[Three Philsophical Dialogues]: On Truth
On Truth Chapters 1: That truth has no beginning or end 2: On the truth of signification, and on the two truths of a statement
3: On the truth of opinion 4: On the truth of the will 5: On the truth of natural and non-natural action
6: On the truth of the senses 7: On the truth of the being of things 8: On the various meanings of 'ought' and 'ought not','can' and 'cannot'
9: That every action signifies something true or false 10: On the supreme truth 11: On the definition of truth 12: On the definition of justice 13: That there is one truth in all true things
Chapter 1 That truth has no beginning or end STUDENT: Since we believe that God is truth,3 and we say that truth is in many other things, I would like to know whether, wherever truth is said to be, we must acknowledge that God is that truth. For you yourself, in your
Monologion, prove on the basis of the truth of speech that the supreme truth has no beginning or end:"Let anyone who can do so think of this: when did it begin to be true, or when was it not true, that something was going to exist?
Or when will it cease to be true, and no longer be true, that something existed in the past? But given that neither of these is conceivable, and both statements cannot be true apart from truth, then it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning or end. Finally, if truth had a beginning or will have an end, before it came into being it was then true that there was no truth, and after it has ceased to exist, it will then be true that there is no truth. Now nothing can be true apart from truth.So truth existed before truth existed,and truth will exist after truth has ceased to exist—which is an absolute absurdity. So, whether truth is said to have a beginning or end or is understood not to have a beginning or end, truth cannot be confined by any beginning or end." So you say in your Monologion.4 And for that reason I am eager for you to teach me a definition of truth.
TEACHER: I don't remember ever discovering a definition of truth; but if you like, let's inquire what truth is by examining the variety of things in which we say there is truth.
S: Even if I can't do anything else, I will at least help by listening.
Chapter 2 On the truth of signification, and on the two truths of a statement T: Then let's inquire first what truth is in a statement, since we quite often call a statement true or false.
S: You inquire, and I will hold on to whatever you discover.
T: When is a statement true?
S: When what it states, whether by affirming or denying, is the case. For I say that it states something even when it denies that what-is-not is, since that is the way in which it states what is the case.
3 Cf. John 14:6, where Christ says "I am the way, the truth, and the life."
4 See Chapter 18 of the Monologion.
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T: So do you think that the thing stated is the truth of the statement?
S: No.
T: Why not?
S: Because nothing is true except by participating in truth, and so the truth of what is true is in the true thing itself, whereas the thing stated is not in the true statement. Hence, we must say that the thing stated is not the truth of the statement, but the cause of its truth. For this reason it seems to me that the truth of a statement must be sought nowhere else but in the statement itself.
T: Then consider whether the statement itself, or its signification, or any of those things that are in the definition of 'statement', is what you are looking for.
S: I don't think so.
T: Why not?
S: Because if that were so, the statement would always be true, since everything in the definition of 'statement' remains the same, both when what is stated is the case and when it isn't. For the statement is the same, its signification is the same, and so forth.
T: Then what do you think truth is in a statement?
S: All I know is that when a statement signifies that what-is is, then there is truth in it, and it is true.
T: For what purpose is an affirmation made?
S: For signifying that what-is is.
T: So it ought to do that.
S: Certainly.
T: So when it signifies that what-is is, it signifies what it ought to.
S: Obviously.
T: And when it signifies what it ought to, it signifies correctly.
S: Yes.
T: Now when it signifies correctly, its signification is correct.
S: No doubt about it.
T: So when it signifies that what-is is, its signification is correct.
S: That follows.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Truth
T: Furthermore, when it signifies that what-is is, its signification is true.
S: Indeed it is both correct and true when it signifies that what-is is.
T: Then its being correct is the same thing as its being true: namely, its signifying that what-is is.
S: Indeed, they are the same.
T: So its truth is nothing other than its rectitude.5
S: Now I see clearly that this truth6 is rectitude.
T: The case is similar when a statement signifies that what-is-not is not.
S: I understand what you're saying. But teach me how I could respond if someone were to say that even when a statement signifies that what-is-not is, it signifies what it ought to. A statement, after all, has received the power to signify7 both that what-is is, and that what-is-not is—for if it had not received the power to signify that even what-is-not is, it would not signify this.8 So even when it signifies that what-is-not is, it signifies what it ought to. But if, as you have shown, it is correct and true by signifying what it ought to, then a statement is true even when it states that what-is-not is.
T: Certainly it is not customary to call a statement true when it signifies that what-is-not is; nonetheless, it has truth and rectitude, in that it is doing what it ought to. But when it signifies that what-is is, it is doing what it ought to in two ways, since it not only signifies what it received the power to signify but also signifies in keeping with the purpose for which it was made.We customarily call a statement correct and true according to the rectitude and truth by 5 That is, its correctness. 'Rectitude' (rectitudo) is the abstract noun corresponding to 'correct' (rectum). I use 'rectitude' rather than 'correctness' for the sake of consistency: later in the dialogue there are passages where 'correctness' will not work as a translation for rectitudo, and since rectitudo is the most important technical term in the dialogue, it seemed important to signal its presence with a consistent translation.
6 "this truth": that is, the truth of statements.
7 "has received the power to signify" is literally just "has received to signify" (accepit significare). Anselm uses this construction and others like it in the three dialogues to speak about the powers and capacities that things receive from whatever causes them to exist in the first place.
8 In other words, a false statement is still a meaningful statement: if I say "Abraham Lincoln served out his second term as President," I do manage to signify that Abraham Lincoln served out his second term, even though what I am signifying does not match the way things really are. The student therefore suggests that what statements were made for (what they "received the power to do") is signifying, period, and not necessarily signifying what is really the case.
