[Three Philsophical Dialogues]: On the Fall of the Devil
On the Fall of the Devil Chapters 1: That "What do you have that you did not receive?" is said even to the angels; and that nothing is from God but good and being; and that every good has being and every being is good
2: Why it seems that the devil did not receive perseverance because God did not give it 3: That God did not give perseverance because the evil angel did not receive it
4: In what way he sinned and willed to be like God 5: That before the fall of the evil angels, the good angels were able to sin
6: How the good angels have been confirmed in their steadfastness and the evil angels in their fall 7: Questions: Is the will, and its turning to what it ought not, the very evil that makes them evil? And why can't the rational creature turn from evil to good on its own, as it can turn from good to evil on its own?
8: That neither the will nor its turning is the very evil that makes them evil 9: That injustice is that very evil and is nothing
10: How evil seems to be something 11: That one cannot prove on the basis of the names that evil and nothing are something, but rather that they are quasi-something
12: That the angel could not have his first will from himself; and that 'can' is applied to many things because of something else's power and 'cannot' because of something else's lack of power
13: That, having received only the will for happiness, he would not be able to will anything else or to refrain from willing happiness; and that no matter what he might will, his will would be neither just nor unjust
14: That the case would be similar if he had received only the will for rectitude, and that he received both wills simultaneously in order that he might be both just and happy
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15: That justice is something 16: That injustice is nothing other than the absence of the justice there ought to be 17: Why an angel who abandoned justice cannot return to it
18: In what sense the evil angel made himself unjust and the good made himself just; and that the evil angel owes thanks to God for the goods he received and abandoned, just as the good owes thanks for the goods he received and preserved 19: That the will, insofar as it has being, is a good; and that no thing is an evil
20: In what sense God makes both evil wills and evil actions; and in what sense they are received from him 21: That the evil angel could not foreknow that he was going to fall
22: That he knew he ought not to will that which he sinned by willing, and that he knew he deserved punishment if he sinned
23: That he should not have known that he would be punished if he sinned 24: That even the good angel should not have known this
25: That even if the good angel is said to be no longer able to sin solely because he now has this knowledge because of the fall of the devil, this is to his glory 26: What it is we fear when we hear the word 'evil', and what causes the deeds that injustice is said to cause, given that injustice and evil are nothing 27: From what source evil entered the angel who used to be good
28: That the power to will what he ought not was always good,and that willing itself is good with respect to its essence
Chapter 1 That "What do you have that you did not receive?" is said even to the angels; and that nothing is from God but good and being; and that every good has being and every being is good STUDENT: When the Apostle says "What do you have that you did not receive?"54 is he saying this only to human beings, or to angels as well?
TEACHER: No creature has anything from itself. For if a thing does not have itself from itself, how can it have anything from itself? In short, since there are only two sorts of things—the Creator and what he created—whatever being anything has must be either God's own being or created being.55
S: That is indeed clear.
T: But neither the Creator nor what he created can have their being from any source other than God himself.56
S: That is no less clear.
T: So he alone has from himself whatever he has, and all other things have nothing but what they have from him. And just as what they have from themselves is nothing, so also what they have from him is something.
S: I don't think it's obviously true that what other things have from God is something. After all,who else brings it about that the many things we see passing from being to non-being are not what they used to be, even if they do not pass completely into nothingness? And who causes what-is-not not to be, unless it is he who causes everything that is to be? Similarly, if something is only because God makes it, it must be the case that what-is-not is not only because
God doesn't make it. Therefore, just as those things that are have from him their being something, so also those that are not, or that pass from being to non-being, seem to have from him their being nothing.
54 1 Corinthians 4:7.
55 More literally: "In short, since nothing exists but the one being who created and the things created by that one being, it is clear that nothing at all can be had but the one who created and what he created." It sounds odd to say that God and his creation "can be had," but Anselm adopts this formulation because the argument takes off from a question about what creatures have. Since (as he will go on to argue) God has his own being from himself, it is proper to say that God "is had" by himself; since creatures have whatever they are from God, it is proper to say that what God creates "is had" by creatures.
56 More literally:"But neither the Creator nor what is created can be had except from the Creator."
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T: It is not only someone who causes what-is-not to be, or causes what-is not to be,who is said to cause something to be or not to be.Rather,someone who can cause something not to be but refrains from doing so is also said to cause something to be; and someone who can cause something to be but refrains from doing so is also said to cause something not to be. For example, it is not only someone who robs another who is said to cause him to be naked or not to be clothed, but also someone who can prevent the robber but fails to do so.
But this is said properly* of the former, whereas it is said improperly of the latter. For when it is said of the latter that he caused someone to be naked or not to be clothed, this simply means that although he could have caused the man to remain clothed or not to be naked, he didn't do so.
It is in this way that God is said to do many things that he does not do, as when he is said to lead us into temptation57 because he does not spare us from temptation even though he could, or to cause what-is-not not to be, since he does not cause it to be even though he could. But if you would consider the things that are when they pass into non-being, it is not God who causes them not to be. After all, not only does no other essence* exist unless God makes it, but what God has made cannot persist even for a moment unless God preserves it; therefore, when he stops preserving what he made, that which used to be does not return to non-being because God causes it not to be, but because he stops causing it to be. For when God, as if in anger,58 destroys something and thereby takes away its being, its non-being is not from God. Rather, when God takes away its being, like something of his own that he has lent— something he made and preserved in order that the thing might be—it returns to the non-being that it had from itself and not from God before it was made. After all, if you ask for your cloak back from someone to whom you willingly lent it temporarily when he was naked, he does not have his nakedness from you; instead, when you take away what was yours he returns to what he was before you clothed him.
So surely, just as whatever is from the supreme Good is good, and every good is from the supreme Good, so also whatever is from the supreme Being has being, and every being is from the supreme Being.59 Therefore, since the supreme Good is the supreme Being,it follows that everything good has being and every being is good. So since nothing and non-being do not have being, they are not good. And so nothing and non-being are not from him from whom only good and being come.
57 Cf. Matthew 6:13, Luke 11:4:"Lead us not into temptation."
58 "as if in anger," because Anselm does not wish to imply that God actually experiences the emotion of anger. Cf. Proslogion, Chapter 8.
59 The word translated 'being' in this paragraph is essentia. See the Glossary entry for essence* (sense 4).
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On the Fall of the Devil
S: I now see clearly that just as good and being come only from God, so also whatever comes from God is good and has being.
T: Now when we read in the Holy Scriptures, or when we say in conformity with them, that God causes evil or causes something not to be,60 you must not in the least suppose that I deny the point being made in those words or find fault with its being said in that way. But we should not so much cling to the improper words that conceal the truth as diligently seek the proper truth that lies hidden in many forms of expression.
S: That would go without saying for anyone who isn't either stupid or dishonest.
T: Go back to what you started with, and consider whether it can be said not only to human beings but also to angels that they have nothing they did not receive.
S: It's quite clear that this is true of angels no less than of human beings.
Chapter 2 Why it seems that the devil did not receive perseverance because God did not give it
So it is clear that the angel who remained steadfast in the truth persevered because he had perseverance, that he had perseverance because he received it, and that he received it because God gave it. It follows, then, that the one who "did not remain steadfast in the truth"61 did not persevere because he did not have perseverance, that he did not have perseverance because he did not receive it, and that he did not receive it because God did not give it. So then I want you to explain to me, if you can, what the angel's fault was. After all, he did not persevere because God did not give him perseverance, and he could have nothing but what God gave him. For I am certain—even though I don't see how it could be true—that his damnation by the supremely Just was just, and he could not have been damned justly apart from some fault.
T: Why do you think it follows that if the good angel received perseverance because God gave it, then the evil angel did not receive it because God did not give it?
S: Because if its being given to the good angel was the cause of its being received, I think its not being given to the evil angel must have been the cause
60 As we read in Isaiah 45:7, for example: "I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things."
61 John 8:44.
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of its not being received. Now if we posit that it was not given, I see that this necessarily entails that it was not received; and we all know that when we don't receive something we want, it's not the case that it isn't given because we don't receive it, but rather we don't receive it because it isn't given. Finally, everyone I've heard or read asking this question always (as far as I can remember) brings it to a point with the following argument: if the good angel received perseverance because God gave it, the evil angel did not receive it because God did not give it. And I don't recall ever seeing a rejoinder to that reasoning.
Chapter 3 That God did not give perseverance because the evil angel did not receive it
T: That reasoning has no force at all, since it's possible for not-giving not to be the cause of not-receiving, even if giving were always the cause of receiving.
S: So if we posit the not-giving, the not-receiving doesn't necessarily follow.
Therefore, there can be receiving even if there is no giving.
T: That's not so.
S: I'd like you to show me an example that illustrates what you're saying.
T: If I offer you something and you receive it, I do not give it because you receive it, but rather you receive it because I give it, and the giving is the cause of the receiving.
S: Right.
T: What if I offer that very same thing to someone else and he doesn't receive it?62 Is it the case that he doesn't receive it because I don't give it?
S: No, it seems that you don't give it because he doesn't receive it.
T: So in this case not-giving is not the cause of not-receiving, and yet if I posit that I didn't give it, that causes it to follow that he didn't receive it.You see, for one thing to cause another is not the same as for the positing of a thing to cause something else to follow.For example,burning is not the cause of fire, but fire is the cause of burning; and yet if we posit that there is burning, this always causes it to follow that there is fire. For if there is burning, there must be fire.
S: I have to admit you're right.
62 That is, does not accept it, refuses it.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On the Fall of the Devil
T: Then I think you understand that even though you received because I gave, it does not therefore follow that the one who did not receive did not receive because I didn't give; and yet it does follow that if I didn't give, he didn't receive.
S: I do understand, and I am pleased that I understand.
T: Do you still doubt that just as the reason the angel who remained steadfast received perseverance is that God gave it, so also the reason God did not give perseverance to the angel who did not remain steadfast is that the angel did not receive it?
