[Three Philsophical Dialogues]: On Freedom of Choice
On Freedom of Choice Chapters 1: That the power to sin does not belong to freedom of choice
2: That nonetheless, angels and human beings sinned through this power and through free choice; and although they were able to be slaves to sin, sin was not able to master them 3: In what way they had free choice after they had made themselves slaves to sin, and what free choice is 4: In what way those who do not have rectitude have the power to preserve rectitude 5: That no temptation compels anyone to sin against his will
6: In what way our will is powerful against temptations, even though it seems weak 7: How the will is more powerful than temptation, even when it is overcome by temptation
8: That not even God can take away rectitude of will 9: That nothing is freer than an upright will
10: How someone who sins is a slave to sin; and that it is a greater miracle when God restores rectitude to someone who abandons it than when he restores life to a dead person 11: That this slavery does not take away freedom of choice
12: Why,when human beings do not have rectitude,we say that they are free, since rectitude cannot be taken away from them when they have it, rather than saying that those who have rectitude are slaves, since they cannot recover it by their own power when they do not have it
13: That "the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself" is a perfect definition of freedom of choice
14: How this freedom is divided
Chapter 1 That the power to sin does not belong to freedom of choice STUDENT: Since free choice seems to be incompatible with the grace, predestination, and foreknowledge of God, I want to know what this freedom of choice is,and whether we always have it.For if freedom of choice is "the ability to sin and not to sin," as some are accustomed to say, and we always have that ability, then how is it that we ever need grace? On the other hand, if we do not always have it, why is sin imputed* to us when we sin without free choice?
TEACHER: I don't think freedom of choice is the power to sin and not to sin.
After all, if this were its definition, then neither God nor the angels, who cannot sin, would have free choice—which it is impious to say.
S: Why not say that the free choice of God and the good angels is one thing, and our free choice is quite another?
T: Even though human free choice differs from that of God and the good angels, the definition of the word 'freedom' should still be the same for both. For example, even though one animal differs from another, whether substantially* or accidentally,* the definition of the word 'animal' is the same for all animals.
Therefore, we ought to offer a definition of freedom of choice that contains neither more nor less than freedom; and since the free choice of God and the good angels cannot sin,"the ability to sin" does not belong in the definition of freedom of choice.
And finally, the power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom—to understand this clearly, pay close attention to what I am about to say.
S: That's why I'm here.
T: Which will do you think is freer: one whose willing and ability not to sin are such that it cannot be turned away from the rectitude of not sinning, or one that in some way can be turned to sin?
S: I don't see why a will isn't freer when it is capable of both.
T: Do you not see that someone who has what is fitting and expedient in such a way that he cannot lose it is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfitting and inexpedient?
S: I don't think anyone would doubt that.
T: And you will say that it is no less indubitable that sinning is always unfitting and harmful.
S: No one in his right mind thinks otherwise.
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T: Then a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is freer than a will that can abandon that rectitude.
S: I don't think anything could be more reasonably asserted.
T: Now if something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom if taken away, do you think that it is either freedom or a part of freedom?
S: I cannot think so.
T: Then the power to sin, which if added to the will diminishes its freedom and if taken away increases it, is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
S: Nothing could be more logical.
Chapter 2 That nonetheless, angels and human beings sinned through this power and through free choice; and although they were able to be slaves to sin, sin was not able to master them T: So what is extraneous to freedom in this way does not belong to freedom of choice.
S: I cannot rebut your arguments at all, but it strikes me quite forcefully that in the beginning both the angelic nature and our own had the power to sin— if they had not had it, they would not have sinned. But if both human beings and angels sinned through this power, which is extraneous in this way to free choice, how can we say they sinned through free choice? And if they did not sin through free choice, it seems they sinned out of necessity. After all, they sinned either spontaneously* or out of necessity. And if they sinned spontaneously, how was it not through free choice? So if it was not through free choice, they apparently sinned out of necessity.
And there is something else that worries me about this power to sin. Someone who has the power to sin can be a slave to sin, since "one who commits sin is a slave to sin."38 But someone who can be a slave to sin can be mastered by sin. In what way, then, was that nature created free, and what sort of free choice did it have, given that it could be mastered by sin?
T: It was through the power of sinning, and spontaneously, and through free choice, and not out of necessity that our nature,* and that of the angels, first sinned and were able to be slaves to sin; and yet sin was not able to master them in such a way that either they or their choice could be said not to be free.