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which it signifies that what-is is, not according to that by which it signifies that even what-is-not is. After all, what a statement ought to do depends more on the purpose for which it received its power of signification than on what was not the purpose for receiving signification; and the only reason it received the power to signify that a thing is when it is not, or that a thing is not when it is, was that it was not possible for it to be given only the power of signifying that a thing is when it is, or that it is not when it is not.
Therefore, the rectitude and truth that a statement has because it signifies in keeping with the purpose for which it was made is one thing; that which it has because it signifies what it received the power to signify is quite another.
The latter is invariable for a given statement, whereas the former is variable, since a statement always has the latter but does not always have the former. For it has the latter naturally, while it has the former accidentally and according to its use. For example, when I say "It is day" in order to signify that what-is is,
I am using the signification of this statement correctly, since this is the purpose for which it was made; consequently, in that case it is said to signify correctly. But when I use the same statement to signify that what-is-not is, I am not using it correctly, since it was not made for that purpose; and so in that case its signification is said not to be correct. Now in some statements these two rectitudes or truths are inseparable: for example, when we say "Human beings are animals," or "A human being is not a stone." For this affirmation always signifies that what-is is, and this negation always signifies that what-isnot is not; nor can we use the former to signify that what-is-not is (since human beings are always animals) or the latter to signify that what-is is not (since a human being is never a stone).9
We began our inquiry with the truth that a statement has when someone uses it correctly, since it is according to this truth that common usage identifies a statement as true. As for the truth that it cannot fail to have, we will discuss that later.10
9 Anselm is noting that statements can be regarded as having two functions and therefore as being true in two different senses.Their real purpose is to signify what is the case, so they can be called true if they signify what is the case (that is the usual sense of 'true'); but they also have the power simply to signify, regardless of whether what they signify is the case, and so they can be called true if they simply signify. Any well-formed statement signifies (so Anselm says that this sort of truth is "invariable" and "natural"), but not every well-formed statement signifies what is the case (so Anselm says that this sort of truth is "variable"). The last two sentences note that there are certain statements in which the two truths cannot diverge: that is, if they signify anything at all, they signify what is the case. These are the affirmations of necessary truths and the negations of necessary falsehoods.
10 There is a brief discussion of this truth at the end of Chapter 5.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Truth
S: Then go back to what you began, since you have adequately distinguished for me between the two truths of statements—if, that is, you have shown that a statement has some truth even when it's a lie, as you say.
T: For the time being let these remarks suffice for our first topic, the truth of signification. After all, the same notion of truth that we examined in spoken statements will be found in all signs that are made for the purpose of signifying that something is or is not: for example, writing and sign language.
S: Then go on to the other things.
Chapter 3 On the truth of opinion T: We also call a thought true when things are as we think they are (whether we think this through reason or in some other way) and false when they are not.
S: That's the custom.
T: So what do you think truth in thought is?
S: According to the reasoning we found persuasive in the case of statements, nothing can be more correctly called the truth of a thought than its rectitude.
For the power of thinking that something is or is not was given to us in order that we might think that what-is is, and that what-is-not is not. Therefore, if someone thinks that what-is is, he is thinking what he ought to think, and so his thought is correct. If, then, a thought is true and correct for no other reason than that we are thinking that what-is is, or that what-is-not is not, its truth is nothing other than its rectitude.
T: Your reasoning is correct.
Chapter 4 On the truth of the will Now Truth Itself says that there is also truth in the will when he says that the devil "did not remain steadfast in the truth."11 For it was only in his will that he was in the truth and then abandoned the truth.
S: So I believe. For if he had always willed what he ought, he would never have sinned; and it was only by sinning that he abandoned the truth.
11 John 8:44.
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T: Then tell me what you understand truth to be in the will.
S: Nothing other than rectitude. For if he was in rectitude and in the truth so long as he willed what he ought—that is, that for the sake of which he had received a will—and if he abandoned rectitude and truth when he willed what he ought not, then we cannot understand truth in this case as anything other than rectitude, since both truth and rectitude in his will were nothing other than his willing what he ought.
T: You understand this well.
Chapter 5 On the truth of natural and non-natural action But we must equally believe that there is truth in action as well. As the Lord says, "One who does evil hates the light,"12 and "One who does the truth comes to the light."13
S: I understand what you're saying.
T: Then consider, if you can, what truth is in action.
S: Unless I am mistaken, we must use the same reasoning about truth in action that we used earlier to identify truth in other things.
T: You're right.For if doing evil and doing the truth are opposites,as the Lord indicates by saying that "One who does evil hates the light" and "One who does the truth comes to the light," then doing the truth is the same as doing good, since doing good and doing evil are contraries. Therefore, if doing the truth and doing good are both opposed to the same thing, they have the same signification. Now everyone agrees that those who do what they ought, do good and act correctly.14 From this it follows that to act correctly is to do the truth, since it is agreed that to do the truth is to do good, and to do good is to act correctly. So nothing is more obvious than that the truth of action is its rectitude.
S: I see no weakness in your reasoning.
T: Consider whether every action that does what it ought to is appropriately said to do the truth.You see, there is rational action, such as giving to charity,
12 John 3:20.
13 John 3:21.
14 "act correctly" is literally "do rectitude."
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Truth
and irrational action, such as the action of a fire that causes heat. So think about whether it would be appropriate for us to say that the fire is doing the truth.
S: If the fire received the power to heat from the one from whom it has being, then when it heats, it is doing what it ought to. So I don't see what is inappropriate about saying that the fire does the truth and acts correctly when it does what it ought to.
T: That's exactly how it seems to me. Hence we can note that there is one rectitude or truth in action that is necessary, and another that is not.When the fire heats,it does the truth and acts correctly out of necessity;but when human beings do good, it is not out of necessity that they do the truth and act correctly. Now when the Lord said that "One who does the truth comes to the light,"he meant us to take 'do'not just to mean what is properly* called doing, but as substituting for any verb. After all, he is not excluding from this truth or light someone who undergoes persecution "for righteousness' sake,"15 or who is when and where he ought to be, or who stands or sits when he ought to, and so forth. No one says that such people are not doing good.And when the Apostle says that everyone will receive a recompense "according to his deeds,"16 we should understand him to mean whatever we customarily identify as doing good or doing evil.