S: You haven't shown me that yet. All you have succeeded in proving is that just because the reason the good angel received perseverance is that God gave it, it doesn't follow that the reason the bad angel didn't receive it is that God didn't give it. If you intend to claim that in fact the reason God didn't give it to the bad angel is that the angel didn't receive it, I want to know why he didn't receive it. It was either because he wasn't able to or because he didn't will to. Now if he lacked either the power or the will to receive it, God did not give them to him, since if God had given them, the angel certainly would have had them.Therefore,since he could not have either the power or the will to receive perseverance unless God gave them to him, in what way did he sin by not receiving what God gave him neither the power nor the will to receive?
T: God did give him the will and the power to receive perseverance.
S: Then he received what God gave, and he had what he received.
T: He did indeed receive it and have it.
S: Then he received and had perseverance.
T: He didn't receive it, and therefore he didn't have it.
S: Didn't you say that God gave him, and that he received, the will and the power to receive perseverance?
T: I did. But I didn't say that God gave him the receiving of perseverance, only that God gave him the will and the power to receive perseverance.
S: Then if he had the will and the power, he received perseverance.
T: That doesn't follow necessarily.
S: I don't see why not, unless you'll explain it to me.
T: Have you ever begun something with the will and the power to complete it, but then you failed to complete it because your will had changed before you finished?
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S: Often.
T: Then you had the will and the power to persevere in something in which you did not in fact persevere.
S: I did indeed have the will, but I didn't persevere in that will, and therefore
I didn't persevere in the action.
T: Why didn't you persevere in that will?
S: Because I didn't will to persevere.
T: As long as you willed to persevere in the action, didn't you will to persevere in that will itself?
S: I can't deny it.
T: Then why do you say you didn't will to persevere in it?
S: I would reply again that I willed to persevere but didn't persevere in that will, except that I see this would go on forever, with you always asking the same question and me always giving the same reply.
T: That's why you shouldn't say,"I didn't will to persevere in that will because
I didn't will to persevere in willing that will." Instead, when asked why you did not persevere in that action in which you had the will and the power to persevere, you can reply that it was because you didn't persevere in that will. If you are then asked why you didn't persevere in that will, you should adduce a different cause, namely the reason why this deficiency in your will came about, rather than saying that it was because you didn't persevere in willing that will.
For the latter reply merely restates the very thing that is being asked about, that is, the fact that you didn't persevere in the will to persevere in that action.
S: I realize that I didn't see what I should say.
T: So tell me in one word what it is to persevere in doing something as far as the thing requires.
S: To finish doing it. For when someone perseveres in writing, we say that he finishes writing; and when someone perseveres in leading, we say that he finishes leading.
T: Then let's likewise say, even though the expression is not in common use, that to persevere in willing is to finish willing.63
S: Very well.
63 Anselm's procedure is much clearer in the Latin. In the first three instances Anselm took the verb and added the prefix per. Thus facere (to do) became perficere (to bring to comple-
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On the Fall of the Devil
T: So when you did not finish doing what you had the will and the power to finish, why didn't you finish doing it?
S: Because I didn't finish willing it.
T: Then in the same way you must say that the devil, who received the will and the power to receive perseverance and the will and power to persevere, did not receive perseverance and did not persevere because he did not finish willing.
S: But then again I want to know why he didn't finish willing. After all, when you say he did not finish willing what he willed, that just amounts to saying that he no longer willed what he had once willed. So when he no longer willed what he had once willed, why did he not will it, unless it was because he did not have the will? I don't mean the will he had had before, when he willed it, but the will he didn't have when he didn't will it.Why, then, did he not have this will, unless it was because he didn't receive it? And why didn't he receive it, unless it was because God didn't give it?
T: Again I say that it's not the case that he didn't receive it because God didn't give it; instead, God didn't give it because he didn't receive it.
S: Explain that.
T: He spontaneously* forsook the will he had. Now as long as he possessed what he later abandoned, he received his possessing it; and in the same way he could have received his always retaining what he abandoned. But since he abandoned it, he did not receive his always retaining it. Therefore, it was because he abandoned it that he did not receive his retaining it—and it's not the case that he didn't receive it because God didn't give it, but instead God didn't give it because he didn't receive it.
S: Who would not understand that it's not because he abandoned it that he didn't will to retain it, but rather it's because he didn't will to retain it that he abandoned it? For not willing to retain something one has is always prior to willing to abandon it; after all, someone wills to abandon something he has because he does not will to retain it. So I am asking if there was a reason why he did not will to retain what he had, other than God's not giving him the will to retain it. tion), scribere (to write) became perscribere (to write in full), and ducere (to lead) became perducere (to lead to the destination). Anselm now proposes to do the same with the word velle
(to will), thereby coining a new word, pervelle, which will mean 'to will to the end, to will with complete perseverance'. In the translation I have represented per by the verb 'to finish': thus, perficere is 'to finish doing', pervelle 'to finish willing', and so on.
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T: Not willing to retain something is not always prior to willing to abandon it.
S: Explain to me when it isn't.
T: When you do not will to retain a thing, but rather to abandon it, for its own sake: for example, if a live coal is placed in your bare hand. In such a case, perhaps, your not willing to retain the thing is prior to your willing to abandon it, and you will to abandon it because you do not will to retain it. After all, before you have it you do not will to retain it, and yet you cannot will to abandon it except when you have it.
By contrast, when you have something that you do not will to retain, but only for the sake of something else, and that you will to abandon only for the sake of something else, and you more strongly will something else that you cannot have unless you abandon what you have: in that case your willing to abandon something is prior to your not willing to retain it.For example,when a miser wills to retain a coin, but he more strongly wills bread, which he cannot have unless he spends his coin,his willing to spend—that is,to abandon— the coin is prior to his not willing to retain it. He does not, after all, will to spend the coin because he does not will to retain it; rather, he does not will to retain it because in order to have bread he must spend it. Moreover, before he has it, he wills to have it and to retain it; and while he has it, he in no way lacks the will to retain it, so long as he need not abandon it.
S: That's true.
T: Therefore, not willing to retain something is not always prior to willing to abandon it; instead, willing to abandon something is sometimes prior.
S: I can't deny it.
T: I therefore say that it was not because his will was faulty—God having failed to give him the will—that he did not will what and when he ought to have willed; but instead, by willing what he ought not, he cast out his good will when an evil will came to exist within him. Hence, it is not the case that he did not have or receive a persevering good will because God did not give it to him; but rather, God did not give it to him because he deserted that will by willing what he ought not, and by deserting it did not retain it.
S: I understand what you're saying.
Chapter 4 In what way he sinned and willed to be like God T: Do you still doubt that it was not because he did not will to retain what he had that the devil abandoned it,but rather it was because he willed to abandon it that he did not will to retain it?
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On the Fall of the Devil
S: I don't doubt that that could be true, but you haven't yet convinced me that it really is true. So show me first what he willed to have that he did not have, so that he willed to abandon what he did have, as you illustrated in the case of the miser. Then, if there's no possible objection, I will acknowledge that I don't doubt it really is true.
T: You don't doubt that he did in fact sin, since a just God could not condemn him unjustly, but you are asking in what way he sinned.
S: Exactly.
T: If he had persevered in preserving justice, he would never have sinned or been wretched.
S: That is what we believe.
T: And no one preserves justice except by willing what he ought or abandons justice except by willing what he ought not.
S: No one would doubt that.
T: So he abandoned justice, and thus sinned, by willing something that he ought not to have willed at that time.
S: That follows, but I'm asking what it was he willed.
T: Whatever he had, he ought to have willed.
S: Certainly he ought to have willed what he had received from God, and he did not sin by willing it.
T: Then he willed something that he did not have and that he ought not to have willed at that time, just as Eve willed to be "like the gods"64 before God willed that.
S: I cannot deny that that follows too.
T: Now he could not will anything but justice or something advantageous.
For happiness, which every rational nature wills, consists in advantageous things.
S: We can see this to be true in ourselves, since we will nothing but what we think is either just or advantageous.
T: But he could not sin by willing justice.
S: That's true.
64 Cf. Genesis 3:5, where the serpent tells Eve,"You will be like the gods, knowing good and evil."
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T: Therefore, he sinned by willing something advantageous that he did not have and ought not to have willed at that time, but that could have served to increase his happiness.
S: Clearly that is the only way in which he could have sinned.
T: I believe you understand that by inordinately willing something in addition to what he had received, he stretched out his will beyond the bounds of justice.
S: I now see clearly that he sinned both by willing what he ought not and by not willing what he ought. It is also evident that it was not the case that he willed more than he ought because he did not will to retain justice. On the contrary, he did not retain justice because he willed something else; and by willing that, he abandoned justice—as you showed in the case of the miser, the coin, and the bread.
T: Now when he willed this thing that God did not want him to will, he willed inordinately to be like God.
S: If God must be thought of as so unique that nothing else like him can be thought,65 how could the devil will what he could not think? After all, he was not so dense that he didn't know that nothing else can be thought to be like God.
T: Even if he didn't will to be completely equal to God, but instead willed something less than equality with God that was contrary to God's will: by that very fact he willed inordinately to be like God, since he willed something by his own will, which was not subjected to anyone else. For it is the prerogative of God alone to will anything by his own will in such a way that he does not follow any higher will.
S: That's true.
T: Now he did not merely will to be equal to God by presuming to have a will of his own; he willed to be even greater than God, in that he placed his own will above God's will by willing what God didn't want him to will.
S: That's quite clear.
T: I believe it's obvious to you now from the arguments offered above that the devil spontaneously* stopped willing what he ought and justly lost what he had, since he spontaneously and unjustly willed what he didn't have and what he ought not to have willed.
65 This expression recalls Anselm's description of God as 'that than which nothing greater can be thought" in the Proslogion, beginning with Chapter 2.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On the Fall of the Devil
S: I think nothing could be more obvious.
