, "When was it ever not true that something was going to exist?" I didn't mean to suggest that the proposition which asserted that something was going to exist was itself without a beginning; nor was I interested in suggesting that the truth of that proposition was God.
I meant only to say that, given the proposition, we could never conceive of a time when truth was not in it; and from the fact that we cannot conceive of a time when the proposition is not true, we see that that other truth which is the first cause of the proposition's truth, had no beginning.
Indeed, the truth of the proposition could not always be unless its cause always were. For the proposition which says that something is going to exist, is not true unless something is really going to exist. And something is not going to exist unless it is in the Supreme Truth. We ought to understand the other proposition, which says that something has existed in the past, in the same way. For since every mind must agree that truth will always be in this proposition (given the proposition), then it follows that we cannot conceive of an end to the truth which is the supreme cause of this proposition's truth. For we speak truly when we say "Something has existed in the past," because, in fact, something has existed in the past, and something was in the past, because it is in the Supreme Truth. Therefore, if it could never have been false that something was going to exist and if it could never be false that something has existed in the past, then it is impossible that the Supreme Truth could have had a beginning or could ever have an end.
I don't see any possible objections to this argument.
Chapter XI On the definition of truth.
Let's return to the investigation of truth which we began.
All that we were just talking about is pertinent to investi-