Article 2: Are people who keep their time free for spiritual works excused from this commandment?

Article 2: Are people who keep their time free for spiritual works excused from this commandment?

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. The substance of bread and the body of Christ both seem to be under those outward appearances in the same instant:

1. Take the last instant the bread is there and the first instant the body of Christ is there. Now, they are either two instants or one. They are not two, however, for then there would be some time that neither the body of Christ nor the substance of bread was there, since there is an intervening time between any two instants.³² Hence, they have to be one instant. Therefore, the body of Christ and the bread are both there in the same instant.

2. If you say that there is no last instant the bread is there, I reply to the contrary: The existence of bread is measured by a certain time. But a thing’s own measure is equal to the thing measured. Hence, the bread is there in every instant of that time, and therefore also in its last instant.

3. An instant relates to instantaneous change in the way that time relates to continuous change. But time includes both endpoints of continuous change. So, one instant includes both endpoints of transubstantiation—an instantaneous change whose endpoints are the bread and the body of Christ. Therefore, the bread and the body of Christ are both there in the same instant.

4. With any instantaneous change it is simultaneously true to say that it comes about and that it has come about, since an instant has no before and after. So, since transubstantiation is an instantaneous change, it is simultaneously true to say that Christ’s body comes about and that it has come about. Yet Christ’s body is a permanent thing, and permanent things are not there when they are coming about; they are only there when they have come about. Hence, Christ’s body is simultaneously there and not there. But the substance of bread is there whenever Christ’s body is not. Therefore, the body of Christ and the substance of bread are both there simultaneously in the same instant.

But to the contrary: Two unrelated substantial forms cannot inhere in the same thing in the same instant. But the form of bread and the form of Christ’s body are two such forms. Therefore, they cannot simultaneously inhere in the same thing in the same instant.

Answer: There is no way that the body of Christ and the substance of bread are both there in the same instant. Nor can we assign a last instant the bread is there but, rather, a last time, which continues until the first instant the body of Christ is there.

To see why, notice that the instantaneous changes of natural things are always endpoints of other changes. The reason is that the endpoints of such changes are a form and its privation. The endpoints of fire’s generation, for instance, are fire and not fire. But there is no midpoint between a form and its privation, except incidentally, insofar as something deprived of a form approaches the form to a greater or lesser degree by being disposed for the form that it is heading toward or losing through continuous change. Accordingly, alteration has two endpoints. One is of its own kind—namely the final disposition, which is the necessity for a form, since alteration is a change in quality.³³ The other is of another kind—namely a substantial form. In the same way, illumination is the endpoint of the sun’s locomotion—an instantaneous change to the form of light from its privation, viz. darkness. With any change measured by time, however, its last endpoint has to occupy the last instant of that time. Hence, since a substantial form is one of the endpoints of alteration, the substantial form has to be introduced in the last instant of that time. But corruption and generation happen simultaneously, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another.³⁴ Hence, the last instant of that time has to contain both the endpoint of one thing’s corruption, such as air, and the endpoint of another thing’s generation, such as fire. Moreover, the endpoint of corruption is nonexistence. Hence, the last instant of that time has to be the first instant that air does not exist, and the first instant that fire does exist. But we cannot select a second to last instant before the last instant of that time, since there is an intervening time between any two instants, as the Philosopher says.³⁵ Hence, there is no selecting a last instant the air exists. Rather, the air existed the whole time that measured the change of alteration, whose last instant is the first instant that air does not exist, and the first instant that fire does exist. Similarly, transubstantiation is the endpoint of a change that consists in uttering certain words. Hence, the last instant that measures their utterance is the first instant the bread is not there, and the first instant the body of Christ is there. So, we cannot give a last instant the bread is there but, rather, a last time. And nothing has to intervene between time and an instant, just as nothing has to intervene between a line and a point. So, there does not have to be any time when neither the bread nor the body of Christ is there.

1. That makes the reply to the first objection clear.

2. To the second objection: Adding or subtracting a point from a line does not make it any longer or shorter. The same goes for an instant added or subtracted from time. Hence, even though the bread is not there in the last instant of the time that measures the bread’s existence, it does not follow that the time is longer than the duration of the bread’s existence, and thus that the measure is not equal to the thing measured.

3. To the third objection: An instant measures instantaneous change inasmuch as it measures the point at which it ends, since the point from which it begins is joined to the whole preceding time, and is thus measured by the time that measures the preceding change. But time measures change by reason of both endpoints. So, the two cases are not alike.

4. To the fourth objection: There are two senses of coming about. In one sense, it means moving toward existence. In this sense, what is being generated is said to come about the whole time of the preceding alteration. This is the sense of coming about that the Philosopher discusses in book VI of the Physics, where he shows that every coming about is preceded by having come about, and having come about is preceded by coming about.³⁶ But it is not true in this sense that something simultaneously comes about and has come about, although it is true that what is coming about is not there. In another sense, however, a thing comes about when its form is introduced. Coming about in this sense does not mean moving toward existence but, rather, ending that movement. Hence, just as movement simultaneously ends and has ended, something simultaneously comes about and has come about. In this sense, what is coming about is there, since the endpoint of coming about is existence, which includes the existence of the thing coming about in this sense.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that God cannot make whiteness or any bodily quality exist without quantity:

1. Quantity is a body’s first attribute, since it adheres directly to a substance, as Boethius says.³⁷ But the first thing of any kind is the cause of those that follow, as it says in book II of the Metaphysics.³⁸ Hence, all other accidents are bodily attributes because of quantity. If quantity were taken away, therefore, no other bodily quality would remain.

2. A spiritual quality such as knowledge or virtue is nobler than a bodily quality. But not even a spiritual quality could exist miraculously without a subject. Much less, therefore, could a bodily quality exist without a subject, at least the subject of quantity.

3. Existing without any subject whatsoever is more foreign to the nature of a bodily quality than inhering in a spiritual subject. For inhering in a spiritual subject is natural to spiritual qualities, which are in the same category as bodily qualities. Whereas existing without any subject whatsoever is natural to substances, which are in another category. But not even a miracle could make a bodily quality inhere in a spiritual subject—for instance, whiteness in an angel. Much less, therefore, can a miracle make a bodily quality exist without a subject, at least quantity.