T: So although the good angel received perseverance because God gave it, it's not the case that the evil angel did not receive it because God didn't give it; rather, God didn't give it because he didn't receive it, and he didn't receive it because he didn't will to receive it.
S: You have given such satisfactory answers to my questions that both the truth of your premises and the validity of your arguments is firmly fixed in my understanding.
Chapter 5 That before the fall of the evil angels, the good angels were able to sin
T: Do you think the good angels were likewise able to sin before the evil angels fell?
S: I think so, but I would like to understand this through reason.
T: You know for certain that if they were not able to sin, they preserved justice out of necessity* and not in virtue of their power.Therefore, they did not merit grace from God for remaining steadfast when others fell any more than they did for preserving their rationality, which they could not lose. Nor, if you consider the matter rightly, could they properly be called just.
S: That's what reason shows.
T: So suppose that those who fell had not sinned, even though they were able to. They would have been greater than the angels who were not able to sin, insofar as they would have been genuinely just and would have merited grace from God. Hence, it follows either that elect human beings will turn out to be better and greater than the good angels, or that the reprobate angels will not be adequately replaced, since the human beings who are received in their place will not be such as they themselves were going to be.66
66 This cryptic argument depends in part on Anselm's views in Cur Deus Homo, Book 1,
Chapters 16–18, where he argues that some human beings will fill up the places in heaven that should have been occupied by the angels who fell. If those views are borne in mind,
Anselm's argument here can be understood in the following reformulation. The bad angels were (obviously) able to sin. But what about the good angels? Either they too were able to sin or they weren't. Suppose they weren't. Then their actions were neither just nor meritorious. But in that case, saved human beings would actually be better than the good angels, since human beings are able to sin and therefore can act justly and meritoriously. And we can't say that human beings are better than angels. So suppose instead we cling to the view that saved human beings are not better than the good angels. It would follow that human
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S: I think both these conclusions must be utterly rejected.
T: Therefore, the good angels were able to sin before the fall of the evil angels, just as has been shown in the case of those who fell.
S: I don't see how else things could be.
Chapter 6 How the good angels have been confirmed in their steadfastness and the evil angels in their fall T: And so the good angels willed the justice that they had, rather than that additional something which they didn't have. As far as their own will was concerned, they lost that good (as it were) for the sake of justice; but they received it as a reward for justice, and they remained for ever in secure possession of what they had. Hence, they have progressed so far that they have attained everything they could will, and they no longer see what more they could will; and because of this they are unable to sin. By contrast, the evil angels willed that additional something which God did not yet will to give them, rather than willing to remain steadfast in the justice in which they were created. By the judgment of that very justice, they not only failed utterly to obtain that on account of which they scorned justice but also lost the good they had.Therefore, the angels are distinguished in the following way: those who cleave to justice can will no good that they do not enjoy, and those who abandon justice can will no good that they do not lack.
S: Nothing could be more just or more beautiful than this distinction. But if you can tell me, I would like to hear what sort of advantageous thing this was that the good angels justly spurned and thereby advanced, and the evil angels unjustly desired and thereby fell away.
T: I don't know what it was. But whatever it might have been, all we need to know is that it was something they were able to attain, which they did not rebeings, like the good angels, act neither justly nor meritoriously. But that can't be true either, since saved human beings are supposed to fill up the gap left by the desertion of the evil angels. Now those evil angels were able to sin, which means that if they hadn't sinned, they would have acted justly and meritoriously. If saved human beings do not act justly and meritoriously, they are not fitting replacements for the rebel angels ("they will not be such as [the reprobate angels] were going to be"). Therefore, since the assumption that the good angels were unable to sin leads to all sorts of dead ends and absurdities, we must conclude that they were able to sin.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On the Fall of the Devil
ceive when they were created, in order that they might advance to it by their own merit.
S: And let this be enough for our discussion of this point.
Chapter 7 Questions: Is the will, and its turning to what it ought not, the very evil that makes them evil? And why can't the rational creature turn from evil to good on its own, as it can turn from good to evil on its own?
But I don't know what it is—as soon as I hope I've finally answered one question, I see more questions sprouting up from the roots of those I've already mowed down. Now that I quite clearly see that unrestrained concupiscence was the only reason the rebel angel could have fallen into this extreme lack of anything good, I am very troubled about the source of this inordinate will. For if that will was good, then it was on account of a good will that he fell from such great good into such great evil. Moreover, if it was good, then God gave it to him, since he had nothing from himself. So if he willed what God gave him to will, what was his sin? On the other hand, if he had this will from himself, he had something good that he did not receive.
Now if that will is evil and is also something, the problem arises again: his evil will must have been from God, who is the source of whatever is something. And once again one can ask what his sin was in having the will God gave him, or how God could give an evil will. If, however, this evil will was from the devil himself and is also something, then the devil had something from himself, and not every essence* is good; nor will evil be nothing, as we are accustomed to say, since an evil will is an essence. On the other hand, if an evil will is nothing, it was on account of nothing, and therefore without cause, that he was so harshly condemned. And what I'm saying about will can equally well be said about concupiscence or desire, since both concupiscence and desire are will; and just as there is good and evil will, so also there is good and evil concupiscence and good and evil desire.
Now suppose someone said that a will is an essence* and is therefore something good, but that it becomes a good will by turning to what it ought but is called a bad will when it turns to what it ought not. Then I notice that whatever I said about the will can be said about this turning of the will. For I am very troubled about the source of the perverse turning of the devil's will, and about the other things I said just now about the will. And there is still something else that bewilders me whenever I think about this turning of the will, namely, why God made that excellent and sublime nature such that it could turn its will from what it ought to will to what it ought not to will but could not turn from what it ought not to will to what it ought. For it seems
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that such a creature ought to have received from such a Creator the power to do the good for which it was created, rather than the evil it was created to avoid.The same question can be asked about our own nature, since we believe that no human being can have a good will unless God gives it, whereas we can have an evil will at any time if God merely permits it.
Chapter 8 That neither the will nor its turning is the very evil that makes them evil
T: I don't think we can deny that both the will and its turning are something.
For even if they are not substances,* it still cannot be proved that they are not essences,* since there are many essences besides those that are properly* called substances. Moreover, a good will is no more a something than is a bad will, nor is a bad will more an evil than a good will is a good. For a merciful, generous will is no more a something than a merciless, rapacious will; nor is the latter more an evil than the former is a good. Therefore, if an evil will is the very evil because of which someone is called evil, it would follow that a good will is the very good by which someone is made good. But then it would turn out that an evil will is nothing at all, if it is that very evil that we believe to be nothing; and then a good will would also be nothing, since it is no more a something than an evil will is. So we would be forced to hold that the very good that makes beings good is nothing,since it is the good will,which would be nothing. But no one for a moment supposes that a good will, or good itself, is nothing. Therefore, an evil will is not the very evil that makes beings evil, just as a good will is not the very good that makes them good.
Now what I said about the will can also be applied to the will's turning: the turning by which a will turns from stealing to bestowing is no more a something than that by which the very same will turns from generosity to greed.
And so on, for all the things I said about the will a moment ago.
S: What you say seems right to me too.
T: Therefore, neither the evil will nor the wicked turning of the will is the very evil that makes an angel or human being evil—that is, the very evil that we claim is nothing—nor is the good will or the good turning of the will the good that makes them good.
Chapter 9 That injustice is that very evil and is nothing S: Then what are we to say is the very evil that makes them evil, and what is the very good that makes them good?
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T: We ought to believe that justice is the very good in virtue of which both angels and human beings are good, that is, just, and in virtue of which the will itself is said to be good or just; whereas injustice is the very evil that we claim is nothing other than a privation of good, which makes them and their will evil. And consequently, we hold that injustice is nothing other than the privation of justice. For when a will was initially given to the rational nature, it was, simultaneously with that giving, turned by the Giver himself to what it ought it to will—or rather, it was not turned but created upright. Now as long as that will remained steadfast in the rectitude in which it was created, which we call truth or justice, it was just. But when it turned itself away from what it ought to will and toward what it ought not, it did not remain steadfast in the original rectitude (if I may so call it) in which it was created.When it abandoned that rectitude, it lost something great and received in its place nothing but its privation, which has no essence,* and which we call 'injustice'.
Chapter 10 How evil seems to be something S: I grant what you say about evil's being a privation of good, but I equally see that good is a privation of evil. And just as I perceive that in the privation of evil something else comes about that we call 'good', so also I notice that in the privation of good something else comes about that we call 'evil.' Now there are certain arguments proving that evil is nothing. For example, it has been argued that evil is nothing but a flaw or corruption, which exists only in some essence,* and the more flaws and corruptions there are in an essence, the more they reduce it to nothingness; and if that essence falls completely into nothingness, the flaws and corruptions will also be found to be nothing.
But even if this or some other argument is offered to show that evil is nothing, my mind cannot endorse that view, except by faith alone, unless someone refutes my contrary argument proving that evil is something. For when we hear the name67 'evil' there would be no reason for our hearts to fear what they understand to be signified by that name if in fact it signified nothing.
Moreover, if the word 'evil' is a name, it surely has a signification; and if it has a signification, it signifies. But then it signifies something. How, then, is evil nothing, if what the name 'evil' signifies is something? Finally, consider what peace there is, what rest, while justice endures: so that in many cases it seems
67 nomen: I have chosen to translate nomen consistently as 'name', since that makes the best sense of Anselm's arguments on the whole; but readers should bear in mind that nomen can also have the more general meaning 'word' and the narrower meaning 'noun'.
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that justice, like chastity and forbearance, is nothing but restraint from evil. But when justice is gone, what varied, troublesome, and multifarious feelings take possession of the soul; like a cruel master they force their wretched slave to be anxious about so many depraved and wearisome deeds and to labor so painfully in doing them. It would be astonishing if you could show that nothing accomplishes all this.
