Chapter VIII
Truth, Freedom, and Evil should see the same man holding a ram, and see the ram shake himself loose from the man's hands: would you think the man less strong when he is holding a ram than when he is holding a bull?
I should think that his strength was the same in both cases, but that he didn't use his strength equally—for to hold a bull is harder than to hold a ram. The man is strong because he has strength, but his action is said to be strong because it is done in a strong way.
T. So now you can see that the will which I call the instrument for willing has a strength which is both indivisible and not able to be overcome by any alien force. But when this instrument for willing is actually willing, it sometimes uses more of its strength, and sometimes less of it. So it follows that the will, when offered something, never abandons what it wants more for what it wants less. But when it is offered something that it wants more than what it already has, it immediately leaves the thing that it does not want as much. Therefore, the will which we call the actual using of the instrument (actionem instrumenti), because it does the work whenever the will wants anything, is said to be more or less strong since it does things more or less strongly.
I'll have to admit that your explanation has made this clear to me.
T. Now you see that when a man who has uprightness of will deserts this uprightness under an assault of temptation, he is drawn away by no alien force, but he turns himself to something which he really wants more.
Chapter VIII That even God is not able to remove the uprightness of will.
S. Now, I wonder whether even God could remove uprightness from a man's will. Could He?
I'll show you that He cannot. For although He can reduce everything which He has made from nothing back to nothing. He does not have the power to separate uprightness from a will that has it.
On Freedom of Choice
I await a good argument for these claims, for they are new to me.
Let's keep in mind that we are talking about that uprightness of will with respect to which the will is called just, i.e., the uprightness which is kept for its own sake. Moreover, no will is just except one which wills what God wills it to will.
S. The will that doesn't will this is obviously unjust.
T. Therefore, to keep uprightness of will for its own sake is, for anyone keeping it, to will what God wills him to will.
Yes, it is appropriate to say this.
If God were to separate this uprightness from the will of someone. He would have to do this either willingly or unwillingly.
S. Well, He can't do it unwillingly.
If, then. He were to remove uprightness from anyone's will. He would will to do what He does.
S. Without doubt.
T. Now it is certain that if He wills to separate uprightness from a man's will. He does not will that man to keep uprightness of will for its own sake.
S. This follows.
T. But we have already established that to keep uprightness of will is, for anyone who keeps it, to will what God wills him to will.
S. Well, even if we hadn't established it, nevertheless, it is so.
T. Thus, if God ever took this uprightness away from any man, He would not be willing that man to will what He wills him to will.
S. Any other conclusion would be impossible.
T. So nothing is less possible than for God to remove uprightness of will from anyone. However, we sometimes say that God removes this uprightness when He does not prevent a man from deserting it. And in the same way, we sometimes say that temptation or Satan removes uprightness, or overcomes the will, or lures it away from the rectitude which it has; and we speak this way because unless temptation or Satan allowed the will to have something, or threatened to take away something the will preferred to uprightness, then the will would never turn away from that uprightness which it otherwise wills.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil S. What you say seems so obvious to me that I can think of nothing against it.
Chapter IX That nothing is more free than an upright will.
T. Now you can understand why nothing is more free than an upright will, since no alien force is able to remove its uprightness. For it is not true to say, when a man wills to lie in order not to lose his life or his health, that he is compelled to will life more than truth. Since he is prevented by an alien force from keeping both at the same time, he chooses the one which he prefers. He is placed under the necessity of deserting one or the other against his will, and not freely; but he keeps the one he prefers, and he does this freely and not against his will. He has no less strength to will truth than to will safety, but he wants safety more.^ Yet if he had a vivid sense of the eternal glory which he would immediately attain upon choosing the truth, and if he had the same vivid sense of the torments of hell into which he would be delivered without any delay after lying, then, without any doubt, we would see that he had sufficient strength to hold to the truth.
S. This seems clear, because he would display greater strength for willing eternal salvation for its own sake, and truth for the sake of this reward, than for preserving his temporal salvation.
Chapter X In what sense someone who sins is a servant of sin; and that it is more miraculous when God gives uprightness back to one who has deserted it than when He gives back life to the dead.
T. A rational nature always has free choice because it always has the abihty to keep uprightness of will for the sake of that ® "Safety" renders "solus." The Latin term means both safety and salvation; the unity of Anselm's illustrations and argument at this point depends on this broader meaning of the word.
On Freedom of Choice
Uprightness itself, even though this is sometimes diflBcult.
But after a free will deserts uprightness because of this difficulty of keeping it, it serves sin because it is impossible for it to regain uprightness by its own means. Thus man becomes a wind which passes away and does not come again (Ps. 78: 39), since "he who does sin is the servant of sin." (John 8:34) For just as before the will had any uprightness, it could not take it from God if He did not give it; so also, when the will deserts the uprightness it has received, it cannot regain it unless God gives it back.
Moreover, I think it a greater miracle when God restores to the will the uprightness which it has deserted than when He restores to a dead man the life which he has lost. For the body is under the necessity of dying; and so by dying it does not sin.
Hence there is no reason why it ought never receive life again.
But when the will deserts uprightness of its own accord, it sins and merits always to be deprived of uprightness.
If a man freely takes his own life, he does not take away something which would not eventually have been lost anyway. But a man who deserts uprightness of will throws away something which he was under obligation always to keep.
I see that what you say about the servitude by which "he who does sin becomes the servant of sin" is absolutely true.
And it's also true that it is impossible to regain uprightness once it has been deserted unless it is returned by God, who originally gave it. Finally, I agree that men and angels were always supposed to observe the uprightness which was given to them, so that in this way they might keep it forever."^
Chapter XI That servitude to sin does not destroy freedom of choice.
S. But your conclusion has greatly curbed my joy, because I used to think that I was always secure in possessing freedom of choice. Therefore, I want you to explain the relation between servitude and the will to me, so that servitude won't by chance
"^ "Supposed to observe" = "considerandum est."