Cur Deus Homo: Book Two

Cur Deus Homo: Book Two

BOOK TWO Chapter 1 Human beings were created just, in order that they might be happy

A: It should not be doubted that God made rational nature just, in order that it might be happy in enjoying him. For it is rational in order that it might distinguish between the just and the unjust, between the good and the bad, and between the greater good and the lesser good. Otherwise, it would have been made rational in vain, and God did not make it rational in vain. Therefore, there is no doubt that it was made rational for this purpose.

A similar argument proves that it received this power of discernment so that it might hate and avoid evil, so that it might love and choose good, and so that it might love and choose the greater good to a greater degree. Otherwise God would have given it this power of discernment in vain, since its discernment would be in vain if it did not love and avoid things in accordance with its discernment; and it is not fitting that God should bestow so great a power in vain.And so it is certain that rational nature was made for the purpose of loving and choosing the supreme Good above all other things, not for the sake of something else, but for his own sake. After all, if rational nature loves the supreme Good for the sake of something else, it loves something else and not the supreme Good. Now it cannot love the supreme Good for its own sake unless it is just. Therefore, it was made rational and just at the same time so that it would not be rational in vain.

Now given that it was made just so that it might choose and love the supreme Good, it was made to be just either so that it would at some time attain what it loves and chooses,or not.But if was not made just so that it would attain what it loves and chooses in this way, its being made just, so that it loves and chooses this, would be in vain, and there would be no reason why it ever ought to attain what it loves. Therefore, as long as it continues to act justly by loving and choosing the supreme Good,which is the purpose for which it was made, it will be unhappy, because it will lack something against its will, by not having what it desires—which is altogether absurd. Consequently, rational nature was made just in order that it might be happy in enjoying the supreme

Good, that is, God. Therefore, human beings, who are rational in nature, were made just in order that they might be happy in enjoying God.

Chapter 2 That they would not die if they had not sinned It is easy to prove that human beings were made such that they would not die

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

of necessity, because, as we have already said,1 it is incompatible with God's wisdom and justice that he should compel those whom he made just for the sake of eternal happiness to suffer death apart from any guilt. So it follows that if they had never sinned, they would never die.

Chapter 3 That they will rise again with the body in which they live in this life

This affords a clear proof of the future resurrection of the dead. If human beings are to be perfectly restored, they certainly ought to be reestablished as what they were going to be if they had not sinned.

B: It cannot be otherwise.

A: If human beings had not sinned, they were going to be transformed into incorruptibility along with the bodies that they bore.Accordingly, therefore, it must be the case that when they are restored, they will be restored along with the bodies in which they lived in this life.

B: What answer will we give if someone says that this ought to be done for those in whom the human race will be restored, but it need not be done for the reprobate?

A: Nothing is understood to be more just or more fitting than this: just as, if human beings had persevered in justice, their whole being—that is, soul and body—would be eternally happy, so too, if they persevere in injustice, their whole being will likewise be eternally wretched.

B: Though you have spoken concisely, you have offered me an adequate account of these matters.

Chapter 4 That God will complete what he began in human nature A: On the basis of these considerations it is easy to recognize that either God will complete what he began in human nature or else he made so sublime a nature for so great a good in vain.And since we know that God made nothing more precious than rational nature, which he created so that it might rejoice in him, it is utterly foreign to him that he should allow any rational nature to perish entirely.

1 In Book 1, Chapter 9.

BASIC WRITINGS

B: A rational heart cannot think otherwise.

A: It is therefore necessary that he complete what he began in human nature.

And as we have said, this can take place only through a perfect recompense for sin, which no sinner can make.

B: I now understand that it is necessary for God to complete what he has begun, lest he seem to fall short in his undertaking in a way that is not fitting.

Chapter 5 That although it is necessary that this be done, God is not compelled by necessity to do it; and that there is a necessity that eliminates or diminishes gratitude, and a necessity that increases gratitude

But if this is so, it seems that God is, as it were, compelled to secure human salvation by the necessity of avoiding what is unfitting. So how can it be denied that he does this more for his own sake than for ours? Or if this is so, what gratitude do we owe him for what he does for his own sake? And how will we ascribe our salvation to his grace if he saves us out of necessity?

A: There is a necessity that eliminates or diminishes gratitude to a benefactor, and there is a necessity that increases the gratitude one owes for a benefit.When someone confers a benefit unwillingly because of the necessity to which he is subject, he is owed little or no gratitude. But when he spontaneously* subjects himself to the necessity of conferring a benefit, and he does not remain subject to the necessity against his will, then he surely deserves greater gratitude for his benefit. In fact, this should not be called necessity, but grace (gratia), since he undertook it or remains subject to it freely (gratis), with nothing compelling him. For example, suppose today you spontaneously promise you will give something tomorrow, and by that same will you do give it tomorrow. It is necessary that you fulfill your promise tomorrow if you can, or else be a liar; but the one to whom you give it owes you no less gratitude for the benefit you have conferred than he would have if you had not made the promise, since you did not hesitate to put yourself under an obligation to him before the time of the giving. This is how things are when someone spontaneously vows to pursue a holy way of life.After he has made the vow, he is obligated by necessity to carry it out, lest he incur the damnation of an apostate; and in fact he can be compelled to carry out the vow if he is unwilling.Yet if he willingly carries out his vow, he is more pleasing to God, not less, than if he had not made the vow, since for God's sake he has renounced not only the common way of life but even his own self-determination. And we should say that he leads a holy life not out of necessity, but by the same freedom by which he made his vow.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

Much more, then, should we offer all our gratitude to God if he does the good for human beings that he set out to do, even though it would not be fitting for him to fall short in the good he has undertaken; for he undertook it for our sake, not for his own sake, since he lacks nothing.After all, when God made human beings, he knew what they were going to do.And yet because, in his goodness, he created them, he spontaneously obligated himself (as it were) to bring to completion the good thing that he had undertaken.

Finally, God does nothing out of necessity, since he is in no way compelled to do or prevented from doing anything. And when we say that God does something as though out of the necessity of avoiding dishonorableness (which God certainly does not fear), we should understand this more properly as meaning that he does it out of the necessity of preserving honorableness.This necessity is nothing other than the immutability of his honorableness, which he has from himself and not from another, and for that reason it is improperly* called necessity. Nevertheless, let us say that it is necessary that the goodness of God,because of its immutability,complete what it has begun in human beings, even though the whole of this good work is a matter of grace.

B: Agreed.

Chapter 6 That only a God-man can make the recompense through which human beings are saved A: But this can be accomplished only if there is someone who in payment for human sin gives God something greater than everything other than God.

B: So we have agreed.2

A: And someone who can give God something of his own that surpasses everything that is less than God must himself be greater than everything that is not God.

B: I can't deny it.

A: But nothing other than God surpasses everything that is not God.

B: That's true.

A: Therefore, no one other than God can make this recompense.

B: That follows.

2 See Book 1, Chapter 21.

BASIC WRITINGS

A: But no one other than a human being ought to make it, since otherwise human beings would not make recompense.

B: Nothing seems more just.

A: So if, as we have agreed, it is necessary that the heavenly city be made complete by human beings,and that cannot be the case unless this recompense is made—a recompense that only God can make and only human beings owe—then it is necessary that a God-man make this recompense.

B: Blessed be God! We have now discovered something great concerning the subject of our investigation. So continue as you have begun. For I have hope that God will help us.

Chapter 7 That it is necessary that one and the same being be perfect God and perfect man

A: We must now investigate how a God-man can exist. After all, divine nature and human nature cannot be transformed into each other, so that a divine nature becomes a human nature or a human nature divine; nor can they be combined in such a way that a third nature, neither altogether divine nor altogether human, emerges from the two of them.Anyway, if it were possible for one nature to be turned into the other, either it would be only God and not a human being, or only a human being and not God. Or if they were combined in such a way that from the two corrupted natures a third nature came to exist—in the way that from two individual animals, a male and a female, of different species, a third animal is born that does not preserve either the father's or the mother's nature intact, but instead possesses a third, mixed nature derived from both—that third nature would be neither a human being nor God. So the God-man for whom we are looking cannot come to be from divine and human nature either by the transformation of one into the other or by a corruptive mixing of the two into a third nature: for these things cannot happen, or if they could happen, they would be unavailing for what we are seeking.

If, on the other hand, these two intact natures are said to be conjoined in such a way that the human being is distinct from God, and it is not one and the same being that is both God and human, it is impossible for the two of them to do what needs to be done. God will not do it, because he will not owe the debt; the human being will not do it, because he will not be able to.

