Cur Deus Homo: Book One

Cur Deus Homo: Book One

BOOK ONE Chapter 1 The question on which the whole work hangs I have received frequent and quite eager requests from many people, both by word of mouth and in letters, that I make a written record of the reasoning that I am accustomed to offer in answer to those who ask about the reason of a certain question of our faith.They say that my reasoning is pleasing to them, and they think it fully answers their questions. They do not seek such an explanation in order to achieve faith through reason, but rather so that they can delight in the understanding and contemplation of things they already believe, and so that they may be "always ready," to the best of their ability,"to give an answer to all who demand" from them "the reason of the hope that is in" us.8

This is the question that unbelievers commonly raise as an objection against us, deriding Christian simplicity as foolishness, and that many believers often ponder in their own hearts: by what reason or necessity did God become a human being and, as we believe and profess, restore life to the world by his own death, when he could have accomplished this through some other person, whether angelic or human, or even by his own will alone? Not only the learned but even many who are unlettered ask this question and look for a rational answer. So there are many people who are asking for a discussion of this question,and although the investigation seems extremely difficult,the solution can be understood by anyone and is appealing to everyone because of its usefulness and the beauty of its reasoning. For this reason I will attempt to present to those who make this request what God sees fit to reveal to me, even though the holy fathers have said what ought to be sufficient on this subject. Now because an inquiry that takes the form of questions and answers is more accessible,and consequently more pleasing,to many people,especially to those whose intellects are sluggish, I will take as my partner in dialogue one of those who have been pressing me on this matter, the one whose urging has been most insistent. Thus, Boso9 will ask the questions and Anselm will reply, as follows:

BOSO: Just as right order requires that we believe the deep matters of Christian faith before we undertake to examine them by reason, so too I think we

8 1 Peter 3:15.

9 Boso was a monk of Bec for whose intellectual abilities Anselm had particularly high regard.When Anselm went to Canterbury as archbishop he summoned Boso there to serve as a philosophical companion; and Anselm's treatise On the Virginal Conception, and On Original

Sin, a companion piece to Cur Deus Homo, is addressed to Boso. Boso eventually became the fourth abbot of Bec, 1124–36.

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would be derelict if we did not strive to understand what we believe, once we have been made steadfast in faith. For this reason, since I think I have such faith in our redemption—thanks to God's prevenient grace—that there is nothing that could uproot me from the steadfastness of that faith even if I could not get any rational grasp on what we believe, I am asking you to explain something to me that, as you know, many others are asking along with me: given that God is omnipotent, by what necessity and reason did he assume the lowliness and weakness of human nature in order to restore human nature?

ANSELM: What you are asking of me is too high for me. And I am afraid to deal with loftier matters,10 lest someone should suppose or even see that I have failed to give a satisfactory answer and think that I have fallen away from the truth in this matter, rather than that my understanding is not equal to the task of grasping it.

B: You should not be afraid of that so much as you should remember that it often happens in discussing some question that God reveals what was previously hidden;and you should place your hope in God's grace,that if you freely share what you have received by grace, you will become worthy to receive the loftier things that you have not yet attained.

A: I see another reason that it is hardly possible, or even not possible at all, for us to examine this question to the fullest extent on this occasion.A full treatment requires knowledge of power, of necessity, of will, and of certain other things; and these are interrelated in such a way that none of them can be considered fully apart from the others.And for that reason an investigation of these things requires a work of its own,11 a work that would not, I think, be terribly easy but would also not be altogether without its usefulness—for ignorance of those things makes certain matters difficult that become easy once one knows them.

B: You can speak briefly to these issues at the appropriate points, so that we may have enough for the work at hand and may postpone to another occasion whatever else needs to be said.

A: I also shrink from your request because the subject matter is not merely precious but, just as it concerns one who is "beautiful in his appearance beyond the children of men,"12 so too is it beautiful in its reasoning beyond the understanding of men. Hence, just as I am accustomed to grow indignant at 10 Cf. Psalm 131:2 (130:1); Ecclesiasticus 3:22.

11 The Lambeth Fragments appear to be Anselm's drafts of a work along these lines.

12 Psalm 45:2 (44:3).

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incompetent painters when I see that the Lord himself is portrayed as ugly in his appearance, so too I am afraid that the same thing will happen to me if I presume to discuss such a beautiful subject in unworthy and inelegant language.

B: Nor should that deter you. For if anyone can speak better, you will allow him to do so; and if your language does not please someone, you will not prevent him from writing more beautifully. But so that I may rule out all your excuses:you will be doing what I ask,not for the learned but for me and those who join me in making this request.

Chapter 2 In what way the things to be said are to be accepted A: Since I see your earnest appeal and that of the ones who join you in making this request out of charity and pious zeal, I will try to the best of my ability, with God's help and your prayers (which you who make this request have often promised me when I asked for them for this very purpose), not so much to reveal the answer you are seeking as to seek it in company with you. But I want everything I say to be accepted on the following terms: If I say something that is not confirmed by a greater authority, even if I appear to prove it by reason, it should be accepted with confidence only as what seems true to me for the time being, until God in some way reveals something better to me.

If I prove to be able to give a satisfactory answer to your question to any extent at all, it ought to be quite clear that someone wiser than I am could do this much more completely. Indeed, it is important to recognize that no matter what someone might be able to say on this topic, there are still loftier reasons for so great a matter that remain hidden.

Chapter 3 The objections of unbelievers and the replies of believers B: Allow me, then, to use the words of unbelievers. For since we are seeking to investigate the reason of our faith, it is appropriate for me to set forth the objections of those who are completely unwilling to accede to that faith without reason. They seek reason because they do not believe, whereas we seek it because we believe. Nonetheless, it is one and the same thing that we all seek.

And if you offer any response that appears to contradict sacred authority, allow me to bring it to your attention so that you can explain how there is no contradiction.

A: Go right ahead.

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B: Unbelievers who deride our simplicity object that we injure and insult God when we say that he descended into a woman's womb, was born of a woman, grew by being nourished by milk and human foods, and (not to mention many other things that do not appear to be suitable for God) suffered fatigue, hunger, thirst, beatings, and crucifixion and death between thieves.

A: We do not injure or insult God at all. On the contrary, we praise and proclaim the ineffable depth of his mercy, giving thanks with our whole hearts.

For the more wondrously and unexpectedly he has rescued us from the great and well-deserved evils in which we once were, and restored us to the great and undeserved goods that we had lost, the greater is the love and generosity that he has shown toward us. If they attentively considered how fitting a way this was to accomplish the restoration of humankind, they would not deride our simplicity but join with us in praising God's wise benevolence. For it was fitting that just as death entered the human race through the disobedience of a human being, so too life should be restored by the obedience of a human being.13 It was fitting that just as the sin that was the cause of our damnation had its origin from a woman, so too the author of our justice and salvation should be born of a woman.And it was fitting that the devil, who through the tasting of a tree defeated the human being whom he persuaded, should be defeated by a human being through the suffering on a tree that he inflicted.And there are many other things that, if carefully considered, demonstrate the indescribable beauty that belongs to our redemption, accomplished in this way.

Chapter 4 That unbelievers think these responses lack necessity and are merely pictures, as it were B: All these things are beautiful, and they have to be treated like pictures. But if there is nothing sturdy underneath them, unbelievers do not think they provide a sufficient explanation for why we ought to believe that God willed to undergo the things we say he underwent.When someone wants to produce a picture, he chooses something sturdy on which to paint, so that his painting will last. No one paints on water or in the air, since no traces of the picture would remain there.So when we offer unbelievers these instances of what you say is fitting as pictures of an actual fact,they think it is as though we are painting on a cloud, since they hold that what we believe is not an actual fact at all, but a fiction. Therefore, one must first demonstrate the rational solidity of the truth: that is, the necessity that proves that God should or could have humbled

13 Romans 5:19.

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himself to the things that we proclaim about him. Only then should one expound on considerations of fittingness as pictures of this truth, so that the body of truth, so to speak, might shine all the more brightly.

A: Does not this seem to be a sufficiently necessary reason that God ought to have done the things we say: that the human race—such a precious work of God—had utterly perished, and that it was not fitting that God's purpose for human beings should be completely annihilated, and that his purpose could not be brought to fulfillment unless the human race were liberated by its Creator himself?

Chapter 5 That human redemption could not have been brought about by anyone but a divine person B: If this liberation were said to have been brought about somehow by someone other than a divine person, by either an angel or a human being, the human mind would accept this much more readily. For God could have made a sinless human being—not from the sinful mass14 and not from another human being, but as he made Adam—and it seems that he could have accomplished this same work by means of this man.

A: Do you not understand that human beings would be rightly judged to be subservient to any other person whatsoever who redeemed them from eternal death? And if that were the case, they would by no means be restored to that dignity that they were going to have if they had not sinned, since they who were not going to be subservient to anyone but God and were going to be in every respect equal to the good angels would instead be subservient to someone who was not God, someone to whom the angels would not be subservient.

Chapter 6 In what way unbelievers cast aspersions on our claim that God redeemed us by means of his own death, and that in this way he demonstrated his love toward us, and that he came in order to subdue the devil on our behalf

B: That is what they find particularly baffling—I mean that we call this liberation "redemption." They say to us,"In what captivity were you being held,

14 The expression 'sinful mass' (massa peccatrix) derives from Augustine, who referred to the human race variously as a 'mass of sin(s)', a 'mass of wrath', and a 'mass of perdition'.

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in what prison, under whose control, from which God could not liberate you except by redeeming you at the cost of so many labors and, in the end, of his own blood?"When we say to them:

He redeemed us from our sins and from his own wrath and from hell and from the power of the devil, whom he himself came to subdue on our behalf, because we could not do so ourselves; and he redeemed for us the kingdom of heaven.

