Chapter XII
Truth, Freedom, and Evil gating truth. But if you like, go on with whatever you wish.
T. Tell me whether you think there is still another rightness in addition to those rightnesses we've discussed.
S. I don't know of any other except the rightness which is in corporeal things, such as the rightness, or straightness, of a stick. But this is quite different from the other kinds.
T. In what way does this rightness seem to you to diflFer from the others?
S. Because it can be apprehended by the bodily sight; but the others can be apprehended only by the rational sight.
Isn't the straightness of material objects understood and recognized by reason without our even looking at them? Suppose there were doubt about whether the surface of an object which is absent were straight or not.
Suppose also that it could be shown that no part of the surface were curved. Then couldn't it be rationally concluded that the surface was straight?
Yes, it could. But the same thing which can be known in this way by reason can also be perceived by the eyes, whereas the other lands of rightness can only be perceived by the mind.
T. Therefore, unless I am mistaken we can define truth as the rightness perceptible only to the mind.
S. There's no mistake in saying this, for this definition of truth contains exactly what is necessary and is neither too broad nor too narrow. The word "rightness" distinguishes truth from everything which is not called "rightness." And "perceptible only to the mind" distinguishes truth from that rightness, or straightness, which is visible to the senses.
Chapter XII On the definition of justice.
S. But since you have taught me that all truth is rightness and since rightness seems to me to be the same thing as justice, teach me also what I may understand justice to be. For it seems that whatever it is for a thing to be right is also what it is for that thing to be just; and conversely, whatever it is for a thing to be just is also what it is for that thing to be right.
It seems to be
Concerning Truth
both just and right for fire to be hot and for a man to love someone who loves him. For if whatever ought to exist exists both rightly and justly, and if nothing else exists justly and rightly except what ought to exist, then justice is simply rightness. And although the Supreme and Simple Nature is not right or just because it is under any obligation to do or to be anything, nevertheless, rightness and justice are also identical in it.
If justice is nothing other than rightness, then you now know the definition of justice. And since we're speaking about the rightness which is perceivable only by the mind—truth, rightness, and justice are definable in terms of one another. Thus, if a person were to know what any one of these is but were not to know what the other two are, he could infer from his knowledge of one to a knowledge of the others.
In fact, were he to know one of them, he could not keep from knowing the other two.
S. But if rightness and justice are the same, shall we call a stone just because it does what it ought when it seeks to move toward the earth—even as we call a man just when he does what he ought?
T. No, we don't ordinarily call a stone just on the basis of this kind of justice.
S. Why, then, do we prefer to call a man just rather than a stone, if both act justly?
T. Don't you think that the activity of a man differs in some way from the activity of a stone?
I know that a man acts freely, but a stone acts by nature and not freely.
T. And this is why we don't call a stone just; for a thing is not called just, even though it does what it ought, if it doesn't will what it does.
Shall we say, then, that a horse is just when he wills to eat, because he willingly does what he ought?^^
I didn't say that something is just which willingly does what it ought; rather, I said that whoever or whatever does not willingly do what he ought is not just.
Tell me, then, who or what is just.
12 Cf. DL, Ch. 5.
Truth, Freedom, and Evil T. As I see it, you are asking for a definition of that justice Vv^hich something should be praised for having, even as it should be blamed for having its opposite, namely, injustice.
S. That's the justice Fm seeking.
It is evident that such justice is not in any nature which does not know rightness. For any nature which does not will Tightness does not merit praise for having it, even if it does have it. But a nature which does not know rightness is not able to will it.
S That's true.
T. Therefore, the rightness which brings praise to a thing which has rightness is present only in a rational nature, which alone knows the rightness we're talking about.
It follows.
T. Therefore, since all justice is rightness, the justice which makes the one who keeps it worthy of praise is present only in rational creatures.
It cannot be otherwise.
T. Then where do you think this kind of justice is to be found in a rational man?
It must be either in his will or his knowledge or his actions.
T. What if someone were to think rightly and to act rightly, but not to will rightly: would anyone praise him for his justice?
S. No.
T. Then justice is not rightness of knowledge or rightness of action, but rightness of will.
It would have to be either this or nothing.
T. Do you think we have adequately defined the justice we are seeking?
S. You decide.
T. Well, do you think that whoever wills what he ought wills rightly and has uprightness of will, which is the will's rightness?
S. No, not if he wills what he should without knowing that he should will it. For example, suppose somebody willed to lock a door without knowing that there was a man outside who wanted to enter the house in order to kill someone inside. It may be that the man who locked the door would have some kind of uprightness of will, but he would certainly not have the uprightness of will that we are interested in.
Concerning Truth
T. All right. Now what would you say about a person who knows he ought to will what he does will?
S. Well, it could happen that a man knowingly wills what he ought to will and yet does not want to have this obligation. ^^ For when a robber is compelled to return money he has stolen, it is evident that he doesn't want to be obHged to do this, since he is compelled to be willing to return the money because he ought to return it. But he is not at all entitled to be praised on account of this rightness.
All right. Now consider the case of someone who feeds a poor, hungry man for the sake of his own hunger for glory. This person wills to have the obligation to will what he does, and he is praised because he wills to do what he ought. But what do you think about him?
S. His rightness must not be praised; and so it is not to be equated with the justice we're seeking. Show me now what does adequately define justice.
T. Every will, when it wills something, also wills for the sake of something. Therefore, just as we must consider what it wills, so we must also notice why it wills. For a will is no more upright by willing what it ought to will than by willing it for the reason it ought to will it. Therefore, every will has both a what and a why, since whatever we will, we will for a reason.
