Chapter VII
The Fall of Satan
able to will, and they no longer saw anything to will which exceeded what they already had. Therefore, they were unable to sin.
But the angels who preferred what God had not yet willed to give them ( rather than preferring to remain upright in the justice in which they had been made) received the judgment of justice: not only did they fail to obtain what they preferred to justice and what made them despise justice, but they even lost the good that they had.
Then the angels were separated into two groups, so that the angels adhering to justice could will no good that they did not already enjoy, and those who deserted justice would be deprived of every good that they could will.
S. Nothing seems more just and lovely than this separation.
But if you could tell me, I would like to hear what kind of advantage it was which the good angels gained by justly not willing, and the evil angels lost by unjustly desiring.
I don't know exactly what it was. But whatever it was, it's enough to know that it was something towards which they were able to grow, which they didn't receive when they were created, in order that they might later attain it by their own merit.
Fine. We can let our investigation of this question be sufficient for the time being.
Chapter VII The question whether the will and its turning to what it should not do is the very evil which makes the angels evil; and why a rational creature cannot turn himself from evil to good in the same way that he can turn himself from good to evil.
I don't know why it is, but just when I was hoping to come to the end of this inquiry, new problems have started growing up from the roots of the questions we've already felled.
For although I can see very clearly that Satan could have come to a state utterly bereft of goodness only because of his excessive desire, I am still greatly troubled to know how he had so disordered a will.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil For if his will were good, then he fell from lofty good into wretched evil by reason of this good will. And if his will were good, then God gave it to him, because from himself he had absolutely nothing. If then, he willed with the will which God gave him, how did he sin? But if he had this will from himself, then he had something good which he did not receive.
On the other hand, if his will were evil and if an evil will is something, again it follows that his will is only from God, because "everything that is something" comes from Him.
If this were the case, it could be asked how he sinned by having a will which God gave him, or how God could have given him an evil will? But if this evil will were from Satan himself and if it were something, then Satan would have had something from himself, and not every being would be good. For if an evil will had being, then it would not be nothing—as we are accustomed to say. But if an evil will were nothing, then Satan would be utterly damned for nothing at all and so without cause.
What I am saying about the will can just as well be said about desire and concupiscence, since the will is desire and concupiscence. For just as there is both a good and an evil will, so there is both a good and an evil desire, and a good and an evil concupiscence.
But suppose we were to say that the will is a kind of being and also that the good is something, so that when the will was turned to what it ought to will, it would be a good will; and when it was turned to what it ought not will, it would be called an evil will. In this case, I can see that the things which I said about the will could also be said about the turning of the will. For I am still troubled by the question from whence Satan had that perverse turning of the will, and I am disturbed by those other things that relate to this problem.
There is something else I really wonder about when I consider this turning of the will: namely, why God made that angelic creature who possessed so much excellence to be such that he could turn his own will away from what he ought to will towards what he ought not will, and yet did not make him so that he was able to turn his will from what he ought not will towards what he ought to will. For it seems that so magnificent a creature from such a Creator ought to have received the ability to do the good
The Fall of Satan
for which he was made, rather than to have received the ability to do the evil which he was created to avoid. This question can be asked with regard to human nature as well, since we believe that no man can have a good will unless God gives it, and that a man can have an evil will only by the permission of God.
Chapter VIII That neither the w^ill nor its turning is evil itself.
I think that both the will and the turning of the will are something. For although they are not substances, nevertheless it cannot be denied that they are beings of some sort, since there are many beings besides those which are properly called substances.
For a good will is not more "something" than an evil will, and the one is not more a good thing than the other is an evil thing.
The will which wills to give a thing mercifully is not more "something" than the will which wills to take something rapaciously; and the latter is as much an evil as the former is a good.
Therefore, if an evil will were the evil itself by which someone were called evil, then a good will would be the good itself which would make someone good. But an evil will would be nothing if it were the evil itself which we believe to be nothing; and conversely, a good will, since it is not more "something" than an evil will, would be nothing also.
If we followed this line of argument, we would have to say that the good which makes men good is nothing, for we would have identified this good with the good will, which itself would be nothing. But in fact, no one thinks that a good will or the good itself is nothing. So we must conclude that an evil will is no more the evil itself that makes creatures evil, than a good will is the good itself that makes creatures good.
Now what IVe just said above about the will can also be applied to the turning of the will. For the turning which turns the will from robbery to charity is not more "something" than the turning which turns the same will from generosity to greed. And all the other arguments which I have just given above also relate to this problem.
I agree.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil T. Therefore, neither the evil will nor the depraved turning of the will is the evil itself by which Satan and Adam became evil, for we say that the evil by which they became evil is nothing; and conversely, neither the good will nor the good turning of the will is the good itself by which they become good.
Chapter IX That injustice is evil itself and that it is nothing.
S. Then what is the evil itself which makes rational natures evil and the good itself which makes them good?
T. We should believe that justice is the good itself by which just men and just angels are good and by which their wills are called good or just. And we should believe that injustice is the evil itself which we say to be nothing other than the privation of the good. This is what makes men and angels evil, and what makes their wills evil; and this injustice is nothing other than the privation of justice. For when a will was first given to the rational nature, it was—in the moment of giving—turned by the Giver towards that which it was supposed to will; or better, it was not first given and then turned upright, but it was originally made upright. As long as the will stood firm in this uprightness in which it was made (and which we call truth or justice), it was just. But when it turned itself away from that which it was supposed to will towards that which it was not supposed to will, it no longer stood fast in the original uprightness in which it was made. When the will deserted this uprightness, it lost something noble, and it received nothing in place of it except the privation of it. And this privation, which we call injustice, has no being.
Chapter X How evil seems to be something.
I concede what you say, namely, that evil is a privation of good. But nonetheless, I see good to be a privation of evil. For I perceive that when something is deprived of evil it becomes something else which we call good; and similarly, I notice that when something is deprived of good it becomes something else,