The Lameth Fragments

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[1. On possibility and impossibility] STUDENT: There are several matters on which I have long wanted your response.Among them are power and inability, possibility and impossibility, necessity and freedom. I am listing them all together as subjects for investigation, because it seems to me that knowledge of each of them is connected with knowledge of the others. I will explain to you in part what motivates me to ask about them, so that once you have answered my questions about them, I will be able to make progress more easily on the other matters that I am concerned about.

You see, we sometimes say that there is power in something in which there is no power. For no one denies that whatever can [do something], can do [it] in virtue of its power. So when we say that what does not exist can exist, we are saying that there is power in that which does not exist, as when we say that a house that does not yet exist can exist—and I just cannot understand that.

After all, there is no power in that which does not exist.

I will say again: that which in no way exists has no power. Accordingly, it does not have a power for being or for not being.And so it follows that what does not exist both cannot exist and cannot not exist. And what goes along with the negative statement, "what does not exist cannot exist," is that what does not exist is such that (a) it is not possible for it to exist, (b) it is impossible for it to exist, and (c) it is necessary that it does not exist. Or, if we take the other negation,"what does not exist cannot not exist," we find that what does not exist is such that (a) it is not possible for it not to exist, (b) it is impossible for it not to exist, and (c) it is necessary that it exists. Therefore, because that which in no way exists cannot exist, it is impossible for it to exist and necessary that it does not exist; but from the fact that it cannot not exist, it follows that it is impossible for it not to exist and necessary that it exists.

1 I have followed the order of the fragments as they appear in the edition of F. S. Schmitt,

"Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury," Beiträge zur Geschichte der

Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters Band 33,Heft 3 (1936),22–43.I have,however,added headings of my own and made somewhat different divisions in the text.

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Furthermore, what cannot exist is not able to exist.And what is not able to exist is unable to exist. Similarly, what cannot not exist is not able not to exist, and what is not able not to exist is unable not to exist. Therefore, what does not exist cannot exist, cannot not exist, is unable to exist, and is unable not to exist. But equally, what is unable to exist is able not to exist, and what is unable not to exist is able to exist.Therefore, what does not exist is both able and unable to exist, and similarly able [and unable] not to exist. Therefore, it equally has power and inability with respect to both existing and not existing.

But all these conclusions are perfectly ridiculous. For the following never hold [of the same thing] at the same time: (1) "it is impossible for this to exist" and "it is impossible for this not to exist"; (2) "it is necessary for this to exist" and "it is necessary for this not to exist"; (3) "this has the power to exist" and "this has an inability to exist"; (4) "this has the power not to exist" and "this has an inability not to exist." So, given that these things are impossible, that from which they follow is also impossible: namely, that "what in no way exists both cannot exist and cannot not exist, since it has no power." But I cannot at all figure out how this is false.

Another thing that motivates me to ask about impossibility and necessity is that we say that something is impossible for God, such as lying, or that God is something out of necessity,such as being just.For impossibility suggests inability, and necessity suggests violence. But there is neither inability nor violence in God.After all, if God preserves the truth because of an inability to lie or is just as a result of violence, he is not truthful or just freely. Now you might reply that this impossibility and this necessity signify an unconquerable strength in God. But in that case I will ask why this strength is designated by words that signify weakness.

These and perhaps other questions force me into a certain puzzlement about power and possibility and their contraries, and about necessity and freedom.

My perplexities may be childish, but I ask you nonetheless to teach me how I might respond to someone who posed the same questions to me. For I must admit, I don't know how to.

[2. On the verb 'to do'] TEACHER: Even if your questions seem childish to you, their answers are not so easy for me that your questions strike me as contemptible. For I can see from a mile away that once I begin to reply to you, you will call me to greater things. Still, I should not restrain myself from matters in which God grants me the ability to answer you, just because I cannot solve all the problems you end up raising. Now in order to investigate the matters you have asked about, I understand that it is necessary first to set down something about the verb 'to do' and about what is properly attributable to something as 'its own', so that I

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will not be compelled to insert a digression on those matters when the need arises.You just be sure to hold your questions in memory.

S: Whatever you set down beforehand will not displease me, as long as you get back to what I asked about.

T: The verb 'to do' [facere] is commonly used for any verb, of whatever signification, whether finite or infinite, even for 'not to do'. For if one asks concerning someone,"What is he doing?" if we pay careful attention, we see that 'do' is being used for any verb that might be used in reply, and that whatever verb is used in reply is used for 'do'.After all, no verb is correctly used in the reply to someone who asks,"What is he doing?"unless that verb is understood in the "doing" about which that person is asking.When the answer is given that "He is reading" or "He is writing," this has the same force as "This is what he is doing: he is reading" or "This is what he is doing: he is writing."

Now any verb can be used in reply to someone who asks this question.This is quite clear in many cases, as in "He is singing" or "He is dictating." In some cases, however, one might have doubts: for example, "He is," "He is living,"

"He can,""He owes,""He is named,""He is called." But no one will complain if the answer to "What is he doing?" is "He is in church" or "He is living like a good man" or "He has power2 over the whole city in which he lives" or "He owes a great deal of money" or "He is named [i.e., renowned] above all his neighbors" or "He is called before all others, wherever he may be."

So any verb can on some occasion be used in response to someone who asks, "What is he doing?" provided that there is someone who knows how to do this properly.And so any verbs whatsoever that are used in response to someone who asks "What is he doing?" are used, as I have said, in place of 'to do' in the response, and 'to do' is used for them in the question, since what is said in response is what is being asked about, and what is asked in the question is what is being addressed in response.