And by doing all these things in this way, he showed us how much he loved us. they reply:

If you say that God—who you say created all things by his command—could not have accomplished all these things simply by commanding them, you are contradicting yourselves, since you are making him out to be powerless. On the other hand, if you acknowledge that he could have done all this simply by commanding it, but that he did not will to do it except in the way you describe, how will you be able to show that he is wise, when you claim that he willed to suffer such indignities for no reason at all? For all the things you mention reside in God's will. God's wrath is just his will to punish. So if he does not will to punish human sin, human beings are free from their sins and from God's wrath and from hell and from the power of the devil, since they suffer all these things on account of their sins; and they receive all the things of which they are deprived on account of their sins. For who holds power over hell and the devil, and to whom does the kingdom of heaven belong, if not God, who made all things?

And so whatever you fear, whatever you desire, it is all subject to God's will, which nothing can oppose. So if indeed God was unwilling to save the human race except in the way you describe, when he could have done so through his will alone, face up to how you are impugning his wisdom—to put it mildly.

After all, no one would judge a man to be wise if, without reason, he expended great effort to do something he could have done quite easily. Moreover, if you offer no proof at all that God could not have saved humanity in some other way, you have no argument to defend your claim that by doing it in the way you describe, God showed how much he loves you.After all, if he could not have done it in any other way, then presumably it was necessary that he show his love in this way. But if he could have saved humanity in some other way, what reason is there for him to do and to undergo the things you describe in order to show his love? He does not undergo such things for the good angels: does he not show them how much he loves them? And as for your claim that he came in order to subdue the devil on our behalf: what are you thinking, that you should dare to say this? Doesn't God's omnipotence rule everywhere? So how did God need to come down from heaven in order to overcome the devil?

It seems that unbelievers can raise these objections against us.

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Chapter 7 That the devil had no just claim on humanity; and why it seems that he had such a claim, thus requiring God to liberate humanity in this way

Now we are also accustomed to say that in order to liberate humanity God was obligated to act against the devil through justice before he acted through force, so that when the devil killed him who did not deserve death and who was God, he would justly lose the power that he held over sinners. Otherwise,

God would have inflicted unjust force on the devil, since the devil justly had possession of human beings,whom he had not captured by force,but who had delivered themselves up to him of their own accord.

But I do not see how this has any cogency. If either the devil or human beings were their own, or belonged to anyone other than God, or remained in the power of anyone other than God, then maybe this would be the right thing to say. But since in fact neither the devil nor human beings belong to anyone other than God or stand outside God's power, on what grounds was

God obligated to do anything with his own, about his own, or in his own, other than to punish his own slave who had persuaded a fellow slave to abandon their common master and transfer allegiance to him, a traitor harboring a fugitive, a thief who received a thief along with what he had stolen from his master? For both of them were thieves, since at one thief's persuasion the other thief stole himself from his master. If God were to do this, what could be done more justly? What injustice would there be if God, the judge of all, were to remove human beings from the control of one who had them unjustly in his possession, in order to punish them by some means other than the devil, or in order to spare them? For although human beings were justly tormented by the devil, he was tormenting them unjustly. Human beings deserved to be punished, and there was no one by whom they might be more appropriately punished than the one to whom they gave their consent for sinning. But there was no merit on the devil's part that entitled him to punish them; in fact, the more he was spurred on to doing this by an impulse for wickedness rather than drawn to it by a love of justice, the more he acted unjustly in doing it. For he was not doing this at God's command, but by the permission of God's incomprehensible wisdom, which orders even evils in a good way.

I also think that those who hold that the devil had some just claim to possess humanity are brought to this view because they see that humanity was justly subject to the devil's persecution and that God justly permitted it; and on those grounds they suppose that the devil justly inflicted it. But it can happen that one and the same thing is both just and unjust according to different ways of looking at it, and accordingly it is judged to be wholly just or wholly

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unjust by people who do not examine it attentively. For example, suppose someone unjustly strikes an innocent man and as a result deserves, as a matter of justice, to be struck himself.Yet if the victim ought not to avenge himself but goes ahead and strikes the one who struck him, he is acting unjustly. So this second blow is unjust on the part of the one who strikes the blow, because he ought not to have avenged himself; but it is just on the part of the one who is struck, because by unjustly striking someone else he deserved, as a matter of justice, to be struck himself. Thus, one and the same action is both just and unjust according to different ways of examining it, and it can happen that one person judges it to be simply* just and another to be simply unjust.And so it is in this way that the devil is said to persecute human beings justly, since God justly permits this and human beings justly suffer it.But even when we say that human beings justly suffer it, they are not said to suffer it justly with respect to their own justice, but because they are punished in accordance with God's just judgment.

Now someone might bring up the "handwriting of the decree" that the Apostle says was "against us"15 and was erased by the death of Christ, thinking that it signifies that before the passion of Christ the devil justly—as though under the handwritten terms of an agreement—demanded sin from human beings as interest on the first sin that he had persuaded them to commit, and also as punishment for sin; and he might seem to prove by this that the devil did have some just claim on humanity. I do not think the passage should be understood in that way at all. That handwriting is clearly not the devil's, since it is called the handwriting "of the decree," and the decree was not the devil's, but God's. For it was decreed by the just judgment of God and confirmed, as it were, in writing that human beings who had sinned of their own accord would not be able on their own to avoid either sin or the punishment for sin. For they are "a spirit that goes forth and does not return,"16 and "one who commits sin is a slave to sin,"17 and one who sins should not be left unpunished unless mercy spares the sinner and frees him and leads him back. Hence, we should not think that this handwriting provides any justification for the devil's persecution of human beings. Finally, just as there is no injustice at all in a good angel, so too there is no justice whatsoever in an evil angel. Therefore, there was nothing in the devil because of which God was obligated not to use force against him in order to liberate humanity.

15 Colossians 2:14.

16 Psalm 78:39 (77:39). The word for 'spirit' is often translated 'breath'.

17 John 8:34.

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Chapter 8 How even though the lowly things we say of Christ do not pertain to his divinity, it seems absurd to unbelievers that they are said of him even as a human being; and why they think this human being did not die of his own accord

A: When God does something, his will ought to be reason enough for us, even if we do not see why he willed it, since God's will is never irrational.

B: That is true, provided that we already agree that God in fact did whatever we are talking about.After all, many people will not in any way concede that God wills something if it seems contrary to reason.

A: What seems to you to be contrary to reason when we confess that God willed the things that we believe concerning his Incarnation?

B: To put it in a few words: that the Most High should stoop to such lowly things, and that the Almighty should expend such effort to do something.

A: Those who say this do not understand what we believe. For we claim that the divine nature is undoubtedly impassible,* that it cannot in any way be brought down from its lofty heights, and that it expends no effort in anything it wills to do. But we say that the Lord Jesus Christ is true God and true man, one person in two natures and two natures in one person. So when we say that God was subject to lowliness or weakness, we do not understand this according to the sublimity of his impassible nature but according to the weakness of the human substance that he bore. In this way it is evident that no reason opposes our faith, since we are not indicating any lowliness in the divine substance but instead pointing out that there is one person of both God and man. So we do not mean that there was any degradation of God in his

Incarnation; rather, we believe that human nature was exalted.

B: Suppose you're right, and nothing that is said of Christ with respect to human weakness is attributed to the divine nature. Even so, this human being was the one whom the Father called his beloved Son, in whom he was wellpleased,18 whom the Son made to be one with himself. So how can it be shown to be just or reasonable for God to treat him, or allow him to be treated, in this way? What sort of justice is it for the most just human being of all to be handed over to death for the sake of a sinner? If any human being condemned an innocent man in order to set a guilty man free, would he not be judged worthy of condemnation himself? In fact, the matter seems to 18 Cf. Matthew 3:17, 17:5; Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22.

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return to the same absurdity that I explained earlier. For if God could not save sinners in any other way than by condemning a just man, where is his omnipotence? On the other hand, if he could but he did not will to do so, how will we defend his wisdom and justice?

A: God the Father did not, as you seem to think, treat him in that way or hand over an innocent man to death for the sake of a guilty man. For God the Father did not compel him to die, or allow him to be killed, against his will.

Rather, he endured death of his own accord in order to save human beings.

B: Even if it was not against his will, since he consented to the Father's will, it still seems that in a way the Father compelled him by commanding him.

Scripture says, after all, that Christ "humbled himself, being made obedient" to the Father "to the point of death, even death on the Cross; for this reason

God has also exalted him."19 It also says, "He learned obedience from the things he suffered,"20 and that the Father "did not spare his own Son, but handed him over on behalf of us all."21 And the Son says,"I did not come to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me."22 And on the way to his passion, he says,"I am doing exactly as the Father has commanded me."23 And again,"The cup that the Father has given me: will I not drink it?"24 And elsewhere,"Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me.Yet not as I will, but as you will."25 And "Father, if it is not possible for this cup to pass from me unless I drink it, your will be done."26 In all these passages it appears that Christ endured death because obedience compelled him, rather than because his own spontaneous will determined it.

19 Philippians 2:8–9.

20 Hebrews 5:8.

21 Romans 8:31.

22 John 6:38.

23 John 14:31.

24 John 18:11.

25 Matthew 26:39.

26 Matthew 26:42.

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Chapter 9 That he died of his own accord; and what is meant by "He was made obedient to the point of death," and by "for this reason God has also exalted him," and by "I have not come to do my own will," and by "God did not spare his own Son," and by "Not as I will, but as you will"

A: It seems to me that you are not distinguishing properly between (1) what he did because obedience demanded it and (2) what was done to him because he preserved obedience, and which he endured, but not because obedience demanded it.

B: I need you to explain this more clearly.

A: Why did the Jews persecute him to the point of death?

B: For no other reason than this: in the way he lived and in what he said, he held unswervingly to truth and justice.

A: I believe that God demands this of every rational creature, and the rational creature owes this to God by way of obedience.

B: It is right and proper for us to acknowledge this.

A: So that man owed this obedience to God the Father, and his humanity owed it to his divinity; and the Father demanded this of him.

B: No one could doubt that.

A: So now you see what he did because obedience demanded it.

B: That's true; and now I see what he endured that was inflicted on him because he persevered in obedience, since death was inflicted upon him because he remained steadfast in obedience, and he endured death. But I do not understand how obedience did not demand this.

