Monologion: Chapter 66
BASIC WRITINGS
seen? After all, we often say many things that we do not properly express as they really are; rather, we signify through some other thing what we are either unwilling or unable to express properly, as when we speak in riddles. And we often do not see something properly as the thing itself actually is, but through some likeness or image, as when we look at someone's face in a mirror. In this way we do indeed both say and not say, or both see and not see, one and the same thing.We say and see through some other thing; we do not say or see through its own distinctive character.65
And so by this argument it is perfectly possible for our conclusions thus far about the supreme nature to be true and yet for that nature himself nevertheless to remain ineffable,if we suppose that he was in no way expressed through the distinctive character of his essence but somehow designated through some other thing. For all the words that seem applicable to that nature do not show him to me through his distinctive character so much as they hint at him through some likeness. For when I think of the significations of these words,
I more readily conceive in my mind what I observe in created things than what I understand to transcend all human understanding. For by their signification they produce something in my mind that is much less than—that is in fact vastly different from—that which my mind is trying to come to understand through their tenuous signification. For the word 'wisdom' does not suffice to show me the one through whom all things were made from nothing and are preserved from nothingness. Nor can the word 'essence' express to me the one who through his unique exaltedness is far above all things and through his natural distinctive character is vastly beyond all things. So this is how it is the case both that his nature is ineffable, because words can in no way express him as he is, and that if reason can teach us to form any judgment about him through some other thing, as in a riddle, that judgment is not false.
Chapter 66 That through the rational mind one comes closest to knowing the supreme essence
Therefore, since it is evident that nothing about this nature can be perceived through his own distinctive character, but only through something else, it is certain that one comes closer to knowing him through that which is nearer to him because it is more like him. For whatever among created things is
65 "Distinctive character" represents the Latin proprietas.The proprietas of a thing is whatever it is in itself, by its very nature. Anselm is arguing that we do not know God by knowing his very nature.We do not have direct intellectual access to what he is in himself. Instead, whatever we know about God must be inferred indirectly through some likeness.