4. A quality depends more on a substance than the other way around. But God cannot make a created substance without any accidents, since a creature would at least have to have a relation to the creator. Much less, therefore, can God make a quality exist without any subject.

But to the contrary: The reason that quantity can be made to exist without a subject in the sacrament of the altar is that quantity differs in essence from a substance. Yet a quality differs in essence from quantity. For the same reason, therefore, a quality can be made to exist without quantity.

Answer: Since God’s power is infinite, we should ascribe to it anything that does not suggest it is lacking. Given the nature of creatures, however, there are some things that cannot possibly be made because they imply an inconsistency due to an implicit contradiction. People usually say that God can make such things, although they cannot possibly be made.

In order to see whether God can make whiteness exist without quantity, realize that there are two things to consider about whiteness or any other bodily quality. First, there is the very nature of whiteness, which makes it that specific kind of thing. Second, there is its individuation, which makes this sensible whiteness distinct from any other sensible whiteness. Now, a divine miracle could make the nature of whiteness subsist without any quantity, yet such whiteness would not be like this sensible whiteness; rather, it would be a certain intelligible form along the lines of the separate forms that Plato posited. But this sensible whiteness could not possibly be individuated without quantity, even though quantity can be individuated without a substance. For quantity is individuated not only by its subject, like other accidents, but also by its position, which belongs to the very nature of dimensional quantity, which is quantity with a position.³⁹ Hence, it is possible to imagine two separate lines of the same kind, yet numerically distinct because of their distinct positions (otherwise each kind of line would be indivisible by nature, since a line is only divided into lines). But it is impossible to imagine more than one whiteness of the same kind without a subject. That makes it clear that whiteness is only individuated by its subject, which is why it cannot possibly be individuated without inhering in a subject, at least in quantity. But quantity can be individuated even without a subject, and hence a miracle can make this sensible quantity exist even without a subject, as we see in the case of the body of Christ.

1. So, to the first objection: If whiteness existed without quantity, it would not be a bodily quality, but a spiritual one, as we just explained.

2. To the second objection: What we just said about a bodily quality should be said about a spiritual one as well.

3. To the third objection: Since a spiritual substance lacks quantity, a bodily quality can only inhere in a spiritual subject if it can exist without quantity in the way we just described.

4. To the fourth objection: The very fact that a created substance is related to God gives rise to a certain accident, such as the relation of creation or servitude or some other such relation. Hence, just as God cannot make a creature that does not depend on God, God cannot make a creature exist without any such accidents, although God can make a creature exist without any other accidents. But an accident does not have a subject in virtue of being related to God. So, there is no reason God cannot make an accident exist without a subject.

To the objection made to the contrary: Clearly the same reasoning does not apply to quantity and to quality, as what we have said makes clear.

Question 5

The next questions were about the bodies of the damned.

There were three such questions: (1) Will the bodies of the damned be incorruptible? (2) Will they rise with their deformities? and (3) Will they be punished in hell with bodily weeping and bodily worms?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that the bodies of the damned will not be incorruptible:

1. A body can only be incorruptible by nature (like a heavenly body), or by the grace of innocence (like the bodies of human beings in their first state), or by glory (like Christ’s body after the resurrection). But the bodies of the damned meet none of these conditions. Therefore, the bodies of the damned will not be incorruptible.

2. If you say that their bodies will be incorruptible because divine justice sentences them to be punished everlastingly, I reply to the contrary: Guilt only deserves an everlasting punishment if it is somehow everlasting itself. Yet guilt is not everlasting because of the body, but because of the will, which chooses to remain in sin everlastingly. Therefore, divine justice does not require the body to be punished eternally.

3. The body is only punished for the soul’s sin insofar as it serves as an organ of the soul that commits the sin. But the soul can commit acts of mortal sin in which the body plays no part, as is clear in the case of spiritual sins. If some people are damned for these sins alone, therefore, their bodies do not deserve everlasting punishment.

4. One is damned for sins of omission as much as for sins of transgression. But the body is not actively involved in omissions, and thus does not deserve everlasting punishment in the case of all the damned. Hence, divine justice does not require the bodies of the damned to be incorruptible. It follows, therefore, that they are corruptible.

But to the contrary: Removing a cause removes its effect.⁴⁰ But after the resurrection, the motion of the heavens—the cause of the corruption of bodies—will cease. Therefore, corruption will cease and, hence, the bodies of the damned will not be corruptible.

Answer: The bodies of the damned will indeed be incorruptible, but they will still be able to suffer. The primary and principal cause of their incorruptibility is divine justice, which will preserve the bodies of the damned in their everlasting punishments. Whereas the secondary and, as it were, assisting cause of their incorruptibility will be the motion of the heavens coming to rest. Once they come to rest, bodies will no longer be able to do or undergo anything related to a change in nature. Hence, the bodies of the damned will not suffer from fire in a way that affects their nature, changing the nature of the human body into something else. Rather, they will suffer from fire in a way that affects the soul, as when a sense organ receives the likeness of a sensible quality from a sensible object.

1. So, to the first objection: That argument is based on an insufficient division. For there is another cause of incorruptibility in addition to the three mentioned—namely a decree of divine justice. Still, in a sense one could also say that the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible by nature, insofar as the natural source of corruption (the motion of the heavens) is removed.

2. To the second objection: Sin gets both its guilty and its everlasting character from the soul, not the body. But the body is punished for sin insofar as it serves as an instrument for sin, which gets its guilty character from the soul. Hence, the body also deserves everlasting punishment insofar as it serves as an instrument for sin, which gets its everlastingness from the will.