A: If human beings had never sinned, would they deserve to suffer death, or would it be right for God to demand this of them?

B: What we believe is that if human beings had never sinned, they would not die, and God would not demand death of them. But I want to hear from you the reason for this.

A: You do not deny that the rational creature was created just, and that it was created in order to be happy in enjoying God.

B: No.

A: But you would not at all suppose it is fitting for God to compel what he created just, and for the sake of happiness, to be wretched, and not on account of any guilt.And it is wretched for a human being to die against his will.

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B: It is evident that if human beings had not sinned, it would not be right for God to demand death from them.

A: It follows that God did not compel Christ, in whom there was no sin, to die. On the contrary, Christ endured death of his own accord. His obedience consisted not in abandoning his life, but in preserving justice; and he persevered in justice with such fortitude that he incurred death.

It can also be said that the Father commanded that he die, since he commanded that on account of which he incurred death. So it was in that way that he "did as the Father commanded" him, and drank "the cup that he gave," and was "made obedient" to the Father "to the point of death," and "learned obedience from the things he suffered"—learned, that is, how far one ought to maintain obedience. Now the expression "he learned," which is used in this passage, can be understood in two ways. Either it is used for "he made others learn,"27 or else it means that he learned by experience what he already knew intellectually.As for the Apostle's statement that "He humbled himself and was made obedient to the point of death, even death on the cross," to which he adds,"for this reason God has also exalted him and given him a name that is above every name": this is like David's words,"He drank from the brook along the road; for that reason he has exalted his head."28 It doesn't mean that he could in no way have come to this exaltation except through the obedience of death, and that this exaltation was granted to him only as a reward for this obedience. For even before he suffered, he himself said that all things were entrusted to him by the Father,29 and that everything the Father had was his.30

Rather, what it means is that he himself, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, had ordained that he would reveal to the world the loftiness of his omnipotence in no other way than through death.And since it had been ordained that this would come about only through that death, it is surely appropriate to say that it came about because of that death, since it came about through that death.

After all, if we aim at doing something, but we decide that we will first do some other thing through which our ultimate aim will be achieved, then once the preliminary thing has been done, if what we aim at comes about, it is correctly said to come about because the preliminary thing has been done, since it had been ordained that the ultimate aim would be achieved only through the preliminary thing. For example, suppose there is a river I can cross either on horseback or by boat, but I decide I am not going to cross it except by boat.

27 That is, to mean "he taught."

28 Psalm 110:7 (109:7).

29 Luke 10:22.

30 John 16:15.

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Since there is no boat available, I put off crossing the river. Now when a boat becomes available, if I cross the river, it is rightly said of me that I crossed the river because the boat became available.And we speak this way not only when we have resolved to attain our ultimate aim only through some preliminary step, but even when we have merely decided to attain our ultimate aim only after some preliminary step,not through it.For example,suppose someone puts off eating because he has not yet attended a celebration of mass that day. Once he has done what he willed to do first, it would be appropriate to say to him,

"Have something to eat now, because you have now done the thing on account of which you were putting off eating." So it is not at all an unusual way of speaking when Christ is said to have been exalted because he endured the death through which, and after which, he decreed that he would bring about that exaltation.This expression can also be understood in the same way as the passage in which we read that the Lord grew in wisdom and in grace before God:31 not that this was actually the case, but that he conducted himself as though this were the case.For he was exalted after his death as though he were being exalted because of his death.

Now his statement that "I have not come to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me" is the same sort of thing as "My teaching is not my own."32

If someone has something from God and not from himself, he ought to say it is not his own so much as it is God's. Now no human being has the truth that he teaches, or a just will, from himself, but from God. Therefore, Christ did not come to do his own will but the Father's will because the just will that he had was not from humanity but from divinity. But God "did not spare his only

Son, but handed him over for our sake" simply means that God did not set him free.We find many expressions like this in Holy Scripture. Now where he says,"Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not as I will, but as you will," and "If this cup cannot pass unless I drink it, let your will be done," by his own will he means the natural desire for well-being by which human flesh shrank from the pain of death. He speaks of the Father's will, not in the sense that the Father wanted the Son's death rather than his life, but because the Father was unwilling that the human race should be restored unless a human being accomplished something as great as that death was.The demands of reason were such33 that no one else was able to accomplish this, and that is why the Son said the Father willed his death, which the Son himself willed to suffer rather than that the human race should not be saved. It was as though

31 Luke 5:22.

32 John 7:16.

33 Reading quia poscebat ratio for quia non poscebat ratio.

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he said,"Because you do not will that the reconciliation of the world should come about in any other way, I say that you will my death in this way. Therefore, let this will of yours be done—that is, let my death take place—so that the world may be reconciled to you."After all, we often say that someone wills a because he doesn't will b, and if he willed b, a would not come about. For example, we say that someone wants to put out a light because he is unwilling to close the window through which a wind comes in that blows out the light. It is in this sense, then, that the Father willed the death of the Son: he was unwilling for the world to be saved unless a human being accomplished something so great, as I have said. Given that no one else could do this, and that the Son so fervently desired the salvation of human beings, the Father's will had the same effect as if he had commanded the Son to die. Hence, he did "as the Father commanded" him, and he drank "the cup that the Father gave" him,"obedient to the point of death."

Chapter 10 Another way in which the same passages can be understood correctly It can also be rightly understood that the Father "commanded him"—but did not compel him—through that generous will by which the Son was willing to die for the salvation of the world; it was in that way that the Father gave him the "cup" of his passion and "did not spare" him "but handed him over for us" and willed his death, and that the Son himself was "obedient to the point of death" and "learned obedience from the things he suffered." For according to his humanity he did not have from himself his will to live justly, but from the Father; and in the same way, it could only be from "the Father of lights," from whom comes "every best gift and every perfect gift,"34 that he had that will by which he was willing to die in order to accomplish so great a good.And just as the Father is said to "draw" someone by giving him a will, so too it is not inappropriate to say that the Father "impels" someone. For just as the Son says of the Father, "No one comes to me unless the Father has drawn him,"35 so too he could have said,"unless the Father has impelled him."

And in a similar way he could have said,"No one risks death for my name's sake unless the Father has impelled or drawn him."After all, given that someone is drawn or impelled by his will to that which he wills unswervingly, it is fitting to affirm that God, who gives him such a will, is drawing or impelling him. In this drawing or impelling we do not find any necessity resulting from 34 James 1:17.

35 John 6:44.

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violence, but only the spontaneous and loving clinging to the good will that one has received. So since it is undeniable that the Father drew or impelled the Son to his death in this way, by giving the Son that will, who will not understand that according to the same reasoning, the Father commanded him to endure death of his own accord and gave him the cup that he willingly drank?

And if it is correct to say that the Son did not spare himself, but handed himself over for us of his own spontaneous will, who will deny that it is also correct to say that the Father, from whom he had such a will,"did not spare" him,

"but handed him over for us" and willed his death? In this way too, by unswervingly and of his own accord preserving the will he had received from the Father, the Son "was made obedient" to the Father "to the point of death" and "learned obedience from the things he suffered"—that is, he learned how great a deed was to be done out of obedience. For there is true and unalloyed obedience when a rational nature, not from necessity but spontaneously,* preserves the will it has received from God.

And there are other ways in which we can correctly understand the claim that the Father willed the Son's death,although the ones already given can suffice. Just as we say that someone wills when he causes another person to will, so too we say that someone wills when he does not cause the other person to will but approves of his willing. For example, when we see someone bravely willing to suffer some hardship in order to bring to completion what he rightly wills, we acknowledge that we will that he endure such suffering; yet we do not will or love his suffering but rather his will.We are also accustomed to say of someone who can prevent something but does not prevent it that he wills the thing he does not prevent. So, since the Son's will was pleasing to the Father, and since the Father did not prevent him from willing or from carrying out what he willed, it is correct to affirm that the Father willed that the Son endure death so generously and for so great a benefit, even though he did not love the Son's suffering. Now he said that the cup could not pass unless he drank it, not because he could not have avoided death if he had wanted to, but because (as I have said) it was impossible for the world to be saved in any other way; and he unswervingly willed to suffer death rather than that the world should not be saved.He spoke those words in order to make it clear that the human race could not be saved except through his own death, not to indicate that there was no way he could have avoided dying. And all the other passages that say similar things about him should be expounded in such a way that we believe he did not die out of any necessity but of his own free will.

He was, after all, omnipotent; and we read of him that "he was offered because he himself willed it."36 And he says himself,"I am laying down my life in order

36 Isaiah 53:7.

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that I might take it up again. No one is taking it from me, but I am laying it down of my own accord. I have the power to lay it down, and I have the power to take it up again."37 Therefore, it cannot be at all correct to say that he was compelled to do something that he does by his own power and of his own will.

B: But the mere fact that God allows him to be treated in that way, even though he was willing, does not seem suitable for such a Father with respect to such a Son.

A: On the contrary: it is especially appropriate for such a Father to consent to such a Son if what the Son wills is praiseworthy because it honors God and useful because it procures the salvation of human beings, which could not be accomplished in any other way.

B: We are still trying to figure out how that death can be shown to be reasonable and necessary. Otherwise, it seems that the Son should not have willed it and the Father should not have compelled or permitted it.What we're asking about, after all, is why God could not have saved humanity in some other way, or, if he could have, why he willed to do it in this way. For it seems unfitting for God that humanity should be saved in this way, and it is also not obvious what efficacy that death had for saving humanity. It would be quite astonishing if God were so pleased by the blood of an innocent man, or so much in need of his blood, that he would not or could not spare the guilty unless the innocent man were killed.

A: Since in this debate you are playing the role of those who are unwilling to believe anything unless it has first been demonstrated by reason, I want to strike a deal with you: we will not accept anything unsuitable, however slight, concerning God; and we will not throw out any argument, however modest, that is not defeated by some weightier argument. For just as an impossibility follows from anything unsuitable in God, however slight, so too necessity accompanies every argument, however modest, that is not defeated by some weightier argument.