38 John 8:34.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Freedom of Choice
S: I need you to explain that, because it's obscure to me.
T: The fallen angel and the first human being sinned through free choice, since they sinned through their own choice, which was so free that it could not be compelled to sin by any other thing. And so they are justly reproached, since, having this freedom of choice, they sinned: not because any other thing compelled them, and not out of any necessity, but spontaneously. They sinned through their choice, which was free; but they did not sin through that in virtue of which it was free, that is, through the power by which it was able not to sin and not to be a slave to sin. Instead, they sinned through that power they had for sinning; by that power they were neither helped into the freedom not to sin nor coerced into slavery to sin.
Now as for what you thought was the implication of their being able to be slaves to sin—namely, that sin was able to master them, and so neither they nor their choice was free—that doesn't follow. For if someone has the power not to be a slave, and no one else has the power to make him a slave, although he can be a slave through his own power,then as long as he exercises his power not to be a slave rather than his power to be a slave, nothing can master him and make him a slave. Suppose a free rich man can make himself the slave of a poor man. As long as he does not do so, he is still entitled to be called 'free', and we don't say that the poor man is able to master him—or if we do say this, we say it improperly,* since it is not in the poor man's power to make him a slave, but in someone else's power.39 Therefore, nothing prevents it from being the case that angels and human beings before their sin were free or had free choice.
Chapter 3 In what way they had free choice after they had made themselves slaves to sin, and what free choice is S: You have convinced me that of course nothing prevents this before their sin, but how could they retain free choice after they had made themselves slaves to sin?
T: Even though they had subjected themselves to sin, they could not destroy the natural freedom of choice within themselves.What they could do, however, was to make themselves unable to exercise that freedom without some additional grace that they had not had before.
S: I believe this, but I want to understand it.
39 The "someone else" is of course the rich man himself.
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T: Let's first examine what sort of freedom of choice they had before their sin, since it is quite certain that they did in fact have free choice.
S: I'm eager to do so.
T: For what purpose do you think they had this freedom of choice: in order to attain what they willed, or in order to will what they ought to and what was expedient for them to will?
S: In order to will what they ought to and what was expedient to will.
T: So they had freedom of choice for the sake of rectitude of will—since as long as they willed what they ought to, they had rectitude of will.
S: Yes.
T: When we say that they had freedom for the sake of rectitude of will, some ambiguity remains unless we add something. So I ask you this: In what way did they have that freedom for the sake of rectitude of will? Was it in order to attain rectitude without a giver when they did not yet have it; or to receive a rectitude they did not yet have, if it were given to them later so that they might have it; or to abandon the rectitude they had received and then, by their own power, to reclaim what they had abandoned; or to preserve always the rectitude they had received?
S: I do not think they had freedom in order to attain rectitude without a giver, since they were not able to have anything that they did not receive.40
And we must not say that they had freedom in order to receive from a giver a rectitude they did not yet have, so that they would then have it, since we must not believe that they were created without an upright will. Still, we should not deny that they had the freedom to receive that same rectitude if they abandoned it and then were given it back by the one who first gave it to them.We often see this in human beings who by heavenly grace are brought back to righteousness from unrighteousness.
T: You're right that they were able to receive that lost rectitude if they were given it back; but we are asking about the freedom they had before they sinned—since undoubtedly they had free choice—not about a freedom that none of them would need if they never abandoned the truth.
S: Then I'll go on and reply to the other possibilities you asked about. It's not true that they had freedom in order to abandon rectitude, since to abandon
40 Cf. 1 Corinthians 4:7:"What do you have that you did not receive?" See also On the Fall of the Devil 1.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Freedom of Choice
rectitude of will is to sin, and you showed earlier41 that the power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom. And they didn't receive freedom in order to reclaim, by their own power, the rectitude they had abandoned, since this rectitude was given to them in order that they might never abandon it— for indeed, this very power to reclaim the rectitude they had abandoned would engender carelessness about preserving the rectitude they had.The only remaining possibility, then, is that freedom of choice was given to the rational nature in order that it might preserve the rectitude of will it had received.
T: You have replied ably to the questions I asked. But we still need to investigate the purpose for which the rational nature ought to have preserved rectitude.Was it for the sake of rectitude itself, or for the sake of something else?