2 'has power' translates potest, which was translated 'can' in the previous sentence. Some of these examples obviously work better in Latin than they do in English. Keep in mind, too, that the question translated "What is he doing?" can also be translated "What does he do?" or even, loosely,"What's the deal with him?" Some of Anselm's proposed answers work a bit better as responses to the latter questions.

3 Anselm's point in this section and the next is about the variety of uses of the Latin verb facere, not of course about the variety of uses of the English verb 'to do', so it seems silly to

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properly cases of bringing about, such as 'to run' and similar verbs; what I am saying can be recognized even in other verbs that seem foreign to this property of bringing about. For in this way someone who sits brings about sitting, and one who undergoes brings about an undergoing, since if there were not someone who underwent there would be no undergoing, nor would anything be named unless there were something that is named, and nothing would in any way be said to exist unless that which is said to exist were first thought.

S: What you say is clear to someone who desires to understand, although I do not yet understand your aim in saying it.

T: You will come to understand it in what follows.

[3. On the senses of 'to do'] The verb 'to do' [facere] is commonly used for any verb, of whatever signification, whether finite or infinite, even for 'not to do'. For if one asks concerning someone,"What is he doing?", if we pay careful attention, we see that 'do' is being used for any verb that might be used in reply, and that whatever verb is used in reply is used for 'do'.After all, no verb is correctly used in the reply to someone who asks,"What is he doing?" unless that verb is understood in the "doing" about which that person is asking.When the answer is given that "He is reading" or "He is writing," this has the same force as "This is what he is doing: he is reading" or "This is what he is doing: he is writing."

"He can,""He owes,""He is named,""He is called." But no one will complain if the answer to "What is he doing?" is "He is in church" or "He is living like a good man" or "He has power over the whole city in which he lives" or "He owes a great deal of money" or "He is named [i.e., renowned] above all his neighbors" or "He is called before all others, wherever he may be."

So any verb can on some occasion be used in response to someone who asks "What is he doing?", provided that there is someone who knows how to do me to make up awkward and unidiomatic uses of the verb 'to do' so that we can keep a consistent English translation of facere. Indeed, there is some advantage for readers in seeing which English expressions are used throughout these translations to correspond to facere.

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this properly.And so any verbs whatsoever that are used in response to someone who asks "What is he doing?" are used, as I have said, in place of 'to do' in the response, and 'to do' is used for them in the question, since what is said in response is what is being asked about, and what is asked in the question is what is being addressed in the response.

'To do' is often used for negative verbs, even for 'not to do'. For example, someone who does not love virtues and does not hate vices does ill, and someone who does not do what he ought not to do does well. In this way 'to do' is used for any verb, whether positive or negative, and every verb is 'to do'.

Moreover, everything of which some verb is said is a cause that what is signified by the verb is the case;and in our common way of speaking,every cause is said to 'bring about' [facere] that of which it is the cause. Hence, everything of which any verb is predicated brings about what is signified by that verb. I will pass right over those verbs that according to their signification are properly cases of bringing about, such as 'to run' and similar verbs; what I am saying can be recognized even in other verbs that seem foreign to this property of bringing about. For in this way someone who sits brings about sitting, and one who undergoes brings about an undergoing,since if there were not someone who underwent there would be no undergoing, nor would anything be named unless there were something that is named; and nothing would in any way be said to exist unless that which is said to exist were first thought. For when it is said that "A human being exists" or "A human being does not exist," the significate of this name is conceived in the mind before it is said to exist or not to exist;and for that reason what is conceived is a cause that 'exists' is said of a human being. Also, if we say, "A human being is an animal," the human being is a cause of his being an animal and being called an animal. I do not mean that the human being is a cause that an animal exists, but that the human being is a cause that he himself is an animal and is called an animal.

For by means of the name 'human being' the whole human being is signified and conceived, and animal is a part of that whole.And so in this case the part follows from the whole in this way, because where the whole is, the part must also be. So because the whole human being is conceived in the name 'human being', the whole human being is himself a cause that he is an animal and is called an animal, since the conception of the whole is a cause that the part is conceived in it and is said of it. In this way, then, whenever 'is' is said of anything at all—whether without qualification, as in "A human being exists,"4 or with some qualification, as in "A human being is an animal" or "A human being is healthy"—the prior conception of a human being is a cause of his being said to be or not to be; it is also a cause that what is said is understood.

4 The word for "exists" is the same as the word for "is."

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According to the foregoing argument, then, whenever a verb is predicated of any thing at all, what is signified is that the thing brings about [facit] what is expressed by that verb. For that reason, it is not altogether groundless that in our common way of speaking, 'to do' [facere] is used for any verb, and every verb is said to involve doing. Indeed, in the Gospel the Lord uses 'do' (or 'act', which is the same thing) for any verb when he says,"Everyone who acts badly hates the light" and "One who does the truth comes to the light."5 Someone acts badly who does what he ought not to do, or does not do what he ought to do—where 'do' again is understood as standing in for any verb. For someone who is where or when he ought not to be, or who sits or stands where or when he ought not to, and someone who is not or does not sit or does not stand where or when he ought to, acts badly. By contrast, someone does the truth who does what he ought to do and does not do what he ought not to do. Similarly, someone who is or sits or stands where or when he ought to, and someone who is not or does not sit or does not stand where or when he ought not to, does the truth. In this way the Lord includes every positive or negative verb in 'to do'.

