Monologion: Chapter 5/Chapter 6
MONOLOGION
be the case unless he is through himself what he is and all existing things are through him what they are. For reason showed a little earlier that he who exists through himself, and through whom all other things exist, is supreme among all existing things. Therefore, either (conversely) he who is supreme exists through himself and all other things exist through him, or there will be several supreme beings. But it is evident that there are not several supreme beings. Therefore, there is a certain nature or substance or essence who through himself is good and great and through himself is what he is; through whom exists whatever truly is good or great or anything at all; and who is the supreme good, the supreme great thing, the supreme being or subsistent,* that is, supreme among all existing things.
Chapter 5 That, just as he exists through himself and other things exist through him, so he exists from himself and other things exist from him
And so, since what has been discovered is satisfactory, it is helpful to investigate whether this very nature, and all things that are anything, exist from him just as they exist through him. Now clearly it can be said that whatever exists from something also exists through that thing, and whatever exists through something also exists from that thing. For example, whatever exists from some matter and through a craftsman can also be said to exist through the matter and from the craftsman, since it has its existence through both and from both— that is, by both—although it does not exist through the matter and from the matter in the same way that it exists through the craftsman and from the craftsman. It follows, therefore, that just as all existing things are what they are through the supreme nature, and so he exists through himself, whereas other things exist through another,in the same way all existing things exist from that same supreme nature, and so he exists from himself, whereas other things exist from another.
Chapter 6 That he does not exist through the help of some other cause that brought him into existence, and yet neither does he exist through nothing or from nothing; and in what sense he can be understood to exist through himself and from himself
Therefore, since the expressions "to exist through something" and "to exist from something" do not always have the same meaning, we must more carefully investigate in what sense all existing things exist through or from the supreme nature. And since he who exists through himself and that which exists through another do not fit the same definition of existing, we shall first
BASIC WRITINGS
look separately at that supreme nature who exists through himself and then at those things that exist through another.
So, since it has been established that he is through himself whatever he is, and all other things are through him what they are, in what sense does he exist through himself? For whatever is said to exist through something seems to exist either through an efficient* cause or through some matter or through some other aid (for example, through a tool). Now whatever exists in any of these three ways exists through another and is both posterior* to and in some way less than that through which it has its existence. But the supreme nature in no way exists through another; nor is he posterior to or less than himself or any other thing. Therefore, the supreme nature could not come about either by his own agency or by that of some other thing, nor was he or anything else the matter from which he came about, nor did he or some other thing in any way help him to be what he was not already.
What then? Something that does not exist by the agency of something or from some matter, or come into existence by means of any aids, appears either to be nothing or, if it is something, to exist through nothing and from nothing. Now although on the basis of what has already been established by the light of reason about the supreme substance I think that these things can in no way apply to him, nonetheless, I shall not neglect to put together a proof of this. For since this meditation of mine has suddenly brought me to this important and interesting point, I do not wish to pass over any objection, however simple and almost foolish, that occurs to me in the course of my disputation. Thus, by leaving nothing doubtful in what went before, I can proceed with greater certainty to what follows; and further, if I should want to persuade anyone of what I have been thinking, even someone who is slow to understand can easily agree with what he has heard once every obstacle, however small, has been removed.
And so the claim that this nature,* apart from whom no nature at all exists, is nothing is as false as it would be absurd to say that whatever exists is nothing. Now he does not exist through nothing, since there is no intelligible sense in which what is something exists through nothing. But if in some sense he exists from nothing, he exists from nothing either through himself or through another or through nothing.
Now it has been established that in no way does something exist through nothing.Therefore, if he exists from nothing in any sense, he exists from nothing either through himself or through another. Now nothing can exist from nothing through itself, since if something exists from nothing through something, that through which it exists must exist beforehand. So, since this essence* does not exist before himself, he does not in any way exist from nothing through himself.