Chapter III
On Freedom of Choice
But what seems to you to follow—namely, that if they were able to be servants of sin, then sin was able to master them so that neither they nor their choice was free—is not right. For example, consider someone who, although able to serve by his own ability, has the ability not to serve and is not being compelled to serve by anyone else: as long as such a person doesn't use his abihty for serving, but uses the ability he has for not serving, nothing is able to master him and force him to serve. For example, even if a free rich man were able to make himself the servant of a poor man, he is properly described as free as long as he doesn't do this; and the poor man is not said to be able to be his master. (Or if it is said that the poor man can master the rich man, it is said improperly—because ruling is not in his power but in the rich man's power. ) From this example we see that nothing prevents either Satan or Adam from having had free choice and from having been free before they sinned.
Chapter III How, after they had made themselves servants of sin, Satan and Adam still had free choice; and what free choice is.
S. You have convinced me that, before Satan and Adam had sinned, certainly nothing prevented their choice being free. But after they had made themselves servants of sin, how could they have kept free choice?
T. Although they yielded themselves to sin, they could not abolish in themselves their natural freedom of choice. However, they could so afiFect their state that they were not able to use that freedom except by a different grace from that which they had before their fall.
I believe what you are saying, but I would like to understand it.
T. Let us first examine what kind of freedom of choice they had before they sinned, since it it obvious that they had free choice then.
I am eager to.
T. For what purpose does it seem to you that they had free-
Truth, Freedom, and Evil dom of choice? Was it in order to attain what they willed, or was it in order to will what they ought to will and what was advantageous for them to will?
S. To will what they ought to will and what was advantageous for them to will.
T. Therefore, they had freedom of choice for the sake of having uprightness of will. And as long as they willed what they ought to have willed, they had uprightness of will.
That's right.
T. But when we say that they had freedom in order to have uprightness of will, there still remains some uncertainty unless we add something else. So let me ask why they had this freedom for uprightness of will:
(1) Was it for the purpose of acquiring uprightness, without anyone's giving it, when they didn't yet have it?
(2) Or was it for receiving what they didn't yet have, if it were given to them? (3) Or was it for deserting what they had received and for later reclaiming, by their own means, what they had deserted?
(4) Or was it for constantly keeping what they originally had received?
( 1 ) I don't think that they had freedom for the purpose of acquiring uprightness without anyone's giving it, because they were unable to have anything except by having received it.
(2) And we ought not to say that they had freedom for the purpose of receiving, from a giver, the uprightness which they didn't have, because we have to believe that they were created with upright wills—although we must not deny that they had freedom for receiving this same uprightness again, should they once desert it and were it returned to them by the one who originally gave it. We often see an evidence of this in men who are led back to justice from injustice by heavenly grace. r.
It is true, as you say, that Satan and Adam were able to receive back their lost uprightness if it were given to them. But we are not here asking about that freedom which someone would need only after he had deserted the truth; rather, we are here asking about that freedom which Satan and Adam possessed before they sinned—for they surely had free choice then.
S. Well then, I shall proceed to reply to what remains of your question.
(3) It is not true that they had freedom in order to desert uprightness, for to desert uprightness of will is to sin, and
On Freedom of Choice
you have shown that the abihty to sin is neither itself freedom nor a part of freedom. Therefore, they did not receive freedom in order to reclaim, by their own means, the uprightness which they had deserted, since this uprightness was given to the end that it never be deserted. For the power of reclaiming what one has deserted would itself beget a negligence toward keeping what one originally had.
(4) But the fourth alternative holds true, namely, that freedom of choice was given to rational nature in order to keep that uprightness of will which it had originally received.
T. You have given a good reply to my questions. But now we must examine the reason why a rational nature was under obligation to keep that uprightness: was it for the sake of the uprightness itself or was it for the sake of something else?
If freedom had not been given to rational nature in order to keep uprightness of will for its own sake, then freedom would have been of no avail for justice, since it is evident that justice is uprightness of will kept for itself alone. But we believe that freedom of choice avails to justice; therefore, we must maintain incontrovertibly that the rational nature did not receive freedom except for keeping uprightness of will for its own sake.
T. And since all freedom is ability, freedom of choice is the ability to keep uprightness of will for itself alone.
It couldn't be anything else.
T. So it is now clear that free choice is nothing other than a choice which is able to keep uprightness of will for the sake of this uprightness itself.
S. This is certainly obvious, and as long as a rational nature has this uprightness it is able to keep it; but after it has deserted uprightness, how is it able to keep what it no longer has? For after the uprightness which is able to be kept is gone, then the definition of free choice can no longer be "a choice which is able to keep uprightness." For what is not in one's possession cannot be kept.
T. Even if uprightness of will were absent, the rational nature would still have what essentially belongs to it. For it strikes me that we have no ability which, if taken by itself alone, would suffice to any actual deed; nevertheless, when those things are absent without which our abilities cannot do the least thing, we
Truth, Freedom, and Evil are still said to have these abilities in us without any diminution.
In the same way, any instrument, taken by itself alone, does not suffice to do anything; nevertheless, even when those conditions necessary for its use are not present, we are still properly said to have the instrument for doing a certain kind of work. You often notice this fact. For example, no one who has sight is ever said to be unable to see a mountain.
If someone can't see a mountain, then he surely has no sight.
So, anyone who has sight has the ability and the instrument for seeing a mountain. But if there were no mountain around, and you said to someone "See the mountain," he would answer:
"I can't, because there is no mountain around; but if there were one, I could see it." Yet suppose there were a mountain, but no light; and suppose you said "See the mountain." This time he would reply to you, "I can't see it because there is no light; but if there were light, I could see it." Or suppose, in another case, that the man were to have sight, and that there were a mountain, and that light were present, but something obstructed his vision
—as if someone covered the man's eyes—then he would say, "I can't see the mountain." But if nothing obstructed his vision, then, without doubt, he could see the mountain.
S. Everyone knows all this.
T. So don't you understand that the abihty to see any given body is one power in the seeing, a second power in the thing to be seen, and a third power in something in between, which is neither in the seeing nor in the thing to be seen? And isn't this third power which is in something in between to be distinguished into (3a) a power which helps the sight, and (3b) something which doesn't hinder sight, i.e., something which could impede seeing but does not?
I see this clearly.
T. Therefore, these powers are four in number [i.e., 1, 2, 3a, 3b], and if ever any one of them is missing, the other three are not able to accomplish anything either singularly or collectively.
Nevertheless, in the absence of any of these, we don't deny either that a man who has sight is able to see (i.e., we don't deny that he has the instrument, or ability, for seeing ) , or that a visible object can be seen, or that light aids his sight.