S: If freedom had not been given to that nature so that it might preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself, freedom would not have been the capacity for justice, since it has been established42 that justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake. But we believe that freedom of choice contributes to justice. Therefore, we must unhesitatingly assert that the rational nature received freedom for no other purpose than preserving rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself.
T: Therefore, since every freedom is a power, freedom of choice is the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself.
S: It can't be anything else.
T: So it is now clear that a free choice is nothing other than a choice that is able to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself.
S: It is indeed clear. Now as long as the rational nature had rectitude, it could preserve what it had. After it has abandoned rectitude, however, how can it preserve what it does not have? Therefore, if there is no rectitude that can be preserved, there is no free choice that can preserve it. For one cannot preserve what one does not have.
T: Even if it lacks rectitude of will, the rational nature nonetheless has what is properly its own. For I believe we have no power that by itself suffices for action. And yet even in the absence of those things without which we can't exercise our powers at all, we are nonetheless said to have those powers within ourselves. In the same way, no instrument is sufficient by itself for any action
41 In Chapter 1.
42 In On Truth 12.
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or task;43 and yet even in the absence of those things without which we cannot make use of the instrument, we are nonetheless correct to affirm that we have the instrument for some particular action or task. And so that you can understand this in many cases, I will show it to you in one: no one who has vision is said to be entirely unable to see a mountain.
S: Someone who is unable to see a mountain certainly does not have vision.
T: Then someone who has vision has the power and the instrument for seeing a mountain. And yet if there is no mountain there and you say to him,
"see the mountain," he will answer you,"I can't, because there's no mountain there.If there were a mountain,I could see it."Similarly,if there were a mountain but no light, and someone instructed him to look at the mountain, he would reply that he couldn't, because there's no light; but if there were light, then he could. Again, if both a mountain and light were present to the person who has vision, but something were interfering with his vision (say, if someone were keeping his eyes shut), he would say that he could not see the mountain; but if nothing were interfering with his vision, then undoubtedly he would have the power to see the mountain.
S: Everyone knows all that.
T: So do you see that the power of seeing some body* is one power in the one who sees, another power in the object to be seen, and another in the medium (that is, neither in the one seeing nor in the thing to be seen); and in the medium there is one power in something that gives aid to vision and another in something that does not impede vision (that is, when nothing that could impede vision actually does so)?
S: I see it clearly.
T: There are, then, these four powers. If any one of them is lacking, the other three cannot accomplish anything, either individually or all together. And yet when the other three are missing, we do not deny that a person who has vision has vision, or the instrument or power for seeing, or that the visible thing can be seen, or that light can aid vision.
43 "Action or task" renders a form of the Latin operari (and later, opus). These are broad terms that can refer to everything from painting a picture to entertaining an idea. Basically, to exercise any power one has is to operari; and the exercise of that power, or the product of that exercise of power, is an opus. Anselm makes no clear distinction here between a power and an instrument, and he will soon speak of the power of vision as the "instrument or power for seeing." Elsewhere he speaks of the power of will as the "instrument for willing": see Chapter 7 and De concordia 3.11.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Freedom of Choice
Chapter 4 In what way those who do not have rectitude have the power to preserve rectitude
The fourth of these, however, is improperly* called a power. For the only reason we say that something that typically impedes vision gives the power of seeing when it does not impede vision is that it does not take away vision. But the power to see light consists in only three things, since in that case what is seen and what aids vision are the same. Doesn't everyone know this?
S: Certainly.
T: So when there's nothing there for us to see, we're in total darkness, and our eyes are closed or blindfolded, we still have the power to see any visible thing—so far as it pertains to us.What, therefore, is to prevent us from having the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself, even in the absence of rectitude, as long as we have reason, by which we can know rectitude, and will, by which we can retain it? For freedom of choice consists of reason and will.
S: You have convinced me that this power of preserving rectitude of will is always present in rational nature, and that this power was free in the choice of the first human being and the angels, from whom rectitude of will could not be taken away against their will.
Chapter 5 That no temptation compels anyone to sin against his will But how is the choice of the human will now free in virtue of this power,given that quite often a person whose will is right abandons that rectitude against his will because he is compelled by temptation?