Chapter 11 That one cannot prove on the basis of the names that evil and nothing are something, but rather that they are quasi-something
T: I imagine you're not crazy enough to say that nothing is something, even though you cannot deny that 'nothing' is a name. So, if you cannot prove that nothing is something based on the name 'nothing', how do you think you're going prove that evil is something based on the name 'evil'?
S: An example that resolves one controversial issue by bringing in another is useless. For I don't know what nothing is either. So, since the question at hand concerns the evil that you say is nothing, if you want to teach me what I should understand evil to be, first teach me what I should understand nothing to be; and then you will respond to the other considerations, besides the name
'evil,' that I said induced me to think evil is something.
T: Now given that there is no difference at all between being nothing and not being something, how can one say what that which is not something is?
S: If there isn't something that is signified by the name 'nothing', then that name doesn't signify anything; and if it doesn't signify anything, it's not a name.But surely it is a name.Therefore,although no one would say that nothing is something, but instead we must always say that nothing is nothing, still, no one can deny that the name 'nothing' has a signification. But if this name does not signify nothing, but instead signifies something, then it seems that what it signifies cannot be nothing but instead is something.Therefore,if what it signifies is not nothing but instead is something, how will it be true that this word signifies that which is nothing? After all, if 'nothing' is said truly, then what is signified by the name is truly nothing, and therefore it isn't something.
Hence, if what is signified by this name is not nothing but instead is something—as the argument seems to show—then it is falsely and inappropriately called by that name. But on the other hand, if (as everyone agrees) that which is named "nothing" truly is nothing and in no way is something, could anything at all follow more logically than this:that this word signifies nothing,that is, doesn't signify anything? And so why is it that the name "nothing" does not
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signify nothing but instead something,and also does not signify something but instead nothing?
T: Perhaps signifying nothing is not inconsistent with signifying something.
S: Suppose they're not inconsistent. Then either this word signifies nothing when taken in one way and something when taken in another way, or else we will have to find a thing that is both something and nothing.
T: What if both turn out to be true? That is, what if we can find two ways of understanding this name and also find one and the same thing to be both something and nothing?
S: I would like to know both.
T: It is agreed that as far as its signification goes, the word 'nothing' is in no way different from 'not-something.' And nothing is more obvious than this:
'not-something' by its signification requires that every thing whatsoever, and anything that is something, is to be excluded from the understanding, and that no thing at all or what is in any way something is to be included in the understanding. But since there is no way to signify the exclusion of something except by signifying the very thing whose exclusion is signified—for no one understands what 'not-human' signifies except by understanding what a human is—the expression 'not-something' must signify something precisely by eliminating that which is something. On the other hand, by excluding everything that is something, it signifies no essence* that it requires to be included in the hearer's understanding. Therefore, the expression 'notsomething' does not signify any thing or that which is something.
Therefore, the expression 'not-something' under different aspects both in some way signifies a thing and something and in no way signifies a thing or something. For it signifies by excluding; it does not signify by including. The same argument applies to the name 'nothing', which excludes everything that is something: by what it eliminates, it signifies something rather than nothing, and by what it includes, it signifies nothing rather than something. Therefore, it is not necessary that nothing be something just because its name signifies something in a certain way; but rather, it is necessary that nothing be nothing, because its name signifies something in that particular way. And so in this way it is not inconsistent for evil to be nothing and yet for the name 'evil' to have a signification, given that it signifies something by excluding it and does not include any thing.
S: I can't deny that the name 'nothing' in some way signifies something, as you've just argued; but it is quite well-known that the something that is signified in that way by this name is not named 'nothing.' Nor when we hear
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this name do we take it as standing for the thing that it signifies in that way.
So I am asking about the item68 that we use this name to stand for and that we understand when we hear this name—I mean, I'm asking what that item is. After all, it is what this name properly* signifies; this name is a name because it signifies that item, not because it signifies something by denying, in the way you explained earlier. That name is reckoned among names precisely because it signifies that item, and that item is called 'nothing'. I am asking how that item is something if it is properly called 'nothing', or how it is nothing if the name that signifies it signifies something, or how one and the same item is both something and nothing. I ask the same questions about the name
'evil', both about what it signifies and about what is named 'evil'.
T: You are right to ask these questions,since even though the argument given above shows that 'evil' and 'nothing' signify something, what they signify is not evil or nothing. But there is another argument showing that they signify something and that what they signify is something—yet not really something, but quasi-something.
You see, the form of an expression often doesn't match the way things are in reality.69 For example,'to fear' is active according to the form of the word even though fearing is passive in reality. And in the same way 'blindness' is something according to the form of the expression,even though it is not something in reality. For we say that someone has blindness and that there is blindness in him in just the same way that we say someone has vision and that there is vision in him, even though blindness is not something, but instead not-something, and to have blindness is not to have something but rather to lack that which is something. After all, blindness is nothing other than non-vision or the absence of vision where there ought to be vision; and non-vision or the absence of vision is not something in cases where there ought to be vision any more than it is in cases where there ought not to be vision. Therefore, blindness is not something in the eye, just because there ought to be vision in the eye, any more than non-vision or the absence of vision is something in a stone, where there ought not to be vision. And there are many other similar cases in which things that are not something are called something
68 There is no word in the Latin corresponding to 'item'. I use it to avoid a confusing string of neuter pronouns with different referents in the sentences that follow.'Thing' would not work, because the Student is not committed to the notion that whatever is referred to by 'nothing' qualifies as a thing; indeed, he is committed to just the opposite, which is why he avoids words like 'something' and 'thing' and formulates his question using only neuter demonstrative pronouns.
69 Literally:"many things are said according to form that are not so in reality."
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according to the form of the expression, in that we speak of them as we speak of things that really exist.
It is in this way, then, that 'evil' and 'nothing' signify something; and what they signify is something, not in reality, but according to the form of the expression. For 'nothing' does not signify anything other than not-something, or the absence of those items that are something. And evil is not anything other than not-good,or the absence of good where it is required or fitting that good should be. Now that which is not anything other than the absence of what is something is certainly not itself something. Therefore, evil is truly nothing, and nothing is not something; and yet in a certain way evil and nothing are something, because we speak of them as if 70 they were something when we say,"He did nothing" or "He did evil," or "What he did is nothing" or "What he did is evil," in the same way in which we say "He did something" or "He did what is good," or "What he did is something" or "What he did is good."
That's why, when we utterly deny that what someone says is something, we say "That which you say is nothing." For 'that' and 'which' are properly* said only of that which is something; and when they are used in the expression I just mentioned, they are not said of that71 which is something, but of that which is spoken of as if it were something.
S: You have succeeded in meeting the argument based on the name 'evil' by which I thought I could prove that evil is something.
Chapter 12 That the angel could not have his first will from himself; and that 'can' is applied to many things because of something else's power and 'cannot' because of something else's lack of power
You still need to show me how I can reply to the other considerations that strive to persuade me that evil is something.72
T: In order for us to be able to elucidate the truth of the matter, we will have to begin a little further back. But it's important for you not to be content
70 "as if": Latin, quasi; hence the expression "quasi-something" above.
71 Reading dicuntur de eo for dicuntur eo.
72 The "other considerations" raised in Chapter 10 are finally answered in Chapter 26. As the Teacher indicates in his next speech, Chapters 12–25 set up the philosophical account needed to make the claims of Chapter 26 compelling, and those chapters should be read with the considerations of Chapter 10 in mind. This is not to say, of course, that Chapters
12–25 are interesting only for the light they shed on the problem raised in Chapter 10; on the contrary, they are arguably the philosophical centerpiece of On the Fall of the Devil.
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merely to understand each of the things I say individually, but to gather them all up in your memory at the same time and see them in one glance,as it were.
S: I will be as attentive as I can. But if I prove to be somewhat slower than you might wish, don't become annoyed at having to wait for me as you see that my slowness requires it.
T: Well, let's suppose that right now God is making an angel that he wills to make happy, and he's not making the angel all at once but rather part by part.
Up to this point the angel has been made apt to have a will, but he does not yet will anything.
S: Suppose whatever you like, and explain what I am asking about.
T: Do you think this angel can will anything on his own?
S: I don't really understand what you mean by "on his own." For as you said earlier,73 no creature has anything that it did not receive, and no creature can do anything on its own.
T: By "on his own" I mean in virtue of what he already has. For example, someone who has feet and whatever else suffices for the ability to walk can walk on his own, whereas someone whose feet are injured cannot walk on his own. This is the sense in which I am asking whether the angel who is already apt to will but does not yet will anything can will something on his own.
S: I think he can, if at some point he wills.
T: You're not answering my question.
S: How so?
T: My question is about someone who is willing nothing, and about the possibility74 that precedes the fact; but your answer is about someone who wills, and about the possibility that comes about with the fact. For whatever is, by the very fact that it is, can be. But not everything that is could be before it was. So when I ask whether this angel who wills nothing can will, I am asking about the possibility before he wills, by which he can move himself to will; but when you reply that if he wills, he can will, you are talking about the possibility that comes about with that will itself. For necessarily, if he wills, he can will.
73 In Chapter 1.
74 possibility: potestas, the abstract noun corresponding to the verb posse, which I have been translating 'can'.
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S: I know that there are two possibilities, one that is not yet realized in fact, and one that is already realized in fact. But I also can't help but know this: if anything can be in the sense that it now actually exists, then if at any time it did not exist, it previously could exist. After all, if it could not have existed, it would never have existed. So I think my reply was perfectly adequate: since, given that he wills, he can will, it must be the case that before he willed, he could will.
T: Do you think that what is nothing has nothing at all and therefore has no power,75 and that without power there is absolutely nothing it can do or be?
S: I can't deny that.
T: I believe that before the world was made, it was nothing.
S: You're right.
T: Therefore, before it existed, there was nothing it could do or be.
S: That follows.
T: Therefore, before it existed, it could not exist.
