Chapter 28 of 113

Monologion: Chapter 31

Monologion: Chapter 31

BASIC WRITINGS

ance is consubstantial with the supreme nature in such a way that they are not two, but one spirit, then of course that utterance is supremely simple,* just as the supreme nature is. Therefore, it does not consist of several words; rather, it is one Word, through whom all things were made.

Chapter 31 That this Word is not a likeness of created things but the truth of their essence, whereas created things are an imitation of that truth; and which natures are greater and more excellent than others

But behold! It seems to me that a question arises that is not easy and yet should in no way be left unresolved. For all words by which we say things in our mind (that is, think them) are likenesses and images of the things of which they are words. And every likeness or image is more or less true as it imitates more or less the thing of which it is a likeness. So what are we to hold about that Word by whom all things are uttered, and through whom all things were made? Is he or is he not a likeness of those things that were made through him? For if he is a true likeness of mutable things, he is not consubstantial* with the supreme immutability, which is false. On the other hand, if he is not an altogether true likeness of mutable things, but merely some sort of likeness, the Word of the supreme truth is not altogether true, which is absurd. But if he has no likeness to mutable things, how is it that they were patterned after him?

But perhaps none of this uncertainty will remain if we understand it in this way. The truth of a human being is said to exist in a living human being, whereas in a painted one there is the likeness or image of that truth. In the same way, the truth of existing is understood to be in the Word, whose essence exists so supremely that in a certain sense it alone exists, whereas in the things that by comparison with him in a certain sense do not exist, and yet have been made something through him and in accordance with him, there is judged to be an imitation of that supreme essence.Thus, the Word of the supreme truth, who himself is also the supreme truth, experiences no gain or loss depending on whether he is more or less like creatures; instead, it must be the case that every created thing is so much greater and more excellent the more it is like him who supremely exists and is supremely great.

For it is perhaps on this basis—no, not perhaps—it is certainly on this basis that every intellect judges that natures that are in some way living are more excellent than those that are not living, natures that perceive than those that do not perceive, and rational natures than those that lack reason. For since the supreme nature in his own unique way not merely exists but also lives and perceives and is rational, it is clear that of all existing things, what is in some

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