Monologion: Chapter 7
MONOLOGION
On the other hand, if it is said that he came to exist from nothing through some other nature, then he is not supreme among all things but inferior to at least one; moreover, he is what he is, not through himself but through another.
Likewise, if he exists from nothing through something, that through which he exists was a great good, since it was the cause of so great a good. But no good thing can be understood [as existing] before that good without whom nothing is good. Now it is quite clear that this good, without whom no good thing exists, is the supreme nature that is under discussion. Therefore, it is not even conceivable that something preceded him through which he came to exist from nothing.
Finally, if this very nature is something either through nothing or from nothing, then undoubtedly either he is not through himself and from himself whatever he is, or he is himself said to be nothing. And there is no need to explain how false either of these alternatives is. Therefore, although the supreme substance does not exist through some efficient cause or from some matter, and although he was not helped by any causes in order that he might be brought into being, nonetheless, he does not in any sense exist through nothing or from nothing, since he is through himself and from himself whatever he is.
In what sense, then, are we to understand that he exists through himself and from himself, if he neither made himself, nor provided matter for himself, nor in any way helped himself to be what he was not already? It seems that perhaps this can be understood only in the same sense in which it is said that light shines, or is shining, through itself and from itself. For 'light' and 'to shine' and 'shining' are related to each other in just the same way as 'essence' and 'to be' and 'being', that is, existing or subsisting.* Therefore, 'supreme essence' and 'supremely to be' and 'supremely being', that is, supremely existing or supremely subsisting, are related to each other not unlike 'light' and 'to shine' and 'shining'.4
Chapter 7 In what way all other things exist through him and from him It now remains for us to discuss the sense in which all those things that exist through another exist through the supreme substance, whether because he made them all, or because he was the matter of them all. For there is no need
4 The Latin words for 'light','to shine', and 'shining' (lux, lucere, and lucens) are a noun, an infinitive, and a participle from the same stem. The same relation holds among the Latin words for 'essence','to be', and 'being' (essentia, esse, and ens).
BASIC WRITINGS
to ask whether they all exist through him merely because he in some way helped all things to exist, whereas some other thing made them or some other matter existed, since it is inconsistent with what became evident above if all existing things exist through him only in some secondary way and not principally.
And so I think I should first ask whether all things that exist through another exist from some matter. Now I have no doubt that the whole mass of this world with its parts, as we see it formed, consists of earth, air, fire, and water.
These four elements can in some way be understood apart from the forms that we observe in formed things, in such a way that the unformed or even confused nature of the elements is seen to be the matter of all the bodies* that are made distinct by their own forms.5 As I say, I have no doubt about that. But I ask where this thing of which I have spoken, the matter of the mass of the world, comes from. For if it in turn comes from some other matter, then that is more truly the matter of the physical universe.
If, then, the totality of things, whether visible or invisible, exists from some matter, it cannot exist—more than that, it cannot even be said to exist—from any matter other than the supreme nature, or from itself, or from some third essence that is neither. But of course nothing at all can even be thought to exist other than he who is supreme among all things, who exists through himself, and the totality of those things that do not exist through themselves but through that same supreme being. Therefore, that which is in no way something is not the matter of anything. But the totality of things, which does not exist through itself, cannot exist from its own nature. For if it did, it would in some way exist through itself, and through something other than the one through whom all things exist, and he would not be the only thing through which all things exist—all of which is false. Moreover, everything that exists from matter exists from another thing and is posterior* to that thing. And since nothing is other than itself or posterior to itself, it follows that nothing exists from itself materially.
But if something less than the supreme nature can exist from the matter of the supreme nature, the supreme good can be changed and corrupted— which it is impious to say. Therefore, since everything that is other than the supreme good is less than he is, it is impossible for anything else to be from him in this way. Furthermore, anything through which the supreme good is changed or corrupted is, without a doubt, in no way good. Now if any lesser
5 In other words, what makes one body different from another is the particular form or configuration that the elements have in that body. But you can conceive of the elements by themselves, in isolation from this or that particular configuration.When you do, you realize that the elements in this unformed state are the building blocks of all bodies.