S: Ordinary language, too, uses 'to do' both of undergoing and of many other things that are not doings. Hence, if I am not mistaken, we can also include among right actions an upright will, whose truth we investigated earlier, before the truth of action.
T: You are not mistaken. For someone who wills what he ought to is said to act correctly and to do good; nor is he excluded from those who do the truth.
But since we are discussing the upright will in the course of investigating the truth, and the Lord seems to speak specifically of the truth that is in the will when he says that the devil "did not remain steadfast in the truth," I wanted to give separate consideration to what truth is in the will.
S: I am glad you did it that way.
T: So since it is established that there is a natural truth in action as well as a non-natural truth, that truth in statements which we saw above cannot be
15 Matthew 5:10.
16 2 Corinthians 5:10.
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separated from them should be classified as natural truth.17 For just as fire, when it heats, does the truth, since it received the power to heat from the one who gave it being, so also the statement "It is day" does the truth when it signifies that it is day, whether it is actually day or not, since it received naturally the power to do this.
S: Now for the first time I see the truth in a false statement.
Chapter 6 On the truth of the senses T: Do you think we have found every dwelling-place of truth apart from the supreme truth?
S: I now recall one truth that I don't find in the things you have discussed.
T: What is it?
S: There is truth in the bodily senses, although not always, since they sometimes deceive us. For sometimes when I see something through glass, my vision deceives me,since it sometimes reports to me that the body* I see beyond the glass is the same color as the glass, when in fact it is a different color; on the other hand, sometimes it makes me think that the glass has the color of the thing that I see beyond it, even though it doesn't. And there are many other cases in which vision and the other senses are deceptive.
T: I don't think this truth and falsehood is in the senses, but in opinion. For it is the interior sense that deceives itself; the exterior sense does not lie to it.
Sometimes this is easy to recognize, but sometimes it is difficult.When a child fears the open maw of the sculpture of a dragon, it is easy to recognize that his vision is not responsible; his vision is reporting to the child exactly what it reports to adults. Rather, what is responsible is the child's interior sense, which is not yet adept at distinguishing between a thing and its likeness. This is the sort of thing that happens when we see someone who resembles someone else and we think he is the person he resembles, or when someone hears what is not a human voice and thinks it is a human voice. The interior sense is responsible for these as well.
17 See Chapter 2. The truth that cannot be separated from a statement is its signifying whatever it "received the power to signify." This truth, Anselm says, is akin to the truth of natural action. Just as fire cannot help heating,"It is day" cannot help signifying that it is day.
In this sense both the statement and the fire are doing what they received the power to do, and so they are both "doing the truth."
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Truth
Now what you say about glass is the case for the following reason.When vision passes through a body* that is of the same color as air—unless that body is denser or darker than the air—nothing prevents vision from taking on the likeness of the color that it sees beyond that body, any more than when it passes through air. This is what happens when, for example, vision passes through glass with its natural color (that is, in which there is no admixture of another color) or through perfectly pure water or crystal or something of a similar color. But when vision passes through another color—as, for example, through glass that is not its natural color, but to which some other color has been added—it receives the color that it encounters first. Hence, once it has received a color and been affected by it, any other color it encounters is received either less accurately or not at all; as a result, what it reports is the color it first received, either by itself or in conjunction with a color it encounters afterwards. For if vision is altered by a prior color to the full extent of its power to see color, it cannot perceive any other color at the same time; but if it is not altered to the full extent of its power to perceive color, it can perceive another color. For example, if it passes through some body, such as glass, that is so perfectly red that vision itself is completely altered by its redness, it cannot be altered by any other color at the same time. But if it does not find the redness it first encounters to exhaust its power to see color, it is
(so to speak) not yet full; it can still take on another color, since its capacity was not satiated by the previous color. Someone who does not know this therefore thinks his vision is reporting that everything it perceives after taking on the first color is either partially or wholly of that same color. And so it happens that the interior sense blames its own shortcoming on the exterior sense.
Similarly, when a straight stick, part of which is in water and part of which is not, is thought to be broken; or when we think we see our own faces in a mirror; or when we think our vision or other senses are reporting that any number of things are otherwise than they really are, it is not the fault of the senses. They are reporting what they can, since that is what they received the power to do. Instead, the blame lies with the judgment of the soul, which does not discriminate well what the senses can or ought to do. To show that this is so would be more troublesome than fruitful for our present purposes, so I don't think we should take up this topic just now. Let it suffice to say that whatever the senses seem to report, whether they do so by their very nature or in virtue of some other cause, they are doing what they ought to. Hence they are acting correctly and doing the truth, and this truth is included in the truth of action.
S: I am happy with your reply, and I don't want you to spend any more time on this question about the senses.
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Chapter 7 On the truth of the being18 of things T: Now consider whether, apart from the supreme truth, we should understand truth to exist in any thing besides those we examined above.
S: What could that be?
T: Do you think anything is,19 in any time or place, that is not in the supreme truth and did not receive its being, insofar as it has being, from the supreme truth, or that can be anything other than what it is in the supreme truth?
S: That is unthinkable.
T: So whatever is, truly is, insofar as it is what it is in the supreme truth.
S: You can conclude without reservation that everything that is, truly is, since it is nothing other than what it is in the supreme truth.
T: So there is a truth in the being of all things that are, since they are what they are in the supreme truth.
S: I recognize that there is truth in their being in such a way that there can be no falsehood there, since whatever is falsely, is not.