B: Nothing in this discussion would please me more than for us to keep this agreement.

A: The question concerns only God's Incarnation and the things that we believe about the human being assumed in the Incarnation.

B: That's right.

37 John 10:17–18.

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A: So let's suppose that God's Incarnation and the things we say about that human being had never happened, and let's agree that human beings were made for a happiness that cannot be possessed in this life, that no one can attain such happiness unless his sins are forgiven,and that no human being passes through this life without sin. And let's assume the other things in which we must have faith in order to attain eternal salvation.

B: Agreed, since there does not seem to be anything impossible or anything unsuitable for God in these claims.

A: It follows that remission of sins is necessary for human beings if they are to attain happiness.

B: So we all believe.

Chapter 11 What it is to sin and to make recompense for sin A: We must therefore investigate this question:"What is the rational basis on which God forgives the sins of human beings?" In order to do this more clearly, we should first see what it is to sin and what it is to make recompense for sin.

B: It is your job to explain and my job to listen.

A: If angels and human beings were always to pay back to God what they owe, they would never sin.

B: I cannot deny it.

A: And so sinning is nothing other than failing to pay back what one owes to God.

B: What is the debt that we owe to God?

A: Every will of a rational creature ought38 to be subject to God's will.

B: Nothing could be truer.

A: This is the debt that angels and human beings owe to God. No one who discharges this debt sins, and everyone who fails to discharge it sins.This is the justice or rectitude of will that makes people just or upright in heart, that is, in will.This is the only and the complete honor that we owe to God and that 38 The words 'ought' and 'owes' both translate debet; the noun form debitum is translated as 'debt' or 'what one owes'.

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God requires of us. For only such a will does works that are pleasing to God when it has the power to do them; and when it does not have the power, it is by itself pleasing to God, since no deed is pleasing without it. Someone who does not pay back to God the honor that is owed him takes from God what is rightly his and dishonors God; and this is what sinning is.

Now as long as someone fails to return what he has stolen, he remains in a state of guilt.And it is not enough for him just to restore what he has taken.

Rather, because of the affront that he has perpetrated, he ought to pay back more than he took. For example, if someone injures another's health, it is not enough for him to restore the other person's health unless he also makes recompense for the damage he inflicted by causing pain. In the same way, if someone violates another's honor, it is not enough for him to pay back that honor if he does not also offer something satisfactory to the one he has dishonored, as compensation for the harm he caused by dishonoring him. It is important to notice this as well: when someone repays what he took unjustly, he owes something that could not have been demanded from him if he had not stolen what belonged to another. It is in this way, therefore, that all those who sin ought to repay God the honor they have stolen from him; and this is the recompense that every sinner ought to make to God.

B: Since we have undertaken to follow reason, I have nothing I could raise as an objection to anything you have said. But you are scaring me just a little.

Chapter 12 Whether it is fitting for God to forgive sin by mercy alone, without any repayment of the debt A: Let's go back and see whether it is fitting for God to forgive sin by mercy alone, without any repayment of the honor that has been taken from him.

B: I don't see why it isn't fitting.

A: Forgiving sin in this way is the same as not punishing it. But to order sin in the right way when no recompense is made just is to punish sin. So if sin is not punished, it is left unordered.

B: What you say is reasonable.

A: But it is not fitting for God to leave anything unordered in his kingdom.

B: I fear I would be sinning if I wanted to say anything else.

A: So it is not fitting for God to leave sin unpunished in this way.

B: That follows.

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A: And there is something else that follows if sin is left unpunished in this way: someone who sins will have the same standing before God as someone who does not sin.And that does not befit God.

B: I cannot deny it.

A: Pay attention to this as well.Everyone knows that the justice of human beings is subject to this law: what God gives as a reward is proportionate to the greatness of a person's justice.

B: That's what we believe.

A: But if sin is neither discharged nor punished, it is subject to no law.

B: I cannot see it any other way.

A: Then if injustice is forgiven by mercy alone, it is freer than justice, which is utterly absurd. Indeed, the absurdity goes so far as to make injustice like

God, since injustice is subject to no law just as God is subject to no law.

B: I cannot escape your reasoning. But since God commands us to forgive unreservedly those who sin against us,39 he seems to be caught in a contradiction, by commanding us to do what it is unfitting for him to do.

A: There is no contradiction here. God commands us to do this so that we will not arrogate to ourselves what belongs to God alone. For the right to exact vengeance belongs only to the one who is Lord of all. When earthly powers act correctly in doing this, it is really God himself, by whom they were ordained for this very purpose, who does it.

B: You have taken away the contradiction I thought was involved. But there is another point on which I would like to have your response. God is so free that he is subject to no law and to no one's judgment; he is so kind that nothing kinder can be conceived. Moreover, nothing is right or fitting except what he wills. Given all that, it seems surprising for us to say that he in no way wills to forgive harm done to himself, or that it is not fitting for him to do so, considering that we often ask his mercy even for harm we have done to others.

A: What you say about God's freedom and will and kindness is true. But we need to understand these things reasonably, so that we do not appear to contradict God's dignity. Freedom, after all, is only for what is expedient or fitting; and what acts in a way that is unfitting for God should not be called kindness.

Now as for the claim that what God wills is just and what he does not will is 39 Matthew 6:12.

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not just, we should not take this to mean that if God wills something unsuitable, it is just, simply because God wills it. If God wills to lie, it does not follow that it is just to lie.What follows is that he isn't God. For there is no way that a will can will to lie unless truth has been corrupted in it—or rather, unless it has become corrupted by abandoning truth. So saying "If God wills to lie"is equivalent to saying "If God's nature is such that he wills to lie";it therefore does not follow that lying is just. Or else we can understand this as we would understand the statement,"If this is true, then that is true," when made about two impossibilities; for neither is actually true. Thus, if someone were to say,"If water is dry, then fire is wet," neither of these is true.And so it is true to say "If God wills this, it is just" only of things that it is not unsuitable for God to will.After all, if God wills that it rain, it is just for it to rain; and if God wills that a certain person be killed, it is just for that person to be killed.

Hence, given that it is not fitting for God to do anything unjustly or inordinately, it does not pertain to his freedom, kindness, or will that he should leave unpunished a sinner who does not repay God what he took from him.

B: You have taken away any ground for objection I thought I had.

A: Now notice a further reason that it is not fitting for God to do this.

B: I will gladly pay attention to whatever you say.

Chapter 13 That there is nothing less tolerable in the order of things than for a creature to take away the honor that is owed to the Creator and not restore what he has taken

A: Nothing is less tolerable in the order of things than for a creature to take away the honor that is owed to the Creator and not restore what he has taken.

B: Nothing could be clearer than that.

A: And nothing is more unjustly tolerated than something than which nothing is less tolerable.

B: That is fairly obvious.

A: So I think you will not say that God ought to tolerate that than which nothing is more unjustly tolerated,namely,a creature's not paying back to God what he has taken from him.

B: On the contrary, I see that this must be emphatically denied.

A: Furthermore, there is nothing that supreme Justice—which is simply God himself—preserves more justly in his governance of things than his own honor, since nothing is greater or better than God.

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B: Here again, nothing could be clearer than that.

A: There is therefore nothing that God preserves more justly than the honor of his own dignity.

B: I have to concede that.

A: Do you think he keeps his honor unimpaired if he allows it to be taken from him and not paid back, and does not punish the one who took it?

B: I wouldn't dare say that.

A: Necessarily, then, when God's honor is taken away, either it is paid back or else punishment follows. Otherwise, either God would not be just toward himself, or he would lack the power to enforce either repayment or punishment.And it is impious even to think such a thing.

Chapter 14 In what way the punishment of a sinner is an honoring of God B: I recognize that nothing more reasonable could be said. But I would like to hear from you whether the punishment of a sinner is itself an honoring of God, or in what way it honors God. After all, if the punishment of a sinner does not bring honor to God, then when a sinner does not repay what he has taken but instead is punished, God loses his honor in such a way as not to recover it.And that appears to contradict the things you have said.

A: It is impossible for God to lose his honor. Either a sinner spontaneously repays what he owes or else God exacts it from the sinner against his will. For either someone offers to God by his own spontaneous* will the subjection that he owes, whether by not sinning or by making restitution for sin, or else God brings him into subjection against his will by tormenting him—thus showing that he is his Lord, which the sinner refused to acknowledge voluntarily. It is important to recognize here that just as a human being in sinning steals what belongs to God, so too God in punishing takes away what belongs to the human being.You see,it is not only what someone already possesses that can be said to belong to him, but also what is in his power to have. Human beings were made in such a way that they have the power to be happy if they do not sin. So when, because of their sin, they are deprived of happiness and of every good thing, they are spending what is their own—unwillingly, of course—to pay back what they have taken. For although God does not use what he takes in order to benefit himself, in the way that a human being takes money from someone else and uses it for his own purposes, he does use what he takes for his own honor, just in virtue of the fact that he takes it. For by

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taking control of the sinner and what belongs to him, God demonstrates that all these things are subject to himself.

Chapter 15 Whether God allows his honor to be violated even to a limited extent B: I like what you're saying. But there is another matter on which I would like to have your response. If God ought to preserve his honor in the way you have proved, why does he allow it to be violated even to a limited extent? For if something is allowed to be harmed in any way, it is not being guarded completely and perfectly.

A: Nothing can be added to God's honor or taken away from it, as far as God is concerned. For God himself is his own incorruptible and utterly immutable honor. But when a creature preserves the ordering that belongs to it and has been, as it were, commanded for it—whether the creature preserves that ordering naturally* or rationally—it is said to obey God and honor him. This is especially true of a rational nature, which has been given the power to understand what it owes.When a rational nature wills what it owes, it honors

God, not because it bestows anything on God, but because it spontaneously* subjects itself to God's will and governance, and it preserves both its own ordering within the whole universe and, so far as it can, the beauty of the universe itself. But when it does not will what it owes, it dishonors God as far as it itself is concerned, because it does not spontaneously subject itself to God's governance, and it disrupts the order and beauty of the universe as much as it can, although it in no way harms or tarnishes God's power or dignity.

