Chapter XIV
On Freedom of Choice
and an ability to walk). And by adding "uprightness," we distinguish the "ability to keep uprightness" from the ability to keep whatever is not uprightness (e.g., money). Then, by adding "of will," we distinguish the "ability to keep uprightness of will" from the ability to keep the uprightness of other things
(e.g., the uprightness, or straightness, of a stick; or the uprightness, or correctness, of an opinion). And by adding "for its own sake," we distinguish the "ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake" from the ability to keep uprightness of will for the sake of something else ( e.g., as when uprightness of will is kept for the sake of financial gain or because of natural inclination—for a dog keeps uprightness of will by natural inclination when he loves either his puppies or the master who cares for him )
. Therefore, since there is nothing in this definition which is not necessary to defining the freedom of choice of a rational will, essential things being included and non-essential things being excluded, the definition is neither too broad nor too narrow.^ Doesn't it seem that way to you?
Yes, the definition seems perfect.
Tell me, then, whether you wish to know anything more about this freedom, without which we cannot judge men to do good or evil. This is the only thing we have left to discuss.
Chapter XIV The distinctions appropriate to freedom.
S. Now it remains only to make the distinctions appropriate to freedom. For although, according to your definition, freedom is common to every rational nature; nevertheless, the freedom of God is quite different from the freedom possessed by rational creatures, and the freedom of creatures differs from one to another.
T. [Here are the distinctions appropriate to freedom:] /. There is an "unoriginated freedom of choice," which is neither created nor received, and this freedom belongs to God alone.
8 Cf.
Plato's method of diaeresis.
Sophist, ca.
221^.
Note also Aristode, Posterior Analytics, 96^ 20 ff.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil 77. There is a "created freedom of choice," which was created by and received from God, and this freedom is characteristic of men and angels. This "created freedom" either (A) does have an uprightness which it may keep, or ( B ) doesn't have an uprightness to keep.
77-A. The "created freedom which has uprightness" keeps this uprightness either (1) so as to he able to lose it, or (2) so as not to he ahle to lose it.
II-A-1. The "created freedom which has uprightness so as to be able to lose it" was characteristic of all angels before the good ones were confirmed and the evil ones fell; and it characterizes, throughout their earthly lives, all men who keep uprightness.
II-A-2. The "created freedom which has uprightness so as not to be able to lose it" is characteristic of elect angels and elect men: it characterized elect angels immediately after the fall of the reprobate angels, and it characterizes elect men immediately after their death.
77-B. The "created freedom which does not have uprightness" either ( 1 ) is ahle to regain it, or ( 2 ) is not ahle to regain it.
II-B-1. The "created freedom which does not have uprightness and yet is able to regain it" characterizes, throughout their earthly lives, all men who lack it—although many may never regain it.
II-B-2. The "created freedom which does not have uprightness and is not able to regain it" is characteristic of reprobate angels and reprobate men—of the angels after their fall, and of these men after their death.
S. Through the favor of God, your definitions and distinctions have so satisfied me that I can find nothing more I think necessary to ask you.
The Pall of Satan (De Casu DiaboU) CHAPTERS I.
That it is even said to the angels, "What do you have that you have not received?" And from God comes nothing except goodness and being; and every good is a being, and every being a good.
II.
Why it seems that Satan did not receive perseverance because God did not give it.
III.
That God did not give perseverance because Satan did not receive it.
IV.
How Satan sinned and willed to be like God.
That the good angels, before the fall of the evil angels, were able to sin.
VI.
How the good angels were confirmed in their uprightness and the evil angels in their fallenness.
VII.
The question whether the will and its turning to what it should not do is the very evil which makes the angels evil; and why a rational creature cannot turn himself from evil to good in the same way that he can turn himself from good to evil.
VIII.
That neither the will nor its turning is evil itself.
IX.
That injustice is evil itself and that it is nothing.
How evil seems to be something.
XL.
That from their name, evil and nothing cannot be shown to be truly something, but only "as if they were something."
XII.
That Satan was not able to have his original willing from himself; and that many things are said "to be able" through another's power, and "to be unable" on account of another's impotence.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil That when Satan had received only the will for hapXIII. piness, he could will only happiness and couldn't keep from willing it; and no matter what he willed thereby, his willing was neither just nor unjust.
That the case would be similar if only the will for upXIV. rightness were received; and therefore he received both wills at the same time, so that he might be both happy and just.
That justice is something.
That injustice is nothing except the absence of justice where justice should be.
Why the angel who deserted justice couldn't return to XV.
XVI.
XVII. it.
How the evil angel made himself unjust and the good angel made himself just; and that the evil angel ought
XVIII. to give thanks to God for the good things which he received and deserted, just as the good angel ought to give thanks to God for the good things which he received and kept.
That the will, insofar as it is, is good; and that no thing XIX. is an evil.
How God is the cause of evil actions and evil wills; and how they are received from Him.
That the evil angel was not able to foreknow that he was going to fall.
That he knew he should not will what it was sin to will, and he knew that he ought to be punished if he sinned.
That he was not supposed to know that if he sinned he would be punished.
That even the good angel was not supposed to know XX.
XXI.
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV. that if he sinned he would be punished.
That even supposing the good angel cannot sin only because he now has this knowledge from Satan's fall,
XXV. still it would be to his glory not to sin.
What we dread when we hear the name "evil"; and what does the works which injustice is said to do, XXVI. since injustice and evil are nothing.
Whence came evil in an angel who was created good.
That the ability to will what should not be willed is XXVII.
XXVIII. always a good, and that willing is itself always good to the degree that it is.