T: Well said! But tell me whether anything ought to be different from what it is in the supreme truth.
S: No.
T: Therefore, if all things are what they are in the supreme truth, they are undoubtedly what they ought to be.
S: Indeed they are.
T: Now whatever is what it ought to be, is correct.20
S: It could not be otherwise.
T: So everything that is, is correct.
18 See the Glossary entry for essence* (sense 4).
19 As often in these dialogues,'is' includes the meanings 'exists','is a certain way', and 'is the case'.
20 Literally, "is correctly." I could use "exists correctly," but the context makes clear that Anselm is not using the verb esse ('to be') solely to denote existence.Something can be what it ought to be, not merely by existing, but by being in the place it ought to be, having the characteristics it ought to have, and so on.
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Truth
S: Nothing could be more logical.
T: So if both truth and rectitude are in the being of things because they are what they are in the supreme truth, it is clear that the truth of things is their rectitude.
S: Nothing could be plainer than the soundness of your argument.
Chapter 8 On the various meanings of 'ought' and 'ought not','can' and 'cannot'
But how can we say,with respect to the truth of a thing,that whatever is ought to be, since there are many evil deeds that certainly ought not to be?
T: How is it surprising that the same thing both ought to be and ought not to be?
S: How can that be the case?
T: I know you do not doubt that nothing is at all, unless God either causes or permits it.
S: There is nothing I am more certain of.
T: Will you dare to say that God causes or permits anything unwisely or badly?
S: On the contrary, I contend that God always acts wisely and well.
T: Do you think that something caused or permitted by such great goodness and wisdom ought not to be?
S: What intelligent person would dare to think that?
T: Therefore, both what comes about because God causes it and what comes about because God permits it ought equally to be.
S: What you are saying is obviously true.
T: Then tell me whether you think the effect of an evil will ought to be.
S: That's the same as asking whether an evil deed ought to be, and no sensible person would concede that.
T: And yet God permits some people to perform the evil deeds that their evil wills choose.
S: If only he did not permit it so often!
T: Then the same thing both ought to be and ought not to be. It ought to be in that God, without whose permission it could not come about, acts
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wisely and well in permitting it; but if we consider the one whose evil will instigates the action, it ought not to be. In this way the Lord Jesus, who alone was innocent, ought not to have suffered death, and no one ought to have inflicted death on him; and yet he ought to have suffered death, in that he himself wisely and generously and usefully willed to suffer it. There are, after all, many ways in which one and the same thing takes on contrary attributes when considered in different ways. This often happens in the case of an action: for example, punishment.21 Punishment involves both an agent and a patient, so it can be called both an action and a passion.22 Even though 'action' and 'punishment' and similar words that are derived from passive participles are used with an active signification, they seem to belong more to the patient than to the agent. In referring to that which acts, it would seem more appropriate to speak of 'acting' or 'punishing', and to use 'action' and 'punishment' in speaking of that which undergoes the action. For 'acting' and 'punishing' get their name from the one who acts and punishes, as foresight gets its name from the one who foresees and restraint from the one who restrains—and those who act, punish, foresee, and restrain are active; by contrast, 'action' and 'punishment' are derived from those who are acted upon and punished, and they are passive.23 But since—to give you one example from which you will understand the rest—just as there is not someone who punishes unless there is also someone who is punished, nor someone punished without someone who punishes, so punishing and punishment cannot exist without each other. Indeed, they are one and the same thing under different names, depending on the different roles being signified. That's why punishment is said to belong to both the one who punishes and the one who is punished.
21 Anselm actually speaks of a blow (percussio). But the argument that follows, if it is to be rendered into English intelligibly, requires a noun with a cognate verb; that verb in turn must have a participle that is distinct in form from the noun. (The latter requirement rules out 'striking' and 'beating', which appear in other translations.) 'Punishment', with 'punish' and 'punishing' available, fits the bill, and is close enough in sense to percussio to allow me to keep intact the example Anselm uses in the last paragraph of this speech.
22 'Patient' and 'passion' are technical terminology. A patient is someone who is on the receiving end of an action, as opposed to the agent, who performs the action. A passion is an undergoing as opposed to an action, which is a doing. If A punishes B,A is the agent and B the patient;A's punishing B is an action, and B's being punished by A is a passion.
23 Literally:"For [the nouns] 'acting' and 'striking' get their name from [the present participles] 'acting' and 'striking', as [the noun] 'foresight' gets its name from [the present participle]
'foreseeing' and [the noun] 'restraint' from [the present participle] 'restraining'—and [the participles] 'acting','striking','foreseeing', and 'restraining' are active; by contrast, [the nouns]
'action' (actio) and 'blow' (percussio) are derived from [the participles] actum and percussum, which are passive."
[THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES:] On Truth
Hence, one and the same action will be evaluated in the same or in opposite ways for the agent and the patient, according to whether the agent and patient themselves are evaluated in the same or in opposite ways. Therefore, when the one who punishes punishes correctly, and the one who is punished is punished correctly—as when a sinner is corrected by one with the authority to correct him—the action is correct on both sides, since on both sides there ought to be punishment. By contrast, when a just man is punished by a wicked man,since the just man ought not to be punished and the wicked man ought not to punish, the action is not correct on either side, since there ought not to be punishment on either side. But when a sinner is punished by someone who lacks the authority to punish him, it cannot be denied that the punishment is both correct and not correct, since it both ought to be and ought not to be: for the sinner ought to be punished, but this man ought not to punish him. But if you look to the judgment of the supreme Wisdom and Goodness and ask whether the punishment ought not to be (whether on one side only or on the part of both agent and patient), who would dare to deny that what is permitted by such great Wisdom and Goodness ought to be?
S: Let him deny it who dares; I certainly do not dare.