Therefore, in order for the God-man to do this, it is necessary that the one who is going to make this recompense be both perfect God and perfect man, since only one who is truly God can make it,but only one who is truly human owes it. Therefore, since it is necessary that a God-man be found, one who

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

preserves both natures intact, it is no less necessary that these intact natures come together into one person, just as a body and a rational soul come together into one human being. There is no other way for one and the same being to be perfect God and perfect man.

B: I like everything you say.

Chapter 8 That it is fitting for God to assume a human being from Adam's race and from a woman who is a virgin

A: It now remains for us to ask from where and in what way God will assume a human nature. Either he will assume it from Adam or he will make a new human being in the same way that he made Adam, from no other human being. But if he makes a new human being not of Adam's race, this new man will not belong to the human race that is born of Adam.And for that reason he will not owe a recompense for the human race, since he will not belong to the human race. For just as it is right that a human being should make recompense for human guilt, so too it is necessary that the one who makes recompense be either the sinner himself or someone of the same race. Otherwise neither Adam nor his race will make recompense for itself.Therefore, just as sin was transmitted to all human beings from Adam and Eve, so too only they or someone born from them ought to make recompense for human sin.Since Adam and Eve cannot do it, the one who will do it must be descended from them.

Furthermore, if Adam and his whole race had not sinned, they would have remained steadfast through themselves, without the aid of any other creature.

Analogously, it is fitting that if that same race rises again after its fall, it should arise and be rescued through itself. For no matter who restores it to its original state, it will certainly stand through the one through whom it will recover its state. And God showed clearly that whatever he was going to make of human nature, his will was to make it from Adam. He showed this by originally making human nature in Adam alone and then, when he created the woman so that human beings would be propagated from both sexes, willing to make her from Adam and from no other. Hence, if Adam's race is rescued by some human being who does not belong to that same race, it will not be restored to the same dignity that it would have had if Adam had not sinned.

Consequently, its restoration will not be complete, and God's purpose will seem to fail—and both of these are unfitting. Therefore, the human being through whom Adam's race is to be restored must be assumed from Adam.

B: If we follow reason, as we set out to do, there is no escaping this conclusion.

BASIC WRITINGS

A: Now let's ask whether God ought to assume a human nature from a father and mother, like other human beings, or from a man without a woman, or from a woman without a man. For in whichever of these three ways the assumed nature comes to be, it will be from Adam and from Eve, from whom every human being of either sex is. And none of these three ways is any easier for God than another, so that it would be more appropriate for the nature to be assumed in that way.

B: You are proceeding well.

A: But there's no need for much effort to show that this human being will be procreated in a purer and more honorable way from a man alone or from a woman alone than from the commingling of the two, as are all other human offspring.

B: That is enough.

A: So he ought to be assumed either from a man alone or from a woman alone.

B: There is no other possibility.

A: There are four ways in which God can make a human being: from a man and a woman, as everyday experience shows; or from neither a man nor a woman,as he created Adam;or from a man without a woman,as he made Eve; or from a woman without a man, which he had never done. So in order to prove that this last way was within his power and had been held in reserve for this very deed, nothing was more fitting than for him to assume the human being whom we are seeking from a woman without a man. And there is no need for debate about whether this would be done more worthily from a virgin or a non-virgin. Rather, one should assert without hesitation that it was right for the God-man to be born from a virgin.

B: You are speaking in accordance with my heart's desire.

A: Is what we have said solid? Or is it something insubstantial, like clouds, as you said unbelievers claim in their objections against us?3

B: Nothing could be more solid.

A: Then paint, not on an insubstantial fiction, but on the solid truth, and say that it is altogether fitting that just as human sin and the cause of our damnation had its beginning from a woman, so too the cure for sin and the cause of our salvation should be born from a woman. And so that women will not 3 See Book 1, Chapter 4.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

despair of membership in the company of the blessed because so great an evil proceeded from a woman,it is fitting that so great a good should proceed from a woman so that their hope might be restored. Paint this too: given that it was a virgin who was the cause of all evil for the human race, it is all the more fitting that it should be a virgin who will be the cause of all good.And paint this as well:given that the woman whom God made from a man without a woman was made from a virgin, it is altogether fitting that the man who will come to be from a woman without a man should likewise be made from a virgin. But let these be enough for now of the pictures that can be painted on the fact that the God-man ought to be born of a virgin woman.

B: These pictures are exceedingly beautiful and reasonable.

Chapter 9 That it is necessary that the Word alone and a human being come together in one person A: Now we must also investigate in which person God, who is three persons, assumes a human being.After all, it is not possible for more than one person to assume one and the same human being into unity of person, so it is necessary that this be done in one person only. But I think I said enough, for the purposes of this present inquiry, concerning this unity of person between God and a human being, and in which divine person it is most appropriate for this to be done, in the letter On the Incarnation of the Word addressed to Lord Pope

Urban.4

B: Nonetheless, touch briefly here on the reason the person of the Son ought to be incarnate rather than that of the Father or the Holy Spirit.

A: If any other person becomes incarnate, there will be two sons in the Trinity: the Son of God, who is a son before the Incarnation, and the person who will be son of the virgin through the Incarnation. And then there will be an inequality among the persons, who ought always to be equal, with respect to the nobility of their births. For the person who is born from God will have a nobler birth than the one who is born of the virgin. Moreover, if the Father is incarnate, there will be two grandsons in the Trinity, since the Father will be the grandson of the virgin's parents through the assumed human being; and the Word, even though he will not derive in any way from a human being, will nonetheless be the virgin's grandson, because he will be the Son of the virgin's son.All these results are unfitting, and they do not arise in the Incarnation of 4 See On the Incarnation of the Word, Chapter 10.

BASIC WRITINGS

the Word.And there is another reason that it is more fitting for the Son to be incarnate than the other persons: it sounds more fitting for the Son to pray to the Father than for any other person to pray to any other person. Moreover, both human beings,for whom he was going to intercede,and the devil,whom he was going to defeat, had arrogated to themselves a false likeness to God through a will of their own.Thereby they sinned more particularly, as it were, against the person of the Son, who is believed to be a true likeness to the Father.And so the one to whom more particular injury was done is the one to whom the punishment or pardon for that fault is more fittingly entrusted.

Therefore, since inescapable reason has led us to the conclusion that divine and human nature must come together into one person, and that this cannot be done in more than one divine person, and that it is evident that it is done more fittingly in the person of the Word than in the other persons, it is necessary that God the Word and a human being come together into one person.

B: The path along which you are leading me is so well-fortified by reason in every direction that I see I cannot turn aside from it to the right or to the left.

A: It is not I who lead you; rather, the one of whom we are speaking, without whom we can do nothing,5 leads us wherever we keep to the path of truth.

Chapter 10 That this human being does not die out of obligation; and in what way he can or cannot sin; and why he or an angel deserves praise for justice, even though they cannot sin Now at this point we ought to investigate whether this human being will die out of obligation, in the way that all other human beings die out of obligation. But given that Adam would not have died if he had not sinned, all the more will this man not be obligated to die; for in him there can be no sin, since he will be God.

B: I want you to linger on this point for just a bit, for it seems to me that whether we say that he is or that he is not able to sin, a serious difficulty arises either way. If we say that he cannot sin, it seems we should find that difficult to believe. If I might speak of him for a moment not as though he had never existed (as we have done up to this point) but as one whom we know and whose deeds we know: who would deny that he was able to do many things that we call sins? To take just one example, how can we say that he was not 5 Cf. John 15:5.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

able to lie, which is always a sin? When he spoke to the Jews about the Father and told them,"If I say that I do not know him, I will be a liar, like you,"6 he uttered the words "I do not know him." Who would say that he was incapable of uttering those same five7 words without the others, so as to say just "I do not know him"? And if he had done so, he would have been a liar, as he says himself; and to be a liar is to be a sinner. Therefore, since he was able to do that, he was able to sin.

A: He was both able to say that and not able to say that.

B: Explain that.

A: All power follows will.When I say that I can speak or walk, the stipulation "if I will" is understood. If there is no implicit reference to willing, it is not power but necessity. After all, when I say that I can be dragged off or overcome unwillingly, this is not my power; it is necessity and someone else's power. In fact,"I can be dragged off or overcome" is equivalent to "Someone else can drag me off or overcome me." And so we can say of Christ that he was able to lie if we implicitly add,"If he willed."And since he could not lie unwillingly, and he could not will to lie, it can equally well be said that he was not able to lie.And so in this way he was both able and not able to lie.

