Monologion: Chapter 33
BASIC WRITINGS
the supreme essence, which the Word is, would indeed be eternal through his essence, but he would not be a Word if nothing were ever made through him? For there can be no word of something that neither existed, nor exists, nor will exist.
But according to this argument, if no essence other than the supreme spirit ever existed, no word at all would exist in him. If no word ever existed in him, he would not utter anything within himself. Now for him, to utter something is the same as to understand it. So if he did not utter anything within himself, he would not understand anything. If he did not understand anything, it would follow that the supreme wisdom, which is nothing other than that same spirit, would not understand anything, which is utterly absurd.What then? If he did not understand anything, how would he be the supreme wisdom?
But then if nothing existed apart from him, what would he understand?
Would he not understand himself? Indeed, how can it even be thought that the supreme wisdom at some time fails to understand himself, since the rational mind can remember not only itself but even the supreme wisdom and can understand both him and itself? For if the human mind were not capable of remembering or understanding either him or itself, it would in no way be able to distinguish itself from nonrational creatures or to distinguish him from all of creation by reasoning silently within itself, as my mind is doing now.Therefore, just as that supreme spirit is eternal, so too he eternally remembers and understands himself after the likeness of the rational mind—or rather, not after the likeness of anything; instead, he does so paradigmatically, and the rational mind does so after his likeness. Now if he understands himself eternally, he utters himself eternally. And if he utters himself eternally, his Word exists with him eternally. Therefore, whether he is thought to exist without any other essence existing, or along with other things that exist, his Word, coeternal with him, must exist with him.
Chapter 33 That by one Word he utters both himself and what he made But behold! While I was asking about the Word by which the Creator utters all the things he made, it was the Word by which he utters himself, who made all things, that presented itself to me. Does he utter himself by one Word and the things he makes by some other Word? Or is the Word by which he utters whatever he makes the very same as the Word by which he utters himself? For the Word by which he utters himself must also be the very same thing that he is, just as was true of the Word by which he utters the things he made. For even if nothing other than the supreme spirit ever existed, reason nevertheless
MONOLOGION
compels the conclusion that the Word by which he utters himself necessarily exists. And so what is truer than this: that his Word is nothing other than what he himself is? Therefore, if by a Word that is consubstantial* with himself he utters both himself and the things he makes, it is evident that the Word by which he utters himself and the Word by which he utters creation are one substance. So if there is one substance, how can there be two Words?
But perhaps the identity of the substance does not compel us to assert the unity of the word. For he who utters by means of these words has the same substance they have, and yet he is not a word. And of course the Word by which the supreme wisdom utters himself is most appropriately called his
Word according to our earlier argument, since he bears a perfect likeness to him. For it cannot be denied by any argument that when the rational mind understands itself by thinking itself, an image of itself is born in its thought.
Indeed, that very thinking of itself is its own image, formed to its own likeness as by its own impress. For whatever the mind desires to understand accurately, whether through corporeal imagination or through reason, it tries to impress a likeness of that thing in its thought, so far as it can. And the more truly it does this, the more truly it thinks of that thing. This fact is of course observed more clearly when the mind thinks of something other than itself, especially when it thinks of some body.* For when I think of someone I know who is absent, the gaze of my thought is formed into an image of him like the one that I committed to memory through the vision of my eyes. This image in thought is the word of the man whom I utter by thinking of him. Therefore, when the rational mind understands itself by thinking itself, it has within itself its own image, born from itself—in other words, its thought of itself, formed to its own likeness as by its own impress—although it is reason alone that can distinguish the mind from this image of itself.43 This image of the mind is its word.
And so who could deny that in this way, when the supreme wisdom understands himself by uttering himself, he begets a likeness of himself that is consubstantial with himself:that is,his Word? Although nothing fully adequate can properly be said of such a uniquely excellent thing, he is not improperly called his likeness, and in the same way also his image44 and figure and character.45
By contrast, the Word by whom he utters creation is not the word of creation 43 That is, when the mind understands itself, there is no real distinction between the mind and its image of itself. The distinction is a purely conceptual one, one that is made by reason alone.
44 Cf. Colossians 1:15:"He is the image of the invisible God."
45 Cf. Hebrews 1:3:"He is the splendor of his glory and the figure of his substance." The Greek word translated as 'figure' is χαρακτη´ρ ('character').