Monologion: Chapter 27/Chapter 28
MONOLOGION
Chapter 27 That he is not included in a common classification of substances, and yet he is a substance and an individual spirit
And so it is established that this substance is not included in any common classification of substances, since every other nature is excluded from having an essence in common with him. Indeed, every substance is classified as either universal or individual. A universal substance is essentially common to several* substances, as being-a-man is common to individual men; an individual substance has a universal essence in common with others, as individual men have in common with other individual men the fact that they are men. So how would someone understand the supreme nature as being included in this classification of other substances,since he is neither divided into several substances nor conjoined with any other through a common essence? Nevertheless, since he not only most assuredly exists but also exists in the highest way of all things, and the essence of any given thing is generally called a substance, surely, if he can be worthily be called anything at all, there is nothing to prevent us from calling him a substance.
Now since we know of no worthier essence than spirit or body,* and of these, spirit is worthier than body, we must of course declare that he is a spirit and not a body. But since that spirit can have no parts, and there cannot be more than one spirit like him, he is necessarily an altogether individual spirit.
For since (as was established earlier) he is not composed of parts,36 and he cannot be understood as capable of being changed by any differences or accidents,37 it is impossible for him to be divisible by any sort of division.
Chapter 28 That this spirit exists in an unqualified* sense, and creatures do not exist at all compared to him It seems, therefore, to follow from our earlier conclusions that this spirit, who thus exists in his own wonderfully unique and uniquely wonderful way, is in a certain sense the only thing that exists, whereas all the other things that appear to exist do not exist at all compared to him. For if we look at this carefully, he alone will be seen to exist in an unqualified sense and perfectly and absolutely, whereas all other things nearly do not exist at all, and barely do exist. For because of his unchangeable eternity, it can in no way be said of that spirit because of any alteration that he existed or will exist; instead, he exists
36 Anselm argues for this claim in Chapter 17.
37 Anselm argues for this claim in Chapter 25.