T: No one abandons rectitude except by willing to do so. Therefore, if 'against one's will' means 'unwillingly',44 no one abandons rectitude against his will. For someone can be tied up against his will, since he is unwilling to be tied up;he can be tortured against his will,since he is unwilling to be tortured; he can be killed against his will, since he is unwilling to be killed; but he cannot will against his will, since he cannot will if he is unwilling to will. For everyone who wills, wills his own willing.
S: Then how is it that someone is said to lie against his will when he lies in order to avoid being killed, since he does not lie without willing to lie? For 44 nolens: the word most naturally describes someone who performs an action grudgingly or prefers to act otherwise, but Anselm takes it here in the more precise sense of "not willing the action in question."
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just as it is against his will that he lies, so also it is against his will that he wills to lie. And if it is against his will that he wills to lie, he is unwilling to will to lie.
T: Perhaps he is said to lie against his will because, when he so wills the truth that he lies only for the sake of his life, he both wills the lie for the sake of his life and does not will the lie for its own sake, since he wills the truth. And so he lies both willingly and unwillingly. For a will by which we will a thing for its own sake, as when we will health for its own sake, is different from a will by which we will a thing for the sake of something else, as when we will to drink wormwood for the sake of health.Hence,on the basis of these two wills, it could perhaps be said that his lying is both against his will and not against his will. So when he is said to lie against his will because insofar as he wills the truth he does not will to lie, this is not inconsistent with my saying that no one abandons rectitude of will against his will; for in lying, he wills to abandon rectitude of will for the sake of his life. And in virtue of that will he does not abandon rectitude against his will; rather, he abandons it willingly—and that is the will of which we are speaking now.We are, after all, speaking of the will by which he wills to lie for the sake of his life, not of that by which he does not will the lie for its own sake.
Or in any event he certainly lies against his will because it is against his will that he must either lie or be killed—that is, it is against his will that he is in this difficulty, so that of necessity one of these two possibilities must come about. For although it is necessary that he either lie or be killed, it is not necessary that he be killed, since he can avoid being killed if he lies; and it is not necessary that he lie, since he can avoid lying if he is killed. Neither of these is determinately a matter of necessity, since both are in his power. And so although it is against his will that he must either lie or be killed, it does not follow either that he lies against his will or that he is killed against his will.
There is another argument as well that is often used to explain why someone is said to do against his will, unwillingly, and from necessity what he nonetheless does willingly. If it would be difficult to do something, and so we don't do it, we say that we can't do it, and that we abandon it from necessity or against our will. And if it would be difficult to refrain from doing something, and so we do it, we claim to do it against our will, unwillingly, and from necessity. So in this sense someone who lies to avoid death is said to lie against his will, unwillingly, and from necessity, since he cannot avoid the lie without risking death.Therefore, just as someone who lies for the sake of his life is improperly* said to lie against his will, since he is willing to lie, so also it is not properly said that his willing to lie is against his will, since he does not will to lie otherwise than willingly. For just as when he lies, he wills that lying, so also when he wills to lie, he wills that willing.
S: I can't deny what you're saying.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Freedom of Choice
T: Then in what way is that will not free, given that no external power45 can bring it into subjection without its consent?
S: Can't we, by a similar argument, say that the will of a horse is free, since it willingly serves the bodily appetite?
T: The two cases are not similar. In the horse, the will does not subject itself; instead, being subjected naturally,* it always of necessity* serves the bodily appetite. In a human being, by contrast, as long as the will itself is right, it does not serve what it ought not to serve, and is not subjected to what it ought not to be subjected to, and it is not turned aside from rectitude by any external power, unless it willingly consents to what it ought not. And it has this consent, as is clearly seen, not naturally or of necessity, like the horse, but through itself.
S: You have met my objection about the will of the horse. Go back to where we were.
T: Will you deny that something is free from another thing if it cannot be compelled or prevented by that other thing unless it is willing to be?
S: I don't see how I could deny it.
T: Then also explain in what way an upright will is victorious and in what way it is vanquished.
S: To persevere in willing rectitude itself is for it to overcome; to will what it ought not is for it to be overcome.
T: I believe that unless the will itself is willing,temptation cannot keep an upright will from rectitude or compel it to do what it ought not, so that it wills against rectitude and wills what it ought not.
S: Nor can I see any reason to think that's false.
T: Then who can say that a will is not free for preserving rectitude, and free from temptation and sin, if no temptation can turn it aside from rectitude to sin (that is, to willing what it ought not) unless it is willing? Therefore, when it is overcome, it is not overcome by something else's power, but by its own.
