Chapter XI
The Fall of Satan
which we call evil. Now, given these considerations, there may be certain arguments which prove that evil is nothing. For example,
I might say that evil is only corruption, or defect, which has no being except as it is in some being. The greater the corruption, the more it reduces towards nothing the being it is in; and if the being it is in becomes absolutely nothing, we find that its corruption, or defect, is nothing also. So it can be proven by this argument that evil is nothing, and there may be other arguments to the same effect.
But my mind can't really be at ease ( except by faith, of course unless the following arguments which seem to prove that evil is something can be refuted.
(1) If nothing were signified by the name "evil," then when we heard the word "evil," our hearts would tremble needlessly at what we understand by this signification. But if the word "evil" is a name, then it is certainly significative; and if it is significative, it signifies. But it can only signify something. How then is evil nothing, if what its name signifies is something?
(2) As long as there is justice, it is accompanied by such serenity and peace that in many cases justice seems to be nothing other than the cessation of evil.
(For example, this is also true of chastity and patience.) But when justice departs, so many harsh and diverging passions take possession of the mind that they compel it—as a cruel master compels a wretched servant—to be loaded down with the worry of many shameful and burdensome tasks and to labor constantly under their weight.
It's incredible to argue that nothing produces all these effects.
Chapter XI That from their name, evil and nothing cannot be shown to be truly something, but only "as if they were something."
I think you are not so mad that you would say nothing is something only because you can't deny that "nothing" is a name, or a meaningful noun. Therefore, if you can't prove that nothing is something simply by the meaning of the word "nothing," how do you think you can prove that evil is something simply by the meaning of the word "evil"?
Truth, Freedom, and Evil S. Your introducing one difficulty in order to resolve another doesn't accomplish anything, for I don't even know what this nothing is. So since the question before us is the nature of evil, which you say is nothing, you must first teach me what nothing is if you wish me to understand the nature of evil. Then, in addition to explaining the word
"evil," you can go on to reply to those other arguments which disturbed me because they seemed to show that evil is something.
T. Since "to be nothing" and "not to be something" mean the same thing, how can we say what anything which is "not something" is?
If something is not signified by the name "nothing," then nothing is meant by it. But if nothing is meant, then "nothing" is not a name. But it is a name.^ Yet although no one would say that nothing is something, and although we are always compelled to say that nothing is nothing, nevertheless, no one can deny that the name "nothing" is significative. But if this name can only signify something, and not nothing, then it seems that what it signifies cannot be nothing, but must be something.
If, then, what is signified is not nothing, but something, how can it be true that what is nothing is signified by this name?
If the thing signified is properly called nothing, then it really is nothing, and for this reason it is not something. And if what is signified by this name is not nothing, but something, then it is falsely and improperly called by the name "nothing"—at least this seems to follow. But if people are right in saying that what is called nothing really is nothing and never is something, then what else could follow except that the word "nothing" simply means nothing, i.e., it does not signify anything at all. So we come to this problem: how can the word "nothing" signify not nothing, but something; and how can it signify not something, but nothing?^^ ^ The term "name"
( nomen ) has for Anselm the meaning conveyed in Boethius' commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione.
Cf. PL, 64, 419flF.
"Nomen igitur est vox significativa, ad placiium, sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa, separata"
1^ A name is a sign signifying, or determining something.
If, however, there is nothing to be signified, or determined, then the name is not significative, i.e., not meaningful. Hence, the problem of the meaning of the word "nothing" arises. Anselm's final solution to this problem is to intro-
The Fall of Satan
T. Perhaps "nothing" and "something" are not opposed in signification.
If they are not opposed, then either the same word means both nothing and something in different respects, or else a thing must be found which is both something and nothing.
T. What if both alternatives can be found to be the case: both that the word has different senses, and that there is a thing which is both something and nothing?
I would like to know both.
It is evident that this word "nothing" does not at all differ from what I am calling "not-something," i.e., as far as its signification goes. AlsO; nothing is clearer than that this word "notsomething" indicates that absolutely every thing and all that is something should be removed from the mind, and that no thing whatever nor anything that is something should be retained in the mind. But the removal of anything cannot be signified except by using the signification of that thing whose removal is intended, for no one knows what "not-a-man" means except by knowing what a man is.^^ Therefore it is necessary that the word "notsomething" signify something by removing that which is some thing. By removing every thing that is something, the expression "not something" signifies no being to be left in the mind of the hearer; therefore it signifies no thing, nor anything that is something.