3. To the third objection: The principal reason the body is punished for the soul’s sin is not that it serves as an instrument of the soul that commits the sin but, rather, that it is an essential part of the human being who commits the sin. For properly speaking, it is the human being who sins by means of the soul. So, if only the soul were punished, then the one who sinned—viz. the human being—would not be punished. Furthermore, it is not true that a human being performs some acts in this life in which the body takes no part. Although the body takes no part in the intellect’s acts as an instrument of those acts, it still takes part in them as what represents their object. For a mental image is the object of the intellect as color is the object of sight, as it says in book III of On the Soul.⁴¹ Yet a mental image does not exist without a bodily organ. Clearly, then, we use the body in some way both for acts of intellect and for other acts of the soul.

4. To the fourth objection: One is not damned for sins of omission because of doing something but, rather, because of failing to do what ought to be done. Yet the failure to do what ought to be done comes both from the soul and from the body, insofar as the body takes part in the soul’s acts. Accordingly, sins of transgression and of omission relate equally to the body and the soul.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that the bodies of the damned will rise without deformities:

The resurrection is accomplished by divine power, which is most perfect. But the action of a perfect power is itself perfect, as is its effect. Hence, the bodies of all those who rise will be perfect. Therefore, the bodies of the damned will rise without deformities.

But to the contrary: Wisdom 11 says: One is tormented by the very things by which one sins.⁴² But the damned sinned by means of bodies with deformities. Therefore, their bodies will rise with deformities.

Answer: A body can be deformed in two ways. It can be deformed in one way by lacking one of its members. But, as most people grant, the bodies of the damned will not be deformed in this way. For all of them will rise incorrupt⁴³—i.e., without lacking any of their members, so that the whole body of the reprobate may be punished and the whole body of the elect rewarded. A body can be deformed or defective in another way by having its parts improperly balanced. A fever, for instance, is due to an improper balance of humors, and a lump is due to an excess of flesh in some area. Now, there are two opinions about such deformities or defects. Some people focus on the damnation of the reprobate, who should lack nothing that is bad. Accordingly, these people say that the damned will not lack such deformities. But other people focus on the power of the one resurrecting them, who established nature in the work of creation, and will therefore restore nature in the resurrection. Accordingly, these people say that the author of nature will remove all the defects due to natural flaws, such as fevers and the like. (But the reprobate will retain the defects caused by their evil will, since these are the stain and guilt of their sins.) Now, which of these opinions is true? Augustine leaves that unanswered in the Enchiridion, where he says that no question should be raised about the beauty of those whose damnation is certain.⁴⁴

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that the bodies of the damned will be punished with bodily weeping and bodily worms:

1. The last chapter of Judith says: He will give fire and worms to their flesh.⁴⁵ But a spiritual worm is not given to the flesh; it is given to the soul. Therefore, the worm used to punish the reprobate will not only be spiritual but also bodily.

2. A certain gloss on Luke 13 says that the resurrection of bodies can be proven true by the weeping with which the Lord threatens the reprobate.⁴⁶ But such a proof would be impossible if that weeping were only spiritual. Therefore, etc.

But to the contrary:

1. The worm used to punish the reprobate is immortal. As the last chapter of Isaiah says: Their worm shall not die.⁴⁷ But the only animals that are to enjoy immortality are human beings. Therefore, that worm will not be bodily.

2. Bodily weeping involves shedding tears. But any finite body that sheds continuously will eventually be completely consumed, unless it has something restored to it. Yet the bodies of the damned will not have what they lose restored to them. Therefore, it seems that their everlasting weeping will not be bodily.

Answer: Augustine presents different opinions about this in book XX of The City of God. He says: Among the punishments of the wicked, the inextinguishable fire and the undying worm are interpreted differently by different people. Some people refer both to the body. Some people refer both to the soul. Some people refer the fire to the body, and the worm metaphorically to the soul, which seems more believable.⁴⁸ Following Augustine, then, we say that the worm will be spiritual: the gnawing of conscience eating away at the soul from within can be called a worm. The weeping will be spiritual as well: such suffering can be called weeping. Yet there is a sense in which the weeping could be bodily even without the shedding of tears: not only can the soul’s suffering be called weeping but so can the disposition that relates the body to the suffering soul.

1. So, to the first objection: That line from Isaiah is tropological. Hence, we can interpret flesh to mean the souls of the impious, who were fleshly.

2. To the second objection: Bodily weeping without shedding tears in the sense just mentioned is sufficient to imply the truth of the resurrection. But if someone insisted on the worms and the weeping being bodily, then we could say that God’s power will sustain the worms and restore the lost tears.

Question 6

The next questions were about the senses of sacred scripture. There were three such questions: (1) Do the words of sacred scripture have other hidden spiritual senses in addition to their literal sense? (2) How many senses of sacred scripture are there? and (3) Are these senses found in other writings?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. One and the same words of sacred scripture do not seem to have several hidden senses:

1. Words employed once are not to be used equivocally or in multiple ways.⁴⁹ But having several senses multiplies an expression. Therefore, one and the same expression of sacred scripture cannot have several hidden senses.

2. Sacred scripture has the purpose of illuminating the intellect, as it says in the Psalms: The declaration of your words gives light, etc.⁵⁰ But many senses cloud the intellect. Therefore, sacred scripture should not have many senses.

3. Sacred scripture should avoid occasions for error. But adding other senses to the literal sense of scripture could be an occasion for error, since people could then interpret scripture however they wanted in order to confirm their own opinions. Therefore, sacred scripture should not have several senses.

4. In book II of his Literal Commentary on Genesis, Augustine says that the authority of sacred scripture is greater than anything of which the human mind is capable.⁵¹ So, a sense without the authority to settle anything is not a sense suitable for sacred scripture. But only the literal sense is firm enough to settle anything. Dionysius makes this clear in his letter to Titus, where he says that symbolic theology—the sort based upon similarities—is not argumentative.⁵² Therefore, sacred scripture does not have other senses in addition to its literal sense.

5. Any sense drawn from the words of scripture that its author did not intend is not its own proper sense, but a foreign one. Yet the author of one part of scripture can only have had one thing in mind, since it is impossible to think of more than one thing at a time, as the Philosopher says.⁵³ Therefore, sacred scripture cannot possibly have several proper senses of its own.