[4. On the modes of bringing about] There is another point to consider about that same verb, namely, in how many different ways we say 'to do' in our regular usage. Although this division has many parts and is rather involved, I shall nonetheless say something about it— as much as I think will be of use for what we are going to say and can give some help to someone who might wish to carry out a more thorough investigation.

Some causes are called 'efficient'—for example, someone who does some writing; others by contrast with them are not called efficient—for example, the material out of which something is made. Nonetheless, every cause (as I have said) is said to 'bring about' [facere], and everything that is said to bring about is named a cause. Now anything that is said to bring about either brings it about that something is or brings it about that something is not. So every bringing-about can be said to be either a 'bringing about being' or a 'bringing about non-being'. These two affirmations are contraries. Their negations are 'not bringing about being' and 'not bringing about non-being', respectively. But the affirmative 'bringing about being' is sometimes put in place of the negative 'not bringing about non-being'; conversely, 'not bringing about non-being' is sometimes put in place of 'bringing about being'. Similarly,

'bringing about non-being' and 'not bringing about being' are put in place of 5 John 3:20–21.

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each other. For sometimes someone is said to bring it about that evil things are, because he does not bring it about that they are not; and not to bring it about that evil things are not, because he brings it about that they are; and to bring it about that good things are not,because he does not bring it about that they are; and not to bring about good things, because he brings it about that they are not.

Let us now provide a classification of 'bringing about'. Now since, as has been explained, bringing about is always of either being or non-being, it will be incumbent upon us to add 'being' and 'non-being' to the individual modes of bringing about, so that they are explicitly distinguished. Accordingly, we predicate 'bring about' in six modes: two modes in which the cause (1) brings about the being, or (2) does not bring about the non-being, of the very thing that it is said to bring about; and four modes (3–6) in which the cause either brings about or does not bring about the being or non-being of something else. For we say that a given thing brings it about that something is, either (1) because it brings about the being of the very thing it is said to bring about, or (2) because it does not bring about the non-being of that very thing, or (3) because it brings about the being of some other thing, or (4) because it does not bring about the being of some other thing, or (5) because it brings about the non-being of some other thing, or (6) because it does not bring about the non-being of some other thing.

(1) In the first mode, when someone fatally stabs a person, he is said to bring it about that that person is dead. For in this case he brings about through himself the very thing he is said to bring about.

(2) I do not have an example of the second mode in the case of bringing it about that someone is dead, unless I imagine someone who could revive a dead person but does not will to do so. If this were the case, he would be said to bring it about that the person is dead according to the second mode, because he would not bring it about that the person is not dead. Examples are plentiful in other sorts of cases. For example, we say that someone brings it about that bad things exist, because he does not bring it about that they do not exist, although he has the power to do that.

(3) It is according to the third mode that someone is said to have killed another, that is, to have brought it about that he is dead, because he commanded that he be killed, or because he brought it about that the killer had a sword, or because he provoked the killing; also, if someone is said to have killed himself because he did something on account of which he was killed.For the people in these cases did not bring about through themselves what they are said to have brought about. That is, they did not kill or bring it about that someone was dead or was killed; rather, they brought this about by bringing something else about. They accomplished through an intermediary what they are said to have brought about.

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(4) It is in the fourth mode when we say that someone killed another person because he did not offer weapons to the victim before he was killed, or because he did not forestall the killer, or because he did not do something such that, if he had done it, the victim would not have been killed. In these cases too the people did not kill through themselves; rather, it was by not bringing about something else that they brought about what they are said to have brought about.

(5) The fifth mode is when someone is said to have killed another because he brought it about that the victim was unarmed by taking away his weapons, or because by opening a door he brought it about that the killer was not locked in where he was being detained.Here again the one who is said to have killed did not kill through himself, but through something else, by bringing it about that something else did not exist.

(6) It is according to the sixth mode when someone is charged with killing because he did not, by taking away the killer's weapons, bring it about that the killer was not armed, or because he did not whisk away the victim so that he would not be accessible to the killer. In these cases too he did not kill through himself, but through something else, that is, by not bringing it about that something else did not exist.

The same classification applies to bringing about non-being. For whatever is said to bring about the non-being of something is said to do so either (1) because it brings about the non-being of that very thing, or (2) because it does not bring about the being of that thing, or (3) because it brings about the being of some other thing, or (4) because it does not bring about the being of some other thing, or (5) because it brings about the non-being of some other thing, or (6) because it does not bring about the non-being of some other thing.We can find examples of these in the killing of a human being, just as I did for bringing about being.

(1) Just as someone who kills brings it about that someone is dead, in the first mode of bringing about being, so too he brings it about that someone is not alive, in the first mode of bringing about non-being.

(2) I do not have an example in the second mode of bringing it about that someone is not living, unless, as I did above, I imagine someone who can revive a dead person. For if he is unwilling to do so, he will be said in the second mode to bring it about that the person is not living, because he does not bring it about that he is living. For although being dead and not being alive are not the same thing—after all, something is not dead unless it is deprived of life, whereas many things are not alive but are not deprived of life: for example, a stone—nonetheless, just as killing someone is nothing other than bringing it about that someone is dead and not alive, so too reviving someone is the same thing as bringing it about that someone is living and not dead.Of course there

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are many examples of this second mode in other cases. For example, someone is said to bring it about that good things do not exist because he does not bring it about that they exist even though he has the power to do so.

The examples that were given for bringing about being will suffice for the other four modes, in which someone brings about or does not bring about the being or non-being of something else.

[5. On the modes of bringing about non-being] Let's now talk about 'bringing about non-being', which I have said can also be classified in six modes. These modes are in every respect the same as the modes of 'bringing about being' except that in this case they are modes of 'bringing about non-being' rather than 'bringing about being'.