S: What has been said shows that.
T: Don't you see that it follows from this that no temptation can overcome an upright will? For if it can, it has a power of overcoming and overcomes by 45 external power: aliena potestas (and later, aliena vis). Literally,"power belonging to something else."
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its own power. But that can't be, since the will is overcome solely by its own power. Therefore, temptation cannot in any way overcome an upright will; and when we say that temptation can do this, we are speaking improperly.*
For this expression simply means that the will can submit itself to temptation—just as when we say that a weak man can be overcome by a strong man, we are not speaking of his own power but of someone else's, since this simply means that the strong man has the power to overcome the weak.
Chapter 6 In what way our will is powerful against temptations, even though it seems weak
S: Even though I cannot find anything wrong with the arguments by which you make every assault subject to our will and do not permit any temptation to master it, I cannot pretend that there is no weakness in the will, which almost all of us experience when we are overcome by the vehemence of temptation.
So unless you show how the power for which you've argued is consistent with the weakness that we feel, my mind can't be at ease with this question.
T: This weakness in the will of which you speak: in what do you think it consists?
S: In the fact that one cannot persevere in clinging to rectitude.
T: If it is because of its weakness that the will does not cling to rectitude, it is turned away from rectitude by some external power.
S: I grant that.
T: And what power is that?
S: The power of temptation.
T: That power does not turn the will away from rectitude unless the will itself wills what temptation has suggested.
S: That's true. But that temptation itself by its power compels the will to will what it has suggested.
T: How does it compel the will to will: in such a way that the will could in fact not will, but only with great difficulty; or in such a way that it is completely unable not to will?
S: Although I must admit that we are sometimes so beleaguered by temptations that it would be difficult for us not to will what they suggest, I can't say that they ever overwhelm us to such an extent that we are completely unable not to will what they tell us to will.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Freedom of Choice
T: I don't know how one could say that. For if a human being wills to lie in order to avoid death and preserve his life for a time, who will say that it is impossible for him to will not to lie in order to avoid eternal death and live for ever? Hence, you should no longer doubt that this powerlessness46 to preserve rectitude, which you say we experience in our wills when we consent to temptations, is not a matter of impossibility but of difficulty. For we commonly say that we can't do something, not because it is impossible for us to do it, but because we can do it only with difficulty. But this difficulty does not destroy the will's freedom; it can assail but it cannot defeat an unwilling will.
In this way, then, I think you can see how the power of the will, which is vindicated by truthful reasoning, is consistent with the weakness that our humanity experiences. For just as difficulty in no way destroys the will's freedom, so also that weakness—which we say is in the will precisely because it cannot retain its rectitude without difficulty—does not take away the will's power to persevere in rectitude.
Chapter 7 How the will is more powerful 47 than temptation, even when it is overcome by temptation S: I can't at all deny what you have proved, but I also can't by any means affirm that the will is more powerful than temptation when it is overcome by temptation. After all, if the will to preserve rectitude were more powerful than the onslaught of temptation, the will, in willing what it retains, would resist temptation more powerfully than temptation would assail the will. For the only way I know my will is more or less powerful is that I will more or less powerfully. So when I will what I ought less powerfully than temptation urges me to do what I ought not, I don't see how temptation is not more powerful than my will.
T: I see that you've been misled by an equivocation on the word 'will'.
S: I would like to understand that equivocation.
46 powerlessness: impotentia, the same word that is generally translated 'weakness' in this chapter.
47 more powerful: fortior. Anselm relies heavily in this chapter on the adjective fortis (strong, powerful) and various cognates, and ideally an English translation would stick with one word and its cognates. Unfortunately, considerations of English idiom make this impossible.
So the reader should bear in mind that fortis is translated variously as 'strong','powerful', and 'forceful'; fortius as 'more powerfully' and 'more forcefully'; and fortitudo as 'strength' and 'force'.