S: And I say that if it could not exist, it was impossible for it ever to exist.
T: That was both possible and impossible before it existed. It was impossible for the world, since the world did not have the power to exist; but it was possible for God, who had the power to make the world. Therefore, the world exists because before it was made, God could make it, not because before it existed the world itself could exist.
S: I can't rebut your argument, but our normal way of speaking is against you.
75 "power": again, potestas. Part of Anselm's point in this chapter is to distinguish two senses of potestas: to say that x has the potestas to be y might just mean that it is possible for x to be y, but it means something more, namely that x can bring it about that x is y. (Consider two examples: a banana has the potestas to be digested in the first sense but not in the second, since it cannot throw itself into your intestines and bombard itself with digestive enzymes and so forth. By contrast, I have the potestas to be in Chicago in both senses: it is possible for me to be in Chicago, and I myself have the power to bring it about that I am in Chicago.) The problem is that in English we have a ready-made distinction between these two senses. For the first we use 'possibility' and for the second we use 'power'.Anselm must therefore labor to make clear a distinction we already have firmly entrenched in ordinary language. The analogue in English would be to distinguish between the two uses of 'can': when I say that the banana can be digested I am using a sense of 'can' that implies mere possibility, but when I say that I can be in Chicago I am using a sense of 'can' that implies a power.
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T: That's not surprising. Many things are said improperly* in ordinary speech; but when it is incumbent upon us to search out the heart of the truth, we must remove the misleading impropriety to the greatest extent possible and as much as the subject matter demands. Because of such impropriety in speaking we quite often apply the word 'can' to a thing, not because it can do anything, but because something else can; and we apply the word 'cannot' to a thing that can do something, simply because some other thing cannot. For example, if I say "a book can be written by me," the book certainly can't do anything, but I can write the book. And when we say "this man cannot be defeated by that man," we understand this to mean simply,"that man cannot defeat this man."76 This is why we say that God cannot undergo anything harmful to himself or do anything wicked, since he is so powerful in his blessedness and justice—or rather, since in him blessedness and justice are not distinct things but a single good, he is so all-powerful in his unitary good— that no thing can do what would harm the supreme Good. Hence, he can neither be corrupted nor lie.77
Therefore, whatever does not exist cannot, before it exists, exist through its own power; but if some other thing can cause it to exist, then it can exist through something else's power. Now although there are many ways to draw distinctions involving power or lack of power, let this be enough for now:
'can' is applied to many things not because of their own power, but because of something else's power; and 'cannot' is applied to many things not because of their own lack of power, but because of something else's lack of power. So I am speaking of his own power when I ask about the newly-created angel whom we are imagining, who up to this point has been made apt to have a will but does not yet will anything. Can he will anything on his own? Answer in terms of his own power.
S: If he is already apt to will and lacks nothing but the willing itself, I don't see why he can't will on his own. After all, someone who is apt to see, but doesn't see anything, who is placed in the light but with his eyes closed, can see on his own.Why, then, couldn't someone who is not willing will on his own in the same way that someone who is not seeing can see on his own?
T: Because the one who is not seeing has vision and a will by which he can move vision.We, however, are speaking of an angel who has no will. So answer this question: if a thing moves itself from not willing to willing, does it will to move itself?
76 Cf. On Truth, Chapter 8.
77 Cf. Proslogion, Chapter 7.
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S: If I say that it is moved without willing, what will follow is that it is moved by something else rather than by itself—except perhaps if someone suddenly closes his eyes in anticipation of a blow or is compelled by something disadvantageous to will what he did not will before. For in those cases I'm not sure whether he first moves himself to this will.
T: No one is compelled by fear or the expectation of something disadvantageous, or incited by love of something advantageous, to will something, unless he first has a natural* will to avoid what is disadvantageous or have what is advantageous. By that will he moves himself to other wills.
S: I can't deny that.
T: You must acknowledge, therefore, that whatever moves itself to will, first wills to move itself.
S: Yes.
T: Therefore, that which wills nothing can in no way move itself to will.
S: I can't object.
T: So it must be the case that the angel who has already been made apt to have a will but nonetheless does not will anything cannot have his first will from himself.
S: I have to grant you that, since that which wills nothing can will nothing on its own.
T: Now he cannot be happy unless he wills happiness. By 'happiness' I don't mean happiness in accordance with justice, but the happiness that everyone wills, even the unjust. After all, everyone wills his own well-being. For leaving aside the fact that every nature* is said to be good, we commonly speak of two goods and of two evils that are contrary to them. One good is that which is called "justice," whose contrary evil is injustice. The other good is what I think can be called "the advantageous"; its opposite evil is the disadvantageous. Now not everyone wills justice, and not everyone avoids injustice, whereas not merely every rational nature, but indeed everything that can be aware of it wills the advantageous and avoids the disadvantageous. For no one wills anything unless he thinks it is in some way advantageous for himself. So in this way everyone wills his own well-being and wills against his own unhappiness. It is of happiness in this sense that I said just now that no one can be happy unless he wills happiness. For no one can be happy either in having what he does not will or in not having what he does will.
S: There's no denying that.
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T: And someone who does not will justice ought not be happy.
S: That's equally true.
Chapter 13 That, having received only the will for happiness, he would not be able to will anything else or to refrain from willing happiness; and that no matter what he might will, his will would be neither just nor unjust
T: Then let's say that God first gives him only the will for happiness and see whether, in virtue of having received a will, he is now able to move himself to will something other than happiness.78
S: Continue what you have begun. I'm ready to understand.
T: It is agreed that he does not yet will anything besides happiness, since he has not received the will for anything else.
S: That's true.
T: So I'm asking you whether he can move himself to will something else.
S: I can't see how someone who wills nothing besides happiness would move himself to will anything other than happiness. After all, if he wills to move himself to will something else, he wills something else.
T: Therefore, just as he could not will anything at all on his own when no will had yet been given him, so also he cannot have any other will from himself if he has received only the will for happiness.
S: Yes.
T: What if he thought something would contribute to his attaining happiness? Couldn't he move himself to will that?
S: I'm not sure how to reply. If he can't, I don't see how he's willing happiness, since he can't will that through which he thinks he can attain happiness.
On the other hand, if he can, I don't understand in what sense he can't will anything other than happiness.
T: If someone wills something,not for the sake of the thing he appears to will but for the sake of something else, which should one properly* judge him to be willing: that which he is said to will, or that for the sake of which he wills?
78 "other than happiness": literally,"other than what he received to will."
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S: Surely that for the sake of which he seems to will.
T: So someone who wills something for the sake of happiness is not willing anything other than happiness.Therefore, it can be true both that he wills what he thinks will contribute to his happiness and that he wills only happiness.
S: That's quite clear.
T: I still want to know whether, having received only this will, he can refrain from willing happiness.
S: He cannot simultaneously both will it and refrain from willing it.
T: That's true, but it's not what I'm asking. I'm asking whether he can abandon that will and move himself from willing happiness to refraining from willing it.
S: If he does that unwillingly, it is not he who is doing it. On the other hand, if he does it willingly, he is willing something other than happiness. But he doesn't will anything other than happiness. So I think it's obvious that there's no way he can, on his own, will anything other than the one thing he received the power to will.79
T: You have understood this well. But now tell me whether someone who wills nothing other than happiness, and who cannot refrain from willing happiness, can keep from willing happiness more and more, the greater he understands it to be.
S: If he didn't will happiness more and more, the greater and better he understood it to be, then either he wouldn't be willing happiness at all, or else he would will something else on account of which he would not will the better thing.80 But we are supposing that he wills happiness and nothing else.
T: Then the higher he realizes happiness can be, the more he wills to be happy.
S: Undoubtedly he does.
T: Therefore, he wills to be like God.
S: Nothing could be more obvious.
T: What do you think: would his will be unjust if he willed in this way to be like God?
79 "received the power to will": literally,"received to will."
80 That is, happiness.
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S: I don't want to call him just, since he would be willing what is not fitting; nor do I want to call him unjust, since he would be willing out of necessity.
T: Now we said that someone who wills only happiness wills only advantageous things.
S: Yes.
T: Then suppose someone who willed nothing but advantageous things could not have those that are greater and truer.Would he will lesser things— whichever ones he could make use of?
S: Indeed, he could not refrain from willing any of the very lowest, if he couldn't have greater ones.
T: Since he would will the lowest advantageous things, the impure things in which irrational animals take pleasure, wouldn't his will be unjust and blameworthy?
S: How would his will be unjust or deserve reproach, given that it would be willing what it did not receive the power not to will?
T: And yet it is well-established that his will, whether it wills the highest advantageous things or the lowest, is the work and gift of God, just as his life and his power of sensation are, and that there is neither justice nor injustice in it.
S: Undoubtedly.
T: Therefore, insofar as it is an essence,* it is something good; but as far as justice and injustice are concerned, it is neither good nor bad.
S: Nothing could be clearer.
T: But he ought not to be happy if he does not have a just will.Indeed,someone who wills what neither can nor ought to be the case cannot be either completely or commendably happy.
S: That is quite evident.
Chapter 14 That the case would be similar if he had received only the will for rectitude, and that he received both wills simultaneously in order that he might be both just and happy
T: Then let's consider the will for justice. If this same angel were given only the will for what it is fitting that he will, could he will anything else? And could he refrain on his own from willing justice?81
81 "willing justice": literally,"willing what he had received to will."
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S: What we found regarding the will for happiness must also turn out to be completely true of this will too.
T: Therefore, he would not have either a just or an unjust will. For just as if he were given only the will for happiness, his will would not be unjust even if he willed unfitting things, since he would not be able to refrain from willing them, so also if he were given only the will for justice, his will would not be just simply because he willed what is fitting, since he would have received that willing in such a way that he would not be able to will otherwise.
T: That's right.