(1) The first mode of 'bringing about non-being' is when something is said to bring about non-being because it brings about the non-being of the very thing whose non-being it is said to bring about. For example, someone who kills a human being is said to bring it about that he is not alive, because he brings about the very thing he is said to bring about.

(2) The second mode is when something is said to bring about non-being because it does not bring about the being of the very thing whose non-being it is said to bring about. The only way I can offer an example of this mode in bringing it about that a human being is or is not alive is to imagine someone who can bring it about that a dead person is alive. If he did not do so, he would be said to bring it about that the dead person is not alive because he did not bring it about that the dead person is alive. In any event, there are plenty of examples in other cases. For example, suppose it is someone's job to bring it about that a house is illuminated at night. If he does not do what he is supposed to, he is said to bring it about that the house is not illuminated, because he does not bring it about that the house is illuminated.

(3) The third mode is when something is said to bring about non-being because it brings about the being of something other than the thing whose nonbeing it is said to bring about, as when we say that A brought it about that B is not alive because A brought it about that B's killer was in possession of a sword.

(4) The fourth mode is when something is said to bring about non-being because it does not bring about the being of something else, as when A is said to have brought it about that B is not alive, because before B died A did not bring it about that B was armed.

(5) The fifth mode is when something is said to bring about the non-being of something because it brings about the non-being of something else, as when A is said to bring it about that B is not alive because before B was killed

A brought it about that B was not armed.

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(6) The sixth mode is when something brings about the non-being of something because it does not bring about the non-being of something else, as when [A is said to bring it about that B is not alive because] A does not bring it about that B's killer is not armed by taking away his arms, even though he can take them away.

And note that although 'bringing about being' and 'not bringing about nonbeing' are put in place of each other, they do in fact differ. Properly speaking, someone brings about being who brings it about that something exists that did not exist,whereas 'not bringing about non-being'does not apply any more to someone who brings it about that something exists than it does to someone who does not bring about either being or non-being. 'Bringing about non-being' and 'not bringing about being' differ in the same way. Properly speaking, someone brings about non-being who brings it about that what used to exist no longer exists, whereas 'not bringing about being' is said equally of one who brings it about that what used to exist no longer exists and of one who does not bring about either being or non-being.

Now I offered these examples of 'bringing about being' and 'bringing about non-being' using efficient causes, because these provide clearer cases of what

I wanted to show. But just as the aforesaid six modes are discerned in efficient causes, so too they are also found in non-efficient causes, if anyone should care to examine them attentively.

[6. More on the modes of 'bringing about'] S: I see it clearly.

T: I have taken these examples from efficient causes, because what I want to show is clearer in efficient causes. But just as efficient causes in the five modes following the first do not bring about what they are said to bring about, but, as I have repeatedly shown through examples, are said to bring about what the first brings about—the second mode by not bringing about the non-being of what the first mode brings about, the third by bringing about the being of something else,the fourth by bringing about the non-being of something else, the fifth by not bringing about the being of something else,6 and the sixth by not bringing about the non-being of something else—so too non-efficient causes are also said to bring about, in accordance with the same modes. For some of them are proximate, though not efficient, causes that what they are

6 The Teacher here reverses the order of the fourth and fifth modes as described in sections

4 and 5.

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said to bring about is the case; and others are remote causes, not that it is the case but that something else is the case. For example, a window brings it about that the house is bright. It is not an efficient cause, but it is a proximate cause through which the light brings it about that what the window is said to bring about is the case. It is a proximate [rather than a remote] cause because it causes this to be the case through itself and not through another.This is in the first mode of bringing about, since in its own way [i.e., non-efficiently] it brings about the very thing that it is said to bring about. But if, when there is no window or the window is closed, the window is said to bring it about that the house is dark according to the second mode: it is said to bring it about that the house is dark on the grounds that it does not bring it about that the house is not dark. On the other hand, suppose we say that the one who made the window brings it about that the house is bright, or that someone who did not make a window brings it about that the house is dark; or suppose someone says that his land feeds him. These are all remote causes because they do not bring about through themselves [what they are said to bring about].

Rather, someone brings it about through the window that he made, or that he didn't make when he should have; and the land brings it about through the produce that it yields. And so, whether they are efficient or non-efficient, causes in the first or second mode can be called proximate, whereas others are remote.

The negations—'not bringing about being' and 'not bringing about nonbeing'—are divided into the same number of modes. One can recognize this by using the examples I gave above for 'bringing about being' and 'bringing about non-being'if one converts the affirmations into negations and the negations into affirmations. If in doing this someone wishes to preserve the order

I followed above, in the four modes after the second, let him state affirmatively in the third mode what I said negatively in the fourth, and let him put negatively in the fourth mode what was expressed affirmatively in the third. Similarly, let him make the fifth mode the sixth and the sixth mode the fifth.And it should be noted that in the negative modes, the first mode is purely a negation and does not imply anything else, whereas the other five present a negation that is equivalent to the contrary of the corresponding affirmation. For someone who revives someone else is said in the second mode 'not to bring it about that he is dead' as equivalent to 'bringing it about that he is not dead', and 'not to bring it about that he is not alive'as equivalent to 'bringing it about that he is alive'. Now if we say of any of the following that he does not bring it about that someone is dead, or that he does not bring it about that someone is not alive, this is understood as meaning that the one of whom we are speaking brings it about (so far as this is in his power) that someone is not dead or that someone is alive:

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(3) in the third mode, one who brings it about that the intended victim is armed by providing him with a weapon; or (6) in the sixth mode, one who does not bring it about that the intended victim is unarmed, even though he has the power to take away his weapons; or (5) in the fifth mode, one who brings it about that the person bent on killing is unarmed by taking away his weapons; or (4) in the fourth mode, one who, by refusing him a weapon, does not bring it about that the person bent on killing is armed.7

The same basis for the division that I laid out in the case of 'bringing about being' or 'bringing about non-being' applies to any verb that is conjoined with 'bring about' in a similar way, as for example if I say "I bring it about that you bring something about" or "I bring it about that you write something," or "I bring it about that something is brought about" or "I bring it about that something is written."

