Monologion: Chapter 15
MONOLOGION
through all things and in all things. Now no created thing can in any way pass beyond the immensity of the Creator and Sustainer,* but it would be absurd to claim that in the same way the Creator and Sustainer cannot in any way go beyond the totality of the things he made. It is therefore clear that he undergirds and transcends, that he encompasses and penetrates all other things.
Therefore, if these conclusions are joined to the ones we discovered earlier, it is he who exists in all things and through all things, and from whom and through whom and in whom all things exist.9
Chapter 15 What can or cannot be said of him substantially* Now I am strongly and quite reasonably moved to inquire, as diligently as I can, which of all the things that can be said of something can be applied substantially to such an astounding nature. For I would be amazed if we could find any noun or verb that we apply to things made from nothing that could be appropriately said of the substance that creates all things. Nevertheless, we must try to see what conclusion reason will lead us to in our investigation.
And so with respect to relatives,* at least, no one doubts that none of them is said substantially of the thing of which it is said relatively.Therefore,if something is said relatively of the supreme nature, it does not signify his substance.
And so it is clear that whatever can be said of him relatively—the fact that he is supreme among all things, or that he is greater than all the things that he made, or anything else like these—does not designate his natural essence. For if none of those things in relation to which he is said to be supreme or greater had ever existed, he would not be understood as supreme or greater; but he would not on that account be any less good, and his essential greatness would in no way be diminished. This is an obvious conclusion from the fact that he has whatever goodness or greatness he has, not through another but through himself. So given that the supreme nature can be understood as not supreme and yet as in no way greater or less than when he is understood as supreme among all things, it is clear that 'supreme' does not simply signify that essence, who is in every way greater and better than whatever is not what he is. And what reason shows us about 'supreme' is found to be similar in the case of similarly relative terms.
And so, having dismissed those things that are said relatively, since none of them simply refers to the essence of anything, let us turn our attention toward other things that must be discussed. And indeed, if one looks carefully at each
9 Cf. Romans 11:36:"For from him and through him and in him all things exist."
BASIC WRITINGS
of them, whatever there is (other than relatives) is either such that _____ is in every respect better than not-_____,or such that not-_____ is in some respect better than _____. By "_____" and "not-_____" here I simply mean true and not-true, body and not-body, and so on.10
Now [some things are such that] it is in every respect better to be _____ than not-_____, for example, wise than not-wise: that is, it is better to be wise than not-wise. For although a just person who is not wise seems to be better than a wise person who is not just,11 it is not better in an unqualified* sense to be not-wise than to be wise. Indeed, whatever is not-wise in an unqualified sense, insofar as it is not-wise, is less than what is wise, since everything that is not-wise would be better if it were wise. Similarly, it is in every respect better to be true than not, that is, than not-true, and just than not-just, and living than not-living.
By contrast, [some things are such that] it is in some respect better to be not_____ than to be _____: for example, not-gold than gold. For it is better for a human being to be not-gold than gold, even though perhaps it would be better for something—say, for lead—to be gold than not-gold. For although both a human being and lead are not-gold, a human being is better than gold in proportion as he would be of an inferior nature if he were gold, and lead is baser in proportion as it would be more precious if it were gold.
But many relatives do not fall under this division at all, as is evident from the fact that the supreme nature can be understood as not-supreme, in such a way that supreme is not in every respect better than not-supreme,and not-supreme is not in some respect better than supreme. I shall not stop to ask whether some relatives do fall under it, since for our present purposes what is already known about them is enough: none of them designates the simple* substance of the supreme nature.
As for everything else, if each is considered individually, either _____ is better than not-_____, or not-_____ is in some respect better than _____.
Therefore, just as it is impious to think that the substance of the supreme nature is something that it is in some way better not to be, so he must be whatever it is in every respect better to be than not to be. For he alone is that than
10 Where I have a blank,Anselm has ipsum,"the very same thing."His point is that you must fill in both blanks with the same word and then apply the test that he explains. If _____ is in every respect better than not-_____, then _____ can be said substantially of God. But if not-_____ is in some respect better than _____, _____ cannot be said substantially of God.
(I owe this device to Paul Vincent Spade, trans. and ed., Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994], p. 42, where it appears in a somewhat different context.) 11 Bear in mind that "just" here means "morally upright."