But to the contrary: Daniel 12 says: Many will run about and knowledge shall multiply.⁵⁴ Furthermore, when he speaks about Revelation in his prologue to the Bible, Jerome says: Each and every word of it has several hidden meanings.⁵⁵

Answer: God gave us sacred scripture to show us the truth necessary for salvation. But there are two ways to show or express any truth. One way is with things, and another is with words. For words signify things, and one thing can stand figuratively for another. Now, the author of sacred scripture—the Holy Spirit—is not only the author of its words but also of the things it mentions. Hence, its author can put words together to signify something, but can also position things to stand figuratively for other things. Accordingly, sacred scripture shows the truth in two ways. It does so in one way insofar as its words signify things, which is its literal sense. It does so in another way insofar as the things it mentions stand figuratively for other things, which is its spiritual sense. Thus, sacred scripture admits of several senses.

1. So, to the first objection: Having various senses only multiplies an expression when one of its senses does not follow from another. But the spiritual sense is always based on and follows from the literal sense. Hence, interpreting sacred scripture literally and spiritually does not multiply it.

2. To the second objection: As Augustine says in his book On Christian Doctrine, God has usefully arranged for the truth of sacred scripture to be shown with some difficulty.⁵⁶ It usefully holds our interest, since difficult things require more attention, which staves off boredom. It also eliminates the occasion for pride when people have difficulty grasping the truth of sacred scripture. And it protects the truth of scripture from being mocked by unbelievers. Hence in Matthew 7 our Lord says: Do not give what is holy to dogs.⁵⁷ And Dionysius warns Timothy to keep holy things from being contaminated by unclean ones.⁵⁸ Clearly, then, it is advantageous for the truth of our faith to be communicated through different senses of scripture.

3. To the third objection: As Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, no passage of scripture communicates anything obscurely that another does not express clearly.⁵⁹ Hence, the spiritual interpretation of scripture should always rest on some literal interpretation, which then avoids every occasion for error.

4. To the fourth objection: Effective arguments cannot make use of the spiritual sense, not because it lacks authority but because of the very nature of similarity, on which the spiritual sense is based. Since one thing can be similar to many others, nothing about any of them in particular can be derived from what scripture says about that one thing: such an inference would be fallacious. For example, because of some similarity, a lion is used to signify both Christ and the devil. Hence, what scripture says about a lion cannot form the basis of an argument inferring anything about either one of them.

5. To the fifth objection: The principal author of sacred scripture is the Holy Spirit, who can have many more things in mind with one word of sacred scripture than the commentators on sacred scripture can even set out. Nor is there anything unacceptable about a person serving as an instrumental author of sacred scripture and having more than one thing in mind with one word of scripture. As Jerome says in his comments on Hosea, the prophets spoke of present occurrences while also intending to signify future ones.⁶⁰ Hence, it is not impossible to think of more than one thing at a time when one of them stands for the other.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that we should not distinguish four senses of sacred scripture—historical or literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical:

1. Just as sacred scripture speaks figuratively of Christ, so it also speaks figuratively of other people. Daniel 8, for instance, uses a he-goat to signify the king of the Greeks.⁶¹ But that figurative way of speaking does not give sacred scripture another sense in addition to its literal sense. Therefore, we should not count the allegorical sense, which concerns how things stand figuratively for Christ, as another sense in addition to the historical sense.

2. Head and members belong to the same person. But the allegorical sense is about the head of the Church, viz. Christ, whereas the moral sense is about the members of his body, viz. the faithful. Therefore, we should not distinguish the moral from the allegorical sense.

3. The moral sense gives instructions about morality. But many passages of sacred scripture give instructions about morality in their literal sense. Therefore, we should not distinguish the moral from the literal sense.

4. Christ is head of the Church militant as much as of the Church triumphant. For there is only one Christ. Therefore, we should not have one anagogical sense about the Church triumphant, and another allegorical sense about Christ and the Church militant.

5. If these four senses were necessary to sacred scripture, then every part of scripture would have these four senses. But not every part of scripture has all four senses. As Augustine says in his comments on Genesis, some passages only have a literal sense.⁶² Therefore, these four senses are not necessary for the interpretation of sacred scripture.

But to the contrary:

1. At the beginning of his Literal Commentary on Genesis, Augustine says: In all the holy books we have to attend to what eternal realities they describe, what past events they record, what future events they foretell, and what actions they command.⁶³ But the first things relate to the anagogical sense, the second to the historical sense, the third to the allegorical sense, and the fourth to the moral sense. Therefore, there are four senses of sacred scripture.

2. At the beginning of his comments on Genesis, Bede says: There are four senses of sacred scripture: history, which narrates past events; allegory, which takes one thing for another; tropology, i.e. moral speech, which addresses the moral order; and anagogy, which leads us above by addressing ultimate and heavenly things.⁶⁴

Answer: We should distinguish the four senses of sacred scripture as follows. As we have said, sacred scripture shows the truth that it communicates with words and with things used figuratively. Showing the truth with words gives scripture its historical or literal sense. Hence, everything relevant to its literal sense can be gathered straight from the signification of its words. But, as we have said, scripture’s spiritual sense consists in things standing figuratively for other things. The sense involving this use of figures is called the spiritual sense because visible things usually stand figuratively for invisible things, as Dionysius says.⁶⁵ Now, the truth that sacred scripture shows by using things figuratively has two aims: right belief and right action. When scripture aims at right action, that is its moral sense, which is also called its tropological sense. But when scripture aims at right belief, we have to make a distinction based on how it aims at various beliefs. As Dionysius says in chapter 4 of The Celestial Hierarchy, the Church stands midway between the synagogue and the Church triumphant: the Old Testament was a figure of the New, and the Old and New Testaments together are a figure of heaven.⁶⁶ Accordingly, the spiritual sense of scripture aimed at right belief can be based on the figurative use of the Old Testament for the New, which is its allegorical or typological sense. This is the sense in which things that happened in the Old Testament are interpreted as speaking of Christ and the Church. But the spiritual sense of scripture aimed at right belief can also be based on the figurative use of the Old and New Testaments together to signify the Church triumphant, which is its anagogical sense.