B: Let us now return to inquiring about him as though he did not yet exist, in the way we began. So I say: If he will not be able to sin because, as you say, he will not be able to will to sin, then he will preserve justice out of necessity, and so he will not be just in virtue of his freedom of choice. So what thanks will he be owed for his justice? After all, we are accustomed to say that God made angels and human beings capable of sin so that they would merit thanks and praise for preserving justice through freedom of choice when they could have abandoned it, whereas they would not be owed thanks and praise if they were just of necessity.

A: Shouldn't the angels who are now unable to sin be praised?

B: Certainly they should, because they earned their present inability to sin by not willing to sin when they were able to sin.

A: What do you say about God? He cannot sin, and he did not earn his inability to sin by not sinning when he had the power to sin. Shouldn't he be praised for his justice?

6 John 8:55.

7 Actually, Anselm says 'three', since the expression translated "I do not know him" is non scio eum.

BASIC WRITINGS

B: On this point I want you to give an answer on my behalf. For if I say he should not be praised, I know I'm lying; yet if I say he should be praised, I fear

I will undermine the argument I gave concerning the angels.

A: It is not because they were able to sin that the angels should be praised for their justice; it is because, as a result of that fact, they in a certain sense have from themselves their inability to sin. In this respect they are a little like God, who has from himself whatever he has. For we say that a person gives something when he can take it away but does not; and we say that someone causes something to be when he can cause it not to be but does not.And so, since in this way the angels had the power to take justice away from themselves but did not, and since they had the power to cause themselves not to be just but did not, it is correct to assert that the angels gave themselves justice and caused themselves to be just. In this way, then, they have justice from themselves— since a creature cannot have justice from itself in any other way.And for this reason they should be praised for their justice, and they are just freely and not of necessity, since it is improper to speak of necessity where there is neither compulsion nor constraint. Hence, because God has from himself in a perfect way whatever he has, he is supremely worthy of praise for the good things that he has and preserves not by any necessity but, as I said above,8 by the eternal immutability that belongs to him alone. So it is in this way that the human being who will himself be God will be just from himself and will therefore be worthy of praise:because every good thing that he will have,he will have from himself, not of necessity but freely. For although the human nature will have from the divine nature whatever it will have, it will be one and the same person who will have it from himself, since the two natures will be one person.

B: You have convinced me by these arguments: I see clearly both that he will not be able to sin and that, nevertheless, he will be worthy of praise for his justice. But I think we should now investigate why—given that God can make a human being like this—he did not make the angels and the two first human beings in such a way that they likewise would not be able to sin but would deserve praise for their justice.

A: Do you understand what you are saying?

B: I think I understand. That's why I'm asking why God didn't make them that way.

A: Because it neither should nor could come about that each of them would be the very same person as God,as we say this man is.And if you ask why God

8 Near the end of Book 2, Chapter 5.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

did not do this for as many of them as there are divine persons, or at least for one of them, my answer is that reason in no way required that it be done at that time; instead, reason forbade it altogether, since God does nothing without reason.

B: I am embarrassed that I asked the question. Say what you were going to say.

A: Let us say, therefore, that he will not be obligated to die, since he will not be a sinner.

B: I have to concede that.

Chapter 11 That he dies of his own power; and that mortality does not belong to pure human nature A: But it remains now to investigate whether he is able to die according to human nature, for according to divine nature he will always be incorruptible.

B: Why should we have any doubt about this, since he will be a true human being, and every human being is naturally mortal?

A: I think mortality belongs not to pure human nature but rather to corrupted human nature. Indeed, if human beings had never sinned and their immortality had been immutably confirmed, they would still be true human beings, no less than now; and when mortals rise again into incorruptibility,9 they will still be true human beings, no less than now.After all, if mortality belonged to true human nature, there is no way there could be an immortal human being. So neither corruptibility nor incorruptibility belongs to bare human nature, since neither of them makes or destroys a human being; rather, one has the power to make a human being wretched, the other to make him blessed. But since there is no human being who does not die, 'mortal' is included in the definition of 'human being' by the philosophers, who did not believe that a whole human being ever could or ever can be immortal.10 So the fact that he will be a true human being is not sufficient to show that this human being ought to be mortal.

B: Then it is up to you to look for another argument to prove that he can die, since if you don't know one, I certainly don't.

9 1 Corinthians 15:42.

10 Anselm specifies 'a whole human being' because some philosophers did believe in the immortality of the soul.

BASIC WRITINGS

A: There is no doubt that just as he will be God, so too will he be omnipotent.

B: That's true.

A: So if he wills to do so, he will be able to lay down his life and take it up again.11

B: If he cannot do this, it doesn't seem that he is omnipotent.

A: Therefore, he will be able never to die, if he so wills, and he will be able to die and rise again. Now it makes no difference to his power whether he lays down his life with no one else causing him to do so or he permits someone else to cause him to lay down his life.

B: Undoubtedly.

A: So if he wills to permit it, he can be killed; and if he does not will to permit it, he cannot.

B: Reason leads us unswervingly to this conclusion.

A: Reason has also taught us that he must have something greater than everything that is less than God, and that he gives this to God of his own accord and not out of obligation.

B: That's right.

A: But no such thing can be found either below him or outside him.

B: That's true.

A: So it must be found in him.

B: That follows.

A: So he will give either himself or something of his own.

B: I cannot understand it any other way.

A: We must now ask what sort of thing this giving ought to be.After all, he will not be able to give God himself or something of his own as though God did not already possess it, since every creature belongs to God.

B: That's right.

11 Cf. John 10:17–18.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

A: So we must understand his giving as follows: he will lay down himself or something of his own for the honor of God in a way that he is not obligated to do.

B: That follows from what was said earlier.

A: If we say that he will give himself to obey God, so that by persevering in preserving justice he subordinates himself to God's will, that will not be a case of giving something that God does not demand of him as a debt; for every rational creature owes such obedience to God.

B: That cannot be denied.

A: And so it is in some other way that he must give God himself or something of his own.

B: Reason drives us to that conclusion.

A: Let's see whether that means giving his life: in other words, laying down his life or delivering himself over to death for the honor of God. For God will not demand this from him as a debt, since because there will be no sin in him, he will not be obligated to die, as we have said.

B: I cannot understand it any other way.

A: Let's consider further whether this is fitting according to reason.

B: Speak, and I will gladly listen.

A: Since humanity sinned through pleasure, is it not fitting for humanity to make recompense through pain? And since humanity was overcome by the devil so easily that it could not have been any easier, and thereby dishonored

God by sinning, is it not just for the human being who makes recompense for sin to overcome the devil with such great difficulty that it could not be any greater, and thereby honor God? And is it not appropriate that humanity, which in sinning took itself away from God as much as possible, should in making recompense give itself to God as much as possible?

B: Nothing could be more reasonable.

A: Now there is nothing more painful or more difficult a human being can do for the honor of God than to suffer death of his own accord and not out of obligation; and there is no greater way for a human being to give himself to God than to deliver himself up to death for the honor of God.

B: All these things are true.

A: So the one who is going to will to make recompense for human sin ought to be such that he can die if he so wills.

BASIC WRITINGS

B: I see clearly that the human being about whom we are inquiring ought to be such that he will not die of necessity, since he will be omnipotent, or out of obligation, since he will never be a sinner, and also such that he can die of his own free will, since this will be necessary.12

A: And there are many other reasons why it is extremely fitting for him be like human beings and to have dealings with them, without sin: reasons that are apparent through themselves in his life and deeds more straightforwardly and more clearly than they can be proved by reason alone, apart from experience. For who will set forth how necessarily and how wisely this was brought to pass: that the one who was going to redeem human beings from the way of death and destruction and, by teaching, lead them back to the way of life and eternal blessedness, should himself have dealings with human beings and in those dealings, when he taught them by his words how they ought to live, should offer himself as an example? Now how would he give himself as an example to those who are weak and mortal that they should not depart from justice on account of injuries, insults, pain, or death, unless they knew that he himself had experienced all these things?

Chapter 12 That although he shares our misfortunes, he is not unhappy B: All these considerations show clearly that he ought to be mortal and to share our misfortunes. But all these misfortunes make us unhappy, so won't he be unhappy?

A: Not in the least. For just as having something advantageous against one's will does not make one happy, so too experiencing some misfortune wisely, willingly, and not under necessity, does not make one unhappy.

B: I have to grant that.