For if the things encompassed by the revolution of the heavens were to will not to be beneath the heavens or to be removed from the heavens, it would not be at all possible for them not to be beneath the heavens or for them to flee from the heavens without approaching the heavens. From wherever they might start, wherever they might go, and by whatever path they might take, they would still be beneath the heavens; and the farther away they drew from one part of the heavens, the closer they would come to the part that lies opposite. In the same way, although a human being or an evil angel may be unwilling to be subject to God's will and ordering, he has no power to escape it.

If he flees from God's commanding will, he runs into God's punishing will.

And if you ask by what path he runs from one to the other, the answer is just this: by God's permitting will. And supreme wisdom transforms the sinner's perverse will or action into order and beauty for the universe. Thus, leaving aside the fact that God brings good out of evil in many ways, both a spontaneous recompense for perversity and the infliction of punishment on one who does not make recompense have their proper place and a beautiful ordering

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in the same universe. If divine wisdom did not add these wherever perversity tries to disturb correct order, a certain ugliness would arise from the violation of the beauty of order in the very universe that God ought to make orderly, and God would seem to fall short in his governance. Since these two conclusions are as impossible as they are absurd, it is necessary that every sin is followed by either recompense or punishment.

B: You have completely met my objection.

A: It is therefore clear that no one can honor or dishonor God as far as what is in God himself is concerned; but as far as what is in the creature is concerned, someone appears to honor or dishonor God when he either subjects his own will to God's will or withdraws his will from subjection to God's.

B: I don't know what I could say to the contrary.

Chapter 16 The reason that human beings are to make up for the number of angels who fell

A: I shall add something further.

B: Keep talking until I get tired of listening.

A: It is agreed that God set out to restore the number of angels who fell by replacing them with human nature, which he created without sin.

B: We believe this, but I would like to have some rational explanation for it.

A: You have misled me.We set out to discuss nothing but God's Incarnation,40 and now you're throwing in extra questions for me.

B: Don't be angry:"God loves a cheerful giver."41 And the best way for anyone to show that he is cheerful in giving what he has promised is to give more than he promised. So answer my question willingly.

A: We must not doubt that God foreknew the number of rational natures who either are or will be happy in the contemplation of God, a number so reasonable and complete that it is not fitting for it to be greater or smaller.

After all, either God does not know the number of such natures that it is most fitting for him to establish, which is false; or else, if he does know, he will establish those natures in the number that he understands to be most fitting for this purpose. Therefore, either the angels who fell were created in order to be

40 See Chapter 10.

41 1 Corinthians 9:7.

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within that number, or else they fell of necessity because they were superfluous and therefore could not persevere, which is an absurd thing to think.

B: What you say is an obvious truth.

A: Therefore, since they were supposed to belong to that number, either their number must be restored, or else the number of rational natures, which God foreknew as complete, will remain incomplete.

B: Undoubtedly they must be replaced.

A: Then they must be replaced with human nature, since there is no other nature by which they can be replaced.

Chapter 17 That they cannot be replaced by other angels B: Why can't either those angels themselves, or else additional angels, take the place of the angels who fell?

A: When you come to see the difficulty of our own restoration, you will understand the impossibility of their reconciliation.42 And additional angels cannot take their place because (not to mention how that seems to impugn the perfection of the original creation43) it would not be right for them to do so unless they could be such as the other angels would have been if they had not sinned. Now those original angels would have persevered without having seen

God's vengeance upon sin; but once the original angels fell, that would be impossible for the additional angels who would be meant to take their place. For these two are not equally praiseworthy if they remain steadfast in the truth: one who has known no punishment for sin,and one who is always face to face with an eternal punishment. Certainly we must by no means suppose that the good angels were confirmed because of the fall of the evil angels; rather, they were confirmed as a result of their own merit. If the good angels had sinned when the evil angels did, they would have been damned along with them; and in the same way, if the unjust angels had remained steadfast along with the just angels, they too would have been confirmed. In fact, if some angels had to fall in order for any angels to be confirmed, then either no angel would ever have been confirmed, or else it was necessary that some angel fall and be punished in order for the other angels to be confirmed.And both of those possibilities

42 See Book 2, Chapter 21.

43 Presumably because it would suggest that God had not created the right number of angels to begin with.

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are absurd. And so those who remained steadfast were confirmed in exactly the same way as all the angels would have been confirmed if they had remained steadfast. I explained the way in which the good angels were confirmed, so far as I was able, where I discussed why God did not give the devil perseverance.44

B: You have proved that the evil angels must be replaced by human nature, and it is apparent from this reasoning that the number of elect human beings will be no less than the number of reprobate angels. But if you can, show whether there will be more elect human beings than there are reprobate angels.

Chapter 18 Whether there will be more holy human beings than there are evil angels

A: If the angels, before some of them fell, existed in that perfect number of which we have spoken,45 then human beings were created for no other purpose than to take the place of the lost angels. In that case it is clear that there will be no more elect human beings than evil angels. On the other hand, if all the angels together did not make up that perfect number, then human beings must make up for both what was lost and what was originally lacking. In that case, there will be more elect human beings than reprobate angels, and we will say that human beings were not created solely to replenish that diminished number, but also to complete what was not yet completed.

B: Which of these views should we prefer:that the angels were originally created in that perfect number, or that they were not?

A: I will tell you what seems true to me.

B: That's all I can ask of you.

A: If human beings were created after the fall of the evil angels, as some people read Genesis, I do not see how I can give a definite proof of either alternative on that basis. I think it's possible that the angels were originally created in that perfect number and that human beings were created afterwards in order to replenish that diminished company. But it's also possible that the angels did not exist in that perfect number because God was delaying (as he is still delaying) the fulfillment of that number because he was going to create human nature at the proper time, thereby either simply completing the 44 See On the Fall of the Devil, Chapters 2–6.

45 That is, the perfect number of all rational natures who are or will be happy. See

Chapter 16.

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number that was not yet complete or else also restoring it, if it had been diminished.

On the other hand,if the entire creation was made all at once,and the "days" by which Moses seems to indicate that the world was not made all at once must be understood as something other than the days that we experience in our own lives, I cannot see how the angels were created in that complete number. Indeed, it seems to me that if they were, then either some angels or human beings had to fall, or else there would be more of them in the heavenly city than the fitting nature of that perfect number demanded. Therefore, it seems that if all things were created at once, the angels and the first two human beings were incomplete in number in such a way that if no angel fell, human beings would simply make up for what was lacking, but if some angel were lost, human beings would also replace what fell. And human nature, which was weaker, would vindicate God and confound the devil if the devil blamed his fall on his own weakness, since human nature remained steadfast despite being weaker.And even if human nature fell, it would defend God all the more against the devil and against itself, since although it was created very weak and subject to death, in the elect it would rise from such weakness to even greater heights than those from which the devil had fallen; for human nature would be owed equality with the good angels, who, because they persevered, were exalted after the fall of the evil angels.

On the basis of these arguments it seems more likely to me that the angels did not originally exist in that complete number in which the heavenly city will be made perfect. For if human beings were not created simultaneously with the angels, it is possible that this is true; and if they were created simultaneously (which is the prevailing opinion, since Scripture says,"He who lives for ever created all things simultaneously"),46 this appears to be necessary.Even if we understand the perfection of the creation of the world to be more a matter of the number of natures than of the number of individuals, it is still necessary that human nature was created in order to complete its perfection; otherwise, human nature would be superfluous, which we would not dare to say even of the nature of the smallest worm. So human nature was made to take its own place in creation, and not merely to supply the place of individuals of another nature. Hence, it is clear that even if no angel had been lost, human beings would still have their own place in the heavenly city.And so it follows that the angels did not exist in that perfect number before some of them fell; for if they did, it was necessary for some angels or human beings to fall, since no one could remain in the heavenly city outside that perfect number.

46 Ecclesiasticus 18:1.

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B: You have really accomplished something.

A: And there is another argument,it seems to me,that lends considerable support to the view that the angels were not created in that perfect number.

B: Tell me.

A: If the angels were created in that perfect number, and human beings were created exclusively to replace the lost angels, it is clear that unless the angels had fallen from happiness, human beings would never have risen to happiness.

B: That is evident.

A: Now suppose someone were to say that elect human beings will exult as much over the loss of the angels as they will rejoice in their own exaltation, because undoubtedly their exaltation would not take place unless the angels' fall had taken place. How can the elect be spared this perverse rejoicing? Or how will we say that human beings are taking the place of the angels who fell, given that if the angels had not fallen,they would have remained free from this sin—the sin of rejoicing over others' fall—whereas human beings will not be able to avoid this sin? Indeed, how will they deserve to be happy when they are guilty of this sin? And finally, how could we dare to say that God is unwilling or unable to bring about this replacement without this sin?

B: Isn't this just like the case of the Gentiles, who were called to faith because the Jews rejected it?

A: No. If all the Jews had believed, the Gentiles would have been called anyway, because "in every race47 one who fears God and does justice is acceptable to God."48 But because the Jews did not heed the apostles, there was an opportunity at that time for the apostles to turn to the Gentiles.

B: I don't see any way I could object to what you are saying.

A: How would it come about, do you think, that individual people would rejoice over another's fall?

B: Only if each person will be certain that he would not be where he is unless someone else had fallen from that very place.

A: So if no one had that certainty, there would be no basis for anyone's rejoicing over another's downfall.

B: So it seems.

47 gens, the singular form of gentes, 'Gentiles' or 'the nations'.

48 Acts 10:35.

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A: Do you think any of them will have such certainty if they greatly outnumber the angels who fell?

B: There is no way I can think any of them will or ought to have such certainty. How, after all, could anyone know whether he was created to make up for what had been lost from, or instead to fill up what had been left incomplete in, the full complement of the city that is to be established? Yet all of them will be certain that they were created in order to make that city perfect.