T: And what if you are thinking in terms of the nature of things: would you say that when iron nails were driven into the Lord's body, his feeble flesh ought not to have been pierced, or that, once pierced by the sharp iron, he ought not to have suffered pain?
S: I would be speaking against nature.
T: So it can happen that according to nature an action or passion ought to be, while with respect to the agent or patient it ought not to be, since the agent ought not to do it and the patient ought not to undergo it.
S: I can't deny any of that.
T: Do you see, then, that it can happen quite often that the same action both ought to be and ought not to be, when considered in different ways?
S: You are showing this so clearly that I cannot fail to see it.
T: Now one thing I want you to know is that 'ought' and 'ought not' are sometimes used improperly*: for example, if I say that I ought to be loved by you. For if it's true that I ought to be loved by you, then I am under an obligation to do what I ought,24 and I am at fault if I am not loved by you.
24 Literally,"I am one who is indebted to pay back what I owe": the Latin plays on the fact that debere means both 'owe' and 'ought', and that the noun debitor (debtor, one who is indebted) can mean 'one who has an obligation'.
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S: That follows.
T: But when I ought to be loved by you, the love is not to be demanded from me but from you.
S: I must admit that's true.
T: So when I say that I ought to be loved by you, it does not mean that there is something I ought to do, but that you ought to love me. Similarly, when I say that I ought not to be loved by you, this is understood to mean simply that you ought not to love me.We talk about abilities and inabilities in the same way: for example, if someone says that Hector was able to be defeated by Achilles, and Achilles was not able to be defeated by Hector. After all, the ability was not in the one who was able to be defeated, but in the one who was able to defeat him; nor was the inability in the one who could not be defeated, but in the one who could not defeat him.
S: I like what you're saying. In fact, I think it is useful to understand this.
T: You're right to think so.
Chapter 9 That every action signifies something true or false But let's return to the truth of signification, which I began with in order to lead you from the better-known to the less well-known. For everyone talks about the truth of signification, but few consider the truth that is in the being of things.
S: Your leading me in that order has been a great help to me.
T: Then let us see how widespread the truth of signification is. For there is true and false signification not only in what we usually call signs, but also in all the other things we have discussed. After all, since no one should do anything but what he ought to do, by the very fact that someone does something, he says and signifies that he ought to do it. And if he ought to do what he does, he says something true; but if he ought not, he lies.
S: I think I understand, but since I have never heard this before, explain more clearly what you mean.
T: Suppose you were in a place where you knew there were both healthful and deadly herbs, but you didn't know how to tell them apart. And suppose someone were there who you did not doubt knew how to tell them apart, and when you asked him which were healthful and which deadly, he said that certain ones were healthful but then ate others.Which would you believe more: his words or his action?
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S: I would believe his action more than his words.
T: Then he would have told you which were healthful by his action more than by his words.
S: That's true.
T: Similarly, if you didn't know that one ought not to lie, and someone lied in your presence, then even if he told you that he ought not to lie, he would tell you by his action that he ought to lie more than he would tell you by his words that he ought not. Likewise, when someone thinks or wills something, if you didn't know whether he ought to think or will it, then if you could see his will and thought,he would signify to you by that very action that he ought to think and will it. Now if he in fact ought to think or will it, he would be saying something true; but if not, he would be lying. And similarly, there is also true and false signification in the being of things, since by the very fact that something is, it says that it ought to be.
S: Now I see clearly what I had never realized before.
T: Let's go on to what remains.
S: You lead, and I'll follow.
Chapter 10 On the supreme truth You will surely not deny that the supreme truth is rectitude.
S: Indeed, I cannot acknowledge it to be anything else.
T: Note that, while all the rectitudes discussed earlier are rectitudes because the things in which they exist either are or do what they ought, the supreme truth is not a rectitude because it ought to be or do anything. For all things are under obligations to it, but it is under no obligation to anything.25 Nor is there any reason why it is what it is, except that it is.
S: I understand.
T: Do you also see that this rectitude is the cause of all other truths and rectitudes, and nothing is the cause of it?
S: I see that, and I notice that some of these other truths and rectitudes are merely effects, while others are both causes and effects. For example, the truth
25 More literally: "the supreme truth is not a rectitude because it owes something. For all things owe [something] to it, but it owes nothing to anything." Recall that 'ought' and 'owe' are the same word in Latin.
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that is in the being of things is an effect of the supreme truth, and it is in turn a cause of the truth of thoughts and statements; and the latter two truths are not a cause of any other truth.
T: You have understood this well. Hence, you can now understand how I used the truth of statements in my Monologion to prove that the supreme truth has no beginning or end. For when I asked,"when was it not true that something was going to exist?"26 I didn't mean that this statement, asserting that something was going to exist in the future, was itself without a beginning, or that this truth was God. Instead I meant that it is inconceivable that this statement could ever have been uttered without its also possessing truth. Therefore, since it is inconceivable that that truth could fail to exist if the statement existed in which that truth could exist, we understand that the truth which is the first cause of this truth existed without a beginning. After all, the truth of a statement could not always exist if its cause did not always exist. For a statement that says something will exist in the future is not true unless in fact something will exist in the future; and nothing will exist in the future unless it exists in the supreme truth. The same reasoning applies to a statement that says something existed in the past. Since it is inconceivable that this statement, if uttered, could lack truth, it must be the case that the supreme cause of its truth cannot be understood to have an end. For what makes it true to say that something existed in the past is the fact that something really did exist in the past; and the reason something existed in the past is that this is how things are in the supreme truth. Therefore, if it was never possible for it not to be true that something was going to exist, and it will never be possible for it not to be true that something existed in the past, it is impossible for the supreme truth ever to have had a beginning or ever to have an end.
S: I see no way to object to your reasoning.
Chapter 11 On the definition of truth T: Let's return to the investigation of truth that we have begun.
S: All of this is relevant to investigating truth, but return to what you wish.