Chapter 13 That he does not possess ignorance along with our other infirmities But tell me whether he will possess ignorance, along with our other infirmities, as part of the likeness to human beings that he ought to have.

12 "this will be necessary": This phrase does not mean that his death will take place as a result of necessity, but that his ability to die of his own free will is a necessary condition for his making recompense for human sin.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

A: Why do you doubt that God knows everything?

B: Because even though he will be immortal in virtue of his divine nature, he will nonetheless be mortal in virtue of his human nature. So, in the same way, why can't this human being be genuinely ignorant, just as he will also be genuinely mortal?

A: Supreme Wisdom will of course act wisely in assuming the human being into unity of person with God, and so he will not assume in that human being what is in no way useful but instead quite harmful, to the work that this human being is going to carry out. Ignorance would not be useful to him in any way; on the contrary, it would be harmful in many respects. How, after all, will he carry out the many great works he is going to do unless he possesses enormous wisdom? How will human beings believe him if they know that he is ignorant? Even supposing they don't know he is ignorant, what purpose would such ignorance serve for him? Finally, given that only what is known is loved, just as there will be no good thing that he does not love, so too there will be no good thing that he does not know. Now no one has perfect knowledge of the good unless he knows how to distinguish it from evil, and no one knows how to distinguish good from evil if he is ignorant of evil. So just as the one of whom we are speaking will have complete knowledge of every good, so too he will not be ignorant of any evil.Therefore, he will possess all knowledge, though he may not show it openly in his dealings with human beings.

B: What you say seems right for when he is an adult; but infancy is not a suitable time for wisdom to appear in him, and so there will be no need for him to possess wisdom in his infancy and, therefore, it will not be fitting for him.

A: Have I not said that this Incarnation will be done wisely? God will assume mortality wisely; for he will use it wisely, in that he will put it to a very beneficial use. But he cannot assume ignorance wisely, since ignorance is never beneficial but always harmful, except perhaps when an evil will is thwarted by ignorance—but there will never be an evil will in him. For even if sometimes ignorance is not harmful in any other way, it is harmful simply by taking away the good of knowledge.And (to answer your question briefly) from the moment he begins to exist, this man will always be filled with God, just as he will be filled with himself.13 Hence, he will never be without God's power, strength, and wisdom.

13 This may mean either "He will have all the attributes of God because he will himself be

God" or "He will have all the attributes of God just as he will have all the attributes of a human being."

BASIC WRITINGS

B: Although I never doubted that this was always the case in Christ, I have asked about it so that I might hear the reason for it. For we are often certain of something but do not know how to prove it rationally.

Chapter 14 How his death outweighs the number and magnitude of all sins I now ask you to teach me how his death outweighs the number and magnitude of all sins, since you have shown14 that a single sin that we regard as extremely insignificant is so infinite that even if one were shown an infinite number of worlds, as full of creatures as this one, and they could not be kept from falling into nothingness unless someone took a single glance contrary to the will of God, it should still not be done.

A: Suppose that man were present and you knew who he was.And suppose someone said to you,"Unless you kill this man, this whole world and everything that is not God will perish." Would you do it in order to save every other creature?

B: I wouldn't do it even if I were shown an infinite number of worlds.

A: What if someone then said to you,"Either you kill him, or all the sins of the world will come upon you"?

B: I would reply that I would rather take up all other sins—not only all the sins of this world that have been or will be, but also, in addition to these, every sin that can even be conceived—than this one sin. I think I ought to give this reply not only about killing him but even about any minor injury that might be done to him.

A: You are right to think that. But tell me: why does your heart judge in such a way that it fears one sin in injuring this man more than all other sins that can be conceived, given that all sins whatsoever are against him?

B: It's because a sin that is committed against his person is incomparably more serious than all conceivable sins that are not against his person.

A: What will you say about the fact that often someone willingly endures damage to his person in order to keep from suffering greater damage to his possessions?

14 In Book 1, Chapter 21.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

B: God has no need for this sort of endurance, because all things are subject to his power, as you said earlier15 in reply to a question of mine.

A: Good answer.We therefore see that sins not committed against the person of God, no matter how great or how numerous they are, cannot be compared to the destruction of this man's bodily life.

B: That is quite clear.

A: How great a good do you think his life is, given that its destruction is so evil?

B: If every good thing is as good as its destruction is evil, his life is an incomparably greater good than those sins are evils, since its destruction is unfathomably greater than those sins.

A: You're right. Consider also that sins are as worthy of hatred as they are bad, and that his life is as worthy of love as it is good. From this it follows that his life is more worthy of love than those sins are worthy of hate.

B: I cannot fail to understand this.

A: Do you think that so great and so lovable a good can be sufficient to discharge the debt that is owed for the sins of the whole world?

B: Indeed, it can do infinitely more.

A: Then do you see how, if his life is given for sins, it overcomes them all?

B: Clearly.

A: So if giving one's life is accepting death, then just as the giving of his life outweighs all the sins of human beings, so too does his accepting death.

B: It is firmly established that this is true of all the sins that do not impinge upon the person of God.

Chapter 15 How his death wipes out the sins even of those who put him to death But now I see another question that needs to be asked.If killing him is as great an evil as his life is a good, how can his death overcome and wipe out the sins of those who killed him? Or, if it does wipe out the sin of one of them, how can it also wipe out the sin of other human beings? For we believe that many

15 In Book 1, Chapter 21.

BASIC WRITINGS

human beings have already been saved and that countless others are being saved.

A: The Apostle has given the answer to this question. He wrote,"If they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory."16 A sin committed knowingly is so different from a sin done through ignorance that this evil, which is so extremely serious that they could never have committed it if they had known what they were doing, is venial because it was done in ignorance.

No human being could ever knowingly will to kill God. And so those who killed God in ignorance did not fall into that infinite sin to which no other sins can be compared. For in our effort to discern how great a good his life is, we did not examine how grave the destruction of his life would be if done in ignorance, but as though it were done knowingly—though in fact no one ever did or could do it knowingly.

B: You have rationally demonstrated that the killers of Christ could attain forgiveness of their sin.

A: What more is left for you to ask? At this point you see how the necessity of reason shows that the heavenly city is to be completed by human beings, and that this can be done only through forgiveness of sins, which no human being can have except through a human being who is himself God and reconciles sinners to God by his own death. Therefore, we have clearly discovered Christ, whom we confess to be both God and man and to have died for our sake. And now that we know this without any doubt, we must not hesitate to believe that everything Christ says is assuredly true, since God cannot lie, and that all the things he did were done wisely, even if we do not grasp the reason for them.

B: What you say is true, and I do not doubt in the least that what he said is true or that what he did was done in accordance with reason. But I do make this request. There are things in the Christian faith that unbelievers think either should not be done or cannot be done. Explain to me the reason according to which they should or can be done—not in order to confirm me in faith, but in order to cause one who is already confirmed to have the joy of understanding the truth of that faith.

16 1 Corinthians 2:8.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

Chapter 16 How God assumed a sinless human being from the sinful mass; and concerning the salvation of Adam and Eve

That is why I am asking that you will disclose the reason of the things that I have yet to investigate, in the same way that you have already revealed the reason of the things discussed above. The first is how God assumed a sinless human being from the "sinful mass"17—that is, from the human race, the whole of which had been infected with sin—as though drawing out something unleavened from what is leavened. For although the conception of this human being is pure, and free from the sin of carnal pleasure, the Virgin from whom he was assumed was "conceived in iniquities, and in sins did" her

"mother conceive" her;18 and she was born with original sin, since she too sinned in Adam,"in whom all have sinned."19

A: Once it has been established that this human being is God and the one who reconciles sinners, there is no doubt that he is completely without sin.

But that cannot be the case unless he is assumed without sin from the sinful mass. If we cannot grasp the reason by which God's wisdom accomplished this,we should not be astonished;instead we should reverently tolerate the fact that in the hidden depths of so great a matter there is something we do not know. Indeed, God restored human nature more wonderfully than he first established it.20 Of course the two things are equally easy for God, but before they existed human beings had not sinned so as to deserve never to be brought into being, whereas by sinning after they had been made, they deserved to lose both what they had been made to be and the purpose for which they had been made—although they did not completely lose what they had been made to be, so that there would be something for God to punish or to have mercy on, neither of which would have been possible if they had been reduced to nothing. So God restored human beings more wonderfully than he first established them insofar as he restored them from a sinful state, contrary to what they deserved, whereas he did not establish them from a sinful state or contrary to what they deserved.And how great a thing it is for God and a human being to come together into one in such a way that one and the same person is both God and man, each nature being preserved intact! So who would

17 For an explanation of the expression 'sinful mass', see note 14 in Book 1, Chapter 5.

18 Psalm 51:6 (50:7).

19 Romans 5:12.

20 Cf. the offertory prayer said quietly by the priest in the Roman rite:"O God, who wonderfully created, and yet more wonderfully restored, the dignity of human nature."

