Chapter II
Truth, Freedom, and Evil onstrate that the Supreme Truth has no beginning and no end, by means of the following argument:
Let anyone who can, try to conceive of when the following proposition began to be true, or was ever not true, namely, that something vv^as going to exist. Or let him try to conceive of when the following proposition will cease being true, namely, that something has existed in the past. Now if neither of these things can be conceived, and if neither proposition can be true unless there is truth, then it is also impossible to conceive that truth might have a beginning or an end. For suppose that truth had had a beginning, or suppose that it would at some time come to an end: then even before truth had begun to be, it would have been true that there was no truth; and even after truth had come to an end, it would still be true that truth had come to an end. But since these statements could not be true unless there was truth, there would have to have been truth before truth came to be, and there would still have to be truth after truth had ceased to be. But these conclusions are preposterous. Therefore, whether someone asserts that truth has a beginning or an end, or whether someone asserts that it has no beginning or end, truth cannot be confined by any beginning or end.^ You argue thus in the Monologion. So I would like to learn the definition of truth from you.
Teacher.
I don't recall ever arriving at a definition of truth there; but if you wish, let us inquire as to what truth is by looking at the various things in which we say there is truth.
If I cannot do anything else, I will at least help by being a good listener.
Chapter II On the truth of signification, and on the two truths of a proposition.
T. Then, let's first ask what truth is in a proposition, since we generally call a proposition true or false.
1 Monologion, Ch. 18.
Concerning Truth
Start with your questions, and I'll trust your answers.
T. When is a proposition true?
S. When what it aflBrms to exist does exist, and when what it denies to exist does not exist.^ (I include this latter condition of a proposition's denying the existence of what does not exist because even then it expresses what is the case.
T. Does it seem to you that the thing which such a proposition either aflfirms or denies is the truth of the proposition?
S. No.
T. Why not?
S. Because nothing is true except by its participation in truth; therefore, when something is true, it is because of a truth which is in that thing itself. But the thing affirmed or denied by a true proposition is not in the proposition itself, and so must not be said to be its truth; rather, it must be called the cause of the proposition's being true. Therefore, it seems to me that the truth of a proposition must be sought only in the proposition itself.^
T. Well, is this truth of a proposition the proposition itself or its signification or something in its definition?
S. i don't think so.
T. What's your reason?
S. Because if the truth of a proposition were any of these, then the proposition would always be true. For the definition of a proposition always remains the same whether the thing the proposition asserts to be the case is or isn't the case. And the proposition, its signification, and other such things also remain the same.
T. Well then, what is the truth in a proposition?
All I know is that when a proposition signifies that what is the case is the case, then it is tru-e and there is truth in it.
T. For what purpose is an affirmation uttered?
2 This definition of true and false sentences follows Boethius' commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione. PL, 64, 457ff.
3 Anselm uses "oratin,"
"enuntiatio," and "propositio" interchangeably throughout this section.
Cf.
S-177f.
(I); 180.11. An enuntiatio is a proposition in the strict sense; i.e., it affirms or denies something. An oratio is an utterance which may or may not make an assertion; e.g., a prayer is an utterance which makes no assertion. Every true or false oratio is, therefore, an enuntiatio. Here, as above, Anselm is following Boethius.
Cf. PL, 64, 434ff.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil S.
In order to signify the existence of what exists.
T. Then this is what an aflBrmation is supposed to do?
S. Yes, of course.
T. So when an aflBrmative sentence signifies the existence of what does exist, it signifies as it is supposed to.
S. Evidently.
T. And when it signifies as it is supposed to signify, it signifies correctly.
S. That's right.
T. And when it signifies correctly, its signification is correct.
S. No doubt about it.
T. Therefore, when it signifies the existence of what does exist, its signification is correct.
S. This follows.
T. Moreover, when it signifies the existence of what does exist, its signification is true.
Yes, its signification is both correct and true when it signifies the existence of what does exist.
T. So for an aflBrmation to be correct is the same thing as for it to be true, namely, for it to signify the existence of what actually does exist.
Yes, this is so.
T. Therefore, the truth in an aflBrmation is simply its correctness.* S.
I now see clearly that this truth is correctness.
T. The situation is the same when a proposition signifies the non-existence of what does not exist [i.e., in the case of a true negation].
I understand what you are saying. But teach me how to reply if someone were to say that a proposition signifies as it should even when it signifies that a thing exists which, in fact, does not exist. For such a proposition has the power of signifying that a thing exists both while that thing exists and when it doesn't exist. For if it didn't have the power of signifying that a thing existed even when that thing didn't exist, it wouldn't signify that thing at all when it didn't exist. For this reason, someone might argue that a proposition signifies as it should even 4 See Introduction, p.
18 for a discussion of "rectitudo."
