Chapter V
Truth, Freedom, and Evil Chapter V On the truth of natural and non-natural actions.
T. We must no less believe that there is truth in actions, for the Lord says, "He who does evil hates the Hght" and "He who does the truth comes to the Hght." (John 3:20,21)
I see what you mean.
T. Then, tell me what truth is in regard to actions, if you can.
S. Unless I am mistaken, truth in actions must be sought by the same line of reasoning we used in earher cases.
That's right. Since to do evil and to do the truth are opposites—as the Lord declares when He says, "He who does evil hates the light" and "He who does the truth comes to the hght' doing the truth is the same thing as doing good. For doing good and doing evil are opposites. Therefore, if doing the truth and doing good have the same opposite term, namely, doing evil, then they are not different in their signification. But everyone maintains that whoever does what he is supposed to do does what is good and what is right, or correct. So it follows that to do what is right, or correct, is to do the truth. For it is evident that to do the truth is to do what is good, and to do what is good is to do what is right. Therefore, nothing is clearer than that the truth of an action is its rightness.
I see no way of refuting your reasoning.
T. Consider whether every action which does what it ought may properly be said to do the truth. For there are rational actions, such as giving alms, and there are non-rational actions, such as a fire's heating something. Now, would it be proper to say that the activity of fire is doing the truth?
S. Since fire has received its power for heating from God, from whom it has its existence,"^ then when it heats something, it does what it should. Therefore, I don't see why it would be improper to say that fire does the truth and what is right when it does what it should.
T. What you say seems right. Hence, we should note that the T"ab eo a quo."
Cf. S-183.4
(I);
S-186.30;
S-265.2.4;
S-260.15. The reference is obviously to God.
Cf. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, Bk, 2, Ch.
19: ab illo a quo sunt omnia bona, hoc est Deo.
Concerning Truth
rightness or truth of an action is sometimes necessary, and sometimes not. A fire does what is right and true by necessity when it heats; but a man does what is right and true, out of no necessity, when he does what is good. When the Lord says "He who does the truth comes to the Hght," He wishes us to understand the verb "to do" not only in its proper sense but in a broad sense, as including all other verbs. For He includes under this promise with regard to truth or Hght the man who suffers persecution for the sake of justice, and the man who is in the right place at the right time, and the man who is standing or sitting when he ought to be, and so on. (Matt. 5:10, etc.) No one calls such actions examples of not doing what is good. And when the Apostle says that each man will receive judgment in accordance with his deeds (II Cor. 5:10), we must understand this to include all the things we usually mean when we speak of doing good and doing evil.
S. Yes, in our ordinary way of speaking we call suffering and many other things "deeds," even though they do not involve "doing." So, unless I am wrong, we can also number among right deeds the upright willing, whose truth we previously discussed.
T. You're not mistaken. Whoever wills what he should is said to do what is right and good; and so he is included among those who do the truth. But since we are discussing truth by examining it in a variety of contexts, and since the Lord seems to be speaking especially of a truth in the will when He says that Satan "did not stand firm in the truth,"
I wanted to examine separately what truth in the will might be.
I think this was a good idea.
T. So it is evident that one truth of action is natural and another is not natural. And we can see that the truth of a proposition which cannot be separated from it (which we previously discussed) must be placed under the category of the natural.
For just as when fire heats, it does the truth because it has received the power to heat from God, from whom it has its existence; so also the proposition "It is day" does the truth when it signifies that it is day, whether it is day or not, since it is its nature to do this.
S. Now at last I see how truth can be in a sentence that is false.