A: So if there will be more elect human beings than reprobate angels, it will be neither possible nor reasonable for any human being to know that he was exalted to heaven only because of another's fall.

B: That's true.

A: So no one will have any reason to rejoice over another's downfall.

B: That follows.

A: And so since we see that the unseemly conclusion that necessarily follows if elect human beings will not outnumber reprobate angels does not follow if they will, and since it is impossible that there will be anything unseemly in that city, it appears to be necessary that the angels were not originally created in that perfect number, and that there will be more blessed human beings than there are wretched angels.

B: I do not see any rational basis to deny this.

A: I think another argument can be given for this same view.

B: You ought to expound that argument as well.

A: We believe that this bodily mass of the world will be transformed into something better,49 and that this will not take place until the number of elect human beings is brought to completion and that blessed city is made perfect; but once the city is made perfect, the transformation of the bodily mass of the world will no longer be delayed. From this it can be concluded that God has intended from the beginning to bring both to perfection at the same time, for two reasons: because the lesser nature that would not be aware of God would by no means be perfected before the greater nature that would enjoy God,and because that lesser nature,transformed into something better,would in its own way rejoice, as it were, in the perfection of the greater nature. Indeed, every creature would exult in its own glorious and wondrous consummation, eternally sharing its joy, each in its own way, with the Creator, with itself, and with 49 2 Peter 3:13.

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every other creature. For a creature that is not aware of God would exhibit naturally,* through God's governance, what the will does spontaneously* in a rational nature.And we are accustomed to join in rejoicing over the exaltation of those who are greater than we are, as when we rejoice with exultation on the festival of the birthdays of the saints,50 rejoicing over their glory.

This view seems to be supported by the fact that if Adam had not sinned, God would nevertheless have delayed perfecting that city until the number that he was awaiting had been completed from human beings and they had been transformed into the immortal immortality of bodies (if I may so express it).You see, they had a sort of immortality in paradise: the power not to die.

But that power was not itself immortal, since it could die, in such a way that human beings would no longer be able not to die.

If it is in fact true that God intended from the beginning to bring that rational and blessed city to completion at the same time as this earthly and nonrational nature, it seems that either (1) that city was not complete in the number of angels before the fall of the evil angels, but God was waiting to complete it with human beings when he would transform the corporeal nature of the world into something better; or else (2) if it was perfect in number, it was not perfect in confirmation, and its confirmation was to be delayed—even if no one in it sinned—until the transformation of the world that we await; or (3) if that confirmation was not to be delayed, then the transformation of the world was to be moved forward so that it would take place along with the confirmation.

(Not 3) But it is completely irrational that God should, from the very beginning, intend to transform the newly created world as soon as he created it, and to destroy those things that would not exist after the transformation, even before the reason they were created in the first place became evident. It therefore follows that the angels did not exist in that perfect number in such a way that their confirmation would not be long delayed; for if that had been the case, the transformation of the world would have had to take place immediately, which is not fitting.

(Not 2) Now it seems unfitting for God to will to delay that confirmation until the future transformation of the world, especially since he completed the confirmation so quickly for some beings, and also since it can be understood that at the time when human beings sinned, he would have performed this confirmation for them if they had not sinned, just as he did for the angels who persevered. For although they would not yet have been promoted to that equality with the angels that human beings would ultimately attain when they

50 The feast days of the saints are celebrated on the day of their birth into the heavenly kingdom, that is, on the day of their earthly death.

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formed part of that perfect number, it does seem that if they had been victorious—so that, though tempted, they did not sin—they and all their progeny would have been confirmed in the justice they possessed, so that they would no longer be able to sin; just as, because they were defeated and sinned, they were so weakened that they could not by their own efforts be free from sin.

For who would dare to say that injustice had more power to bind the human being in slavery when he consented to its first persuasion than justice would have had power to confirm him in freedom when he cleaved to it in the face of the first temptation? For since the whole of human nature was in our first parents, the whole of human nature in them was overcome in such a way that it sinned, with the exception of that one man whom God knew how to keep free from Adam's sin, even as he knew how to make him from a virgin without a man's seed; and in the same way, the whole of human nature would have been victorious in them if they had not sinned.

(1) So the only thing left to say is that the original number of angels was not enough to complete the heavenly city, but it was to be completed with human beings.And if all these things are true, there will be more elect human beings than there are reprobate angels.

B: The things you say seem extremely reasonable to me. But what shall we say about the Scripture that says God "established the limits of the peoples according to the number of the sons of Israel"?51 Because the words 'angels of God' are found in place of 'sons of Israel',52 some people expound this passage as meaning that the number of elect human beings is to be set according to the number of good angels.

A: This is not inconsistent with the view I have set forth, so long as it is not certain that the number of angels who fell is exactly the same as the number who remained. For if there are more elect angels than reprobate angels, it is both necessary that elect human beings replace the reprobate angels and possible that the number of blessed human beings is equal to the number of blessed angels.And thus there will be more just human beings than unjust angels. But keep in mind the agreement we made before I began to answer your questions:"if I say something that is not confirmed by a greater authority,even if I appear to prove it by reason, it should be accepted with confidence only as what seems true to me for the time being, until God in some way reveals

51 Deuteronomy 32:8.

52 The Greek translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint, had the words 'angels of God' instead of 'sons of Israel', as did Latin versions that were translated from the Septuagint rather than directly from the Hebrew.

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something better to me."53 For I am certain that if I say anything that undoubtedly contradicts Scripture, it is false; and I do not wish to maintain it once I have recognized the contradiction. But there are matters in which it is possible to hold any of a number of views without danger, and the issue we are now discussing is one of those, since I do not think there is any danger to the soul if we do not know whether there will be more elect human beings than lost angels, and we favor one of these possibilities over the other. If in such matters we expound the divine writings in such a way that they seem to support different views, and we find no passage that settles what we must unhesitatingly hold, I do not think anyone ought to find fault with us.

Now as for the passage you brought up—"he established the limits of the peoples," that is, of the nations, "according to the number of the angels of God," which in another translation reads, "according to the number of the sons of Israel"—since both translations either signify the same thing or signify different things but without any contradiction, we should understand that both 'the angels of God' and 'the sons of Israel' signify only the good angels, or only elect human beings, or both the angels and elect human beings together (that is, the whole heavenly city); or that 'the angels of God' signifies only the holy angels and 'the sons of Israel' only the just human beings; or that 'the sons of Israel' signifies only the angels and 'the angels of God' just human beings. If both expressions signify only the good angels, then that is the same as if only 'the angels of God' had been used. But if they signify the whole heavenly city, the verse means that the peoples (that is, the multitudes of elect human beings) will continue to be exalted, or there will continue to be peoples in this present age, so long as the predestined number of that city has not yet been made complete by human beings.

But I do not now see how 'the sons of Israel' can mean only the angels, or both angels and holy human beings. By contrast, it is not strange for holy human beings to be called 'sons of Israel', just as they are called 'sons of Abraham'54 They can also rightly be called 'angels of God' in virtue of the fact that they imitate angelic life and are promised likeness and equality with the angels in heaven, and also because all who live justly are angels of God for the same reason that they are called 'confessors' or 'martyrs'. For one who confesses and bears witness to God's truth is a messenger—that is, an angel—of God.55 And if an evil human being is called a devil, as the Lord called Judas a 53 Quoted verbatim from Chapter 2.

54 Galatians 3:7.

55 As Anselm knows, martyr is the Greek word for one who bears witness, and angelos for a messenger.

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devil,56 because they are alike in evil, then why shouldn't a good human being be called an angel because he imitates an angel's justice? Therefore, we can (or so I think) say that God established "the limits of the peoples according to the number" of elect human beings because there will be peoples and the procreation of human beings in this world until the number of the elect is made complete; and once it is complete, the begetting of human beings that takes place in this life will come to an end.

On the other hand, if we take 'the angels of God' to mean the holy angels alone and 'the sons of Israel' to mean only just human beings, there are two ways in which we can understand the claim that "God established the limits of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God": either that as many people (that is, as many human beings) will be exalted as there are holy angels of God, or that there will be peoples until the number of the angels of God is filled up from human beings.And I can see only one way in which we can expound the claim that he "established the limits of the people according to the number of the sons of Israel," namely, that as was said above, there will be peoples in this present age until the number of holy human beings is completed. Either translation implies that the number of human beings who will be exalted is the same as the number of angels who remained;but even though the lost angels will be replaced by human beings, it does not follow from this that the number of angels who fell is the same as the number who persevered.

But if that claim is made, one will have to find some mistake in the arguments given above, which seem to establish that the angels did not exist in that perfect number I have talked about before some of them fell, and that there will be more elect human beings than evil angels.

B: I do not regret compelling you to say these things about the angels, for it was not done in vain. Now return to the point from which we digressed.

Chapter 19 That human beings cannot be saved without recompense for sin A: It has been established that God intended for human beings to replace the angels who fell.

B: Certainly.

A: So in the heavenly city the human beings who are taken up into that place as replacements for the angels ought to be such as the angels whom they are replacing were going to be in that city: in other words, they should be such as 56 John 6:70–71.

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the good angels are now. Otherwise, those who fell would not in fact be replaced, and it would follow either that God cannot complete the good thing that he has undertaken, or else that he regrets having undertaken so great a good—both of which are absurd.

B: Indeed, it is right that human beings should be equal to the good angels.

A: Did the good angels ever sin?

B: No.

A: Can you think that a human being who sinned at one time and never made recompense to God for his sin, but is simply let off without punishment, is equal to an angel who never sinned?

B: I can think such words and say them, but I cannot conceive their meaning, in the same way that I cannot understand that falsity is truth.

A: Therefore, it is not fitting for God to exalt sinful human beings to replace fallen angels without recompense for sin, since truth does not allow them to be raised to equality with the blessed.

B: That is what reason shows.

A: Now leave aside the fact that human beings ought to be made equal to the angels,and just consider human beings themselves.Should God promote them in this way to any happiness, even the happiness they had before they sinned?

B: Tell me what you think, and I will examine it as well as I can.

