Chapter XXV
The Fall of Satan
sole cause is seen to be that which is honorable and helpful, because freely chosen? And isn't this better than if the other motive, which is both dishonorable and unhelpful, because against one's free accord, were also present at the same time?
S. What you say is so clear that I now rejoice because the good angel didn't know what I previously wished that he had known; but now, of course, he has this knowledge from the example of Satan, whose fall he surely knew.
Chapter XXV That even supposing the good angel cannot sin only because he now has this knowledge from Satan's fall, still it would be to his glory not to sin.
T. Of course, both the good angel and the evil angel now know that guilt of this kind is followed by punishment; but just as there are two different kinds of knowledge, so there are different causes and different results of their knowledge. For what
Satan knew by his own experience, the good angel learned by Satan's example; the former learned in his way because he did not persevere, and the latter learned in his way because he did persevere.
Just as Satan's knowledge was to his disgrace, since he was blameable for not having persevered, so the good angel's knowledge was to his glory, since he was worthy of praise for having persevered.
If, then, the good angel is said to be unable to sin only because he has this knowledge, it is sufficiently clear that just as the knowledge which is obtained from laudably persevering is glorious, so the inability to sin which was the result of this glorious knowledge is likewise to the good angel's glory. Therefore, just as the evil angel must be blamed because he is not able to return to justice, so the good angel must be praised because he cannot depart from justice. And just as the evil angel cannot now return to justice, because he deserted it by an evil will alone, so the good angel cannot now depart from justice, because he continued in it by a good will alone. Therefore, it is obvious that just as it is the penalty of sin for Satan not to be able to regain what he lost, so it is the reward of
Truth, Freedom, and Fvil justice for the good angel not to be able to desert what he kept.
S. Your reflections upon the good angel's knowledge and inability to sin would be very lovely if, as you say, the good angel attained to this knowledge and inability to sin by virtue of his own presevering. But he doesn't seem to have attained these things because he himself persevered, but rather because Satan did not persevere.
If what you say is true, then the good angel would be able to rejoice over the fall of Satan, inasmuch as it was advantageous for him that Satan should fall; for the good angel would then have attained to the knowledge by which he was able never to sin nor become less happy, not because he merited good, but because another merited evil. Yet that he should have all these benefits in this way is absurd.
S. The more absurd it seems that the fall of Satan should so benefit the angel who didn't fall, the more it is necessary for you to show that the good angel did not obtain this knowledge that sin would be punished simply because of the sin of Satan.
T. You shouldn't say that the good angel gained this knowledge because Satan sinned, but you should say that the good angel gained this knowledge by the example of Satan's falling because he sinned. For if neither had sinned, God was certainly going to give that same knowledge to both of them in some other way than by the example of anyone's fall, for he would have given it because of the merit of perseverance. For no one will say that God was not able to give this knowledge to his own angels in some other way. Therefore, when Satan sinned, God simply used his example to teach the good angel what He was going to teach him in any case; and God used this example not because He was unable to teach in any other way, but because
He was able—by His greater power—to make good come from evil by so using this example. God did this so that not even evil might remain unordered within the realm of omnipotent wisdom.
S. What you say is especially agreeable to me.
T. So it is clear that if the good angel were not now able to sin only because he knows that punishment followed the sin of the evil angel, nonetheless this inability to sin would not be to
The Fall of Satan
the lessening of his praiseworthiness; rather, it would be his reward for having preserved justice. But, as you know, we have already made it clear that he is not able to sin since, through the merit of his perseverance, he was elevated so that he can no longer see anything more to want.
I have not forgotten what we have already learned on this subject.
Chapter XXVI What we dread w^hen w^e hear the name "evil"; and what does the works which injustice is said to do, since injustice and evil are nothing.
S. Although you have answered all my questions up to now, yet I await your explaining what it is that we dread when we hear the name "evil," and what causes things hke robbery and lust, which injustice and evil seem to do, if evil is nothing?
I shall give a brief answer. The evil which is injustice is always nothing; but the evil which is disadvantage sometimes is nothing, as in blindness, and sometimes is something, as in sadness or grief. We always regard with aversion the disadvantage which is something.
Therefore, when we hear the word "evil," we do not fear an evil which is nothing, but an evil which is something, and which follows the absence of good.
For the evil of many disadvantages which are something, follows upon the evil of injustice and blindness, which are nothing; these disadvantages are what we dread when we hear the name "evil."
And when we say that injustice causes robbery, or that blindness causes a man to fall into a pit, we should not think that injustice or blindness do something. But we are to think that if justice were in the will and sight in the eyes, then neither the robbery nor the fall into the pit would have taken place.
It is as if we were to say, "The absence of a rudder drives the ship onto the rocks," or "The absence of reins causes the horse to run wild." In these statements we mean only that if a rudder or reins were present, then the winds would not drive the ship
Truth, Freedom, and Evil onto the rocks nor would the horse run wild. For just as a ship is steered by a rudder and a horse restrained by reins, so the will of a man is restrained by justice and his feet are steered by sight.
S. You have satisfied me concerning this evil which we call injustice, so that every question about it which used to be in my mind is now cleared up. For my question about this evil which we call injustice seems to have arisen from the fact that if injustice were to have any being, it would be from God, from whom everything that is something must come, and from whom sin and injustice cannot possibly come. But I see nothing that could be against right faith if the evil which we call pain were ever something.
Chapter XXVII Whence came evil in an angel vv^ho was created good.
S. But please don't be too weary to reply briefly to my last foolish question so that I may know how to reply when I am asked the same thing.
I know that it is not always easy to give a wise answer to a foolish questioner, and yet I wonder whence came the first evil (which we call injustice or sin) in an angel who was created just.
Tell me from whence nothing comes to be something.
S. Nothing neither comes nor goes.
T. Then why do you ask from whence comes injustice, which is nothing?
S. Because when justice withdraws from where it was, we say that injustice approaches.
T. Well then, speak more properly and clearly, and ask rather about the withdrawal of justice. For indeed, an apt question often conduces to an apt response, while an inept question produces a more encumbered reply.
S. Then why did justice withdraw from a just angel?
If you wish to speak properly, you shouldn't say that it withdrew from him, but that he deserted it by willing what he shouldn't have willed.