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T: 'Will' is said equivocally in much the same way as 'sight'.We use the word 'sight' to refer to the instrument for seeing, that is, the ray proceeding through the eyes by which we see light and things that are in light; we also use it to refer to the activity48 of that instrument when we make use of it, that is, vision. Similarly, we use the word 'will' to refer to the instrument for willing, which is in the soul, and which we direct to willing this or that, just as we direct sight to seeing various things; and we also use it to refer to the exercise of the will that is the instrument for willing, just as we use the word 'sight' to refer to the exercise of the sight that is the instrument for seeing.49 Now we have the sight that is the instrument for seeing even when we are not seeing anything, whereas the sight that is its activity is in us only when we are seeing something. Similarly, the will that is the instrument for willing is always in the soul, even when it is not willing anything—for example, when one is asleep—but we have the will that I am calling the exercise or activity of that instrument only when we are willing something. So the will that I am calling the instrument for willing is always one and the same, no matter what we will; but the will that is its activity is as multifarious as the many objects and occasions of our willing—just as the sight that we have even in darkness or with our eyes closed is always the same, no matter what we see, whereas the sight that is its activity, which is also called vision, is as various as the varied objects and occasions of our seeing.
S: I clearly understand and admire this distinction between two senses of 'will', and I think I now realize the error I fell into because I didn't know it.
Still, go on with what you've begun.
T: Then since you understand that there are two wills, the instrument for willing and its activity, in which of these two do you think the strength of willing resides?
S: In the will that is the instrument for willing.
T: Suppose you know a man who is so strong that if he restrains a wild bull, the bull can't move, and you see him restraining a ram in such a way that the ram breaks free from his grasp.Will you think that he is less strong in restraining the ram than in restraining the bull?
S: I will judge that he is equally strong in either action, but I will acknowledge that he is not using his strength equally, since he acts more forcefully on 48 activity: opus. See note 43.
49 Cf. De concordia 3.11, in which Anselm distinguishes three different senses of 'will'.
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the bull than on the ram. The man is strong because he has strength, whereas his action is called strong because it is done forcefully.
T: In the same way you must understand that the will I am calling the instrument for willing has an inseparable strength, insuperable by any external power, which it sometimes uses more and sometimes less in willing. Hence, it by no means abandons what it wills more forcefully when it is offered what it wills less forcefully; and when it is offered what it wills more forcefully, it immediately lets go of what it does not will with equal force. And then the will—which we can call the activity of this instrument, since it is actively at work when it wills something—this will as activity, I say, is called more or less strong as the action is done more or less forcefully.
S: I must admit that what you have explained is quite clear to me now.
T: Then you see that when a human being assailed by temptation abandons his rectitude of will, he is not torn away from rectitude by any external power; rather, his will turns itself to that which he wills more forcefully.
Chapter 8 That not even God can take away rectitude of will S: Can God, at any rate, take away rectitude from the will?
T: You must understand in what sense he can't. He can indeed reduce to nothing the whole substance that he has made from nothing, but he cannot take away rectitude from a will that has it.
S: I am very eager for you to offer an argument for this claim of yours, which I have never heard before.
T: We are speaking of the rectitude of will in virtue of which a will is called just: that is, rectitude that is preserved for its own sake. Now no will is just unless it wills what God wills it to will.
S: One that does not will this is clearly unjust.
T: Then for any will that preserves rectitude, its preserving rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself is the same as its willing what God wills it to will.
S: So one must acknowledge.
T: If God takes away this rectitude from someone's will, he does so either willingly or unwillingly.
S: He cannot do so unwillingly.
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T: So if he takes away rectitude from someone's will, he wills what he does.
S: Undoubtedly.
T: So if he takes away rectitude from someone's will,he does not will that that person should preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself.
S: That follows.
T: But it has already been settled that for everyone who preserves rectitude, preserving rectitude of will in this way is the same as willing what God wills him to will.
S: Even if that hadn't been settled, it would still be true.
T: Therefore, if God takes this much-discussed rectitude away from someone, he does not will that person to will what he wills him to will.
S: Nothing could be more logical, but nothing could be more impossible.
T: Therefore, nothing is more impossible than for God to take away rectitude of will. Nonetheless, he is said to do this when he does not prevent someone from abandoning rectitude. Moreover, the devil or temptation is said to take away rectitude, or to overcome the will and tear it away from the rectitude it possesses, because unless he promised50 something or threatened to take away something that the will wills more than rectitude, the will would by no means turn itself away from the rectitude that it does in fact will to some extent.
S: What you say appears so evident to me that I don't think anything could be said against it.