A: Let's suppose some rich man holds in his hand a precious pearl that has never been touched by any impurity. Suppose no one else can take it out of his hand unless he himself permits it, and that he plans to put it away in his treasury, where all his costliest and most precious possessions are found.

B: I conceive this as clearly as if it were right in front of us.

A: Suppose he permits some envious person to grab that pearl out of his hand and cast it into the mud, even though he could prevent this; and afterwards he takes it out of the mud and puts it away, still muddy and unwashed, in some clean and costly place, to be stored in that condition from then on.Would you think him wise?

B: How could I? Would it not be far better for him to keep and store his pearl clean rather than dirty?

A: Wouldn't God be acting in a similar way? He held human beings in his hand, so to speak, in paradise; they were sinless, destined to be companions for the angels. If he had willed to prevent the devil, the devil would not have been

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able to tempt human beings; so he allowed the devil, enraged with envy, to cast them down into the mire of sin—with their consent, admittedly. So wouldn't God be acting in a similar way if he led human beings, stained with the grime of sin and without any washing (that is, without any recompense), even back into the paradise from which they had been cast out, to remain in that condition for ever?

B: I do not dare deny that if God did this, the analogy would hold; and for that reason I do not grant that he can do it. For in that case it would appear that either he could not accomplish what he had set out to do or else that he had come to regret the good thing he had set out to do; and neither of those can be true of God.

A: Therefore, you must hold with the utmost certainty that without recompense—that is, without a spontaneous payment of the debt—God cannot leave sin unpunished and a sinner cannot attain happiness, even such happiness as he had before he sinned.For without recompense human beings would not be restored, even to the state they were in before they sinned.

B: I cannot in any way contradict your arguments. But then why do we say to God,"forgive us our debts"? 57 Why does every nation pray to the god in which it believes that he will forgive their sins? If we pay what we owe, why do we pray for God to forgive it? Is God unjust, so that he demands again what has already been paid? On the other hand, if we do not pay our debt, why do we pray in vain for God to do something that he cannot do, because it would be unfitting for him to do it?

A: Someone who does not pay it says "forgive" in vain. But someone who does pay it asks for forgiveness, because his asking forgiveness is part of his payment. God, after all, owes nothing to anyone, but every creature is in debt to him. For that reason it is not appropriate for a human being to deal with God as though they were on an equal footing. But there is no need for me to answer your questions about this matter right now. Once you come to see why Christ died, perhaps you will see on your own the answer to your question.

B: Then the answer you have already given is enough for me for the time being. But you have shown that human beings cannot attain happiness in a state of sin or be released from sin unless they repay what they took by sinning— shown it so clearly, in fact, that I could not doubt it even if I wanted to.

57 Matthew 6:12.

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Chapter 20 That recompense ought to be proportionate to sin, and that human beings cannot make recompense on their own

A: I think you will also not doubt that recompense ought to be proportionate to sin.

B: Otherwise sin would remain disordered to some extent, and that cannot be the case if God leaves nothing disordered in his kingdom.And it was settled in advance that any unseemliness, however small, is impossible in God.58

A: Then tell me: what will you give God in payment for your sin?

B: Repentance, a contrite and humble heart, acts of self-denial and a great variety of bodily labors, mercy in giving and forgiving, and obedience.

A: What are you giving to God in all these things?

B: Do I not honor God when out of fear and love for him I cast down temporal happiness in heartfelt contrition, when I trample underfoot the pleasures and repose of this life in acts of self-denial and labor, when I bestow my own possessions in giving and forgiving, when I submit my very self to God in obedience?

A: When you repay God what you already owe him even if you have not sinned, you should not count this as payment for the debt you owe for sinning.And you owe God all the things you have mentioned. In this mortal life your love and (this is where prayer comes in) your desire to reach the state for which you were created, and your sorrow that you are not yet there, and your fear of not reaching it, ought to be so great that you should not experience any happiness except in things that give you help or hope in reaching that state. For if you do not love and desire it in accordance with its nature, and feel sorrow that you do not yet have it and that there remains such great uncertainty whether you will ever have it, then you do not deserve to have it.

This involves fleeing the repose and worldly pleasures that call the soul away from that true repose and pleasure, except insofar as you know they support your effort to reach that state. As for giving, you ought to regard yourself as doing that because you owe it, as you understand that what you give, you do not have from yourself, but from the one of whom both you and the one to whom you give are servants. And nature teaches you that you should do to your fellow servant, that is, to your fellow human being, what you want him

58 See Chapter 10.

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to do to you,59 and that someone who is not willing to give what he has ought not to receive what he does not have. As for forgiving, I will say briefly that vengeance does not belong to you in any way, as we said above.60 For you do not belong to yourself, and the one who has wronged you does not belong to you or to himself. Rather, both of you are servants of the one Lord who created you from nothing; and if you take revenge on your fellow servant, you arrogantly presume to exercise on him the judgment that rightly belongs to the Lord and Judge of all.And as for obedience, what are you giving to God that you do not already owe? For you owe everything you are, everything you have, and everything you can do to his command.

B: I no longer dare to say that in any of these things I am giving something to God that I do not already owe.

A: Then what will you give to God in payment for your sin?

B: If even when I do not sin I owe God my very self and everything I can do, lest I sin, then I have nothing that I can give in payment for my sin.

A: Then what will become of you? How will you be able to be saved?

B: If I think about your arguments, I don't see how I can be saved. But if I turn to my faith, I have hope in the Christian faith,"which is active through love,"61 that I can be saved. I also have hope because we read that "if an unjust man turns from injustice and does justice,"62 all his injustices are forgotten.

A: But that is addressed only to those who either looked for Christ before he came or believe in him now that he has come. But when we set out to investigate by reason alone whether it was necessary for Christ to come in order to save humanity,we agreed to treat Christ and the Christian faith as though they had never existed.

B: Indeed we did.

A: Then let us proceed by reason alone.

B: Although you are leading me into difficulties, I still very much want you to proceed in the way you set out.

59 Matthew 7:12.

60 See Chapter 12.

61 Galatians 5:6.

62 Ezekiel 18:27.

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Chapter 21 How serious sin is A: Let's suppose you do not owe all the things you just suggested you could offer in payment for your sin, and let's examine whether they could be sufficient recompense for a single sin as small as, say, one glance contrary to God's will.

B: If it weren't for the fact that I hear you raising this question, I should have thought I could wipe out this sin with just one act of remorse.

A: You have not yet come to grips with how serious sin is.

B: Show me now.

A: Imagine that you found yourself under God's watchful eye and someone said to you,"Look over there," but God said,"I do not in any way want you to look." Now ask yourself in your own heart what there is, among all the things that are, for the sake of which you ought to take that look, contrary to the will of God.

B: I find nothing on account of which I ought to do so, unless perhaps I were in such a bind that it would be necessary for me to do it in order to avoid committing some greater sin.

A: Set that case of necessity aside and just think about whether you can commit that sin in order to save your own life.

B: I see quite clearly that I can't.

A: Not to drag this out any longer: what if it were necessary that either the whole world and whatever is not God perish and return to nothing, or else you do such a small thing contrary to God's will?

B: When I think about the action itself, I see that it is something exceptionally insignificant. But when I recognize that it is contrary to God's will, I understand that it is something exceptionally serious and not commensurable with any loss.Yet we often justifiably act contrary to someone's will in order to keep his possessions safe, and afterwards he approves what we did contrary to his will.

A: This is true in the case of a person who sometimes does not understand what is useful for himself or who cannot replace what he loses. But God needs nothing;and if all things perished,he could replace them,just as he made them in the first place.

B: I must admit that I ought not to do anything contrary to God's will, even to preserve the whole of creation.

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A: What if there were many worlds, as full of creatures as this one is?

B: Even if there were infinitely many worlds spread out before me, I would give the same answer.

A: Nothing you can do would be more correct. But now suppose you did in fact take that look contrary to God's will. Consider what you might be able to give in payment for that sin.

B: I have nothing greater to give than what I said earlier.

A: That is how seriously we sin every time we knowingly do something, however small, contrary to the will of God; for we are always under his watchful eye, and he always commands us not to sin.

B: As I hear it, we are living very dangerously.

A: It is evident that God demands recompense according to the size of the sin.

B: I cannot deny it.

A: So you do not make recompense unless what you pay back is greater than the thing for the sake of which you ought not to have committed the sin.

B: I see that reason requires this, and I also see that this is completely impossible.

A: And God cannot, because he ought not, exalt to happiness anyone who is in any way liable for the debt of sin.

B: This conclusion is serious indeed.

Chapter 22 What injury human beings did to God when they allowed themselves to be overcome by the devil, for which they cannot make recompense

A: Hear yet another reason that it is no less difficult for human beings to be reconciled to God.

B: If faith did not give me comfort, the first reason alone would compel me to give up hope.

A: Listen anyway.

B: Go ahead.

A: Human beings in paradise, created without sin, were (so to speak) put in God's place between God and the devil so that they would overcome the devil

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by not consenting to his temptation to sin, thus vindicating and honoring God and confounding the devil—for then the weaker ones on earth would not have sinned though the devil tempted them, whereas the stronger one in heaven had sinned though no one tempted him. And although human beings could have accomplished this easily, they allowed themselves—not coerced by any power, but simply giving in to temptation of their own accord—to be overcome in accordance with the devil's will and contrary to the will and honor of God.

B: What are you getting at?

A: Judge for yourself whether it is not contrary to God's honor for human beings to be reconciled to him when they are still guilty of the insult and wrong they have done to God, unless they have first honored God by overcoming the devil, just as they dishonored God by being overcome by the devil. Now that victory ought to be like this: just as human beings were strong and immortal in power when they gave their consent for sin to the devil, thereby justly incurring the punishment of mortality, so too, weak and mortal as they have made themselves, they will overcome the devil through the pain of death in such a way as not to sin at all. But they cannot do this as long as they are conceived with the wounds of the first sin and born in sin.

B: I say again that reason proves what you are saying, and yet what you are saying is impossible.