[7. On the modes of other verbs] These modes that I have laid out in the case of 'bring about' are also found in other verbs in a somewhat similar way. Although not all the modes apply to all verbs, one or more of them will apply in particular cases, and especially in verbs that take other verbs as their complements, such as 'ought' and 'can'.

These take verbs as their complements when we say "I can read" or "I can be read" or "I ought to love" or "I ought to be loved." There are also verbs that do not take a verb as a complement, but rather some thing, as in "to eat bread" and "to burn wood." And there are some verbs that have no complement at all, for example, "to lie down" or "to sleep"—although some such verbs do appear to take a verb as their complement, as in "The people sat down to eat and drink and rose up to play."8 But that is not actually the case."The people sat down to eat and drink and rose up to play" is not said in the same way as 7 Reading non facit illum esse armatum for non facit illum non esse armatum.Anselm says earlier in this section that the fourth mode of the negation 'not bringing about being', which (4) is intended to exemplify,"put[s] negatively . . . what was expressed affirmatively in the third" mode of 'bringing about being'. The third mode of bringing about being is exemplified above (section 4) as follows: "someone is said to have . . . brought it about that [someone else] is dead . . . because he brought it about that the killer had a sword." Consequently, the fourth mode of not bringing about being has to be that someone is said not to have brought it about that someone else is dead because he did not bring it about that the killer was armed.Accordingly, we can see that the second non is in error.

8 Exodus 32:6.

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"He wills to eat and drink and play." For the former expression is resolved as follows:"The people sat down in order to eat and drink and rose up in order to play."

Some of the modes described above are also found in the verb 'to be'. Certainly the first two modes are easy to recognize.The other four, which involve bringing it about or not bringing it about that something else exists or does not exist,are more difficult to grasp,since there are many ways in which things bring it about or do not bring it about that something else exists or does not exist. But I shall say a few words on this subject, and you will be able to observe in Scripture or in common speech similar points that I will not discuss explicitly.9

The verb 'to be' also resembles the verb 'to do'. For something is said to be what it is not, not because it is what it is said to be, but because there is some other cause that this is said. For example, someone is said to be a foot for the lame and an eye for the blind,10 not because he is what he is said to be, but because he serves as a foot or as an eye.And the lives of the just who confront many struggles because of their desire for eternal life are said to be blessed, not because they in fact are, but because their lives are a cause of their being blessed at some future time.

We also note a similarity between the verb 'to have' and the verb 'to do'.

Someone who has no eyes is said to have eyes, not because he in fact has eyes, but because he has something else that does for him what eyes do; and someone who has no feet is said to have feet because he has something else that does for him what feet do.

It seems to me that whenever a name or verb is attributed improperly* to some thing, the thing to which it is attributed is related to the thing of which that name or verb is properly said as similar, or as cause, or as effect, or as genus, or as species, or as whole, or as part, or as equivalent, or as representation, or as what is represented (for although every representation bears some similarity to the thing it represents, not everything that is similar is a representation or something represented), or (as I was about to say) as signifying in some way other than representation the thing whose name or verb it receives, or as signified by it, or as being in it; or, conversely, that of which it is properly said is in that of which it is predicated improperly; or else the two are related as someone who makes use of something and the thing of which he makes use, in a case in which 'to do' is predicated.

9 Nothing more is said on this subject.

10 Job 29:15.

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Now all these modes that I identified in the verb 'to do'are sometimes found in other verbs as well—at least one or more of them, even if not all of them are found in each verb.After all, every verb is said according to the first mode if it is said properly of some thing that does what the verb expresses: for example,"he throws"or "he sits"or "he runs"(when he does this with his feet) or "he builds a house" (when he does this with his hands) or "daylight exists" or "the sun shines" and so forth.

By contrast, if what is expressed by the verb is not done by the subject, it is said according to some mode other than the first: for example, if someone is said to build a house who does not actually do anything but merely gives orders, or when we say "The horseman gallops" when the horseman doesn't gallop but makes the horse gallop. So whenever we hear a verb applied to some thing that does not do what is expressed by the verb, careful examination will find that the verb is said in one of the five modes, following the first, that I have described.

So when someone tells me,"I ought to be loved by you," he is speaking improperly. For if he ought, he is obligated to be loved by me; and so he ought to demand from himself that he be loved by me, since he is the one under an obligation, and if he does not carry out what he ought to do, he is sinning.

But that's not how he understands what he is saying, even though that's the way he puts it. He says he ought to be loved by me because he makes it the case that I ought to love him.After all, if he has done something to deserve it, he has made it the case that I ought to love him; and if he has not done anything to deserve it, by the mere fact that he is a human being he has in himself a reason why I ought to love him. Thus,'ought' is said of someone who is not under an obligation but somehow makes it the case that someone else is under an obligation, because he is a cause of the other person's being under an obligation—just as I showed earlier that 'do' is said of someone who does not do anything but is the cause, in one of the ways described earlier, of someone else's doing something. In this same way it is said that the poor ought to receive help from the rich.The poor are not under the obligation; rather, they are in need of this help, and their need is the cause by which the poor make the rich obligated to give them that help.