1. So, to the first objection: The he-goat and other such things that scripture uses to refer to people other than Christ were not real things; they were imaginary representations used to signify those people. Hence, the use of such representations to signify and designate those people or kings only concerns the historical sense. But some things that truly happened are also used as shadows of the truth to signify Christ. Hence, the use of such things to signify Christ or the members of his body gives scripture another sense in addition to the historical sense, viz. the allegorical sense. But when such imaginary representations are used to signify Christ, that way of signifying him remains within the literal sense. Christ is signified that way in Daniel 2, for instance, by the stone cut out of the mountain without hands.⁶⁷

2. To the second objection: The allegorical sense is not only about Christ the head but also about the members of his body. The twelve stones chosen from the Jordan in Joshua 7, for instance, signify the twelve apostles.⁶⁸ Yet the moral sense is not about the members of Christ’s body considered as his members but, rather, with a view to their own proper actions.

3. To the third objection: The moral sense is not just any sense that gives instructions about morality; it is the sense that gives instructions about morality based on some similarity with past actions. That is why the moral sense is part of the spiritual sense. Clearly, then, the moral and the literal senses are never the same.

4. To the fourth objection: Just as the allegorical sense is about Christ as head of the Church militant (justifying and infusing the Church with grace), so the anagogical sense is about Christ as head of the Church triumphant (glorifying the Church).

5. To the fifth objection: These four senses are not attributed to sacred scripture as though every part of it should be interpreted in these four senses. Rather, sometimes it has all four, sometimes three, sometimes two, and sometimes only one. Sacred scripture especially uses earlier things to stand figuratively for later things. So, when the literal sense of sacred scripture says something about an earlier thing, it can be interpreted spiritually as speaking of a later thing, although the reverse does not hold. Now, among all the things that sacred scripture recounts, the first relate to the Old Testament. So, things we see done in the literal sense of the Old Testament can be interpreted in all four senses. The second things recounted by scripture relate to the state of the present Church. Among these things, those relating to the head come before those relating to the members. For the true body of Christ and its experiences are a figure of the mystical body of Christ and its experiences. But we also ought to take Christ as the example for our lives, and our future glory is revealed in him as well. Hence, things said literally about Christ the head can be interpreted allegorically as referring to his mystical body. They can also be interpreted morally as referring to our actions, which ought to take their shape from him. The same things can also be interpreted anagogically insofar as our path to glory is revealed in Christ. But when the literal sense says something about the Church, it cannot be interpreted allegorically, except perhaps insofar as what it says about the early Church is interpreted as speaking about the future state of the present Church. Nevertheless, what it says about the Church can be interpreted morally and anagogically. However, what scripture says about morality in the literal sense can usually only be interpreted anagogically. And what the literal sense says about the state of glory can usually only be interpreted in that sense: such things do not stand figuratively for other things; all other things stand figuratively for them.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that we should distinguish these same senses in other writings as well:

1. The spiritual sense of sacred scripture is based on certain similarities. But other disciplines make use of similarities as well. Therefore, spiritual senses can be found in the writings of other disciplines.

2. The art of poetry indicates the truth about things with certain fictitious representations. Therefore, spiritual senses seem to be found in the writings of poets, not just in sacred scripture.

3. According to the Philosopher, the person who says one thing, in a certain sense says many.⁶⁹ Hence, it seems that in other disciplines many things can be indicated with one sense. Therefore, not only sacred scripture has these spiritual senses.

But to the contrary: In book XX of his Morals, Gregory says: Sacred scripture surpasses all other branches of knowledge and teaching even by its manner of expression, for in one and the same speech it both recounts events and proclaims mysteries.⁷⁰

Answer: The spiritual sense of sacred scripture stems from the fact that things happening in their own course also signify something else, which is captured by the spiritual sense. Now, positioning things in their own course so that they can be used to signify other things is the sole prerogative of the one whose providence governs things—namely God alone. Just as human beings can use words or fictitious representations to signify things, God uses the course of things subject to divine providence in order to signify other things. But signifying things with words or with fictitious representations whose sole purpose is to signify such things does not make for anything but the literal sense, as is clear from what we said earlier. Properly speaking, therefore, only the literal sense can be found in any branch of knowledge developed by human effort. The other senses are only to be found in writings whose author is the Holy Spirit, with human beings serving only as instruments, as the Psalmist says: My tongue is the pen of a scribe, etc.⁷¹

1. So, to the first objection: Other disciplines make use of similarities in their arguments, but they do not do so with words that signify one thing in order to signify other things as well.

2. To the second objection: Poetic fictions only relate to other things for the purpose of signifying them. Hence, their use to signify such things remains within the realm of the literal sense.

3. To the third objection: The person who says one thing, says many in a certain sense—namely potentially, insofar as conclusions are contained potentially in premises. For many conclusions follow from just one premise. But other disciplines do not signify things in such a way that what they say about one thing is simultaneously understood to be about other things signified as well, although of course conclusions can be drawn about other things from what they say about one.

Question 7

The next questions were about manual labor. There were two such questions: (1) Is working with your hands a commandment? and (2) Are people who keep their time free for spiritual works excused from this commandment?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Working with your hands seems to be a commandment:

1. 2 Thessalonians 3 says: If anyone will not work, let him not eat. For we hear, etc.⁷² The gloss says: I command this, therefore, since we hear.⁷³ Therefore, etc.

2. In his book The Work of Monks, Augustine says: Therefore, let those to whom the Apostle gave this command, those who do not have this power, listen.⁷⁴

3. As the law says, no one ought to be excommunicated except for mortal sin.⁷⁵ But the only way to sin mortally is by doing something against a commandment. Now, those who avoid manual labor can be lawfully excommunicated. 2 Thessalonians 3 makes this clear when it says: If anyone does not obey what we say in this letter, note that man, and have nothing to do with him, that he may be ashamed.⁷⁶ Therefore, working with your hands seems to be a commandment.

