Chapter XIII
Truth, Freedom, and Evil S.
I can't contradict this.
T. So it turns out to be the case that Satan, in the moment when he was created with a capabiHty for wilUng, but not yet willing anything, couldn't have had his first willing from himself.
S. I'm convinced that he who has never yet willed anything is able to will nothing through himself.
T. No one can be happy unless he wills happiness.
I mean simply happiness; not happiness together with justice, but the happiness which everyone wills—even the unjust. Everyone wants happiness very much. Now, except for that good ascribed to things by virtue of their good nature, there are usually said to be two goods and two corresponding evils. One good is that which is called justice, and injustice is its corresponding evil; the other good is that which seems best called benefit, and its corresponding evil is disadvantage.
Not everyone wills justice, and not everyone flees injustice; but every rational nature, as well as every nature which can sense, wants to have what is beneficial and wants to avoid what is disadvantageous. For no one wants any particular thing unless he thinks it will be beneficial to him in one way or another. Therefore, in this way, everyone wants what is good for him and does not want what is harmful to him.
So no one can be happy who doesn't want happiness in general; and no one can be happy by having what he does not want or by not having what he does want.
It's not to be denied.
T. On the other hand, someone who does not want justice should not be happy.
I concede this as well.
Chapter XIII That when Satan had received only the will for happiness, he could will only happiness and couldn't keep from willing it; and no matter what he willed thereby, Ins willing was neither just nor unjust.
T. Let us suppose that at first God gave Satan only the will for happiness; and let us ask whether he could move himself to
The Fall of Satan
willing something other than what he had received to will, simply because he had received a will.
S. Continue with what you have begun. Vm ready to understand.
It is evident that Satan wouldn't yet will anything other than happiness, because he had not received anything else to will.
S. That's true.
T. Therefore, I ask you whether he could move himself to will something else.
I can't see how he could move himself to will something other than happiness when he didn't want anything else. For if he willed to move himself to some other willing, then he wanted something else.
T. Just as when he had been given no will, he was able to will nothing through himself (per se), so when he had received only the will for happiness, he was able to htve no other will from himself (ase).
S. That's correct.
Isn't it the case that if he should think something to be of advantage for acquiring happiness, he could move himself to will it?
I am in doubt about what to answer. For if he could not, then I don't see how he would will happiness—for he could not will that by which he thought he could acquire happiness. But if he could, then I don't understand why he could not will something other than happiness.
T. Someone may will something for the sake of something else; i.e., not for the sake of the thing he seems to will. In such a case, which of the following should he be judged properly to will: that which he is said to will, or that for the sake of which he wills what he is said to will?^^ S. The latter.
T. Therefore, whoever wills something for the sake of happiness does not will anything other than happiness. For this reason, he both can will a thing he thinks to be of advantage to happiness and can will happiness itself.
S. That's plain enough.
17 Cf . DL, Ch. 5.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil T. At the time Satan had received only the will for happiness, was he able not to loill happiness?
S. Well, he couldn't both will and not will at the same time.
T. True enough, but I'm not asking that. Rather, I am asking whether he could desert this willing and move himself from willing happiness to not willing it.
If he could do this unwillingly, it would not be he himself doing it. And if he did it willingly, he would be willing something other than happiness. But he couldn't will anything else; and so I think it is evident that, through himself, he could never keep from willing the only thing which he had received to will.
You're coming along well. But tell me whether Satan, when he willed nothing but happiness, and could not avoid willing happiness, could avoid willing happiness more if he understood there to be a greater happiness.
If his will for happiness did not increase to the degree that he thought there to be a better and a greater happiness, then either he did not will happiness at all or else he willed something other than happiness and thereby did not will the better happiness. But we said that he willed happiness and nothing else.
T. Therefore, the more he could understand that there was a happiness higher than his own, the happier he willed to be.
S. Without doubt, he so willed.
Therefore, he willed to be like God.
S. Nothing clearer.
T. Does it seem to you that his wilhng was unjust if, in this way, he willed to be like God?
I don't want to call it just, because he willed what was not proper; and yet I don't care to call it unjust, because he willed from necessity.
T. But we posited that he who wills happiness alone only wills things that are beneficial.
Yes, we did.
T. Therefore, if he who could will only what was beneficial was unable to have higher and truer things, wouldn't he have willed whatever lesser things he was able to use?
Certainly, for he was unable to avoid willing even the meanest things when he could not have the higher.
T. If Satan willed these base and unclean pleasures (commoda),
The Fall of Satan
by which his irrational and carnal sensibilities were delighted, wouldn't his will be both unjust and blameworthy?
S. How could his will be unjust and worthy of blame if he willed only what he had received, and thus was unable to keep from willing?
T. So it is evident that this will is the work and gift of God, whether it wills the highest benefits or the lowest pleasures—just as life and sensibility are also gifts; and it is clear that justice and injustice are not in this will.
S. No doubt about it.
T. Therefore, insofar as this will has being, it is something good; but insofar as it is related to justice and injustice, it is neither good nor evil.
S. Nothing is clearer than this.
T. Yet someone ought not be happy if he does not have a just will; moreover, he cannot be perfectly and laudably happy if he wills what could not or should not be.
That's fairly obvious.
Chapter XIV That the case would be similar if only the will for uprightness were received; and therefore he received both wills at the same time, so that he might be both happy and just.
T. Now, let's suppose that only a will for justice had been given to Satan for him to will only what would be fitting for him to will. Might he also have willed something else, or might he, through himself, have been able to keep from willing what he had received to will?
S. Everything applicable to the will for happiness must be brought forth in this case, too.
T. So you see that, in this case too, he would have a will which could be neither just nor unjust. For even as the will for happiness wouldn't be unjust if it willed unfitting things which it couldn't keep from willing, so this will for justice wouldn't be just by virtue of willing fitting things, since it had received no ability to do anything else.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil S. That's right.
T. Then since Satan could be called neither just nor unjust simply because he necessarily willed happiness alone or justice alone, and since he could not, and ought not, be happy unless he wanted happiness and justly wanted it, it was necessary for God to make both wills agree in him, so that he could both will to be happy and will this justly. Since justice was added, it would so temper the will for happiness that its excesses would be curtailed and yet its ability to transgress not be destroyed. Because Satan willed happiness, he could exceed the mean; and yet because he willed justly, he would not want to exceed it. So, having a just will for happiness, Satan could and should be happy. For whoever does not will what he should not will, although he could will it, merits to be able never to will what he should not will.
And whoever always holds to justice by an ordered will merits never to be in need of anything; on the other hand, whoever deserts justice by an immoderate will deserves to be in need in every way.
S. No thought seems more fitting.
T. Remember that when we were previously considering only the will for happiness, without yet having added that other will by which someone keeps himself subordinate to God, we said there was no justice or injustice in that will regardless of what it willed.
I remember well.
Chapter XV That justice is something.
T. Do you think that whatever, when added to the will, tempers it, so that it wants no more than is proper and advantageous, is something?
S. No one with any sense will think it is nothing.
I believe you are suflBciently aware that this is nothing other than justice.
It couldn't be anything else.
T. Therefore, it is certain that justice is something.
S. In fact, it's something good.