Chapter 9 That nothing is freer than an upright will T: And so you see that nothing is freer than an upright will, since no external power can take away its rectitude. If, when it wills to lie in order not to lose life or well-being, we say that it is compelled by fear of death or torture to abandon the truth, that is certainly not true. For it is not compelled to will life more than truth; but since an external power prevents it from preserving both, it chooses what it wills more. And certainly the will does so spontaneously* and not against its will,although its being in a position where it must abandon one or the other is not spontaneous but against its will. For it has no 50 Reading promitteret for permitteret.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Freedom of Choice
less strength for willing truth than for willing well-being, but it wills wellbeing more forcefully. For if it saw right before its eyes the eternal glory that it would immediately attain if it preserved the truth, and the torments of hell to which it would be given over without delay if it lied, there's no question that it would quickly be found to have strength enough to preserve the truth.
S: That's clearly true, since it would show greater strength for willing eternal well-being for its own sake, and truth for the sake of the reward, than for preserving temporal well-being.
Chapter 10 How someone who sins is a slave to sin, and that it is a greater miracle when God restores rectitude to someone who abandons it than when he restores life to a dead person T: So rational nature always has free choice, since it always has the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself, although sometimes with difficulty. But once a free will abandons rectitude because of the difficulty of preserving it, the will is thereafter a slave to sin because of the impossibility of recovering rectitude through its own power. Thus it becomes "a spirit going on its way and not returning,"51 since "one who commits sin is a slave to sin."52 Indeed, just as no will before it had rectitude could acquire it unless God gave it, so also, once it has abandoned the rectitude it received, it cannot regain it unless God restores it. And I think it is a greater miracle when God restores to a will the rectitude it has abandoned than when he restores to a dead man the life he has lost. For a body, in dying out of necessity, does not sin so as never to regain life; but a will, by abandoning rectitude through its own power, deserves always to lack rectitude. And if someone spontaneously* inflicts death upon himself, he does not take away from himself what he was never going to lose; but someone who abandons rectitude of will throws away what he ought always to have preserved.
S: I see that what you are saying about the slavery by which "one who commits sin is a slave to sin," and about the impossibility of recovering rectitude once it is abandoned unless it is restored by him who first gave it, is entirely true; and it should be ceaselessly contemplated by all to whom rectitude is given, in order that they might always retain it.
51 Psalm 78:39 (77:39).
52 John 8:34.
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Chapter 11 That this slavery does not take away freedom of choice But with this claim you have quite dampened my excitement, since I was thinking it was already firmly established that human beings always have freedom of choice. So I insist that you explain this slavery to me, lest it might perhaps seem incompatible with freedom. For both this freedom and this slavery are in the will, and it is in virtue of the will that human beings are free or slaves. So if they are slaves, how are they free? Or if they are free, how are they slaves?
T: If you distinguish carefully, they are, without any inconsistency, both free and slaves when they do not have rectitude. After all, it is never in their power to acquire rectitude when they don't have it; but it is always in their power to preserve it when they do have it. Because they cannot return to rectitude from sin, they are slaves; because they cannot be torn away from rectitude, they are free. But they can be turned back from sin, and from slavery to sin, only by someone else, whereas they can be turned away from rectitude only by themselves; and they cannot be deprived of their freedom either by themselves or by someone else. For they are always by nature free to preserve rectitude if they have it, even when they do not have the rectitude that they might preserve.
S: I am satisfied with the compatibility you have shown between freedom and slavery, so that they can both exist in the same person at the same time.
Chapter 12 Why, when human beings do not have rectitude, we say that they are free, since rectitude cannot be taken away from them when they have it, rather than saying that those who have rectitude are slaves, since they cannot recover it by their own power when they do not have it
But I very much want to know why, when human beings do not have rectitude, we say that they are free, since no one else can take it from them when they have it, rather than saying that when they do have it, they are slaves, since they cannot recover rectitude by their own power when they do not have it.
For because they cannot return from sin, they are slaves; because they cannot be torn away from rectitude, they are free; and just as they can never be torn away from it if they have it, so also they can never return to it if they do not have it.
Hence, just as they are always free, so also, it seems, they are always slaves.
T: This slavery is nothing other than the inability not to sin. For whether we call it the inability to return to rectitude or the inability to recover rectitude
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Freedom of Choice
or have it again, human beings are slaves to sin only because, since they cannot return to rectitude or recover it or have it again, they are unable not to sin. By contrast, when they have rectitude, they do not have the inability not to sin.Therefore, when they have rectitude, they are not slaves of sin. But they always have the power to preserve rectitude, both when they have rectitude and when they do not; and so they are always free.