BASIC WRITINGS

presume even to think that the human mind can penetrate how wisely and how wonderfully so inscrutable a work was accomplished?

B: I agree that no human being in this life can completely reveal so great a mystery, and I am not asking you to do what no human being can do, but just to do as much as you can. For your claim that more exalted reasons lie hidden in this matter will be more persuasive if I have seen you point out one reason than if, by saying nothing, you show that you do not understand any reason for it.

A: I see I can't escape your demands. But if I can show what you are asking for, even in a small way, let us give thanks to God. If I can't, let the things proved above be sufficient. After all, since it has been established that God ought to become a human being, there is no doubt that he has the wisdom and the power to accomplish this without sin.

B: I am happy to agree to that.

A: It was of course necessary that the redemption Christ brought about should benefit not only those who were alive in his day but others as well.

Imagine, then, that there is a king, and the entire populace of one of his cities, with the exception of one man (who is nonetheless of their race), has sinned against him in such a way that none of them can do what is necessary to escape the death penalty.But the one innocent man has such favor with the king that he can reconcile them by means of some service that will greatly please the king, and he has such love for the guilty that he is willing to do this for all who put their trust in his help. He will do this service on a day that has been fixed according to the king's will.And since not all of those who are to be reconciled can come together on that day, the king, in view of the magnitude of this service, makes a concession: he will release from all past guilt all those who profess, either before or after that day, that they want to attain pardon through the deed that will be done on that day and to become parties to the agreement made there. And if they should happen to sin again after this pardon,they will again receive pardon through the efficacy of that same agreement, provided that they are willing to make appropriate recompense and then to amend their lives.But none of them will be allowed to enter the king's palace until the deed is done by which they are absolved of guilt.

In keeping with this analogy, since not all those who were to be saved could be present when Christ accomplished this redemption, there was such power in his death that its effect extends even to those who are absent in time or place. That his death ought to benefit not only those who are present is easy to recognize in virtue of the fact that not enough people could be present at his death as are necessary to build up the heavenly city—not even if everyone who was alive anywhere in the world at the time of his death were admitted

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

to that redemption. For there are more demons than there were human beings alive on that day, from whom the number of fallen angels would have to be replaced.

Nor should it be believed that there was ever a time, from the moment human beings were created, that this world—together with its creatures, which were created for the use of human beings—was so bereft that it did not contain a single person from the human race who attained the purpose for which human beings were created.After all, it seems unfitting that God should allow the human race, and the things he created for the use of those who would make the heavenly city complete, to be pointless, as it were, even for a moment. For they would appear to exist in vain in some measure so long as they are seen to stop short of the purpose for which they were principally created.

B: By a fitting argument, and one that seems subject to no objection, you show that from the moment human beings began to exist, there was never a time without someone who belonged to the reconciliation without which every human being would have been made in vain.We can conclude that this is not merely fitting but indeed necessary. For if this is more fitting and more reasonable than the opposite (namely, that at some time there was no one in whom God's purpose in making human beings was realized), and if there is nothing that undermines this argument, it is necessary that at every time there has been someone who belonged to the aforesaid reconciliation. Hence, it should not be doubted that Adam and Eve belonged to that redemption, even though divine authority does not teach this explicitly.

A: And it seems incredible that God should exclude the two of them from his purpose at the very time that he made them and immutably purposed that from them he would make all the human beings whom he was going to exalt to that heavenly city.

B: On the contrary, we ought to believe that they were created above all so that they might be in the company of those for whose sake they were created.

A: You have examined this well.Yet before the death of Christ no soul could gain entrance to heaven, as I said earlier about the king's palace.

B: So we believe.

A: Now the Virgin from whom the man we are discussing was assumed was among those who were cleansed from their sins by him before his birth; and he was assumed from her in her cleansed state.

B: I very much like what you say, except for one thing. He ought to have his cleanness from sin from himself, but he would appear to derive this condition from his mother and to be clean through her rather than through himself.

BASIC WRITINGS

A: That's not so. His mother's cleanness, through which he is clean, was itself from him; therefore, he was clean through himself and from himself.21

B: That sounds good. But I think there's something else we need to investigate. Earlier we said that he was not going to die of necessity, and now we see that his mother was clean through his future death; and if she had not been clean, he could not have come to exist from her. So how is it that he did not die of necessity, given that he could not even exist unless he was going to die?

After all, if he had not been going to die, the Virgin from whom he was assumed would not have been clean, since there was no way for her to be clean except by believing in the fact of his death; and he could not be assumed from her unless she was clean. So if he did not die of necessity after he had been assumed from the Virgin, it was possible for him not to have been assumed from the Virgin after he had already been assumed, which is impossible.

A: If you had reflected properly on what was said earlier,22 you would,I think, understand that this question has already been answered.

B: I don't see how.

A: When we investigated whether he was able to lie, did we not show that there are two powers involved in lying: the power to will to lie, and the power to lie? And that although he had the power to lie, he had from himself the lack of any power to will to lie? And that for that very reason he deserves praise for the justice by which he preserved truth?

B: Yes.

A: Similarly, when it comes to preserving his life, there is the power to will to preserve it and the power to preserve it. So if someone asks whether the Godman was able to preserve his life so that he would never die, it should not be doubted that he always had the power to preserve it, although he was not able to will to preserve it so that he would never die; and since it was from himself that he had this inability to will, he laid down his life not of necessity but by a free power.

B: These two powers of his—the power to lie and the power to preserve life—are not exactly alike. In the case of the power to lie, it follows that if he

21 The nuances of the Latin can be made clearer if we use the name 'Christ' to designate

"the man whom we are discussing": his mother's cleanness, through which Christ is clean, was itself from Christ; therefore, Christ too (i.e., as well as his mother) was clean through Christ and from Christ.

22 In Book 2, Chapters 10 and 11.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

willed to lie, he was able to lie. But in the case of the power to preserve his life, it seems that if he had willed not to die, he was no more able not to die than he was able not to be what he was. For he was a human being precisely in order that he might die, and he was able to be assumed from the Virgin because of her faith in his future death, as you said earlier.

A: You think that he was unable not to die or that he died of necessity, because he was unable not to be what he was; but you might just as well claim that he was unable to will not to die or that he willed of necessity to die, because he was unable not to be what he was. For it is every bit as true that he became a human being in order that he might will to die as it is that he became a human being in order that he might die. Hence, just as you ought not to say that he was unable to will not to die or that he willed of necessity to die, so too one ought not to say that he was unable not to die or that he died of necessity.

B: On the contrary: since the same reasoning applies to both dying and willing to die, it seems that both of them were necessary in his case.

A: Who was this who spontaneously willed to make himself a human being, so that by this same immutable will he might die, and so that the Virgin from whom this human being would be assumed would be made clean through faith in this certainty?

B: It was God, the Son of God.

A: Was it not shown earlier23 that God's will is not compelled by any necessity, but rather that when it is said to do something of necessity, it is preserving itself by its own spontaneous immutability?

B: Yes, that was shown; but conversely, we see that what God immutably wills cannot not be, but necessarily is. Hence, if God willed that this human being should die, he was unable not to die.

A: By virtue of the fact that the Son of God assumed a human being with the will that he should die,you prove that this human being was unable not to die.

B: That's how I understand it.

A: From what has been said, is it not likewise clear that the Son of God and the assumed human being are a single person, so that one and the same being is both God and man, the Son of God and the son of the Virgin?

B: Yes.

23 See Book 2, Chapters 5 and 10.

BASIC WRITINGS

A: So it was by his own will that this human being was unable not to die and did die.

B: I cannot deny it.

A: Therefore, since God's will does nothing by any necessity, but only by its own power, and since his will was God's will,24 he did not die of any necessity, but solely by his own power.

B: I cannot quarrel with your arguments, since I cannot in any way undermine either your premises or the conclusions you draw. Still, what I said earlier continues to strike me: If he had willed not to die, he could not have avoided dying, any more than he could have not been what he was. For he was truly going to die, since if he had not been truly going to die, the faith in his future death through which both the Virgin from whom he was born and many others had been cleansed from sin would not have been true.And if that faith had not been true, it could not have been of any benefit.Therefore, if he was able not to die, he was able to make untrue what was already true.