4. Those who have sinned are bound by the force of a commandment to suffer the punishment due for sin. But in Adam all have sinned, as Romans 5 says.⁷⁷ And manual labor is the punishment for Adam’s sin. As Genesis 3 says: By the sweat of your brow you shall eat your bread.⁷⁸ Therefore, all are commanded to work with their hands.

5. Ephesians 4 says: Let the one who used to steal no longer steal, but rather let him labor, doing work with his hands.⁷⁹ The gloss says: let each one labor not only doing work through his servants, but also with his own hands. Yet what applies to everyone is a commandment, not a counsel. Therefore, etc.

6. Manual labor is necessary to preserve our bodily life, just as acts of virtue are necessary to preserve our spiritual life. But acts of virtue are commanded. Therefore, so is working with our hands.

7. What leads to mortal sin cannot be done without mortal sin. But not working leads to not eating, which can sometimes be a mortal sin. As 2 Thessalonians 3 says: Anyone who does not work, let him not eat.⁸⁰ Therefore, not working with your hands is a mortal sin, and hence its opposite is a commandment.

But to the contrary:

1. A commandment does not contradict another commandment or counsel. But in Matthew 6, the Lord either commands or counsels: Do not be anxious about your life, etc.⁸¹ Yet manual labor contradicts this, since those who work with their hands are anxious about bodily needs. Therefore, manual labor is not a commandment.

2. The moral demands of the Old Law sufficiently contained the things necessary for salvation. Hence in Matthew 18, the Lord says: If you would enter into life, keep the commandments.⁸² And he is talking about the Ten Commandments. Hence he adds: You shall not kill, You shall not steal.⁸³ But the demands of the Old Law contain nothing about manual labor. Therefore, manual labor is not a commandment.

3. Everyone is bound to keep the commandments. But not everyone is bound to do manual labor, otherwise rich people who do not work with their hands would be guilty of mortal sin. Therefore, manual labor is not a commandment.

4. Religious are not more bound to keep the commandments than seculars. But religious seem more bound to do manual labor than seculars. Hence in his book The Work of Monks, Augustine reprimands monks—and no others—for not working with their hands. Therefore, etc.

5. Practicing the liberal arts is nobler than practicing the mechanical arts, which consist of manual labor. But practicing the liberal arts is not a commandment. Much less, therefore, is manual labor.

Answer: Each thing should be judged by reference to the end at which it is aimed. Now, manual labor is found useful for three things. First, it is useful for avoiding idleness. Hence Jerome says to a country monk: always be doing some work, so that the devil may find you occupied.⁸⁴ And he is clearly thinking of manual labor, given what he adds: Or weave a basket out of bulrush.⁸⁵ And afterward he adds: Every idle person has longings.⁸⁶ Second, manual labor is useful for mastering the body. Hence the Apostle mentions it among other mortifications of the flesh in 2 Corinthians 6, where he says: in labors.⁸⁷ The gloss says: works, since he was working with his hands.⁸⁸ And he adds: in fasts, in vigils, etc.⁸⁹ Third, manual labor is aimed at making a living. As Acts 20 says: These hands provided the things necessary for me and for those who were with me.⁹⁰ Now, if we consider manual labor insofar as it is aimed at avoiding idleness or mastering the body, then the same judgment applies to manual labor and to other practices with the same aims. There is no commandment to avoid idleness with this or that occupation; it is enough to escape idleness by avoiding it with any permissible occupation. Hence, given this end, manual labor is not commanded as an occupation. The same goes for manual labor aimed at mastering the body. Lots of practices help to master the body: fasts, vigils, and many other such things. Hence, none of them is specifically commanded insofar as it aims at such an end, although all of them are generally commanded in the command to master the body with any practices that check our deadly desires. Nevertheless, insofar as it is aimed at making a living, manual labor does seem to be a commandment. Hence 1 Thessalonians 4 says: to work with your hands as we commanded you.⁹¹ Moreover, this is a demand not only of positive law but also of natural law. For natural law concerns what human beings are naturally directed toward, and the very design of our bodies shows that human beings are naturally directed to manual work. Hence Job 5 says: Man is born to labor and the bird to fly.⁹² In the case of other animals, nature has sufficiently provided what they need to preserve their lives: food, weapons, and armor. But it has not provided such things for human beings, since they have been endowed with reason, which enables them to provide such things for themselves. Instead of such things, human beings have received hands suited for various activities, by which they accomplish what reason devises in the various arts, as it says in book IV of the Parts of Animals.⁹³

Notice, however, that natural law makes two sorts of demands. Demands of one sort aim to meet the needs of one particular person. These can be spiritual needs, as when acts of virtue are commanded, or bodily needs, as when God commanded the man in Genesis 2: You may eat of every tree in paradise, etc.⁹⁴ But demands of another sort aim to meet the needs of the species as a whole, as with the commandment in Genesis 1: Increase and multiply and fill the earth.⁹⁵ For this commands the act of reproduction, which preserves and multiplies our nature. Now, these two sorts of demands differ in the following respect. The first demands of the natural law have to be met by every single person, but the second demands do not have to be met by every single person. For where the species is concerned, all human beings are to be counted as one human being: by participation in the species the many human beings are one human being, as Porphyry says.⁹⁶ Compare how one human being has various bodily members holding various offices. All the offices aim to meet that individual’s needs, but not all the offices can be filled by just one member. The eye sees for the whole body, for instance, while the foot carries the whole body. The same is true where the whole species is concerned. Since one human being cannot provide everything human society requires, various offices have to be held by various people. As it says in Romans 12: As in one body we have many members, etc.⁹⁷ This variety of human beings holding a variety of offices is due primarily to divine providence, which distributes human states of life in a way that ensures that no one ever lacks any of the necessities of life. Yet this variety is also due secondarily to natural causes, which give various human beings various inclinations to various offices or various ways of life.

Now, people engaged in manual labor can meet their own needs as well as the needs of others. And yet no one human being is completely self-sufficient; everyone requires the help of others. Clearly, then, the commandment to do manual labor falls in some sense under both sorts of demands just mentioned. Insofar as one person’s manual labor meets the needs of others, the second sort of natural demand applies. Yet insofar as it meets the individual’s own needs, the first sort of demand applies, as with the commandment to eat. But demands aimed at meeting one’s own bodily needs only oblige if such needs exist. Hence, if some people could survive without eating at all, the commandment to eat would not oblige them to do so.