Chapter 23 What human beings took away from God when they sinned, which they cannot repay A: Note one further condition that must be met if human beings are to be justly reconciled but that is no less impossible.

B: You have already put forward so many things we ought to do that nothing you add can make me any more afraid.

A: But listen.

B: I'm listening.

A: What did human beings take from God when they allowed themselves to be overcome by the devil?

B: You should say, as you started to, because I don't know what else they could add to the evils you have already set forth.

A: Did they not take from God whatever he intended to make out of human nature?

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B: Undeniably.

A: Think in terms of uncompromising justice and judge on that basis whether human beings make recompense to God that is equal to their sin unless, by overcoming the devil, they restore the very thing they took from God by allowing themselves to be overcome by the devil: so that, as the devil took what was God's and God lost it through humanity's defeat, so too the devil will lose it and God recover it through humanity's victory.

B: Nothing more uncompromising or more just can be conceived.

A: Do you think supreme justice can transgress this justice?

B: I don't dare think so.

A: Therefore, there is no way human beings either should or can receive from God what God intended to give them, unless they pay back to God everything they took from him, so that God will recover this through human beings just as he lost it through human beings. There is only one way that this can be accomplished: just as, through one who was defeated the whole of human nature was corrupted and, as it were, leavened with sin—and God does not exalt any sinner to perfect that heavenly city—so too, through one who is victorious, as many human beings will be justified from sin as were going to complete that number, which human beings were created in order to complete. But there is no way for a sinful human being to do this, since a sinner cannot justify a sinner.

B: Nothing is more just, and nothing is more impossible. But these considerations seems to spell the end of divine mercy and human hope when it comes to the happiness for which human beings were created.

Chapter 24 That as long as they do not repay God what they owe, they cannot be happy; and that they are not excused because of their inability

A: Be patient just a little while longer.

B: What more do you have to say?

A: If a human being is called unjust because he does not repay what he owes to another human being, one who does not repay what he owes to God is all the more unjust.

B: If he is able to repay it and does not do so, he is truly unjust. But if he is not able to repay it, how is he unjust?

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A: Perhaps if he is not responsible for that inability,he can be excused to some extent. But if the inability is his fault, it does not excuse him from repaying what he owes, just as it does not mitigate his sin. Suppose someone orders his servant to perform some task. Suppose he shows the servant a pit from which there is no way to get out, and he warns the servant not to fall into it.

But the servant ignores his master's command and warning; of his own accord he throws himself into the ditch he was shown, so that there is no way he can perform the task he was assigned. Do you think his inability to perform the task he was assigned can in any way serve to excuse him for not performing it?

B: Not at all. Instead it serves to magnify his fault, since he brought that inability on himself.He has sinned in two ways:he did not do what he was commanded to do, and he did what he was warned not to do.

A: Human beings are without excuse in just the same way. For of their own accord they bound themselves to a debt they are unable to pay, and it is by their own fault that they made themselves unable to repay not only what they already owed before they sinned (namely, not to sin), but also what they owe because they sinned. Their inability is itself a fault, since it is not something they ought to have—in fact, they ought not to have it. For just as it is a fault not to have what one ought to have, so too it is a fault to have what one ought not to have. Therefore, just as it is a fault in human beings that they do not have the ability they received in order to be able to avoid sin, so too it is a fault in them that they have the inability in virtue of which they cannot hang on to justice or avoid sin or give anything in repayment for what they owe on account of sin. After all, they spontaneously did what caused them to lose that ability and fall into that inability.(For not having the ability they ought to have is the same thing as having the inability they ought not to have.) For that reason their inability to repay God what they owe, which brings it about that they do not repay, does not excuse human beings for not repaying it, since an effect of sin does not excuse the sin that it in turn brings about.

B: This is very dire, but it must be the way things are.

A: Therefore, a human being who does not repay God what he owes is unjust.

B: That is all too true. For he is unjust because he does not repay, and he is unjust because he cannot repay.

A: Now no unjust person will be admitted to happiness. Happiness is a state of fullness in which nothing is lacking, and so it is suitable only for those in whom justice is so pure that there is no injustice in them.

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B: I do not dare believe otherwise.

A: So someone who does not repay God what he owes cannot be happy.

B: I can't deny that that follows.

A: Now you might want to say that God, who is merciful, forgives the debt of those who call upon him—precisely because they cannot repay it. But there are only two things God can be said to forgive: either that which human beings ought to repay of their own accord but cannot—that is, that which could make recompense for sin, which ought not to be committed even to preserve everything that is not God; or that which he was going to take away from them against their will as punishment, as I explained above—that is, happiness. Now if God forgives what human beings ought to repay of their own accord, precisely because they cannot repay it, isn't that the same as God's forgiving what he cannot have? But it is a travesty to attribute that sort of mercy to God.And if, on account of their inability to repay what they ought to repay of their own accord,God forgives what he was going to take away against their will, he is lightening the punishment of human beings and making them happy on account of sin, because they have what they ought not to have. For they ought not to have this inability, and for that very reason, as long as they have it without recompense, it is sin for them. But mercy of this sort is altogether contrary to God's justice, which does not permit anything other than punishment to be repayment for sin. Hence, it is impossible for God to be merciful in this way, just as it is impossible for God to be contrary to himself.

B: I see that we need to look for some other mercy in God besides this.

A: Assume that God does forgive someone who does not repay what he owes, precisely because he cannot repay it.

B: I wish that were really true.

A: As long as he does not repay it, either he wills to repay it or he does not.

But if he wills what he cannot do,he is lacking something.On the other hand, if he does not will it, he is unjust.

B: Nothing could be clearer.

A: But whether he is lacking or unjust, he is not happy.

B: That too is obvious.

A: Therefore, as long as he does not repay it, he cannot be happy.

B: If God follows the rational demands of justice, wretched mortals cannot escape it, and God's mercy seems to perish.

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK ONE

A: You asked for reason; you must accept reason. I do not deny the mercy of God, who saves men and beasts, as he has multiplied his mercy.63 But we are speaking now about that final mercy by which he makes human beings happy after this present life.And I take it that by the arguments given above, I have shown compellingly that this happiness ought not to be given to any but those whose sins are completely forgiven, and that this forgiveness ought not to take place unless the debt that is owed on account of sin is repaid, according to the magnitude of the sin. If you think any objection can be raised to those arguments, you ought to say so.

B: In fact I see that none of your arguments can be weakened in the slightest respect.

A: I don't think so either, provided that they are examined well. Besides, if even one of all the arguments I have put forward has the strength of invincible truth, that ought to be enough. For the truth is secured against all doubt equally well, whether it is demonstrated invincibly by just one argument or by several.

B: That is certainly true.

Chapter 25 That of necessity human beings are saved through Christ How then will human beings be saved, given that they cannot themselves pay what they owe and ought not to be saved unless they pay it? Or how will we have the effrontery to say that God,"who is rich in mercy"64 beyond human understanding, cannot bestow this mercy?

A: At this point you ought to ask those who do not believe that Christ is necessary for human salvation—those on whose behalf you are speaking—to say how human beings can be saved apart from Christ. If they cannot do so in some way,they should stop mocking us and instead draw near and join us who do not doubt that human beings can be saved through Christ; or else they should give up hope that we can be saved in any way at all. If they recoil from this, let them believe in Christ along with us, so that they can be saved.

B: As I have from the beginning, I will ask you to show me the reason according to which human beings are saved through Christ.

63 Cf. Psalm 36:7 (35:7–8).

64 Ephesians 2:4.

BASIC WRITINGS

A: Since even unbelievers don't deny that human beings can somehow be made happy, and since it has been fully demonstrated that if we assume Christ does not exist, we cannot find any way human beings can be saved, isn't that sufficient proof that human beings can be saved through Christ? After all, human beings can be saved either through Christ, or by some other means, or by no means. So if it is false that they can be saved by no means or by some other means, it is necessary that they can be saved through Christ.

B: Suppose someone who grasped the reason that it cannot be by any other means, but didn't understand how it can be through Christ, should wish to claim that this cannot be the case either through Christ or in any other way.

How will we respond to him?

A: How should one respond to someone who insists that what must be the case is impossible, simply because he does not know how it is the case?

B: That he is a fool.

A: Then one should pay no attention to what he says.

B: True, but one still ought to show him the reason of what he thinks is impossible.

A: Do you not understand, on the basis of what we said above, that it is necessary that some human beings will attain happiness? For if it is unfitting for God to bring human beings who are in any way blemished to that state for which he created them unblemished, lest he seem to regret the good he had undertaken or to be unable to achieve his purpose, much more so is it impossible, on account of that same unfittingness, that no human being is advanced to the state for which he was created. So either some recompense for sin, of the sort we showed earlier ought to exist, must be found outside the Christian faith—and no reasoning can reveal any such thing—or else one must believe in that faith without doubting. For if one has concluded by means of a necessary argument that something is really and truly the case, one ought not to fall into any doubt about it, even if one does not grasp the reason for how it is the case.

B: What you say is true.

A: So what more is there for you to ask?

B: I did not get involved in this discussion so that you would take away my doubts about the faith, but so that you would show me a reason for my certainty.You have already led me by reason to see that sinful human beings owe

God, on account of their sin, something that they cannot repay but that they must repay if they are to be saved. Now I want you to lead me further, so that

CUR DEUS HOMO, BOOK ONE

I understand on the basis of rational necessity that all the things the Catholic faith requires us to believe about Christ if we want to be saved must be true, and how they are efficacious for human salvation, and in what way God saves human beings through his mercy, given that he does not forgive their sin unless they repay him what they owe on account of sin. And to make your arguments more solidly grounded, start from a long way back so that you build them on a firm foundation.

A: May God help me now, since you are not making any allowances for me or taking into account the weakness of my knowledge in imposing so great a task on me. But I will try, since I have already begun, trusting not in myself but in God; and I will do whatever I can, with his help. But to keep from wearing out someone who wants to read this by going on too long without a break, let's separate the earlier discussion from what is still to be said by making a fresh start.

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