Chapter XII
Truth, Freedom, and Evil properly said only of that which is something. And when they are said in the manner I have just mentioned, they are not said aboiit that which is something, but about that which is spoken of "as if it were something."
S. You have convinced me that we cannot argue that "evil" is something simply because we use this word as a name.
Chapter XII That Satan was not able to have his original willing from himself; and that many things are said "to be able" through another's power and "to be unable" on account of another's impotence.
It remains now for you to teach me how to reply to those other arguments which tend to persuade me that evil is something.
If we are ever going to get to the heart of this issue, then we'll have to begin a httle more elaborately. But you should not be content to understand the things I'm going to say merely by considering them one after the other; rather, you should try to gather them together in your mind so that you can behold them as if under a single view.
I will follow what you say as carefully as I can, but please don't let it annoy you if you have to wait a bit because I am slower than you had hoped.
T. Let us suppose that God created Satan step by step, and not all at once; and that God wished to make him happy. And let us suppose that Satan has been created up to the point of being suited for willing, but without yet having willed anything.
S. Suppose what you wish, but explain what I wish.
T. Do you think that Satan, in this condition, could will anything through himself {per se)?
S. I don't really know why you say "through himself." For you have already said above that no creature has anything which he has not received, and so can do nothing through himself.
T. When I say "through himself," I mean, "through that which
The Fall of Satan
he already has"; for example, whoever aheady has feet, and whatever is necessary in order to walk, can walk by his own efforts (per se). And whoever has feet, but has some injury to his feet, is not able to walk by his own eflForts. In this sense, then, I am asking whether Satan, when already suited for willing, but not yet having willed anything, was able to will something through himself.
I think that he could, if he ever wanted to.
T. You are not answering my question.
S. In what way?
I am not asking about Satan's willing anything, but about an ability which precedes willing something; and you are replying in terms of Satan's willing something, and in terms of the ability which is used in willing something. For everything, by the very fact that it is, is able to be. But not everything that is was able to be before it was. When, therefore, I ask whether someone who is not willing anything is able to will, I am asking about an ability which precedes willing, by which someone can move himself to will. But when you reply, "He could if he wanted to," you are talking about the ability which is used in a particular willing. For of course it's true that if someone wills, he is able to will.
I know that there are two abilities:
(1) an ability which is not yet in use, and (2) an ability which is already in use.^^ For I can't deny o^whatever is able to be in such a way that it already is, that if at some time or other it had not been, it would still have been able to be. If it had not been able to be, then it never would have been. So I think that I have made a good reply by saying that whoever is able to will because he already has willed must have been able to will before he actually willed.
T. Do you think that whatever is nothing has nothing at all, and thus has no ability, and with no abihty is able to be nothing at all?
I can't deny this.
I think that the world was nothing before it was made.
S. True enough.
T. Therefore, before it was, it had absolutely no ability.
S. This follows.
13 Cf . DL, Ch.
7, where this distinction is introduced and explained.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil T. Then before it was, it was not able to be.^* S.
I don't agree. If it were not able to be, it would have been impossible for it ever to be.
T. Before there was a world, it was both possible and impossible for it to be.
It was impossible for the world, since the world had no ability to be; but it was possible for God, since it was in God's power to make the world be. Therefore, the world exists because God had the ability to make a world before there was a world, and not because the world itself possessed an abihty to be, before it was.
I can't refute you rationally, but our common way of speaking does not agree with this.
It's not surprising. For we say many things improperly in our ordinary way of speaking. But when we wish to come to the heart of a matter, it is necessary to analyze, as far as the subject matter allows, the improper usage which is troubling us. Because of this impropriety of speaking, it happens that we very frequently say "a thing can .
." not because it can, but because something else can; and we say that a thing which can cannot, because something else cannot. For example, I might say "A book can be written by me"; yet a book can do nothing, although I can write a book. Or we might say, "This man cannot be conquered by that man"; we understand this to mean only that that man cannot conquer this man.^^ Hence we say that God cannot do anything perverse or contrary to Himself, since He is so powerful in happiness and justice that nothing can occur which might harm Him, the Highest Good.
(Actually beatitude and justice are not diverse in Him but are one good, and so He is all-powerful in simplicity of goodness. He also cannot be corrupted and cannot lie. ) Therefore, whatever is not is not able to he by its own power before it is; but if another thing is able to make it be, then it is able to be, because of this other power.
Although we can make a number of distinctions with respect to abihty and inability, let's settle on this: Many things are said
14 This argument introduces a qualification of the Boethian table of modalities. See D.
P. Henry, "Remarks on Saint Anselm's Treatment of Possibility," Spicilegium Beccense, 1 (Paris:
J. Vrin, 1959), 19-22. i'"> Cf. DV, Ch. 8.
The Fall of Satan
"to be able" not by their own ability, but by another*s; and many things are said "not to be able" not by their own inability, but by another's. Now with reference to Satan, whom we have imagined as created to the point where he has the capability for willing, but without yet willing anything, I refer to his own ability and ask, "Was he then able to will something through himself?" In relation to what I've just said, give your answer.
If Satan were so fit for willing that nothing else was lacking to him than actually to will, I don't see why he was not able to will through his own ability. For whoever is capable of seeing, but sees nothing because he is standing in the light with his eyes closed, is still able to see by his own ability. Now, just as a person who is not seeing is still able to see by his own powers, so I should think that a person who is not willing would also be able to will by his own powers. The cases seem similar; so why not?^^
T. Because the person who does not see has sight and the volition by which he is able to control his sight. But we are now talking about Satan when he had no volition. So can you tell me how someone moves himself from not-willing to willing? Does he will to move?
If I should say that someone is moved, but not by his own willing, then the consequence would be that he was not moved by himself, but by something else. Of course, a person might suddenly blink when he sees a blow coming, or might be compelled by some distress or other, to will something he previously was not willing. But I don't know whether in such a case he first wills to move to this willing.
T. No one is compelled by fear or a sense of any disadvantage, nor attracted by love of any benefit, to will any particular thing, unless he first has the natural will, or inclination, to avoid what is disadvantageous and to enjoy what is beneficial. By this natural will he moves himself to other willings.
I can't deny it.
T. Therefore, you should say that whoever moves himself to willing any particular thing must first will that he move.
S. That's right.
T. But whoever is not willing anything at all can in no way move himself to willing.
16 Cf . DV, Ch. 3.