We also say that we are not obligated to sin instead of saying that we are obligated not to sin.11 For if one examines this properly, not everyone who does

11 This paragraph is largely dedicated to sorting out an ambiguity that does not arise in English. Latin sometimes uses non debere for debere non.The English equivalent for non debere is 'it is not the case that one ought' or 'one need not'; the English for debere non is 'one ought not'. Obviously we do not mix up these expressions in English—no one is tempted to say

"It is not the case that one ought to sin" or "One need not sin" to mean "One ought not to sin," and it would never occur to anyone to suppose that it is always a sin to do some-

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what he is not obligated to do sins. For just as 'to be obligated' is the same as 'to be under an obligation', so too 'not to be obligated' is the same as 'not to be under an obligation'. And human beings do not always sin when they do something they are not under an obligation to do. For example, a man is not under an obligation to get married, since it is permissible for him to remain a virgin. It follows from this that he is not obligated to get married; yet if he does get married, he does not sin. Therefore, a man does not always sin when he does something he is not obligated to do, if 'not to be obligated' is understood properly.Yet no one denies that a man ought to get married.12 Therefore, he is both obligated and not obligated. But if we are mindful of what was said earlier, then just as we say 'not bring about being' for 'bring about nonbeing', we also say 'is not obligated to do' for 'is obligated not to do'.And so wherever we find 'is not obligated to sin', it is said for 'is obligated not to sin'.

This usage is so common that no one takes it to mean anything other than 'is obligated not to sin'. Now as for saying that a man ought to get married if he wants to,"He ought to get married" is said for "He is not obligated not to get married," just as I showed earlier that 'bring about being' is said for 'not bring about non-being'. In exactly the same way, then, just as we say 'is not obligated to do' for 'is obligated not to do', we also say 'ought to do' for 'is not obligated not to do'. Granted,'ought to do' can also be understood in the sense it has when we say that God ought to rule over all things.After all, God is not obligated to do anything, but all things ought to be subject to him. So it is said that God ought to rule over all things because he is the cause of the fact that all things ought to be subject to him, just as I said the poor ought to receive help from the rich because what causes the rich to be obligated to give them that help is in the poor. So it can be said in this sense that a man ought to get married, since everything that is up to a given person ought to be subject to that person's will. And it is up to every man who has not taken a vow of celibacy whether he gets married or not. Therefore, since getting married or not ought to be up to his will, it is said that he ought to get married if he wants to and he is not obligated to get married if he does not want to.13

But when we pray that God will forgive14 us our sins, it would not actually help us if God did for us exactly what our words express. For if God forgives thing we need not do. Since the point will be lost in English anyway, translation is hopeless; but I've done my best by using 'is obligated' and 'ought' to translate debere, 'is not obligated' to translate non debere, 'is obligated not to . . .' to translate debere non, and 'is [not] under an obligation' to translate debitor [non] esse.

12 That is, no one says that a man is obligated not to get married.

13 Cf. Cur Deus Homo, Book 2, Chapter 18.

14 It helps to think of 'forgive' in the sense in which we speak of 'forgiving a debt'—that is, canceling the debt without requiring repayment.

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us our sins, he does not remove them or take them away from us. Rather, when we pray for our sins to be forgiven, we are not praying that our sins themselves will be forgiven, but that what we owe on account of our sins will be forgiven. For sins cause it to be the case that we owe these debts, which we need to have forgiven; that is why we pray for our sins to be forgiven when we ought to pray for our debts to be forgiven.What we are praying for in this case is not that our sins will be forgiven but that the debts caused by our sins will be forgiven. This is made clear in the Lord's Prayer when we say "forgive us our debts."15 This accounts for the fact that in the usual way of speaking, someone says to a man who has burned down his house or inflicted some other sort of harm on him,"Make good the damage you have caused," and the one who burned down his house says,"Forgive me the damage that I caused you."This is not taken to mean that the damage should be restored or forgiven, but that what was destroyed by the damage should be made good, and that what ought to be given in restitution for the damage should be forgiven.

Along these same lines, the Lord says that those whom we mercifully forgive, and to whom we mercifully give,"will give into your bosom a good measure, pressed down, shaken together, and running over,"16 because those to whom mercy is shown are the cause that a reward is given to those who show mercy, and so they are said to give the reward.

[8. On will and willing] We say 'to will' in the same six modes in which we say 'to bring about being'.

Similarly, we say 'to will non-being' in the same variety of ways in which we say 'to bring about non-being'.

Notice that we sometimes will in such a way that, if we are able, we bring it about [facere] that what we will is the case: for example, when a sick person wills health. For he brings it about that he is healthy, if he can; and if he cannot, he would bring it about if he could. This will can be called "efficient," since, so far as it is in the will's power, it brings it about [efficit] that what it wills is the case.

Sometimes, however, we will something that we can bring about but don't; and yet, if it is brought about, it pleases us, and we approve. Suppose someone were to say to me that some naked pauper whom I do not will to clothe is naked because I want17 him to be naked or because I do not want him to be clothed. I respond that I want him to be clothed and not to be naked, and I 15 Matthew 6:12.

16 Luke 6:38.

17 Keep in mind that 'will' and 'want' are the same verb in Latin.

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approve of his being clothed more than his being naked, even though I do not bring it about that he is clothed.We can call this will, by which I will in this way that he be clothed, an "approving" will.