A: Why was it true, before he died, that he was going to die?

B: Because he himself willed it spontaneously and with an immutable will.

A: So if, as you say, he was unable not to die because he was truly going to die, and he was truly going to die because he himself spontaneously and immutably willed this, it follows that he was unable not to die because, and only because, he willed to die with an immutable will.

B: Right. But whatever the reason may have been, it is still true that he was unable not to die and that it was necessary that he die.

A: You are hung up on nothing.As the saying goes, you're looking for knots in a bulrush.25

24 Taken strictly,Anselm's words seem to commit him to a heretical view called "monothelitism," according to which there is only one will in Christ, the divine will. But by Anselm's day it had long been settled that there are two wills in Christ: both a divine will and a human will. (For according to orthodoxy, there are two complete and intact natures in Christ: the divine nature and a human nature.And will is an essential feature of each, so that any being with both natures would have to have two wills.) Moreover, the arguments of Book 1, Chapters 8 and 9, clearly involve attributing a human will to Christ. Presumably, then, what Anselm means here is that Christ's human will always freely accorded with his divine will.

25 Bulrushes are smooth; they have no knots or nodes. The proverb refers to finding difficulties where in fact there are none.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

B: Have you forgotten what I said to counter your excuses at the beginning of our discussion—namely, that you should do what I was asking, not for the learned but for me and for those who joined me in making this request?26 So bear with me as I ask questions that reflect the slowness and dullness of our minds, and satisfy me and them with your answers even to childish questions, just as you set out to do.

Chapter 17 That there is no necessity or impossibility in God; and that there is compelling necessity and non-compelling necessity

A: We have already said that it is improper to say that God cannot do something or that God does something of necessity. In fact, all necessity and impossibility are subject to God's will; his will is not subjected to any necessity or impossibility. For nothing is necessary or impossible except because God himself wills it to be so, whereas it is far from the truth to say that God wills or does not will anything on account of necessity or impossibility. Hence, because God does all and only those things that he wills, just as no necessity or impossibility precedes his willing or not-willing, so too neither does any necessity or impossibility precede his doing or not-doing, even though he wills and does many things immutably. Now when God does something, after it has been done it can no longer not have been done, but rather it is always true that it has been done; and yet it is not rightly said that it is impossible for God to bring it about that what is past is not past—for in this case there is no necessity of not bringing it about, or impossibility of bringing it about, at work, but only the will of God, who, because he is himself the truth, wills that the truth be always immutable, just as he is. In the same way, if he immutably resolves to do something, then although what he resolves to do, before it is done, cannot fail to come about in the future, nonetheless there is not in God any necessity of doing it or impossibility of not doing it, since only God's will is at work in him. For to say that God "cannot" do something is not to deny any power in God, but rather to signify his invincible power and strength. For all it means is that nothing can make God do the thing that we say is impossible.27

For this sort of expression is quite common, in which a thing is said "to be able," not because there is a power in it, but because there is a power in another thing; and in which a thing is said "not to be able," not because there is a lack of power in it, but because there is a lack of power in some other thing.

26 At the end of Book 1, Chapter 1.

27 More literally: For nothing else is understood [by such statements] than that no thing can bring it about that God does the thing that is denied to be possible.

BASIC WRITINGS

For example, we say "This man can be overcome" for "Someone can overcome him," and "He cannot be overcome" for "No one can overcome him."

After all, to be able to be overcome is not a power, but a lack of power; and not to be able to be overcome is not a lack of power but a power. Nor do we say that God does something of necessity on the grounds that there is any necessity in him, but because there is some necessity in something else, just as I said was true of lack of power, when he is said not to be able. For all necessity is either compulsion or constraint; these two necessities are related to each other as contraries, just like necessary and impossible. For whatever is compelled to exist is constrained from not existing, and what is compelled not to exist is constrained from existing, just as what is necessary to exist is impossible not to exist, and what is necessary not to exist is impossible to exist, and vice versa. But when we say that something is necessarily the case or necessarily not the case in God, we do not mean that there is any compelling or constraining necessity in him; rather, we signify that in all other things there is a necessity constraining them from acting, and compelling them not to act, contrary to what is said of God. For when we say that it is necessary that God always speaks the truth, and that it is necessary that he never lies, this simply means that there is in God such steadfastness in preserving the truth that it is necessary that no thing can make it the case that he does not speak the truth or that he lies.

For this reason, when we say that this human being, who through unity of person (as was said above28) is himself the very same as God, the Son of God, was unable not to die or to will not to die after he was born of the Virgin, this does not signify any lack of power in him to preserve, or to will to preserve, his own immortal life; rather it signifies (1) the immutability of his will, by which he spontaneously made himself a human being so that, persevering in that same will, he might die, and (2) the fact that no thing was able to change that will. For it would not be power, but a lack of power, if he were able to will to lie or to deceive or to change his will, which he previously willed to be immutable.And if, as I said above,29 when someone spontaneously resolves to do something good and by that same will afterwards accomplishes what he resolved to do, then even though he can be compelled to do it if he is unwilling to make good on his promise, he should still not be said to do of necessity what he does, but rather to do it by the free will by which he originally resolved to do it—for we should not say that something is done or not done out of necessity or out of a lack of power when what is actually active is neither necessity nor lack of power but will—if, I say, this is true in the case of 28 Book 2, Chapters 7 and 9.

29 Book 2, Chapter 5.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

human beings, much more so should we refrain from speaking of any necessity or lack of power at all in the case of God, who does nothing but what he wills, and whose will cannot be compelled or constrained by any power. For in Christ the diversity of natures and unity of person worked in such a way that if the human nature could not do what needed to be done for the restoration of human beings, the divine nature did it; and if it was not at all fitting for the divine nature, the human nature exhibited it.And it was not two distinct persons,but he himself who,existing perfectly as both divine and human, through his human nature paid what human nature owed and through his divine nature was able to do what was beneficial. Finally, the Virgin, who through faith was made clean so that he could be assumed from her, in no way believed that he was going to die except because he willed, as she had learned from the prophet who said of him,"he was offered because he himself willed it."30 Hence, because her faith was true, it was necessary for things to be in the future as she believed they were going to be. Now if again it bothers you that I say "it was necessary," remember that the truth of the Virgin's faith was not the cause of his dying spontaneously; rather, because this was going to be in the future, her faith was true. Hence, if it is said that "It was necessary that he die by his will alone, because her faith, or the prophecy, which came beforehand, was true," this is equivalent to saying, "It was necessary that this was going to be the case in the future, because this was going to be the case in the future." But that sort of necessity does not compel a thing to be; rather, the thing's being is what brings about the necessity of its being.

You see, there is antecedent necessity, which is the cause of something's being; and there is subsequent necessity, which the thing itself brings about. It is a case of antecedent and31 efficient necessity when it is said that the heavens revolve because it is necessary that they revolve, whereas it is a case of subsequent necessity—and necessity that brings nothing about but rather is brought about—when I say that you are speaking of necessity because you are speaking. For when I say this, I signify that nothing can make it the case that while you are speaking you are not speaking, not that anything is compelling you to speak. For the violence of their natural condition compels the heavens to revolve, whereas no necessity brings it about that you speak. Now wherever there is antecedent necessity there is also subsequent necessity; but it is not the case that where there is subsequent necessity there is automatically also antecedent necessity. For we can say,"It is necessary that the heavens revolve, because they revolve"; but it is not similarly true that you are speaking because

30 Isaiah 53:7.

31 This 'and' as well as the next one should be treated as epexegetic: that is, they function like 'that is' or 'in other words'.

BASIC WRITINGS

it is necessary that you speak. This subsequent necessity runs through all times32 in the following way.Whatever was, necessarily was.Whatever is, necessarily is and necessarily was going to be.Whatever will be, necessarily will be. This is the necessity that, where Aristotle discusses singular and future propositions, seems to destroy contingency and show that all things are of necessity.33 Because that faith in or prophecy about Christ, namely, that he was going to die willingly and not of necessity, was true, it was necessary—in terms of this subsequent necessity, which does not bring anything about— that the actual event should be this way. It was by this necessity that he became a human being, by this necessity that he did and suffered whatever he did and suffered, by this necessity that he willed whatever he willed. For because these things were going to take place in the future, they took place of necessity; and because they in fact took place, they were going to take place of necessity; and because these things took place, they took place of necessity.

