Chapter IV
The Fall of Satan
will. For this reason, it is not the case that Satan didn't have, or didn't receive, a good persevering will because God did not give it; rather, God didn't give him a good persevering will because he deserted it by willing what he ought not; and by deserting it he didn't keep it.
I understand your point.
Chapter IV How Satan sinned and willed to be like God.
T. Do you doubt that Satan did not will to desert what he had because he was unwilling to keep it, but rather that he was unwilling to keep it because he willed to desert it?
I don't doubt that this could be the case, but you have not yet made me certain that it is. First of all, show me what Satan willed to have that he didn't have, so that he willed to desert what he did have—just as you have shown in the case of the miser. Then, if nothing can contradict it, I will agree that it is true.
T. You do not doubt that Satan sinned, since he could not be unjustly damned by a just God; but what you are asking is how he sinned. Is that right?
S. That's right.
If he had continually held to justice, he would never have sinned nor have been wretched.
S. We believe this.
T. No one holds to justice except by willing what he ought, and no one deserts it except by wilhng what he ought not.
S. No doubt.
T. Therefore, by willing something which he ought not to have willed at that time, he deserted justice and thereby sinned.
S. That follows, but I want to know what he willed.
T. Well, he was supposed to will what he already had in his possession.
Yes, he was supposed to will what he had received from God, and he did not sin by willing that.
T. Therefore, he willed something which he did not already
Truth, Freedom, and Evil have and was not supposed to will at that time—just as Eve willed to be **like a god" before God willed it for her.^ S.
I cannot deny that this follows.
T. But Satan was able to will nothing except what was just or what was beneficial (commodum).^ Happiness, which every rational nature desires, consists in these beneficial things.
S. We can recognize this in ourselves, for we will nothing unless we think it is either just or beneficial.
T. Satan was not able to sin by willing justice.
That's true.
Therefore, he sinned by willing something beneficial, which he neither possessed nor was supposed to will at that time, even though it was able to increase his happiness.
S. This is clear, since there's no other possibifity.
T. So I think you now see that he extended his will beyond justice by a disordered willing of something that was more than he had received.
I now see clearly that Satan sinned both by willing what he ought not and by not willing what he ought. And it is evident that he did not will more than he should because he was unwilling to hold to justice, but rather that he did not hold to justice because he willed something else; and by willing this, he deserted justice, as you have shown in your example of the miser with his bread and money.
T. And when Satan willed what God did not want him to will, he willed inordinately to be like God.
S. But if God cannot be conceived except as a unique being, so that nothing else can be conceived to be like Him, how was
Satan able to will what he could not conceive? He was not so obtuse that he thought something else could be conceived to be hke God.-^ T. Even if he did not will to be completely Hke God, but willed
^"diis."
(plural). "Ye shaU be as gods, knowing good and evil."
(Genesis 3:5).
6 ''Commodum" refers to whatever one judges to be useful, advantageous, beneficial. Thus such things as life, health, pleasure—and in general all that we call goods and think to be conducive to happiness—are commoda.
Cf.
De Concordia. Q. 3, Ch. 11. S-281 (II).
^ Cf. the ontological argument of the Proslogion, Chs. 2-4.
The Fall of Satan
to be something less than God which was against God's will, then he still willed inordinately to be like God—for he willed something by his own will, which was subject to no one else.
For it is supposed to be characteristic of God alone to will something by His own will and to obey no higher will.
Yes, that's right.
T. And not only did Satan will to be equal to God because he presumed to have his own will, but he even willed to be greater than God by willing what God did not will for him to will, for he placed his own will above the will of God.
S. This leaves me satisfied.
T. Now then, from the above arguments, I think I have shown you that Satan freely departed from willing what he ought and so justly lost what he had. This is so because he freely and unjustly willed what he didn't have and what he wasn't supposed to will.
S. Nothing is more evident.
T. Therefore, although the good angel received perseverance because God gave it, it is not the case that the evil angel did not receive it because God did not give it. But rather, God did not give it because Satan did not receive it, and he did not receive it because he was unwilling to receive it.
S. Your arguments and your conclusions have dealt with my questions so convincingly that I can't think of anything to shake their truth.
Chapter V That the good angels, before the fall of the evil angels, were able to sin.
T. Do you think that the good angels were likewise able to sin before the evil angels fell?
Yes, but I wish to understand this rationally.
T. You are certain of this much: that if the good angels were not able to sin, then they held to justice not by their own free ability, but by necessity.
If this were the case, they would no more have merited grace from God because they remained up-
Truth, Freedom, and EvU right while others fell than because they preserved rationality, which they were unable to lose. And then, if you carefully consider the matter, the good angels would not properly be called just.
S. So reason shows.
T. Moreover, if the fallen angels had not sinned when they possessed the ability not to sin, then to the degree that they might have been truly just and might have merited grace from God, they would have been better than the good angels who were not able to sin. From this supposition, it follows that either (1) the men who are elect will eventually be better and greater than the good angels, or (2) the full number of the reprobate angels will not be perfectly restored, since the men who are being raised up to complete their number will not be as those angels would have become.^ S.
I think both of these possibilities must be completely denied.
T. Then, if you deny these two possibilities, you must affirm that the good angels were able to sin before the fall of the evil angels—just as the evil angels were also able to sin.
I don't see how it could be otherwise.
Chapter VI How the good angels were confirmed in their uprightness and the evil angels in their fallenness.
T. The angels who preferred the justice which they had to that thing which they didn't have, received through the reward of this very justice the good which they had seemed to lose on account of their choosing justice; and they also remained eternally secure in the justice which they had. For this reason, they were raised to honor, so that they obtained whatever they were
8 See also DCD, Ch.
23. In his later writing, CDH (Chs.
16-18, Book I), Anselm develops an argument to show that the number of elect men is greater than the number of fallen angels. See also D.
P. Henry, "Numerically Definite Reasoning in the Cur Deus Homo,"
Dominican Studies, 6(1953), 48-55.