As for your asking why, when human beings do not have rectitude, we say that they are free, since no one else can take it from them when they have it, rather than saying that when they do have rectitude, they are slaves, since they cannot recover it by their own power when they do not have it: that's like asking why, when the sun is not present, we say that people have the power to see it, since they can see it when it is present, rather than saying that when the sun is present they are unable to see it, since when it is not present they cannot themselves cause it to be present. For even when the sun is not present, we have within ourselves the power of vision by which we see it when it is present; and in the same way, when rectitude of will is lacking in us, we nonetheless have within ourselves the aptitude for understanding and willing by which we can preserve it for its own sake when we have it. And when we have everything we need in order to see the sun except its presence, the only power we lack is the one that its presence confers upon us; and in the same way, when we lack rectitude, the only inability we have is the one that its absence causes in us. Therefore, human beings always have freedom of choice, but they are not always slaves of sin. They are slaves of sin only when they do not have upright wills.
S: If I had reflected carefully on what you said earlier when you divided the power of seeing into four powers,53 I would not have been uncertain about this; so I acknowledge that I'm to blame for my uncertainty.
T: I will forgive you now if from here on out you will keep what we say in the forefront of your mind as much as will be necessary, so that we won't have to repeat it.
S: I appreciate your kindness. But don't be surprised if just one hearing should not be enough to keep these things, which I have not been used to thinking about, always clearly before my mind's eye.
T: Tell me whether you are still in doubt about anything in the definition of freedom of choice that we have offered.
53 In Chapter 3.
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Chapter 13 That "the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself" is a perfect definition of freedom of choice
S: There is one thing that still worries me a bit about the definition.We often have a power to preserve something, but the power is not free in such a way that it cannot be impeded by any external force. So when you say that freedom of choice is the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself, consider whether perhaps we ought to add something to indicate that this power is so free that it cannot be overcome by any force.
T: If the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself could sometimes be found apart from the freedom that we have come to understand, it would be a good idea to add what you say. But since the stated definition is perfect in terms of genus* and differences,* so that it includes neither more nor less than the freedom we are investigating, it cannot be understood to need any addition or deletion. For 'power' is the genus of freedom. By adding 'to preserve' we distinguish it from every power that is not a power to preserve, for example, a power to laugh or to walk. By adding 'rectitude' we distinguish it from the power to preserve gold or whatever else is not rectitude. By adding 'of will' we distinguish it from the power to preserve the rectitude of other things, such as a stick or an opinion. By the phrase 'for the sake of rectitude itself' we distinguish it from the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of something else, as when rectitude is preserved for the sake of money, or naturally.* For a dog preserves rectitude of will naturally when it loves its puppies or its kindly master.
Therefore, since there is nothing in this definition but what is necessary to include the freedom of choice of a rational will and to exclude everything else, and freedom is sufficiently included and everything else sufficiently excluded,our definition is surely neither overly broad nor overly narrow.Do you think so?
S: It certainly seems perfect to me.
T: Then tell me whether you have any further questions about this freedom, on the basis of which an action, be it good or bad, is imputed* to someone— for that is the only freedom we are discussing now.
Chapter 14 How this freedom is divided S: You still need to set out how this freedom is divided. For although freedom as defined in this way is common to every rational nature, God's freedom
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Freedom of Choice
is very different from that of rational creatures, and theirs in turn differs from one creature to another.
T: There is a freedom of choice that is from itself, neither made by nor received from anyone else; it belongs to God alone.There is another freedom of choice that is made by and received from God; it belongs to angels and human beings. The freedom that is made or received either has rectitude that it preserves, or lacks rectitude. That which has rectitude has it either separably or inseparably. That which has rectitude separably belonged to all the angels before the good were confirmed and the bad fell, and it belongs now to all human beings before death who have rectitude. That which has rectitude inseparably belongs to elect angels and human beings—but to angels after the fall of the reprobate and to human beings after their death. Now that which lacks rectitude lacks it either recoverably or irrecoverably. That which lacks it recoverably belongs only to human beings in this present life who lack it, although many do not recover it. That which lacks it irrecoverably belongs to reprobate angels and human beings—but to angels after their fall, to human beings after this life.
S: With God's assent you have so completely explained the definition and division of freedom that I can't find anything else I need to ask about them.