We also will in another way, if, for example, a creditor, by way of accommodating his debtor, wills to accept barley in place of the wheat that the debtor cannot repay. We can call this a merely "concessive" will. For the creditor would prefer the wheat, but because of his debtor's neediness he makes a concession and allows the debtor to pay back barley.

It is also a common way of speaking to say that someone wills what he neither approves nor concedes, but merely permits, although he could prevent it.

For example, when a ruler does not will to crack down on robbers and plunderers within his domain, we complain that he wills the evil things that they do, even though they displease him, because he wills to permit them.

Now it seems to me that every will is included in this fourfold division. Of these four different sorts of will, the one that I have called "efficient will" brings about, so far as it can, what it wills; it also approves, concedes, and permits it.The approving will, by contrast, does not bring about what it wills, but merely approves, concedes, and permits it. The concessive will, however, neither brings about nor approves what it wills, except for the sake of something else, but merely concedes and permits it. And the permissive will neither brings about nor approves nor concedes what it wills, but merely permits it, though deploring it.

Holy Scripture makes use of all these different sorts of willing. I shall offer a few examples of this.When it is said of God that "all things whatsoever that he willed, he made,"18 and "he has mercy on whom he wills,"19 this is efficient will, and it belongs to the first mode of willing to be, after the likeness of causing to be, since God wills the very thing that he is said to will.

But when we read that "he hardens whom he wills,"20 this is permissive will, and it is in the second mode of willing to be, since God is said to will someone to be hardened on the grounds that he does not will by an efficient will that the person not be hardened; that is, God does not will to bring it about that he is not hardened. Now if we say that God wills to harden him because he does not will to soften him, the meaning will be the same, and it will likewise be a case of permissive will, but in the fourth mode of willing to be. For God is said to will to harden him on the grounds that he does not will something else, namely, that he be softened. For someone who softens brings it about that someone is soft and that he is not hardened.

18 Psalm 115:3 (113:11).

19 Romans 9:18.

20 Ibid.

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But when we hear that "God wills that every human being be saved,"21 this is an approving will, and like God's willing to harden, it will be in the second mode of willing to be, since he does not will to bring it about that anyone is not saved, and in the fourth mode, since he does not will something else, namely, he does not will by an efficient will that a human being be damned, that is, he does not will to bring about that on account of which a human being is damned. This was said as a response to those who say that God's will is the cause of their being not just but unjust, and of their not being saved. For the injustice on account of which they are damned is from them; it does not come from God's will.

If we say that "God wills that virginity be preserved," this is an efficient will in the first mode of willing to be in the case of those in whom God brings it about that they preserve virginity. But in others it is an approving will, either because he does not will by an efficient will that it not be preserved (which is in the second mode) or because he does not will that it be violated (which is in the fourth mode).22

[9. On causes] Now some causes are called efficient—for example, an artisan (for he makes his product) and wisdom (which makes someone wise)—whereas others by contrast with them are not called efficient—for example, the matter from which something is made, and place and time, in which placed and temporal things are made.Nevertheless,every cause is said,in its own way,to bring about [something]; and everything that is said to bring about [something] is named a cause.23

Every cause brings about something. But one sort brings it about, and is the cause, that that which it is said to bring about—whether being or nonbeing—is the case; another sort does not bring it about that that which it is said to bring about is the case, but merely that it is said [to be the case]. Thus, both the executioner and Herod are equally said to have killed John [the Baptist], since each brought it about, and was the cause, that what they are said to have brought about was the case.

21 1 Timothy 2:4.

22 There are two additional fragmentary remarks on the subject of will that Schmitt omits from his edition:(1) "Sometimes we will something for its own sake,as when we will health, and sometimes for the sake of something else, as when we will to drink something bitter for the sake of health." (2) "'Will' is said equivocally. . . .A permitting will is when we permit something to be done that nevertheless displeases us."

23 Throughout this section as well I have translated facere as both 'do' and 'bring about'.

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An example: the fact that the Lord Jesus in his infancy and boyhood interacted with Joseph as though he were Joseph's son brought it about, and was the cause, not that he was Joseph's son, but that he was called Joseph's son. Now

I shall first say something, as God grants me, about the cause that brings it about that what it is said to bring about is the case, and then about the other sort.

Now some of the former sort are proximate causes, which by themselves bring about what they are said to bring about, with no other intermediate cause existing between them and the effect that they bring about; others are remote causes, which do not bring about by themselves what they are said to bring about, without one or more other intermediate causes. For a fire, the one who kindles the fire, and the one who orders that the fire be kindled all bring about the burning, but the fire brings about the burning by itself, without any intermediate cause between it and its effect. By contrast, the one who kindles the fire brings about the burning with the fire alone as an intermediate; and the one who commands that the fire be kindled brings about the burning by means of two other intermediate causes: the fire and the one who kindles it.And so some causes bring about by themselves that which they are said to bring about, whereas others bring about something that is then adequate to produce that same effect, in which case the cause is remote.

It does sometimes happen, however, that an effect is primarily attributed to the cause that brings about something else rather than to the cause that brings about that same effect by itself. For example, we attribute to a ruler that which is done by his command and authority; and we say of someone who does something because of which he is killed that he was killed by himself rather than by someone else.