T: Then tell me whether you think there is any other rectitude besides those we have discussed.
26 Chapter 18 in the Monologion, as quoted at the beginning of the dialogue.
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S: I don't think there is any, except that which is in corporeal things, which is very different from those we have discussed—for example, the rectitude27 of a stick.
T: In what way do you think this differs from those?
S: In that this can be known through corporeal vision, whereas the others are perceived by reason.
T: Can't that rectitude of bodies* be understood and known through reason apart from the subject?28 If, when a body is not present, you are in doubt whether its surface is straight, and it can be shown that it is not curved in any place, are you not grasping by reason that it must be straight?
S: Certainly. But this same rectitude that is understood by reason in this way is also perceived by vision in the subject. The others, however, can be perceived only by the mind.
T: Then if I'm not mistaken, we can define truth as rectitude perceptible only by the mind.
S: I don't see any way someone saying that could be mistaken. For this definition of truth contains neither more nor less than it should, since the term
'rectitude' distinguishes truth from everything that is not called rectitude, and the phrase 'perceptible only by the mind'distinguishes it from visible rectitude.
Chapter 12 On the definition of justice But since you have taught me that all truth is rectitude, and rectitude seems to me to be the same thing as justice, teach me also what I should understand justice to be. It seems, after all, that if it is right for something to be,29 it is also just for it to be; and conversely, if it is just for something to be, it is also right for it to be. For it seems to be both just and right for fire to be hot and for all human beings to love those who love them. Indeed, if—as I believe—whatever ought to be is right and just, and nothing is right and just but what ought to be, then justice cannot be anything other than rectitude. Certainly justice
27 That is, straightness.
28 "the subject": the physical object that has the property in question (in this case, straightness).
29 Here again, 'to be' includes the meanings 'to exist','to be a certain way', and 'to be the case'.
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and rectitude are the same in the supreme and simple* Nature, although he is not just and right because he is under any obligation.
T: So if justice is nothing other than rectitude, you have your definition of justice. And since we are speaking of the rectitude that is perceptible only by the mind, truth and rectitude and justice are all inter-defined, so that someone who knows one and not the others can attain knowledge of those he doesn't know through the one he does know. Or rather, someone who knows one cannot fail to know the others.
S: What then? Shall we say that a stone is just when it seeks to go from higher to lower, since it is doing what it ought to, in the same way that we say human beings are just when they do what they ought to?
T: We don't generally call something 'just' on the basis of that sort of justice.
S: Then why is a human being any more just than a stone is, if both act justly?
T: Don't you think what the human being does differs in some way from what the stone does?
S: I know that the human being acts spontaneously,30 whereas the stone acts naturally* and not spontaneously.
T: That is why the stone is not called just: something that does what it ought to is not just unless it wills what it does.
S: Then shall we say that a horse is just when it wills to graze, since it willingly does what it ought to?
T: I did not say that something is just if it willingly does what it ought to, but that something is not just if it does not willingly do what it ought to.
S: Then tell me who is just.
T: I see that you are looking for a definition of the justice that deserves praise, just as its opposite, injustice, deserves reproach.
S: That's what I'm looking for.
T: Clearly that justice is not in any nature that is not aware of rectitude. For whatever does not will rectitude, even if it in fact retains rectitude, does not deserve praise for retaining it; and what does not know rectitude cannot will it.
30 'Spontaneously' is used as a technical term in this translation; the word does not have the connotations it has in ordinary usage. For a definition, see the Glossary.
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S: That's true.
T: So the rectitude that wins praise for the one who retains it exists only in a rational nature, since only a rational nature perceives the rectitude of which we are speaking.
S: That follows.
T: Therefore, since all justice is rectitude, the justice that makes praiseworthy the one who preserves it does not exist anywhere at all except in rational natures.
S: That must be right.
T: Where, then, do you think this justice exists in human beings, who are rational?
S: Either in the will, or in knowledge, or in action.
T: If someone understands correctly or acts correctly, but does not will correctly, will anyone praise him for his justice?
S: No.
T: Therefore, this justice is not rectitude of knowledge or rectitude of action, but rectitude of will.
S: It is either that or nothing.
T: Do you think we have reached an adequate definition of the justice we're investigating?
S: You had better say.
T: Do you think everyone who wills what he ought to wills correctly and has rectitude of will?
S: If someone unknowingly wills what he ought to—for example, if someone wills to lock the door against one who, unbeknownst to him, intends to kill someone in the house—then whether or not he has some rectitude of will, he doesn't have the rectitude of will we're asking about.
T: What do you say about someone who knows that he ought to will what he wills?
S: It can turn out that someone who knowingly wills what he ought to is also unwilling to be under that obligation.For example,if a robber is forced to give back the money he stole, he clearly does not will to be under that obligation, since he is forced to give it back because he ought to. But in no way does he deserve praise for this rectitude.
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T: Someone who gives food to a starving pauper for the sake of an empty reputation31 wills that he be under the obligation to will what he in fact wills.
For he is praised because he wills to do what he ought to.What do you think about him?
S: His rectitude does not deserve praise, and so it is not sufficient for the justice we're asking about. But show me now what is sufficient.
T: Every will not only wills something but wills for the sake of something.
Now just as we must examine what it wills, so also we must understand why it wills. In fact, a will should not be correct because it wills what it ought to will more so than because it wills it for the reason it ought to will. Hence, every will has a what and a why.For we do not will anything at all unless there is a reason why we will it.
S: We all recognize this in ourselves.
T: But what do you think is the why on account of which everyone must will whatever he wills, if he is to have a praiseworthy will? What everyone must will is clear, after all, since someone who does not will what he ought to is not just.
S: It seems no less obvious to me that just as everyone must will what he ought, so also everyone must will it because he ought, in order for his will to be just.