And if you want to know the true necessity of all the things that he did and suffered, know that all these things were of necessity because he himself willed them. But no necessity preceded his will. Therefore, given that the only reason they took place is that he willed them, it follows that if he had not willed them, they would not have taken place. And so in this way no one took his life from him; instead, he laid it down and took it up again, since he had the power to lay down his life and take it up again, as he himself says.34

B: You have satisfied me that it cannot be proved that he was subject to death by any necessity, and I do not regret having pressed you to do this.

A: I take it that we have presented a solid explanation of how God assumed a sinless human being from the sinful mass,but I do not at all think one should deny that there is any other reason besides the one we have given—not to mention the fact that God can do what human reason cannot comprehend.

Yet because this reason seems sufficient to me, and also because if I decided to look into the other reason now,it would be necessary to investigate what original sin is and how it is transmitted from our first parents to the whole human race (apart from the man whom we are discussing), and to look into certain other questions that require a treatise to themselves, let us be content with what we have already said in accordance with reason, and go forward with what remains of the task we have undertaken.

32 or 'tenses': the word is the same in Latin (tempora).

33 Aristotle, De interpretatione 9.

34 John 10:18.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

B: As you wish—but on one condition: that you treat this other reason, which for now you evade discussing, as a debt that at some point you will repay, with God's help.

A: Since I know that I want to do just that, I will not deny your request. But because I am uncertain of the future, I will not be so bold as to make a promise, but I will entrust this to God's providence.35

Chapter 18 How by Christ's life restitution is made to God for human sins; and how Christ both owed and did not owe suffering

But now say something about what you think remains to be resolved concerning the question you raised at the outset,on account of which many other questions have arisen.

B: The kernel of the question was this: why did God become a human being in order to save human beings through his death, given that it seems he could have accomplished this in some other way? In reply you showed by many necessary reasons that the restoration of human nature ought not to have been left undone, and that it could not be brought about unless humanity paid what it owed to God on account of sin. Only humanity owed this debt, but it was so great that only God could pay it; thus, there had to be one and the same being who was both God and human. For this reason it was necessary for God to assume a human being into unity of person, so that one who in his nature owed the debt and could not repay it would be the same person as one who could repay it. Then you showed that the human being who would be God ought to be assumed from a virgin and by the person of the Son of God, and you showed how it was possible for him to be assumed without sin from the sinful mass.And you proved quite compellingly that this man's life was so sublime and so precious that it could suffice to pay what was owed for the sins of the whole world, and infinitely more besides. So what is left now is to explain how his life repays God for the sins of human beings.

A: Since he allowed himself to be killed for the sake of justice, did he not give his life for the honor of God?

35 Anselm's uncertainty is not just the usual acknowledgment that we cannot be sure of what will happen in the future, but a recognition that both the pressure of his administrative duties and his own failing health might well keep him from writing further on these topics. Nonetheless, he did in fact repay his "debt" by writing On the Virginal Conception, and On Original Sin, which he dedicated to Boso.

BASIC WRITINGS

B: If I can understand what I do not hesitate to believe—even if I do not see how it was reasonable for him to do this, given that he had the power both to preserve justice unswervingly and to preserve his own life eternally—I will acknowledge that what he spontaneously gave to God for God's honor is something that cannot even be compared to anything that is not God and something that can make restitution for all the debts of every human being.

A: Do you not understand that when (as we discussed earlier)36 he bore with generous patience the things that were inflicted on him because he obediently preserved justice—injuries and slanders and death on the cross between thieves—he gave an example to human beings that they ought not to turn aside from the justice that they owe to God, because of any suffering they might experience? And he would not have given this example if he had exercised his power and turned aside from the death that was inflicted upon him for the sake of justice.

B: It seems there was no need for him to give this example. After all, we know that even before Christ came, many people had given a sufficient example by courageously enduring death for the sake of truth, and John the Baptist did so after Christ came but before he died.

A: No human being other than Christ ever gave God, in dying, something that he was not at some point going to lose of necessity anyway, and none ever repaid God what he did not owe. Christ, by contrast, spontaneously offered the Father what he was never going to lose of necessity, and he repaid on behalf of sinners what he did not owe for himself. He gave his most precious life—indeed, he gave his very self, so great a person, with such great willingness—for the sake of those whom he owed nothing but punishment, even though he in no way lacked for anything for his own sake or was compelled for anyone else's sake. Much more so, then, did he give an example, so that every person will, when reason demands it, unhesitatingly render to God on his own behalf what he will at some point lose without delay.

B: You are getting very close to what I am longing for. But bear with me as I ask a question that perhaps you will think it is foolish for me to ask, but that I would not be able to answer readily if someone asked it of me.You say that when he died, he gave what he did not owe. But no one will deny that when he gave this example in such a way, he did something better and pleased God more than he would have if he had not done this.And no one will say that he did not owe what he understood to be better and more pleasing to God.How, then, will we claim that he did not owe God what he did, namely, what he

36 Book 1, Chapter 9.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

knew to be better and more pleasing to God, especially given that a creature owes God everything it is and everything that it knows [is good] and has the power to do?

A: Granted, a creature has nothing from itself. But when God leaves it up to a creature either to do something or not to do it, he gives each alternative to the creature as something of its own, so that even if one alternative is better, neither is determinately required; rather, whether the creature does the better alternative or the other, we say that it ought to do what it does.And if it does what is better, it has a reward, because it spontaneously gives something of its own. For example, although virginity is better than marriage, neither is determinately required of human beings; rather, both someone who makes use of marriage and someone who prefers to remain a virgin are said to do what they ought to do. No one, after all, says that either virginity or marriage ought not to be chosen. Instead, we say that someone ought to act according to what he prefers before he has settled on one or the other; and if someone remains a virgin, he looks forward to a reward for the spontaneous gift that he is offering to God. Therefore, when you say that a creature owes God what it knows is better and has the power to do, that is not always true if you mean the creature owes it as a matter of obligation, and you do not add the qualification,"If God commands it." For, as I have said, human beings do not owe virginity as a matter of obligation; instead, they ought to make use of marriage if that is what they prefer.

Perhaps the word 'ought'37 is bothering you,and you cannot understand how there can be owing without any obligation. In that case, you should know that 'ought'—like 'can','cannot', and 'necessity'—is sometimes said, not because it is in the things of which it is said, but because it is in something else. For example, when we say that the poor ought to receive alms from the rich, this is equivalent to saying that the rich ought to give alms to the poor.After all, one should exact this obligation from a rich person, not from a poor one.We say too that God ought to rule over all things, not because he is under an obligation in this respect, but because all things ought to be subject to him; and we say that God ought to do what he wills, because what he wills ought to be the case. Thus, when some creature wills to do what it has the prerogative either to do or not to do, it is said to do what it ought to do, because what it wills ought to be the case.And so when (as we have said) the Lord Jesus willingly underwent death, which it was his prerogative either to suffer or not to suffer,

37 'Owe' and 'ought' are the same word in Latin. English idiom makes it impossible to stick consistently with one translation. Up to this point in the chapter 'owe' has been the prevailing (but not invariable) translation, but from here to the end of the chapter 'ought' will be more common.

BASIC WRITINGS

it was true that he ought to do what he did, because what he willed ought to come about; but it was also not the case that he ought to do it, because he was not under an obligation to do it. For he himself is both God and a human being. Therefore, in terms of his human nature, from the time he was a human being his divine nature (which is distinct from his human nature) conferred on him this prerogative: that whatever he possessed was his own, so that there was nothing he ought to give, other than what he willed to give.

But in terms of his person, whatever he possessed, he had it from himself in such a way, and was so perfectly self-sufficient, that he did not owe any repayment to anyone and did not need to give anything in order to be repaid.

B: I now see clearly that there is no sense in which he was under an obligation to give himself over to death for God's honor, as my argument seemed to show, and that nevertheless he did what he ought to do.

A: That honor in fact belongs to the whole Trinity. For because he is himself God, the Son of God, he offered himself to himself, as to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, for his own honor. That is, he offered his humanity to his divinity, which is one and the same as the divinity of the three persons. But in order to say more clearly what we mean, while abiding in this same truth, let us adopt the usual way of speaking and say that the Son freely offered himself to the Father. For this is the most suitable way to express it, since in [the name of] one Person we understand God as a whole, to whom as a human being he offered himself; and the names of Father and Son kindle intense devotion in the hearts of those who hear that the Son is said to intercede with the Father in this way on our behalf.

B: I accept this most willingly.