S: Therefore, since he cannot be called just or unjust for willing only happiness or for willing only what is fitting when he wills in that way out of necessity, and since he neither can nor ought to be happy unless he wills to be happy and wills it justly, God must create both wills in him in such a way that he both wills to be happy and wills it justly.This added justice governs his will for happiness so as to curtail its excess without eliminating its power to exceed. Thus, since he does will to be happy, he can exceed the limits of justice; but since he wills it justly, he does not will to exceed them. And thus, having a just will for happiness, he both can and ought to be happy. By refraining from willing what he ought not to will, even though he could will it, he deserves to be unable ever to will what he ought not, and by always retaining justice through a disciplined will he deserves not to lack happiness in any way.
On the other hand, if he abandons justice through an undisciplined will, he deserves to be deprived of happiness altogether.
S: I cannot imagine anything more fitting.
T: Remember that earlier, when we were examining the will for happiness by itself, without the restraint we added so that it might subject itself to God, we said there would be no justice or injustice in it no matter what it willed.
S: I remember that well.
Chapter 15 That justice is something T: Now do you think that this item which, when added to the will, governs the will so that it does not will more than what it is fitting and expedient for it to will, is something?
S: No sensible person will think that it is nothing.
T: This, as I believe you fully realize, is nothing other than justice.
S: It cannot be thought to be anything else.
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T: So it is certain that justice is something.
S: Indeed, it is something outstandingly good.
Chapter 16 That injustice is nothing other than the absence of the justice there ought to be
T: Before it received this justice, was the will obligated to will and to refrain from willing in accordance with justice?
S: The will did not owe82 what it did not have because it had not received it.
T: But once it had received justice, you have no doubt that it was obligated, unless it were to lose justice by coercion.
S: I think it is always bound by this obligation, whether it retains what it received or spontaneously* abandons it.
T: You're right. But what if the will abandons the justice that was so usefully and so wisely added to it—abandons it without being compelled by any lack or any coercion, but by spontaneously exercising its own power, that is, by willing more than it ought to? Will anything remain in that will besides what we imagined it to have before justice was added to it?
S: Since nothing was added but justice, once justice is lost it is certain that nothing will remain besides what was there before, except that the justice it received made the will a debtor to justice and left behind, as it were, certain beautiful traces of itself when justice was abandoned. For the very fact that it remains a debtor to justice shows that it had been adorned with the nobility of justice. And it is quite just that what has once received justice should always be a debtor to justice, unless it lost justice by coercion. Certainly, if a nature is shown to have once had justice, and to be always obligated to have so noble a good, it is thereby proved to be of far greater dignity than a nature that is known never to have had this good or to have been obligated to have it.
T: You have thought this through very well. But add this to your view: the more praiseworthy a nature that had and ought to have this good is shown to be, the more blameworthy a person who does not have what he ought is proved to be.83
82 Bear in mind that 'ought','owe', and 'is obligated' all translate the same Latin word: debet.
The cognate noun, debitrix, is translated 'debtor.'
83 For a precise statement of the distinction between nature and person that is implicit here, see On the Virginal Conception, Chapter 1.
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S: I heartily agree.
T: Pinpoint for me what it is in this nature that shows it to be praiseworthy and what makes the person blameworthy.
S: Its having had or being obligated to have justice is what shows the nature's dignity; not having justice is what makes the person corrupt. For his being obligated was brought about by the one who gave him justice, whereas his not having justice was brought about by the one who abandoned justice. After all, he is obligated because he had received it, whereas he does not have it because he forsook it.
T: So what you condemn in the will that did not remain steadfast in justice is not its being a debtor to justice, but its not having justice.
S: What I condemn in it is precisely the absence of justice, or in other words, its not having justice. For as I have already said, its being a debtor to justice confers honor, whereas its not having justice brings disgrace; and the more honorable it is to have justice, the more dishonorable it is to lack justice. Indeed, the only reason that the will is dishonored by not having justice through its own fault is that it is honored by being obligated to have justice by the goodness of its Giver.
T: Don't you judge that a will that does not have the justice it ought to have is unjust, and that there is injustice in it?
S: Who would judge otherwise?
T: I believe you would find nothing in it to condemn if it weren't unjust and there weren't injustice in it.
S: Nothing at all.
T: Therefore, what you condemn in it is nothing other than injustice and its being unjust.
S: I cannot condemn anything else in it.
T: So if, as you just said, you do not condemn anything in it other than the absence of justice and its not having justice, and if it is also true that you do not condemn anything in it other than there being injustice in it, in other words, its being unjust, then clearly its injustice or its being unjust is nothing other than the absence of justice or its not having justice.
S: There's no way there can be any difference between them.
T: Therefore, just as the absence of justice and not having justice have no essence,* so also injustice and being unjust have no being, and therefore they are not something but rather nothing.
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S: Nothing could be more logical.
T: Remember also that we've already agreed that once justice has been lost, nothing but the obligation to justice remains in him beyond what he had before he received justice.
S: Right.
T: But before he had justice he was not unjust and did not have injustice.
S: No.
T: Therefore, either there is no injustice in him and he is not unjust once justice has been lost, or else injustice and being unjust are nothing.
S: No conclusion could be more inevitable.
T: And you conceded that once he has abandoned justice he has injustice and is unjust.
S: I could hardly fail to realize that!
T: Therefore, his injustice or being-unjust is nothing.
S: You have caused me to know what I used to believe without knowing it.
T: I suppose you also already know why, even though injustice is nothing but the absence of justice and being unjust is nothing but not having justice, it is only after he has abandoned justice and not before he was given it that this absence of justice is called injustice, and not having justice is being unjust, and both are worthy of reproach. The reason is simply this: the absence of justice is dishonorable only where there ought to be justice. For example, not having a beard is not dishonorable for a man who is not yet supposed to have a beard, but once he ought to have a beard it is unbecoming for him not to have one.
In the same way, not having justice is not a defect in a nature that is not obligated to have justice, but it is disgraceful for a nature that ought to have it.
And to whatever degree his being supposed to have a beard shows his manly nature, to that degree his not having it disfigures his manly appearance.
S: I now understand quite well that injustice is nothing other than the absence of justice where there ought to be justice.
Chapter 17 Why an angel who abandoned justice cannot return to it T: When we stipulated that only the will for happiness had been given to the angel we discussed earlier, we saw that he could not will anything else.
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S: We saw that clearly.
T: Now that he has forsaken justice and retains only the will for happiness that he had before, can the angel who abandoned justice return by his own power to the will for justice, which he could not obtain before it was given to him?
S: Far less so can he return to it now. After all, he could not have justice then because of the way his nature had been created, whereas now he ought not to have it because of his desert and his fault.
T: Then there is no way he can have justice from himself when he doesn't have it,since he cannot have it from himself either before he receives it or after he has abandoned it.
S: He shouldn't have anything from himself.
Chapter 18 In what sense the evil angel made himself unjust and the good made himself just; and that the evil angel owes thanks to God for the goods he received and abandoned, just as the good owes thanks for the goods he received and preserved
T: Isn't there a sense in which, when he had justice, he was able to give himself justice?
S: How could he do that?
T: We use the word 'make'in many ways.For example,we say that we "make" something when we make a thing exist, and also when we can make it not exist but we refrain from doing so. And in this latter way he was able to give himself justice, since he was able to take it away from himself and also able not to take it away. In the same way, the one who remained steadfast in the truth in which he was made did not make himself not have it, although he could have; and thus he both gave himself justice and received all this from God. For both angels received from God the having of justice, the ability to retain justice, and the ability to abandon it. God gave them this last ability so that they could, in a certain sense, give justice to themselves. For if there was no sense in which they were able to take away justice from themselves, there was also no sense in which they were able to give it to themselves. Therefore, the one who in this sense gave himself justice received from God the very fact that he gave himself justice.
S: I see that they were able to give themselves justice by not taking it away from themselves; but one angel gave it to himself, while another took it away from himself.
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T: Then do you see that each ought to give God equal thanks for his goodness, and that the devil is no less obligated to render God his due simply because he took away from himself what God gave him and was unwilling to receive what God offered?
S: I see that.
T: So an evil angel always owes thanks to God for the happiness that he took away from himself, just as a good angel always owes thanks for the happiness that he gave himself.
S: That's quite true.
T: I believe you realize that the only way God can make something unjust is by not making an unjust thing just even though he can. For until someone has received justice, he is neither just nor unjust; and once someone has received justice, he does not become unjust unless he spontaneously* abandons justice.
Therefore, just as a good angel made himself just by not taking justice away from himself even though he could, so also God makes an evil angel unjust by not giving justice back to him even though he can.
S: That's easy to see.
Chapter 19 That the will, insofar as it has being, is a good; and that no thing is an evil
T: Let's return to our discussion of the will and recall what we discussed earlier, namely, that before the will receives justice, the will for happiness is not an evil but something good, no matter what it wills. It follows that when it abandons the justice it received, if it is the same essence* it was before, it is something good insofar as it has being; but insofar as the justice that was once in it is no longer there, it is called evil and unjust. For if willing to be like God were evil, the Son of God would not will to be like the Father; and if willing the lowest pleasures were evil, the will of brute animals would be called evil.
But the will of the Son of God is not evil, since it is just; and the will of an irrational animal is not called evil, since it is not unjust.
Hence,it follows that no will is an evil;84 on the contrary,every will is a good insofar as it has being, since it is the work of God, and it is evil only insofar as it is unjust. Now only two sorts of things are called evil: an evil will, and whatever is called evil on account of an evil will (for example, an evil human being
84 Notice,Anselm does not say that no will is evil (nullam voluntatem esse malam), since obviously the devil's will is evil. He says that no will is an evil (nullam voluntatem esse malum); that is, every will, insofar as it has being, is a good.
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or an evil action); therefore, nothing is more evident than that no thing is an evil. Evil is nothing other than the absence of justice that has been forsaken, either in a will or in some other thing on account of an evil will.