T: You correctly grasp that these two things are necessary for the will to have justice: to will what it ought to, and because it ought to. But are they sufficient?
S: Why wouldn't they be?
T: Suppose someone wills what he ought because he is compelled, and he is compelled because he ought to will it. Doesn't he in a certain sense will what he ought to, because he ought to?
S: I cannot deny it. But he wills it in one way, and the just man in quite another.
31 "for the sake of an empty reputation": propter inanem gloriam. Someone who gives food propter inanem gloriam does so in order to win praise for his generosity when in fact he is not generous but self-seeking. Anselm says that such a person "wills to be under an obligation to will what he in fact wills" because if he were under no such obligation, he could not win praise for doing as he ought to do. Since he clearly wills the praise, he must also will the obligation.
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T: Distinguish these two ways.
S: When the just man wills what he ought, he does not—insofar as he deserves to be called just—preserve rectitude for the sake of anything other than rectitude itself. But someone who wills what he ought only because he is compelled, or because he is bribed by some extraneous reward, preserves rectitude not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else—if he should be said to preserve rectitude at all.
T: Then a will is just when it preserves its rectitude for the sake of that rectitude itself.
S: Either such a will is just, or no will is.
T: Then justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake.
S: That is indeed the definition of justice for which I was looking.
T: Now consider whether perhaps something in it needs correcting.
S: I see nothing in it that needs to be corrected.
T: Neither do I, since there is no justice that is not rectitude, and no rectitude other than rectitude of will is called justice in its own right. For rectitude of action is called justice, but only when the action proceeds from a correct will.
Rectitude of will, on the other hand, is always entitled to be called justice, even if it is impossible for what we correctly will to come about.
Now the use of the word 'preserved' might prompt someone to say that if rectitude of will is to be called justice only when it is preserved, then it is not justice as soon as we have it, and we do not receive justice when we receive rectitude of will; rather, we cause it to be justice by preserving it. After all, we receive and have rectitude of will before we preserve it. For we do not receive or initially have it because we preserve it; instead, we begin to preserve it because we have received it and have it.
But in response we can say that we simultaneously receive both the willing and the having of rectitude. For we have it only in virtue of willing it, and if we will it we thereby have it. Now just as we simultaneously have it and will it, so also we simultaneously will it and preserve it. For just as we do not preserve it except when we will it, so also there is no time at which we will it but do not preserve it; on the contrary, as long as we will it, we preserve it, and as long as we preserve it, we will it. Therefore, since we both will it and have it at the same time, we both will it and preserve it at the same time. Necessarily, we simultaneously receive both the having and the preserving of rectitude.
And just as we have it as long as we preserve it, so also we preserve it as long as we have it. Nor does any absurdity follow from these statements. Indeed, just as the receiving of this rectitude is prior* in nature to having or willing it
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(since neither having nor willing it is the cause of receiving it, but receiving it is the cause of willing and having it) and yet receiving it is temporally simultaneous with having and willing it (since we simultaneously begin to receive it, to have it, and to will it, and no sooner do we receive it than we have it and will it), so also having or willing it, although prior in nature to preserving it, is nonetheless temporally simultaneous with preserving it. Hence, the one from whom we simultaneously receive the having, the willing, and the preserving of rectitude of will is also the one from whom we receive justice; and as soon as we have and will that rectitude of will, it is rightly called "justice."
Now the last phrase we added,"for its own sake," is so essential that rectitude is in no way justice unless it is preserved for its own sake.
S: I can't think of any objection.
T: Do you think this definition can be applied to the supreme Justice—insofar as we can talk about a thing about which nothing, or hardly anything, can be said properly*?
S: Although in him will and rectitude are not distinct, still, just as we speak of the power of divinity or the divine power or powerful divinity even though in the divinity power is nothing other than divinity, so also it is appropriate for us to speak of God's rectitude of will or voluntary rectitude or upright will.
And we cannot so fittingly say of any other rectitude as we can of his that it is preserved for its own sake. For just as nothing else preserves that rectitude but itself, and it preserves itself through nothing else but itself, so also it preserves itself for the sake of nothing but itself.
T: Then we can unhesitatingly say that justice is rectitude of will that is preserved for its own sake. And since we have no present passive participle of the verb 'preserve,' we can use the perfect passive participle of the same verb in place of the present.32
T: It is extremely common for us to use perfect passive participles in place of the present passive participles that Latin doesn't have. Similarly, Latin has no perfect participles for active and neuter33 verbs, so in place of the perfect
32 English, however, is better equipped with participles; the present passive participle is
"being preserved."Anselm's point is best explained as follows: because of the lack of a present passive participle in Latin, the phrase "rectitude of will preserved for its own sake" is ambiguous. It can mean either "rectitude of will that is being preserved for its own sake" or "rectitude of will that has been (or was) preserved for its own sake." In his definition of justice,Anselm means us to understand the phrase in the first way.
33 By 'neuter' verbs Anselm seems to mean intransitive verbs that are active in form.'Study'
(studere) is an example of a neuter verb and 'read' (legere) of an active verb.
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participles that it doesn't have, it uses present participles. For example, I might say of someone,"that which he learned studying and reading, he doesn't teach unless forced." That is, "what he learned when he studied and read, he does not teach unless he is forced."34
T: Then we were right to say that justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake—that is, rectitude of will that is being preserved for its own sake.
This is why the just are sometimes called "upright in heart," that is, upright in will, and sometimes simply "upright" without the addition of "in heart," since no one else is understood to be upright but those who have an upright will: for example, "Rejoice, all you upright in heart"35 and "The upright will see and be glad."36
S: You have made the definition of justice clear enough even for children.
Let's pass on to other things.