So this word "not-something," for these various reasons, in some sense signifies something and in no sense signifies something. For it signifies by removing and it does not signify by determining.^^ duce the distinction between signification secundum formam and signification secundum rem.
11 "Not-man," writes Boethius (following Aristotle), is not a noun. See his commentary on De Interpretatione, PL, 64, 424.
12 "Constituo" is generally translated throughout this section as "determinvi."
Note Anselm's account in his Incomplete Work: "We call injustice 'something' when we assert that someone who is punished on account of injustice is punished on account of something. And we call nothing 'something' if we say of some thing or other 'It is nothing' or 'It is not nothing.' For since a proposition is true or false, we say that it either affirms something about something or denies something about something [as in the above two propositions].
But, nevertheless, injustice and nothing are not concepts in our minds, even though they admit of being understood, as do countless names. Indeed, to admit of being understood
(constituere intellectum) and
Truth, Freedom, and Evil For this same reason, the name "nothing," which negates whatever is something, signifies something rather than nothing by its removing, and it signifies nothing rather than something by its determining. For it is not necessary that nothing be something simply because its name somehow signifies something; rather, nothing must be nothing, because the word "nothing" signifies something only in the sense we've mentioned. So in this way, it is not repugnant to think that evil is nothing or that the name "evil" is significative; for this name is determinative of no thing when it signifies the negation of something.
I can't deny that the word "nothing" somehow signifies something according to this argument you've given. But it is well known that the something which is signified in this way is not what we call nothing; for when we hear the word "nothing," we don't accept it as meaning this something that it signifies.
Now, I want to know what we refer to by means of the word "nothing," and what we understand when we hear this word. For this word signifies properly; therefore, it is a name because it is significative, and not because it signifies something by neeating it. "Nothing" is distinguished from other names on account of its own particular signification, and what it names is called "nothing." Now I ask, how that can be something if it is properly called nothing? And I ask how it could be nothing if its significative name signifies something? And I ask how the same thing can then be both something and nothing? And I ask the same questions about the word "evil," and about what it signifies, and about what we call evil.
T. You are right to ask this because, on the basis of the argument given above, "evil" and "nothing" do signify something; to be something in the intellect are not the same. For 'not-man' admits of being understood, because it causes the hearer to understand that the concept 'man' is not contained in the signification of this utterance, but is removed.
But there is not something in the intellect which is the thing signified by this utterance; however, the utterance 'man' does determine and signify a concept in the mind.
So 'injustice' signifies the removal of justice where justice ought to be, and it does not determine something in the mind; and 'nothing' signifies the removal of something and likewise does not determine something in the mind."
Ein neues unvollendetes Werk, p. 42f.
( See bibliography
The Fall of Satan
nevertheless, what they signify is neither evil nor nothing. But there is another argument which not only shows that they svj,nify something, but also shows that what they signify is something—not truly something, but as if it were something (quasi aliquid).
Many things are said according to form (secundum formam) which are not said according to fact (secundum rem). For example, ''timere"
( "to fear'') is said to be active according to the form of the word, but it is passive according to fact. So also, "blindness" is called something according to the form of speaking, although it is not something according to fact. For just as we say of someone that he has sight and that sight is in him, so we also say that he has blindness and that blindness is in him—although this blindness is not "something," but rather is "not-something." For to have blindness is not to have something, but to lack what is something, since blindness is not anything other than not-seeing, or the absence of sight where sight should be.
But not-seeing, or the absence of sight, is not something more in a case where there should be sight than where it should not be.
For this reason, blindness is not something more in the eye because sight ought to be there than not-seeing, or the absence of sight, is in a stone, where no sight ought to be. And likewise we call many other things something according to the form of speaking
( although they are not something in fact ) , since we speak of these things just as if they were existing things.
Therefore, in this way, "evil" and "nothing" signify something; and what they signify is something not according to fact, but according to the form of speaking. For "nothing" only signifies notsomething, or the absence of whatever is something. And evil is nothing else except not-good, or the absence of good where good should be, or where it is useful for it to be. But what is nothing other than the absence of that which is something is certainly not something. So evil truly is nothing, and nothing is not something. Nevertheless, in a certain sense, evil and nothing are something, because we speak of them as if they were something when we say, "Nothing caused it," or "Evil caused it"; this is just like saying "Something caused it," or "Good caused it." So too, when we absolutely deny someone's assertion, we say, "This thing which you are saying is nothing." But "this" and "which" are