Chapter 20 In what sense God makes both evil wills and evil actions; and in what sense they are received from him
S: Your disputation is constructed out of such true, necessary, and evident arguments that I would see no argument that could undermine it, except that I find it entails something I think should not be said, and I cannot see how that conclusion could fail to be true if what you say is also true. For if willing to be like God is not nothing or evil, but something good, it could be had only from him from whom comes everything that is. Therefore, if an angel did not have anything he did not receive, then whatever he had, he received from the one from whom he had it. But what did he receive from God that God did not give? Therefore, if he had the will to be like God, he had it because God gave it to him.
T: How would it be surprising if we acknowledge that God gives an evil will by not preventing it even though he can—especially since the power to will anything at all is from him alone—in the same way in which God is said to lead us into temptation when he does not free us from it?
S: Looked at in that way, it doesn't seem absurd.
T: Now it is not unusual for us to speak of giving not only when someone willingly hands something over but also when someone grudgingly lets it go.
So, since there is no giving without receiving, it is also not incongruous for us to speak of receiving not only when someone accepts what has been handed over but also when someone presumes to take what is unlawful.
S: What you say strikes me as neither incongruous nor unusual.
T: Then suppose we say that when the devil willed what he ought not, he both received this from God, since God permitted it, and did not receive it from God, since God did not consent. How would this be contrary to the truth?
S: Nothing in that statement seems incompatible with the truth.
T: So when the devil turned his will to what he ought not, both that willing and that turning were something, and nonetheless he had this something from no source other than God, since he could neither will anything nor move his will unless permitted by God,who makes all natures,substantial* and
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accidental,* universal and individual. For insofar as the will and the turning or movement of the will is something, it is good and is from God. But insofar as the will lacks justice, which it ought not to be without, it is not an unqualified* evil, but something evil; and its being evil is not from God, but from the one who wills or moves his will. Injustice, after all, is an unqualified evil, since it is nothing other than evil,which is nothing.By contrast,the nature in which there is injustice is something evil, since it is something, and something distinct from injustice, which is evil and nothing. Therefore, that which is something is brought about by God and is from God, but that which is nothing, that is, evil, is brought about by the unjust person and is from him.
S: Certainly we have to acknowledge that God brings about the natures of all things. But who would grant that he brings about the individual actions of perverse wills or the depraved movement of the will by which an evil will moves itself?
T: What's so surprising about our saying that God brings about the individual actions that are brought about by an evil will, since we acknowledge that he brings about the individual substances that are brought about by an unjust will and a dishonorable action?
S: I have no objection to make. I can't deny that any given action is genuinely something, and I refuse to say that anything that genuinely has some essence* is not brought about by God. And this argument of yours in no way accuses
God or excuses the devil; in fact, it completely excuses God and accuses the devil.
Chapter 21 That the evil angel could not foreknow that he was going to fall But I would like to know whether the rebel angel foreknew that he was going to abandon justice.
T: When you ask whether the angel who did not remain steadfast in the truth foreknew that he was going to fall, it's important to distinguish what sort of knowledge you mean. If you're asking about the knowledge that exists only when something is understood through a conclusive argument, then I reply emphatically that what can fail to be the case cannot be known, since what can fail to be the case cannot be shown by any conclusive argument to be the case.So it is clear that there was no way he could foreknow his own fall,which was not necessarily going to happen. After all, suppose this fall was not going to happen. Do you think he could have foreknown it if it was not going to happen?
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S: It seems that what can fail to happen in the future cannot be foreknown, and that what is foreknown cannot fail to happen in the future. But I now recall that most celebrated question about divine foreknowledge and free choice. For although it is so authoritatively asserted and so usefully held—so much so that we should in no way doubt it because of any human reasoning—that divine foreknowledge and free choice are compatible with each other, they nonetheless seem to be irreconcilably opposed as far as the reasoning goes by which we examine them. Hence, we see that many people who consider this question are so inclined to one alternative that they entirely abandon the other, dying as they sink beneath the waves of unbelief; many, however, are tossed to and fro as if by opposing winds and are in danger of maintaining contradictory opinions. Therefore, since it is agreed that there is divine foreknowledge of all actions done by free choice and that none of them is a matter of necessity, it still seems that what is foreknown can fail to happen in the future.
T: For the time being I will reply briefly. God's foreknowledge is not properly* called foreknowledge. To him, everything is always present, so he does not have foreknowledge of what is future but simply knowledge of what is present. So since the argument regarding foreknowledge of a future thing differs from that regarding knowledge of a present thing, divine foreknowledge need not have the same implications as the foreknowledge we are asking about now.
S: I agree.
T: Let's return to the question at hand.
S: I'm happy to do as you say, but on the understanding that when I ask again about the issue I just mentioned, you will not refuse to give me the answer that God will deign to show you. For the resolution of that problem is absolutely crucial, whether someone has already come up with it or will come up with it in the future. I must admit that I have not yet read an argument anywhere that was sufficient for me to understand how the problem is resolved—except in that divine authority that I believe without hesitation.
T: When we come to that question, if we do, we will have whatever success God gives us.85 For now, however, since the argument given above shows that the fallen angel could not foreknow his fall with the sort of foreknowledge that depends upon a thing's being necessary, listen to another argument that 85 Anselm takes up the issue at length in De concordia.
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rules out any prior expectation of his fall not only through foreknowledge but even through rational calculation or any suspicion.
S: I am eager to hear it.
T: If, while he was remaining steadfast in his good will, he foreknew that he was going to fall, he either willed that this should happen, or he didn't.
S: One of these must be true.
T: But if, along with his foreknowledge, he at some time had the will to fall, he had already fallen in virtue of that evil will.
S: What you say is evident.
T: So it's not the case that before his fall he knew he was going to fall and also willed to fall.
S: No objection can be raised against your conclusion.
T: But if he foreknew he was going to fall and did not will it, then the more he willed to remain steadfast, the more his distress made him wretched.
S: That can't be denied.
T: And the more he willed to remain steadfast, the more just he was; and the more just he was, the happier he deserved to be.
S: Undeniably so.
T: Therefore, if he knew he was going to fall but did not will his fall, then the happier he deserved to be, the more wretched he actually was—and that's absurd.
S: I can't deny that that follows, but we often recognize that this happens not only without any absurdity but even in a praiseworthy way and through heavenly grace. For often—if I may mention a few things about the sufferings of the just—the more just someone is, the more he is moved by compassion for the plight of another. And we often see that someone who is more steadfast in justice is more brutally persecuted by the unjust.
T: The case is not the same for human beings as it is for that angel. The nature of human beings has now been made capable of suffering countless misfortunes because of the sin of our first parent, and out of this capacity for suffering, grace works incorruptibility for us in many ways. The angel, by contrast, had not yet deserved to suffer any evil because of some previous sin.
S: You have met my objection. It is obvious that this argument not only de-
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nies the evil angel foreknowledge of his fall but also eliminates any opinion that he was going to fall.
T: And there is something else that I think shows convincingly that he did not in any way conceive his future sin beforehand. Certainly he would have conceived it as either coerced or spontaneous.* Now he would not have supposed there was anything that might ever coerce him, and as long as he willed to persevere in the truth he could in no way think he was going to abandon it by his will alone. For it has already been shown that as long as he had an upright will, he willed to persevere in that will.Therefore, as long as he willed to persevere in retaining what he had, I can't see any way he could have so much as suspected that he was going to abandon it by his will alone, without any additional cause playing a role. I don't deny that he knew he could change the will that he was retaining. I just mean that he could not have thought that with no other cause acting upon him, he would ever spontaneously change the will that he willed to persevere in retaining.
S: Anyone who attentively understands what you are saying will see clearly that the evil angel could in no way know or think that he was going to do the evil act that he did.
Chapter 22 That he knew he ought not to will that which he sinned by willing, and that he knew he deserved punishment if he sinned
But I also want to you show whether he knew he ought not to will that which he willed when he sinned.
T: You shouldn't be in doubt about that if you think through what was said earlier. For if he hadn't known that he ought not to will that which he unjustly willed, he wouldn't have been aware that he ought to retain the will that he abandoned. And so he would not have been just by retaining, or unjust by abandoning, the justice that he would not have known. In fact, if he didn't know that he ought to be content with what he had received, he also could not have refrained from willing to have more than he had. And finally, since he was so rational that nothing prevented him from making use of reason, he was not ignorant of what he ought to will and what he ought not to will.
S: I don't see how your argument can be refuted, but even so, it seems to me that it prompts a certain question: if he knew that he ought not to abandon what he had received, surely he knew equally well that he would deserve punishment if he abandoned it. How, then, could someone who had received an ineliminable will for happiness spontaneously* will that which would bring him wretchedness?
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Chapter 23 That he should not have known that he would be punished if he sinned T: Just as it is certain that he must have known he would deserve punishment if he sinned, so also he should not have known that he would be punished if he sinned.
S: How did he not know that, if he was so rational that his rationality was not prevented from knowing the truth, as ours is often prevented by the burden of this corruptible body?
T: Because he was rational, he was able to understand that it would be just for him to be punished if he sinned. But since God's "judgments are a great abyss"86 and "his ways are unsearchable,"87 the angel could not have known for certain whether God would in fact do what he could justly do.Suppose someone were to say this:"There is no way the angel could have believed that God would damn his own creature, which he had made out of his great goodness, because of the creature's fault—especially since there had been no example of avenging justice prior to the angel's injustice. And he would have been certain that God had so wisely established the number of those who were meant to enjoy him that, just as it contained nothing superfluous, so also it would have been incomplete if it had been reduced. He would have been certain, too, that so outstanding a work of God would not remain incomplete in any part. If human beings had already been created, he could not have known by any reasoning that God was going to substitute human nature for the angelic or angelic nature for the human if either fell, instead of each nature's being restored to the state in which it was created, to fill its own proper place and not that of another. Or, if human beings had not yet been created, far less could he have thought they were going to be created as a substitute for another nature." If someone were to say all this, is there anything unreasonable in it?