Chapter 19 How very reasonable it is that his death brings about human salvation

A: Let us now examine, as well as we can, how very reasonable it is that his death brings about human salvation.

B: That is what my heart is longing for. For although I think I understand this, I want you to show how the rational account holds together.

A: Now there is no need to set forth how great a thing it is that the Son freely gave.

B: That is already sufficiently clear.

A: And you will not judge that the one who freely gave so great a gift to God should go unrewarded.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

B: On the contrary, I see that it is necessary that the Father reward the Son.

Otherwise, he would appear to be either unjust, if he were unwilling to reward him, or powerless, if he were unable to reward him; and neither of these is true of God.

A: Someone who gives a reward either gives the other person what he does not have or cancels a debt that can be demanded from him. But before the Son did such a great thing, everything that was the Father's was also his; and he never owed any debt that could be canceled. So what reward will be given to one who lacks for nothing, one to whom nothing can be given and for whom no debt can be canceled?

B: I see on the one hand that a reward is necessary, and on the other that it is impossible. For it is necessary that God pay what he owes, yet there is also nothing for him to pay.

A: If such a great and well-deserved reward is not given either to the Son or to anyone else, it will seem that the Son did so great a deed in vain.

B: It is impious to suppose such a thing.

A: Then it is necessary that the reward be given to someone else, since it cannot be given to him.

B: That conclusion is inescapable.

A: If the Son should will to give someone else what was owed to himself, could the Father rightfully prevent him or deny the reward to the one to whom the Son gives it?

B: On the contrary, I understand that it is just and necessary that the Father pay the reward to the one to whom the Son wills to give it, since it is proper for the Son to give what belongs to him, and the Father cannot pay what he owes except to someone other than the Son.

A: To whom will he more fittingly give the fruit and reward of his death than to those for whose salvation he made himself a human being, as truthful reasoning has taught us, and to whom, as we have said, he gave an example by dying for the sake of justice? For their imitation of him will be unavailing if they do not share in what he has earned.And whom will he more justly make heirs of the reward he does not need, and of the abundance of his own riches, than his own kindred and brothers, whom he sees languishing in poverty and deep misery, bound by their many and great debts, so that what they owe for their sins is forgiven and they are given what they lack on account of their sins?

B: The world can hear nothing more reasonable, nothing sweeter, nothing more desirable. For my part, this gives birth to such assurance in me that I can

BASIC WRITINGS

no longer express the great joy with which my heart exults. For it seems to me that God rejects no one who approaches him under this name.

A: That is so, provided that one approaches him as one ought. And Holy Scripture—which is established on the firm foundation of the solid truth that we have in some measure glimpsed, with God's help—teaches us in every place how we ought to approach participation in such great grace and how we ought to live under it.

B: Truly, whatever is built on this foundation is established on solid rock.38

A: I think I have now to some extent given a satisfactory answer to your question,although someone better than I am could do so more fully,and there are more and greater reasons for this matter than my mind, or any mortal mind, can grasp. It is also clear that God had no need at all to do the thing we have been discussing; rather, unchangeable truth demanded it. Now because of the unity of person, God is said to do what this man did; nonetheless, God had no need to come down from heaven in order to overcome the devil or in order to act justly against the devil in order to set human beings free. Instead,

God demanded that humanity overcome the devil and that humanity, which had offended against God through sin, make recompense through justice. For God owed the devil nothing but punishment, and humanity owed him nothing but defeat, so that those whom he had defeated would in turn vanquish him.Whatever else was demanded of humanity was owed to God, not to the devil.

Chapter 20 How great and how just is God's mercy As for God's mercy, which seemed to you to vanish when we were considering God's justice and human sin,39 we have found it to be so great and so consonant with justice that it cannot be thought to be greater or more just.What, indeed, can be understood to be more merciful than for God the Father to say to a sinner condemned to eternal torments, with no way to redeem himself,

"Take my only-begotten Son, and offer him on your behalf," and for the Son himself to say, "Take me and redeem yourself"? For when they call us and draw us to the Christian faith, it is as though they were saying those things.

And what is more just than for one who is paid a price greater than every debt to cancel every debt, if the price is paid with the proper affection?

38 Luke 6:47–48.

39 Book 1, Chapter 24.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK TWO

Chapter 21 That it is impossible for the devil to be reconciled As for the devil's reconciliation, which you asked about,40 you will understand that it is impossible if you attentively consider the reconciliation of humanity.

For just as humanity could be reconciled only through a God-man who would be able to die,through whose justice God would be repaid what he lost through human sin, so too the damned angels can be saved only through a God-angel who can die and through his justice restores to God what the sins of the other angels have taken away.And just as it was not right for human beings to be rescued by another human being who was not of the same race, even if he were of the same nature, so too no angel ought to be saved by another angel, even though they are all of one nature, since unlike human beings they are not of the same race. For it is not the case that all angels are from one angel, as all human beings are from one human being.

Another thing that prevents their restoration is the fact that just as they fell without anyone else harming them, so too they ought to get back up without anyone else helping them, which is impossible for them. For there is no other way for them to be restored to the dignity that they were originally going to have, since if they had not sinned, they would have remained steadfast in the truth through their own power that they had received,without help from anyone else. Hence, if anyone thinks that our Savior's redemption ought to be extended to them, he will be convinced rationally that he has irrationally fallen into error. I do not mean that the price of his death does not outweigh in its magnitude all the sins of human beings and angels, but that immutable reason forbids the restoration of the lost angels.

Chapter 22 That the truth of the Old and New Testaments has been proved in what has been said B: I think everything you say is reasonable and cannot be contradicted, and I understand that through this answer to the one question we have put forward, everything that is contained in the Old and New Testaments has been proved.

For your proof that God had to become a human being is such that, even if one were to eliminate the few things you introduced from our books in order to say something about the three divine persons and about Adam, you would satisfy not only Jews but also pagans by reason alone; and the God-man himself establishes the New Testament and confirms the Old. Therefore, just as 40 Book 1, Chapter 17.

BASIC WRITINGS

one must confess that the God-man himself is truthful, so too no one can doubt that everything contained in the Old and New Testaments is true.

A: If we have said anything that requires correction, I will not spurn correction if it is made reasonably. But if what we take ourselves to have discovered by reason is strengthened by the testimony of truth, we should ascribe it not to ourselves but to God,"who is blessed forever.Amen."41

41 Romans 1:25; cf. Romans 9:5, 2 Corinthians 11:31.

ON THE VIRGINAL CONCEPTION,

AND ON ORIGINAL SIN

Chapters 1: What original and personal justice and injustice are 2: How human nature was corrupted 3: That sin exists only in a rational will

4: That nothing is just or unjust in itself except for justice and injustice; and that nothing is punished other than the will

5: That the evil that is sin or injustice is nothing 6: That nonetheless, when God punishes on account of sin, he does not punish on account of nothing 7: In what way the seed of a human being is said to be unclean and to be conceived in sins, even though there is no sin in it

8: That there was neither sin nor the necessity of future sin in the seed received from the Virgin

9: Why the sin by which the human race is damned is ascribed to Adam more than to Eve, even though he sinned after her and because of her

10: Why those who were not Adam's accomplices are burdened by his sin 11: That propagation from the Virgin is not subject to the law and merits of natural propagation; and that there are three courses of events

12: That it would not be right for Adam's evils to be transmitted to that man 13: That even if he were not God, but merely a human being, it would still have been necessary for him to be such as the first human being was created 14: That the passages saying human beings are conceived from unclean seed and in iniquities do not contradict the argument I have offered, even if they do apply properly to certain cases

15: How the sinful mass is not wholly sinful 16: Why John,and others who likewise were miraculously conceived,are not of themselves free from sin

BASIC WRITINGS

17: Why God was incarnate, given that he could have made from Adam a sufficient number of non-divine human beings without sin

18: It was not necessary that God be conceived from a just virgin, as if he could not have been conceived from a sinful woman; but it was fitting that he should be conceived in this way

19: How the explanation offered here both harmonizes with and differs from the one I offered elsewhere 20: That he who was born of the Virgin had original justice in place of original sin

21: Why he could not possess personal injustice 22: On the magnitude of original sin 23: Why and how it passes to infants 24: That the sins of ancestors after Adam are not counted in the original sin of their descendants 25: How the parents' sins harm their children's souls

26: How, nevertheless, no one bears the sin of his father, but his own sin 27: What original sin is, and that it is equal in all

28: Against those who do not think infants should be damned 29: In what way their inability to have justice excuses them after baptism

↑ Back to top