Chapter XXIII
Truth, Freedom, and Evil that he was not supposed to will what he unjustly willed, then he would not have known that he was supposed to keep the will which he deserted. In such a case, he could not have been just by keeping justice, nor could he have been unjust in deserting justice, for he wouldn't have known justice. For if he hadn't known that he was supposed to be content with what he had received, then he couldn't have avoided willing more than he received. Moreover, since he was a rational being and was in no way prevented from using his reason, he knew what he should and should not will.
I don't see that your reasoning can be refuted, but a certain question seems to arise from it: for if Satan knew that he ought not desert the justice he had received, then certainly he also knew that he ought to be punished if he were to desert it.
How then could Satan, who had received an unfaiHng will towards being happy, freely will a thing that would make him wretched?
Chapter XXIII That he was not supposed to know that if he sinned he would be punished.
T. Just as it is certain that Satan couldn't be ignorant that he ought to he punished if he sinned, so it is also certain that he ought not to have known that he would he punished if he sinned.
S. But how could he have been ignorant of this, if his reason were not prevented from knowing the truth, as ours often is when it is impeded by the burden of a corruptible body?
T. Because he was rational, he was able to understand that he deserved to be punished if he were to sin. But since "the judgments of God are deep and His ways past finding out"
(Romans 11:33), Satan was unable to discern whether God would do what He justly could do. Now, if anyone were to claim that Satan wasn't even able to believe that God would damn His own creature on account of his guilt, i.e., damn the very one He had created out of His own goodness, then I ask, what is so objectionable in this? For such a person might argue as follows:
"There had been no previous instance of justice
The Fall of Satan
punishing injustice. Moreover, it was certain that the number of angels who had been created to enjoy God was fixed by His wisdom, without any superfluity, so that if that number were diminished, it would be imperfect; but so excellent a work of God could not continue to be imperfect in any respect. Moreover, even assuming that man had already been created, Satan couldn't in any way know that God was going to substitute a human nature for an angelic or an angelic nature for a human, if either nature fell; rather, he would think that God was going to restore the fallen nature to its own place and not to the place of another. And if man had not yet even been created, then still less could Satan imagine that such a being was going to be created for the express purpose of serving as a substitute for another nature." So if anyone were to claim that Satan wasn't able to believe that God would damn His own creature on account of his guilt, why would we have any objection?
S. Well, it does seem to be consistent, doesn't it.
T. Then, let's go back to what I said before: that Satan ought not to have had the knowledge that he would be punished if he sinned. For if he had known this, then even while willing and possessing happiness, he wouldn't have been able freely to will that thing which would make him wretched. And in such a case, he wouldn't have been just when he didn't will what he shouldn't, because he couldn't have willed it. Now keeping this argument in mind, consider whether Satan ought to have known the thing you are asking, namely, that he would be punished if he sinned. For if he had known this, either he would have sinned or he would not have sinned.
S. One or the other must be true.
If, having foreseen the punishment, he sinned without being in any need or without being coerced, then he ought to have been punished all the more.
I think so, too.
T. Then this foreknowledge was not advantageous to him.
S. That's right; for one who was going to sin, it was no advantage to foreknow that he would be punished if he did.
T. And if Satan had not sinned when he foreknew he would be punished for sinning, then it was either solely because of a good will or because of a fear of this punishment.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil S. What else can we say?
T. But his very deed showed that he would not have avoided sin solely because he loved justice.
S. There's no doubt about this.
T. And if he had refrained from sinning because of fear, he would not have been just.
S. So it is obvious that Satan should in no way have known that the punishment which fell upon him was going to occur after he sinned.
Chapter XXIV That even the good angel was not supposed to know that if he sinned he would be punished.
S. We believe that both the angel who remained upright in truth and the angel who did not remain upright were endowed with equal knowledge in their first condition; but I don't see why the knowledge we are talking about was denied to the angel whose good will was so steadfast that it sufficed to avoid sin.
If the good angel had foreknown there was a punishment for sinning, he wouldn't have been able to regard such a punishment hghtly, nor should he have so regarded it.
S. So it seems.
T. But either the love of justice alone or the hatred of punishment alone would have sufficed to keep him from sinning.
S. Clear enough.
T. So if he had foreknown there would be a punishment for sin, then he would have had two reasons for not sinning—the one honorable and helpful, and the other dishonorable and useless: these are the love of justice and the hatred of punishment.
But it is not honorable to refrain from sinning simply because of hatred of punishment, nor is the hatred of punishment helpful for avoiding sin, since the love of justice suffices by itself.
S. There is nothing I can object to in this.
T. Then what shall we make of it? Doesn't the good angel's perseverance strike us as having much more splendor when its