Monologion: Chapter 70
MONOLOGION
made for. Furthermore, the supremely good and supremely wise and omnipotent Creator caused it to exist in order that it might love him, so it would be utterly absurd for him to cause it not to exist as long as it truly loved him; and he willingly gave life to something that did not love him in order that it might always love him, so it would be utterly absurd for him to take that life away, or to allow it to be taken away, from something that loves him in order that it will, necessarily, not love him—especially since there should be no doubt that he loves every nature that truly loves him. It is therefore evident that its life will never be taken away from a human soul if it always strives to love the supreme life.
So what sort of life will it have? After all, what good is a long life unless it is truly secure against the onslaught of troubles? For if someone as long as he lives is subject to troubles that he either fears or suffers, or else is deceived by a false security, is his life not miserable? By contrast, if someone's life is free from these things, he lives happily. But it is utterly absurd that any nature always leads a miserable life by always loving him who is supremely good and omnipotent. It is therefore clear that the human soul is such that if it preserves what it was made for, it will at some time live happily, truly secure from death itself and from all other troubles.
Chapter 70 That he gives himself as a reward to the one who loves him Finally, it can in no way seem to be true that he who is most just and most powerful, who gave being to one that did not love him in order that it might be able to love him, would give no reward to one who loves him perseveringly. For if he gives no reward to one who loves him, he who is most just does not distinguish between one who loves what ought to be supremely loved and one who disdains it; nor does he love one who loves him—either that, or it does no good to be loved by him. But all those things are incompatible with his nature. Therefore, he rewards everyone who loves him perseveringly.
But what does he give as a reward? If he gave a rational essence to nothing in order that it might love him, what will he give to someone who loves him if he does not cease to love? If what serves love is so great, how great is that which repays love? And if such is the support of love, what will the benefit of love be like? For if the rational creature, which is useless to itself without this love, is so eminent among all creatures, surely nothing can be the reward of this love except that which is supereminent among all natures. For the very same good who thus demands to be loved compels the one who loves him no less to desire him. For who loves justice, truth, happiness, and incorruptibility in such a way that he does not also desire to enjoy them? So what will the