S. We all recognize this in ourselves.
T. But if a man's will is to be praiseworthy, for what reason do you think he ought to will what he does?
It is clear ichat he should will, since a man who does not will what he ought to will is not just.
S. And it is equally clear that if a man's will is to be just, he should not only will what he ought, but also because he ought.
T. You have a good grasp of these two things that are necessary for a will to be just: willing what one ought and willing because one ought. But now tell me whether these two things are sufficient for the will's being just.
S. Why wouldn't they be?
T. When someone wills what he ought because he is compelled to and is compelled to will it because he ought to, isn't 13 "Velle*' means both wilhng and wanting—wanting in the sense of consenting to or wishing for.
Truih, Freedom, and Evil he (in a certain way) willing what he ought to will because he ought to?
I can't deny it. But he wills in one way, and a just man wills in another.
T. Distinguish these two ways.
S. When a just man wills what he ought to will, then, insofar as he is to be called just, he keeps uprightness of will only for its own sake; but someone who wills what he ought to will only when he is compelled to, or when induced by external rewards, does not keep uprightness of will for its own sake, but keeps it for the sake of something else—if he can be said to keep it at all.
T. Then that will is just which keeps the uprightness it has for its own sake.
S. Either this will is just or no will is.
Therefore, justice is uprightness of will kept for its own sake.i^ S.
Yes, this is the definition of justice I was seeking.
T. Consider whether something in the definition shouldn't be amended.
I don't see anything to be improved.
T. Nor do I. For there is no justice which is not rightness, and only the uprightness of will is called justice in and of itself. For rightness of action is called justice only when that action is performed with a just will, while uprightness of will does not at all lose the name "justice" even if it should be impossible actually to do what we rightly will.
Now as regards the word *1cept," someone will perhaps say: "If uprightness of will is to be called justice only when it is kept, then the original uprightness of vdll is not justice and we don't receive justice when we receive this uprightness, but we make this uprightness become justice by keeping it. For we must receive and have uprightness of will before we can keep it. So we don't receive uprightness and have it for the first time because we keep it, but we begin to keep it because we have received it and already have it."
But to these objections we can reply that at one and the same '4 "Justitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata." This definition of justice is the key to Anselm's conception of free choice, and hence is the link between this treatise and the one which follows it.
Concerning Truth
time, we receive uprightness both to will and to have. For we only have it by willing it, and by the very act of willing it we have it. Moreover, just as we both have it and will it at the same time, so we both will it and keep it at the same time; for just as we do not keep uprightness except by willing it, so there is no time when we are willing it that we are not keeping it. As long as we will uprightness we keep it, and as long as we keep it we will it. Therefore, since willing it and having it occur at the same time, and since willing it and keeping it do not occur at difiFerent times, then our having it and our keeping it necessarily occur at the same time. And just as we have it as long as we keep it, so we keep it as long as we have it. These assertions involve no contradictions.
Of course, the receiving of this uprightness is by nature prior to having it or willing it, since having it or willing it is not the cause of receiving it, but receiving it makes possible both the having and willing it. Nevertheless, receiving, having, and willing occur simultaneously, for we originally received and had and willed uprightness at the same time. Therefore, as soon as uprightness is received, it is both had and willed. Moreover, having uprightness and willing it occur simultaneously with keeping it, even though having and willing are by nature prior to keeping.
Therefore, we receive justice from God, from whom we simultaneously receive the having and willing and keeping of uprightness of will. And as soon as we have and will this uprightness of will, we may be said to have justice.
The phrase "for its own sake," which we included in our definition of justice, is essential because this very uprightness could in no way be justice unless it were kept for its own sake.
I can think of no objections to this.
T. Do you think that this definition can also be applied to the Supreme Justice—at least to the extent that we are able to speak about Something of which nothing, or almost nothing, can properly be said?
S. Well, God's will is not one thing and His uprightness another any more than His divinity is one thing and His power another. Nevertheless, just as we speak of the "power of divinity" or the "divine power" or the "powerful divinity," so it is also not inconsistent to speak of His "voluntary uprightness" or His "up-
Truth, Freedom, and Evil right will." Moreover, if we say that the will's uprightness is "kept for its own sake," then it seems that this phrase can be applied to no other uprightness more fittingly than to God's uprightness. For just as nothing else keeps God's uprightness, but it keeps itself, and just as it keeps itself through nothing other than itself, so it keeps itself for the sake of nothing but itself.
T. Then, we can say, without any hesitation, that justice is uprightness of will which is being kept for its own sake (quae rectitudo propter se servatur).
[There is one last point touching the grammatical form of the verb servatur (is being kept).] Since we don't have a passive participle of the present tense in Latin, we can use the perfect passive participle of the same verb to express present time.
It is very well known that we are accustomed to use the perfect passive participle as a substitute for a present passive participle. For Latin lacks a present passive participle, just as it also lacks a perfect participle for active and middle verbs. So too, we can use the present active participle in place of this perfect active participle that we lack. For example,
I might say about someone, "He teaches you what he learned while studying and reading (studens et legens) only when compelled (coactus)"; that is, "He teaches you what he learned while he studied and read only when he is compelled."
T. Then we did well to say that justice is uprightness of will kept (servatam) for its own sake, i.e., uprightness of will which is being kept (servatur) for its own sake. For this reason just men sometimes are called "upright in heart"
(i.e., upright in will), and sometimes they are called simply "upright"—without the qualifying phrase "in heart." For no one is understocd to be upright except one whose will is upright. Thus the Scripture uses both expressions when it says, "Let all the upright in heart glory" and "The upright shall see and shall rejoice."
(Ps. 64:10; 107:42) S. Your definition of justice will satisfy even children.
Let's move on.