Chapter XII
Truth, Freedom, and Evil seem to be opposed to freedom. For you have shown that both freedom and servitude are in the will, and a man is free or servant in accordance with whichever he has.
If, then, he is a servant, how is he free? And if he is free, how is he a servant?
If you take a close look, you will see how a man is both servant and free, without contradiction, when he does not have the uprightness we've been talking about. For it is never in his power to acquire uprightness when he doesn't have it; but it is always in his power to keep it when he does have it.
In one respect, because he is unable to escape from sin, he is a servant; in another respect, because he is unable to be forcibly drawn away from uprightness, he is free. But he can be turned away from sin and from servitude to sin only by another; and he can be turned away from uprightness only by himself; but he cannot be deprived of his freedom at all—either by himself or by another. For a man is always naturally free to keep uprightness, whether he has it in his possession or whether he does not.
S. This consistency which you have worked out between servitude and freedom convinces me that they both can be present in the same man at the same time.
Chapter XII Why we would rather say "A man is free even when he does not have uprightness, because it could not be taken away from him if he had it" than say "A man is a servant even when he has uprightness, because he could not recover it by his own power if he did not have it."
S. But now, I would like to know why it is more proper to say: "A man is free even when he does not have uprightness, because it could not be taken away from him by someone else if he had it" than say "A man is a servant even when he has uprightness, because he could not recover it by his own power if he did not have it." For in one case, we call him a servant because he cannot withdraw from sin; and in another case, we call him a free man because he cannot be drawn away from
On Freedom of Choice
Uprightness by anyone else. And just as when he has uprightness, he can never be drawn away from it by anyone else; so too, when he does not have uprightness, he can never withdraw from sin. Therefore, just as a man always has freedom, so he always seems to have servitude. [And if this is the case, why do we prefer to call him free rather than a servant?]
T. Because this servitude is nothing other than an inability to avoid sinning. Whether we call this servitude "the inability to return to uprightness" or "the powerlessness to recover it and possess it again," a man is a servant of sin for no other reason than this: that he can't avoid sinning, because he is unable to return to uprightness, or to recover rectitude and have it again.
When he has uprightness, he does not have this inability to avoid sinning; i.e., when he has uprightness, he is never the servant of sin. But he always has the ability to keep uprightness, both when he has uprightness and when he does not.
Therefore, he is always a free man.
Now to return to the question which you are asking, namely, why would we rather say "A man is free even when he does not have uprightness, because it could not be taken away from him by anyone else if he had it" than say "A man is a servant even when he has uprightness, because he could not recover it by his own power if he did not have it"? Your question is analogous to asking: Why do we prefer to say "A man has the ability to see the sun even when the sun is absent, because he would be able to see it if it were present" than to say "A man lacks the power to see the sun when the sun is present, because, if it were absent, he could not make it present"? Now even as when the sun is absent, we have sight in us by which to see it when it is present; so also, when uprightness of will is lacking to us, we have the aptitudes of understanding and willing by which we could keep uprightness for its own sake if we had it. And just as when we lack nothing for seeing the sun except the sun's presence, so that the only thing we don't have is the power which the sun's presence causes in us: so when we lack uprightness, the only inability we have is that which the absence of uprightness causes in us. Therefore, a man always has freedom of choice; but he is not always "the servant of sin." He is the servant of sin only when he lacks an upright will.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil S.
If I had thought carefully about what you said earlier when you distinguished the abihty to see into four powers, then I should not have been puzzled here.
I confess that my confusion was my own fault.
T. If you will keep those things which we have discussed present in your mind so that when we need them it won't be necessary to repeat them, Til spare you the trouble of going over them again.
S. Thank you for your kindness; but you should not be surprised if all the things which are new to me are not present in my memory after only one hearing.
T. Tell me whether you now have any qualms about our definition of freedom of choice.
Chapter XIII That "the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake" is the complete definition of freedom of choice.
S. There is one thing which disturbs me a little about our definition up to now. For we often have an ability to keep something, and yet that abihty is not free to the point that it can escape being overcome by an alien force. So when you define freedom of choice as "the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake," shouldn't you consider whether something else doesn't have to be added which stipulates that this ability is so free that it cannot be overcome by another force?
If the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake could at any time be found without that freedom which we have been discussing, then it would be useful to add what you are saying. But since the proposed definition is so complete with respect to genus and differentia that it neither excludes anything essential nor includes anything non-essential to freedom, nothing can conceivably be added to or subtracted from it. For "ability"
(i.e., "power") is the genus of "freedom." But when "to keep" is added to "ability," this "ability" is distinguished from every ability which is not "ability to keep" (for example, there is an ability to laugh