Monologion: Chapter 18
MONOLOGION
nature is in no way a composite and yet is in every way those many good things, it must be that all those things are not several but one. So each of them is the same as all the others, whether all at once or individually.Thus, when he is said to be justice or essence, those words signify the same thing that the others do, whether all at once or individually. And therefore, just as whatever is said essentially* of the supreme substance is one, so whatever he essentially is he is in one way and under one aspect. For when a human being is said to be body and rational and human, these three things are not said in one way or under one aspect.For he is body according to one,rational according to another,and neither of these individually is the whole of the fact that he is human. By contrast, the supreme essence is in no way like this.Whatever he is in any way, he is in every way and under every aspect.For whatever he in any way essentially is,that is the whole of what he is.Therefore,whatever is truly said of his essence is not understood as expressing what sort of thing or how great he is, but rather as expressing what he is. For whatever is a thing of a certain quality or quantity is something else with respect to what it is, and so it is not simple but composite.
Chapter 18 That he exists without beginning and without end So from what time has this so simple nature, the Creator and Sustainer* of all things, existed? And until what time will he continue to exist? Or does he instead exist, not from some time and until some time, but rather without beginning and without end? For if he has a beginning, either he has it from himself or through himself, or he has it from another or through another, or he has it from nothing or through nothing.But through the truth that has already been clearly discerned, it has been established14 that he in no way exists from another or from nothing, or through another or through nothing. So no beginning was in any way allotted to him through another or from another, or through nothing or from nothing. But he cannot have a beginning from himself or through himself, although he does exist from himself and through himself. For he exists from himself and through himself in such a way that the essence he is through himself and from himself is in no way different from the essence through which and from which he exists. By contrast, whatever begins to exist from something or through something is not in every respect the same as that from which or through which it begins to exist. Therefore, the supreme nature did not begin to exist through himself or from himself. Therefore, since he has no beginning through himself or from himself, or through another or from another, or through nothing or from nothing, he in no way has a beginning.
14 In Chapters 3, 5, and 6.