Monologion: Chapter 16
MONOLOGION
which absolutely nothing else is better, and he alone is better than all things that are not what he is.
Therefore, he is not a body,* or any of the things that the bodily senses perceive. Indeed, there is something better than all of these things that is not what they are. For the rational mind (concerning which no bodily sense perceives what, or what sort of thing, or how great it is) is greater than any of those things that are in the domain of the bodily senses, in proportion as it would be less if it were one of them. For the supreme essence must not at all be said to be any of those things to which something that is not what they are is superior; and, as reason teaches, he absolutely must be said to be any of those things to which whatever is not what they are is inferior. He must therefore be living, wise, powerful and all-powerful, true, just, happy, eternal, and whatever similarly it is absolutely better to be than not to be.Therefore,why should we seek any further for what that supreme nature is, since it is evident which of all things he is and which he is not?
Chapter 16 That for him, to be just is the same as to be justice, and the same thing holds for those things that can be said of him in a similar way, and that none of these designates what sort of thing or how great he is, but rather what he is12
But perhaps when he is said to be just or great or something like that,this does not reveal what he is, but rather what sort of thing he is or how great he is.
For it seems that all these things are said through a quality or a quantity. After all, everything that is just is just through justice, and so on for similar things.
Therefore,that supreme nature is just precisely through justice.So it seems that the supremely good substance is said to be just in virtue of his participation in a quality, namely justice. But if that is the case, he is just through another and not through himself.
But that is contrary to the clearly discerned truth that whatever he is— whether good or great or subsistent*—he is through himself and not through another.13 So given that he is not just except through justice, and he cannot be just except through himself, what is more obvious, what is more necessary, than that this same nature is justice itself; and that when he is said to be just
"through justice," this is the same as "through himself"; and that when he is said to be just "through himself," this means nothing other than "through 12 For an explanation of Anselm's point in this chapter, see the Glossary entry for quality/quantity/quiddity.* 13 Anselm argues for this claim in Chapters 1–4.