Chapter 13 That there is one truth in all true things T: Let's return to rectitude or, in other words, truth—since we are speaking of rectitude perceptible only by the mind, these two words, 'rectitude' and 'truth', signify one thing, which is the genus* of justice—and ask whether there is only one truth in all the things in which we say there is truth, or whether there are several* truths, just as there are several things in which (as we have established) there is truth.
S: I very much want to know that.
T: It has been established that in whatever thing there is truth, that truth is nothing other than rectitude.
S: I don't doubt it.
34 The differences between English and Latin grammar again make Anselm's point obscure.
In his sample sentence,'studying' and 'reading' are both present participles, while 'forced' is a past ("perfect") participle. His point is that, since the studying and the reading were in the past, whereas the being-forced is in the present, it would be more accurate to use the perfect participles of 'study' and 'read' and the present participle of 'force' rather than vice versa—the only problem being that Latin does not have those participles. Once again, English is better supplied: the relevant participles are 'having studied','having read', and 'being forced'.
35 Psalm 32:11 (31:11).
36 Psalm 107:42 (106:42).
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T: So if there are several truths corresponding to the several things in which there is truth, there are also several rectitudes.
S: That is no less certain.
T: If there must be diverse rectitudes corresponding to the diversities of things, then these rectitudes have their being in virtue of the things themselves; and as the things in which they exist change, the rectitudes must also change.
S: Show me one example involving something in which we say there is rectitude, so that I can understand it in others as well.
T: I am saying that if the rectitude of signification differs from rectitude of will because the one is in the will and the other in signification, then rectitude of signification has its being because of signification and varies according to signification.
S: So it does. For when a statement signifies that what-is is, or that what-isnot is not, the signification is correct; and it has been established that this is the rectitude without which there is no correct signification. If, however, the statement signifies that what-is-not is, or that what-is is not, or if it signifies nothing at all, there will be no rectitude of signification, which exists only in signification. Hence, the rectitude of signification has its being through signification and changes along with it, just as color has its being and non-being through body.* For when a body exists, its color must exist; and if the body ceases to exist, its color cannot remain.
T: Color is not related to body in the same way that rectitude is related to signification.
S: Explain the difference.
T: If no one wills to signify by any sign what ought to be signified, will there be any signification by means of signs?
S: No.
T: And will it therefore not be right for what-ought-to-be-signified to be signified?
S: It will not be any less right, nor will rectitude demand it any less.
T: Therefore, even when signification doesn't exist, the rectitude in virtue of which it is right for what-ought-to-be-signified to be signified, and by which this is demanded, does not cease to exist.
S: If that rectitude ceased to exist, this would not be right, and rectitude would not demand it.
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T: Do you think that when what-ought-to-be-signified is signified, the signification is correct on account of and in accordance with this very rectitude?
S: Indeed, I cannot think otherwise. For if the signification is correct through some other rectitude, there is nothing to keep it from being correct even if this rectitude ceases to exist. But in fact there is no correct signification that signifies what it is not right to signify, or what rectitude does not demand.
T: Then no signification is correct through any rectitude other than that which remains even when signification ceases.
S: That's clear.
T: So when rectitude is present in signification, it's not because rectitude begins to exist in signification when someone signifies that what-is is, or that what-is-not is not; instead, it's because at that time signification comes about in accordance with a rectitude that always exists. And when rectitude is absent from signification, it's not because rectitude ceases to exist when signification is not what it should be or there is no signification at all; instead, it's because at that time signification falls away from a rectitude that never fails.
Don't you see that?
S: I see it so clearly that I cannot fail to see it.
T: Therefore, the rectitude by which signification is called correct does not have its being or any change because of signification, no matter how signification itself might change.
S: Nothing is clearer to me now.
T: Can you prove that color is related to body in the same way that rectitude is related to signification?
S: I am more apt now to prove that they are very dissimilar.
T: I think you now realize what the proper view is about the will and its rectitude, and about the other things that ought to have rectitude.
S: I fully understand that this very argument proves that however those other things may be, rectitude itself remains unchangeable.
T: Then what do you think follows concerning those rectitudes? Do they differ from one another, or is there one and the same rectitude for all things?
S: I admitted earlier that if there are several* rectitudes because there are several things in which they are observed, they must exist and change in accordance with those things; and it has been demonstrated that this does not happen at all.So it is not the case that there are several rectitudes because there are several things in which they exist.
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T: Do you have any other reason for thinking that there are several rectitudes, other than the fact that there are several things in which they exist?
S: Not only do I realize that that's no reason, I also see that no other reason can be found.
T: Then there is one and the same rectitude for all things.
S: So I must acknowledge.
T: Furthermore, if there is rectitude in the things that ought to have it only because they are as they ought to be, and if this is precisely what it is for them to be correct, then it is evident that there is only this one rectitude for all of them.
S: Undeniably.
T: Therefore, there is one truth in all of them.
S: That, too, is undeniable. But explain this: why do we speak of the truth of this or that particular thing as if we were distinguishing different truths, when in fact there aren't different truths for different things? Many people will hardly grant that there is no difference between the truth of the will and what is called the truth of action, or of one of the others.
T: Truth is said improperly* to be of this or that thing, since truth does not have its being in or from or through the things in which it is said to be. But when things themselves are37 in accordance with truth, which is always present to those things that are as they ought to be, we speak of the truth of this or that thing—for example, the truth of the will or of action—in the same way in which we speak of the time of this or that thing despite the fact that there is one and the same time for all things that are temporally simultaneous, and that if this or that thing did not exist, there would still be time. For we do not speak of the time of this or that thing because time is in the things, but because they are in time. And just as time regarded in itself is not called the time of some particular thing, but we speak of the time of this or that thing when we consider the things that are in time, so also the supreme truth as it subsists in itself is not the truth of some particular thing, but when something is in accordance with it, then it is called the truth or rectitude of that thing.
37 Again,'are' includes the meanings 'exist','are a certain way', and 'are the case'.