Now just as some efficient causes are proximate causes that bring about by themselves what they are said to bring about,whereas others are remote causes that bring it about through an intermediary, the same is true in non-efficient causes. For the iron of a sword is a proximate cause and in its way brings about the sword through itself, without there being any other cause as an intermediate; and earth, from which iron is made, is a remote cause of the sword, bringing it about through something else, that is, through an intermediate, which is the iron. For every cause has causes, all the way up to God, the supreme cause of all, who, because he is the cause of all things that are anything, has no cause.Also, every effect has many causes, and causes of different kinds, except for the first effect, when the supreme cause alone created all things. Indeed, in the killing of one human being the one who kills is a cause, as is the one who commands the killing, as is that on account of which he is killed, as well as the place and the time apart from which the killing is not done, as well as many others.

Also, some causes are said to bring about [facere] by acting [faciendo], but others by not acting—and sometimes not merely by not acting but by not

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even existing.For in this way someone who does not prevent bad things is said to bring it about that they exist, and someone who does not bring about good things is said to bring it about that they do not exist.And in the same way, just as when teaching is present it brings it about that good things exist and bad things do not exist, so too when it is absent, we affirm that through its absence it brings it about that bad things exist and good things do not exist. But these sorts of causes are included among those that are said to bring about by not acting.

Now although causes are quite commonly said to bring something about not through themselves but through another, that is, through an intermediate—for which reason they can be called remote causes in such a case— nonetheless, every cause has its own proximate effect that it brings about through itself and of which it is the proximate cause. For example, someone who lights a fire is the proximate cause of the fire, and through the fire as an intermediate he brings about burning, of which he is the remote cause. So when something is a proximate cause it is said properly to bring about, because it brings about through itself; whereas when something is a remote cause, it is said to bring about [the remote effect] on the grounds that it brings about something else [that in turn brings about the remote effect].

Every cause is either being or non-being, and similarly, every effect is either being or non-being, since every cause either brings about being or brings about non-being. Now by 'being' I mean everything that is expressed without a negation, whether in one word or in more than one, and by 'non-being' I mean what is said by means of a negation.When the sun is named, a being is said, but it is not yet signified to be a cause. Likewise, when I say 'shines', I say something, but I do not yet signify that it is an effect of something. But when

I say "The sun shines," 'sun' is the cause and 'shines' the effect, and each of them is something and a being, since the sun has its being and brings it about that light has being.So in this case the cause is a being and the effect is a being.

On the other hand, if I say "The sun brings it about that it is not night," in this case the cause is a being and the effect a non-being. Similarly, I can express a being using a plurality of words. For example, the sun's being over the earth is something, and it brings it about that it is day and that it is not night.

Here a being brings about both a being and a non-being. The sun's not being over the earth brings it about that it is night and that it is not day. In that sentence a non-being brings about both a being and a non-being. Just as that which is said to bring about is clearly a cause, so too that which in any way is signified to be a cause brings about the thing whose cause it is said to be. For example, if one says,"It is day, and it is not night, on account of the presence of the sun," or "It is night and it is not day, on account of the absence of the sun," that is the same as saying,"The presence of the sun brings it about that it is day and that it is not night" and "The absence of the sun brings it about

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that it is night and that it is not day." And so someone who says,"My knees are weak from fasting and my flesh has been transformed because of oil,"24 is saying the same as this: "Fasting has weakened my knees and oil has transformed my flesh"; but fasting did this because it was present and oil because it was absent, that is, because it was not present. For often some cause is said to bring about being and non-being by means of its presence and absence, even though 'presence' and 'absence' are not said explicitly—as, for example, in "The sun makes day exist and not exist, and it makes night exist and not exist." But it brings about some things by means of its presence and others by means of its absence.

[10. On the senses of 'something'] We say 'something' in four ways:

1. What we properly call 'something' is what is uttered by means of its name and is conceived in the mind and exists in reality, such as a stone or a log. For these things are named by means of their own terms and are conceived in the mind and exist in reality.

2. What has a name and a mental conception but does not exist in reality, such as a chimera, is also called 'something'. For a certain mental conception in the likeness of an animal is signified by this name; nevertheless, a chimera does not exist in reality.

3. We are also accustomed to call 'something' that which has only a name, without any conception of that name in the mind, and which is without any being at all, such as injustice and nothing. For we say that injustice is something when we claim that someone who is punished for injustice is punished for something.And we say that nothing is something if we say something like

"Something is nothing" or "Something is not nothing," since whether the statement is true or false, we are saying that 'something' is affirmed of something or that 'something' is denied of something. Nonetheless,'injustice' and 'nothing' have no conception in the mind, although they do constitute an understanding in the way that indefinite names do. You see, to constitute an understanding is not the same as to constitute something in the understanding.'Not-man'25 constitutes an understanding because it makes someone who hears it understand that man is not contained in, but rather is excluded from, the signification of this word.It does not,however,constitute something in the understanding that is the significate of this word, in the way that 'man' consti24 Psalm 109:24 (108:24).

25 'Not-man' is offered as an example of an indefinite name.

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tutes a certain conception of that which this name signifies. In this way 'injustice' excludes required justice and does not posit anything else in the understanding, and 'nothing' excludes something and does not posit anything in the understanding.

4. We even call 'something' that which does not have its own name or any conception or any existence, as when we say that a non-being is something and a non-being exists. For when we say that the sun's not being above the earth makes it not be day, if every cause is called 'something' and every effect is called 'something', we will not deny that the sun's not being above the earth and its not being day are something, since one is a cause and the other an effect. Now we say that a non-being exists when someone denies that something exists and we reply by asserting that it is just as he says it is—when in fact, if we were speaking properly, we ought rather to say that it is not just as he says it is not.

Therefore, although 'something' is predicated in four ways, in only one of them is 'something' predicated properly; the others are not something but quasi-something (because we speak of them as if [quasi] they were something).

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