Monologion: Chapter 21
MONOLOGION
Chapter 21 That he exists in no place or time Now if this is so, either he exists as a whole in every place or time, or only part of him does, so that another part exists outside every place and time. But if he partly exists and partly does not exist in every place or time, he has parts, which is false. Therefore, he does not partly exist everywhere and always.
But then how does he exist as a whole everywhere and always? This could be understood in two ways: either he exists as a whole all at once in all places and times and by parts in each individual place and time, or he exists as a whole even in each individual place and time.Now if he exists by parts in each individual place and time, he does not escape the composition and division of parts. And that, as we have found,21 is altogether foreign to the supreme nature. Therefore, he does not exist as a whole in all places and times in such a way that he exists by parts in each individual place or time.
The other possibility remains to be discussed, namely, how the supreme nature exists as a whole both in all times and places and in each of them individually.This of course can only be the case either all at once or at different times.
Now up to this point a single pursuit has been able at once to trail both the argument about place and that about time, since they have followed the same tracks. But at this point they part ways; they seem, as it were, to flee from disputation along disparate paths.They must therefore be investigated in separate discussions. Therefore, we shall first see whether the supreme nature can exist as a whole in individual places either all at once or at different times.Then we shall ask the same question about times.22
So, if he exists as a whole in individual places, individual wholes exist in individual places. For just as one place is distinct from another place, in such a way that they are individual places, what exists as a whole in one place is distinct from what at the same time exists as a whole in another place, in such a way that they are individual wholes. For if something exists as a whole in a given place, there is nothing of that thing that does not exist in that place.
Now if there is nothing of a thing that does not exist in a given place, then there is nothing of that thing that exists at the same time outside that place.
Therefore, if something exists as a whole in a given place, there is nothing of it that exists at the same time outside that place. Now if there is nothing of a thing that exists outside some place, there is nothing of that thing that exists at the same time in some other place.Therefore, if something exists as a whole
21 In Chapter 17.
22 That is, whether the supreme nature can exist as a whole at individual times either all at once or at different times.
BASIC WRITINGS
in a given place, there is nothing of it that exists at the same time in some other place. So if something exists as a whole in a given place, how can that whole exist at the same time in some other place, if nothing of it can exist in any other place?
Therefore, since one whole cannot exist as a whole all at once in individual places, it follows that if anything exists as a whole all at once in distinct places, it exists as individual wholes in individual places. And so if the supreme nature exists as a whole at one time in all individual places, there are as many individual supreme natures as there can be individual places, which is an irrational view to hold. Therefore, he does not exist as a whole at one time in individual places. On the other hand, if he exists as a whole in individual places at different times, then as long as he exists in one place, there is no good and no essence in the other places, since without him nothing at all exists. But the places themselves show that this is absurd, since they are not nothing, but something. And so the supreme nature does not exist as a whole in individual places at different times. So, if he does not exist as a whole in individual places either at the same time or at different times, it is clear that he in no way exists as a whole in all individual places.
Now we must investigate whether that same supreme nature exists as a whole at individual times, either all at once or distinctly at individual times.
But how does something exist as a whole at individual times all at once if those times themselves do not exist all at once? On the other hand, if he exists as a whole separately and distinctly at individual times, in the way that a human being exists as a whole yesterday, today, and tomorrow, then it is correct to say that he existed and exists and will exist. Therefore, his life, which is nothing other than his eternity, does not exist as a whole all at once; instead, it is prolonged by parts through the parts of time.
Now his eternity is nothing other than himself. So it would follow that the supreme essence is divided into parts in accordance with the distinction of times. For if his life is produced by means of the flow of times, he has a past, present, and future along with those times. But what is his life, or the duration of his existence, other than his eternity? Therefore, since his eternity is nothing other than his essence (as the argument laid out above23 proves beyond doubt), if his eternity has a past, present, and future, it follows that his essence also has a past, present, and future. Now what is past is not present or future, and what is present is not future or past, and what is future is not past or present.
So how will our conclusion survive,which became clear above24 by a rational and evident necessity—namely,that the supreme nature is in no way composite,but 23 In Chapters 16 and 17.
24 In Chapter 17.