Concerning Truth
when it aflBrms that something exists which doesn't exist. Then if your argument held true—namely, that a proposition is correct and true when it signifies as it should—it would follow that a proposition would be true even when it asserts that something exists which, in fact, does not exist.
T. Well, it is rather unusual to call a proposition true when it signifies that something exists which does not exist; nevertheless, such a sentence has a certain truth and correctness, for it signifies as it should in one respect. But when a sentence signifies that something exists which does, in fact, exist, it functions as it should in two respects-, for it signifies (1) in accordance with its power of signifying and (2) in accordance with the purpose for which it has its power of signifying. Now a proposition is usually said to be correct and true when it signifies in accordance with that correctness and truth by which it affirms a thing to exist which does, in fact, exist; and we do not ordinarily call a proposition correct and true when it signifies only with that correctness and truth by which it affirms a thing to exist which does not, in fact, exist. For a proposition ought to be judged correct and true with respect to the purpose for which it received the power of signification rather than with respect to a purpose for which it didn't receive this power. For a proposition has the power of signifying that a thing exists when it doesn't exist, or doesn't exist while it actually does, simply because there is no way for the proposition to have only the power of signifying that a thing exists while it does exist or that a thing doesn't exist when it doesn't. So on the one hand, a proposition is correct and true because it signifies in accordance with the purpose for which it has the power of signifying; and on the other hand, it is correct and true because it signifies in accordance with its mere power of signifying. The first of these correctnesses can vary from time to time; but the second always belongs to a proposition. A proposition does not always have the first kind of truth; but it always possesses the second. The first kind of truth belongs to a proposition accidentally and follows its usage; the second kind of truth belongs to a proposition naturally. For example, when I say "It is day" in order to signify the existence of what does, in fact, exist, I use the signification of this sentence correctly, in accordance with the purpose for which it is made;
Truth, Freedom, and Evil and so it is said to signify correctly. But when, by means of the same sentence, I signify the existence of what does not exist, I don't use it correctly, because it is not made for this purpose; and so, in this respect, its signification is said not to be correct.
Now in certain propositions, the two truths or correctnesses are inseparable, as when we say "Man is an animal" or "A man is not a stone." For the aflBrmative proposition signifies what is always the case; and the negative proposition signifies what is never the case. Therefore, we cannot use the aflRrmative sentence for signifying what is not the case (for man is always an animal), and we cannot use the negative sentence for signifying what is the case (because a man is never a stone).
We began our questioning by discussing the truth which a proposition has by virtue of someone's using it correctly, for our common way of speaking judges a proposition to be true in accordance with this kind of truth. We shall put off, to a later time, our discussion of the other kind of truth which a proposition must always have.^ S. Now that you have shown how a proposition can have a kind of truth even when it is false, please return to the issue you first took up—for you have distinguished well enough between the two kinds of truth.
T. Let the things we've just said about the truth of signification suflSce for now. For the same notion of truth which we have examined in spoken propositions must now be examined in all the signs which are made in order to signify the existence or non-existence of something—for example, written characters or sign language.
S. All right.
Let's proceed to these other topics.
Chapter III On the truth of thoughts.
T. We also call a thought true when what we think is the case, either because of an argument or for some other reason, ^ The discussion of this other truth of signification is taken up in DV, Chs.
5 and 13; and this discussion is the argument by which Anselm "proves" that the truth in all things is one truth.
Concerning Truth
really is the case; and we call a thought false when what we think is the case really is not the case.
S. This is our custom.
T. Then what does truth seem to be in a thought?
S. Following the argument we saw to be true in the case of a proposition, we should say that the truth of a thought is best called its correctness. For we have been given the power of conceiving something either to exist or not to exist so that we might conceive the existence of what is and the non-existence of what is not. For this reason, whoever thinks something to exist which does exist thinks as he ought; therefore, his thought is correct.
Now if our thought is correct and true simply because we think the existence of what is or the non-existence of what is not, then the truth of a thought can only be its correctness.
T. Your thinking is correct.
Chapter IV On the truth of the will.
T. Now God, Who is Himself the Truth, says that there is also truth in the will, for He says that Satan did not stand firm in the truth. (John 8:44) But it was only with respect to his will that Satan was in the truth and deserted the truth.
I believe this. For he deserted the truth only by sinning; and if he had always willed what he ought to have willed, then he never would have sinned.
Tell me, then, what you think truth in the will is.
It is only that correctness of the will which we call uprightness.^ For as long as Satan willed what he ought to have willed—namely, the end for which he had received a will—he remained in the truth and in uprightness; and when he willed what he ought not to have willed, he deserted this truth and uprightness. So truth in the will can only be thought to be this uprightness, or correctness, of willing—because the truth, or uprightness, in Satan's will consisted only in his willing what he ought.
T. You are thinking well. s "uprightness" = "rectitudo."