Accordingly, the commandment to do manual labor does not oblige every single person insofar as it aims to meet some common need, nor insofar as it aims to meet the individual’s own needs, unless such needs exist. Hence, those who have some other permissible means of survival are not bound to work with their hands. But those who lack such means, or who can only make a living by engaging in some impermissible activity, are bound to work with their hands.

The Apostle makes this clear in the three places where he gives the commandment to work with your hands. First, in Ephesians 4, where he forbids stealing, he enjoins working with your hands: Let the thief no longer steal, but let him work with his own hands.⁹⁸ Second, in 1 Thessalonians 4, he commands manual labor, forbidding the desire for other people’s goods: Work, he says, with your own hands as we commanded you, that you may walk uprightly among outsiders and desire nothing of anyone else’s.⁹⁹ Third, in 2 Thessalonians 3, he commands working with your hands, forbidding disgraceful activities as a way to make a living: We hear, he says, that some of you are walking idly, not working, but minding other people’s business.¹⁰⁰ The gloss says: Those who provide for their needs by shameful means.¹⁰¹ He goes on: We charge such people and exhort them in the Lord Jesus Christ to work silently and eat their own bread.¹⁰²

Notice, too, how sight is the first among our other senses, which is why words for seeing are extended to all our other senses, as Augustine says.¹⁰³ The hand is similar: since we need it for so many activities, it is called the tool of tools in book III of On the Soul.¹⁰⁴ Hence, manual labor means not only what we do with our hands but with any bodily instrument whatsoever. In short, manual labor covers any activity that people are permitted to engage in to make a living. For it does not seem reasonable for masters of the mechanical arts to be able to make a living by practicing their arts, while masters of the liberal arts are unable to make a living by practicing theirs. Likewise, lawyers are able to make a living by serving as legal counsel in their cases. And the same goes for every other permissible occupation.

Since working with your hands is a commandment, but not one that obliges everyone, we have to reply to the arguments made on both sides.

1 & 2. What we just said provides the answer to the first and second objections: We grant that manual labor is a commandment, but not every single person is obliged to do it.

3. To the third objection: As what we have said makes clear, the Apostle is discussing the case of people who neglect manual labor and make their living by engaging in some shameful activity. Such people are obliged to keep the commandment, and are thus fit to be excommunicated.

4. To the fourth objection: The Lord’s words there foretell a punishment more than they command satisfaction. Hence just before that he said: Cursed is the earth in your work.¹⁰⁵ And: Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth for you.¹⁰⁶ To the woman likewise he said: In pain shall you bring forth children.¹⁰⁷ So, it does not follow that every person is obliged to work by the force of a commandment. Otherwise it would follow that every person is bound to work in agriculture, since the Lord mentions that there as well.

5.* To the fifth objection: No one can preserve their spiritual life without acts of virtue. Hence, everyone is required to keep the commandments about acts of virtue. But many people can preserve their bodily life without working with their hands. So, even though manual labor is a general commandment, not everyone is bound to obey it.

6.† To the sixth objection: Not eating is only a mortal sin when you cannot preserve your life without eating: for then not eating amounts to killing yourself. Similarly, not working with your hands is only a sin when you have no other way to preserve your life except by impermissible means. Hence, since impermissible means must always be avoided, the Apostle looks just as strictly upon not eating and not working when he says: Anyone who does not want to work, let him not eat.¹⁰⁸

1. To the first objection made to the contrary: The Lord does not forbid the apostles from having any concern at all about their bodily livelihood; otherwise he would not have had them keep a moneybag.¹⁰⁹ Rather, he forbids them from having a suffocating concern about it. Now, the mind is suffocated in two ways. One way involves taking temporal things as the end of right action, which God forbids. Hence when he explains the verse Do not be anxious, etc.,¹¹⁰ in his book The Work of Monks, Augustine says: It is not that they may not attend to such things as much as they need to and are able to by honest means. But they may not look to such things as the reason they do what they are commanded to do in preaching the gospel.¹¹¹ The gloss on 2 Thessalonians 3 says the same thing.¹¹² Concern suffocates the mind in another way by making it lose its trust in God. That is what the Lord intends to forbid. Hence the gloss on Matthew 6 says: By this example—viz. of the birds and lilies—he does not forbid planning and working, but rather anxiety, so that our whole trust might be in God, who enables the birds to live carefree as well.¹¹³

2. To the second objection made to the contrary: Not all commandments are contained explicitly in the Ten Commandments, but they can all be traced back to them, since they are all contained in them implicitly. Hence, the commandment about manual labor, which preserves our bodily lives, is traced back to this commandment: You shall not kill.¹¹⁴ The same goes for the commandment about eating. Or it is traced back to this commandment: You shall not steal.¹¹⁵ For that forbids every impermissible means of profit, which manual labor enables one to avoid.

3. To the third objection made to the contrary: There are two things to consider about each commandment, viz. the end of the commandment and the possibility of obeying it. For every commandment of every law is aimed at doing some good or avoiding some evil, and no commandment can aim at anything impossible for human beings. Hence Jerome says: Whoever says that God commands the impossible, let him be anathema.¹¹⁶ So, if a commandment is never impossible to obey, and is directed to an end that cannot possibly be achieved without it, then that commandment always retains its obligatory force. This is the case, for instance, with the commandments about acts of virtue, since at least internal acts are always within our power, and our spiritual life cannot be preserved without them, as we have said. Thus, there are two ways for the commandment about manual labor to lose its obligatory force. One way is when someone is incapable of working due to some bodily disability. Another way is when the end of the commandment, viz. the preservation of bodily life, can be achieved without doing manual labor, as what we have said makes clear.