S: To me it seems reasonable rather than unreasonable.
T: Let's return to what I had said, namely, that he should not have had this knowledge, since if he had known this, he, as one who both willed and had happiness, could not have spontaneously willed that which would make him wretched. Therefore, he would not have been just for not willing what he ought not, since he would not have been able to will it.
Now consider another argument about whether he should have had the knowledge you're asking about. If he had known he would be punished, either he would have sinned or he wouldn't.
86 Psalm 36:6 (35:7).
87 Romans 11:33.
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S: One of those would have been the case.
T: If he sinned even though he had foreseen such punishment, and even though he lacked nothing and there was nothing compelling him, he would be that much more deserving of punishment.
S: Yes.
T: So this foreknowledge was not beneficial for him.
S: Indeed, foreknowing his punishment was not beneficial for one who was going to sin.
T: Now if he hadn't sinned, he would have refrained from sinning either by his good will alone, or out of fear of punishment.
S: There's no other possibility.
T: But he showed by his action that he would not have refrained from sinning solely out of love for justice.
S: Undoubtedly.
T: But if he had refrained from sinning out of fear, he would not be just.
S: It is clear that he should not have known at all that the punishment now inflicted upon him was going to follow his sin.
Chapter 24 That even the good angel should not have known this Now we believe that both the angel who remained steadfast in the truth and the angel who did not were endowed with equal knowledge when first created. But I don't see why this knowledge was denied to the angel whose good will was so tenacious that it was sufficient for him to refrain from sinning.
T: Still, if he had foreknown this punishment, he neither could have nor should have disregarded it.
S: So it seems.
T: Therefore, just as the love of justice was sufficient by itself for him not to sin, so also his hatred of that punishment would have been sufficient by itself for him not to sin.
S: Nothing could be clearer.
T: So there would have been two causes of his not sinning: one honorable and useful, the other not honorable and useless: that is, the love of justice and
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the hatred of punishment. For it is not honorable not to sin solely out of hatred of punishment, and hatred of punishment is useless for not sinning in a case where the love of justice is sufficient by itself.
S: There's no objection I could raise.
T: Then isn't his perseverance more resplendently satisfactory when only one cause of that perseverance is seen in him, a cause that is both useful and honorable because it is spontaneous,* than if at the same time another cause were to present itself, one that is useless and dishonorable because it is understood to be necessary*?
S: What you are saying is so evident that I am now glad he didn't know what a little while ago I wanted him to have known—except that we can't deny he has that knowledge now, since thanks to the example of the angel who sinned he can't help having it.
Chapter 25 That even if the good angel is said to be no longer able to sin solely because he now has this knowledge because of the fall of the devil, this is to his glory
T: Although both the good and the evil angel are now certain that such a fault will be followed by such punishment, this knowledge is different in each, the cause of the knowledge is not the same, and its result is different. For what the evil angel knows by his own experience, the good angel learned solely by someone else's example.The evil angel knows it by one means, because he did not persevere; the good angel knows it by another means, because he did persevere. Hence, just as the evil angel's knowledge is to his discredit, since his not persevering was blameworthy, so also the good angel's knowledge is to his glory, since his persevering was praiseworthy. So if the good angel is said to be no longer able to sin solely because he has this knowledge, it is perfectly clear that just as the knowledge itself, which was acquired by his praiseworthy perseverance, is glorious, so also the inability to sin that arises out of that glorious knowledge is to his glory. Therefore, just as the evil angel deserves reproach for being unable to return to justice, so also the good angel deserves praise for being unable to desert justice. For just as the evil angel cannot now return to justice because he deserted it by his evil will alone, so also the good angel is no longer able to desert justice because he remained in it by his good will alone. So it is clear that just as the evil angel's punishment for sin is his inability to recover what he abandoned, so also the good angel's reward for justice is his inability to abandon what he retained.
S: Your discussion of the good angel's knowledge and his inability to sin would be very appealing—if, as you say, it is because he persevered that the
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good angel comes to have this knowledge and the inability to sin. But in fact it seems that he acquired them, not because he persevered, but because the rebel angel did not persevere.
T: If you're right, the good angel can rejoice over the fall of the rebel angel inasmuch as it was beneficial for him that the evil angel fell, since he acquired this knowledge—in virtue of which he can no longer sin or be wretched— not because of his own good deserts, but because of someone else's evil deserts. And all of that is wildly absurd.
S: The more absurd it seems—as you point out—that the fall of the sinful angel was advantageous for the angel who remained steadfast, the more necessary it is for you to show that the good angel did not receive the knowledge in question because the evil angel sinned.
T: You must not say that the good angel attained this knowledge because the evil one sinned, but rather that he attained this knowledge through the example of the fallen angel because the evil angel sinned. For if neither had sinned, God would have given both the same knowledge by some other means because of the merit of their perseverance, without the example of anyone's fall. After all, no one will say that God could not have given his angels this knowledge by some other means.Therefore, since the evil angel sinned, God used his example to teach the good angel what he was going to teach anyway: not on account of some lack of power, because he could not teach it in any other way, but through that greater power of his through which he was able to bring good out of evil, so that no evil would remain disordered in the realm of allpowerful wisdom.
S: What you say is very appealing.
T: And so it is evident that even if the good angel were no longer able to sin solely because he knows that the sin of the evil angel was met with punishment, even so, this inability would not diminish his praiseworthiness but would be the reward for his having preserved justice. But you know, because it became clear earlier,88 that the reason he cannot sin is that by the merit of his perseverance he has come to the point where he no longer sees what more he could will.
S: I haven't forgotten any of what we found out earlier through the investigations of reason.
88 In Chapter 6.
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Chapter 26 What it is we fear when we hear the word 'evil', and what causes the deeds that injustice is said to cause, given that injustice and evil are nothing
But even though you have answered all my questions, there is something else I'm eager for you to explain. Since evil is nothing, what is it we fear when we hear the word 'evil'? And what causes the deeds that injustice, which is an evil, seems to cause, for example, in a robber or a lustful person?
T: I will answer you briefly.The evil that is injustice is always nothing; but the evil that is misfortune is undoubtedly sometimes nothing, as in the case of blindness, and sometimes something, as in the case of sadness and pain. And we always hate the misfortune that is something. So when we hear the word
'evil', we do not fear the evil that is nothing, but the evil that is something, which follows from the absence of good. For many misfortunes that are evil and are something follow from injustice and blindness, which are evil and are nothing; and it is the former that we fear when we hear the word 'evil'.
Now when we say that injustice causes robbery, or that blindness causes someone to fall into a ditch, we must in no way understand this to mean that injustice or blindness causes something; rather, it means that if there had been justice in the will and sight in the eyes, neither the robbery nor the fall into the ditch would have happened.It's like when we say that the absence of the rudder drives the ship into the rocks or that the absence of the reins causes the horse to run wild; that simply means that if there had been a rudder on the ship and reins for the horse, the winds would not have driven the ship and the horse would not have run wild. For in the same way that a ship is controlled by the rudder and a horse by the reins, the human will is governed by justice and the feet by vision.
S: You have so thoroughly put my mind at rest concerning the evil that is injustice that every difficulty about it that used to trouble me has been cleared up. For this evil seems to generate a difficulty: if it were an essence,* it would be from God, since it is necessary that whatever is something is from him, and it is impossible that sin or injustice be from him. But I see that there is nothing threatening to a correct faith if the evil that is misfortune should sometimes be something.
Chapter 27 From what source evil entered the angel who used to be good But don't grow weary of giving brief answers to my foolish questions, so that I might know how to answer those who ask the same thing. After all, it's not always easy to respond wisely to someone who asks a foolish question. So I ask this: from what source did the evil that is called injustice or sin first enter the angel who had been created just?
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On the Fall of the Devil
T: You tell me: from what source does nothing enter something?
S: Nothing neither enters nor goes away.
T: Then why do you ask from what source injustice entered, given that injustice is nothing?
S: Because when justice departs from where it was, we say that injustice comes in.
T: Then use the clearer and more proper* expression, and ask about the departure of justice. For often an apt question makes for an easier answer, while an inept question make the answer more difficult.
S: Then why did justice depart from the just angel?
T: If you want to speak properly, justice did not depart from the angel; rather, the angel abandoned justice by willing what he ought not to will.
S: Why did he abandon justice?
T: In saying that he abandoned it by willing what he ought not, I indicate clearly both why and how he abandoned it. He abandoned justice because he willed what he ought not to will, and he abandoned it by willing what he ought not to will.
S: Why did he will what he ought not?
T: No cause preceded this will, except that he was able to will.
S: Did he will it because he was able to will it?
T: No, because the good angel was likewise able to will it, but he didn't. No one wills what he can will simply because he can, with no other cause, although no one ever wills anything unless he can will it.
S: Then why did he will it?
T: Simply because he willed it.For there was no other cause by which his will was in any way incited or attracted.Instead,his will was its own efficient cause, if I may put the matter that way, and its own effect.
Chapter 28 That the power to will what he ought not was always good, and that willing itself is good with respect to its essence
S: If that power to will,and the willing itself,were something,they were good and were from God.
T: Both were something. The power indeed was something good, a spontaneous* gift of God, whereas the willing was good according to its essence* but bad in that it was done unjustly—and yet it was from God, since whatever is
BASIC WRITINGS
something comes from God. Indeed, any given person has from God not only what God spontaneously gives him,but also what he steals unjustly with God's permission. And just as God is said to do what he permits to be done, so also he is said to give what he permits to be stolen. Therefore, since it was with God's permission that the angel stole his exercise of the power God had spontaneously given him, he had this exercise of power—which is nothing other than the willing itself—from God. For willing is nothing other than exercising the power to will, just as speaking is nothing other than exercising the power to speak.89
89 See De concordia 3.11.