4. To the fourth objection made to the contrary: Speaking essentially, religious and seculars are both equally bound to do manual labor. Two things make this clear. The first is what the Apostle says in 2 Thessalonians 3, where he gives the commandment to work with your hands, saying: keep yourselves away from every brother walking in idleness, etc.¹¹⁷ For he calls all Christians brothers, and at the time there were no religious for him to be talking about. The second thing that makes it clear is this: religious are not bound to anything more than seculars except the obligations they took on with their vows. Speaking accidentally, however, this commandment could affect religious more than others, which could happen in two ways. First, since religious live in poverty, it could be easier for them than for seculars to lack the means to live. Second, some orders could have such a statute in their rule. Hence in his letter to a country monk, Jerome says: The monasteries of Egypt have the custom of not accepting anyone who will not labor and work; for they consider it necessary not only to make a living, but also to save the soul, lest the mind wander into harmful thoughts.¹¹⁸ Compare how their statutes sometimes bind religious to master the body with vigils and other things that seculars are not bound to do.

5. To the fifth objection made to the contrary: Although practicing the liberal arts is nobler, it is not necessary for preserving our bodily life. And it is covered by manual labor anyway, as what we have said makes clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. People who keep their time free for spiritual works do not seem to be excused from manual labor:

1. 2 Thessalonians 3 says: If anyone does not want to work, let him not eat.¹¹⁹ The gloss of Augustine says: Some people say that the Apostle gave this command about spiritual works.¹²⁰ It then adds: But they are foolishly trying to pull the wool over their own eyes and everyone else’s. Not only do they not want to do what charity usefully prescribes; they do not even understand it.¹²¹ Therefore, spiritual works do not seem to excuse people from manual labor.

2. The greatest of all spiritual works are praying, reading, and preaching. But these works do not excuse people from manual labor. Therefore, etc. Here is the proof of the minor premise: In his book The Work of Monks, Augustine says: I would like to know what those who do not want to do bodily work are doing, and why they keep their time free. “For prayers,” they say, “and readings, and the word of God.” After that he adds: But if we are not to be called away from such things, then we cannot eat or prepare food either. If, however, the necessity of sickness forces the servants of God to make time for the latter things at certain intervals, then why can’t we also set aside some portion of time to obey the Apostle’s commands?¹²² And he says this about them praying: One prayer from an obedient person is heard more quickly than ten thousand from a disobedient one.¹²³ And he adds this about them chanting psalms: They can easily sing divine songs while they work with their hands, and thus cheer up their labor like rowers with a divine rowing song.¹²⁴ And he adds this about people reading: And those who claim to keep their time free for reading—haven’t they read the Apostle’s command? What kind of perversity is this, not wanting to obey what you read, but wanting to have free time to read it? Who could fail to realize that the quicker you do what you read, the quicker you profit from good reading?¹²⁵ And he adds this about them preaching: But if speaking has to be assigned to someone, and if it is so consuming that there is no time for manual labor—surely not everyone who enters the monastery has the ability to explain the divine readings or to treat certain questions beneficially. Since not everyone has the ability, then, why does everyone want to have free time on this pretext? And even if everyone did have the ability, they still ought to take turns doing it, not only so that the rest can be occupied with necessary tasks, but also because it is enough for one person to speak while the rest listen.¹²⁶

3. Clerics are the most occupied with spiritual works. Yet even they are bound to do manual labor. Therefore, etc. Here is the proof of the minor premise: Distinction LXXXI says: Let clerics provide for their living and clothing by some trade or agriculture, at least to the extent that their office allows.¹²⁷ And another chapter says: Let every cleric learned in the word of God make a living by some trade.¹²⁸ Again: Let every cleric who is able to work become versed and skilled in a trade.¹²⁹

4. Religious, who abandon everything, have the most free time for spiritual works. But even they are bound to do manual labor. Therefore, etc. Here is the proof of the minor premise: Luke 12 says: Sell your possessions.¹³⁰ The gloss says: Not only share your food with the poor, but also sell your possessions, so that once you have abandoned all your own things for the Lord’s sake, you may then work with your hands, so as to live and give alms thereby.¹³¹

5. Distinction XXII of the Decretum says that a person who does something against a statute of the Roman Church is a heretic.¹³² But people who beg instead of working with their hands do something against a statute of Pope Calixtus in C. XII, q.1, The high priests seeing, etc., where it says that the Church decrees that no one may be found in need among those who wish to live a common life.¹³³ Therefore, spiritual works do not excuse religious from manual labor; indeed, if they beg, they are heretics.

6. People who put themselves in danger of death sin by tempting God. For instance, if you saw a bear coming at you in a frenzy, and you dropped the weapons you had to defend yourself, you would be tempting God. But people who abandon everything, and do not work with their hands, throw away the necessities of life, which replace what the body’s natural heat consumes. Therefore, such people sin by tempting God.

7. In Philippians 3 the Apostle says: Be imitators of me, brothers.¹³⁴ Yet even though he preached and kept time free for spiritual works, he still made his living by manual labor. As 2 Thessalonians 3 says: You yourselves know how you ought to imitate us: for we were not idle among you, nor did we eat anyone’s bread for free, but in labor and toil we worked night and day, so that we might not burden any of you.¹³⁵ Therefore, etc.

8. The gloss on the verse The field was made over, etc., of Genesis 23 says that the perfect preacher hides his own soul under the cover of good activity and contemplation.¹³⁶ Hence, those taken up with spiritual works (contemplation) ought to make time for external works (action) as well. Therefore, spiritual works do not excuse people from manual labor.

But to the contrary:

1. The gloss on the verse Let the dead bury their dead of Luke 9 says: The Lord teaches that lesser goods should be given up for greater ones.¹³⁷ But spiritual works are greater goods than manual works. Therefore, people ought to give up the latter for the former.

2. Works of piety are more important than bodily exercises. As 1 Timothy 4 says: Bodily exercise is useful for a few things, but piety is profitable for everything.¹³⁸ Yet works of piety and mercy should be given up to make time for preaching. As Acts 6 says: It is not right for us to give up the word of God, etc.¹³⁹ And Luke 9 says: Let the dead bury their dead, but as for you, go and proclaim the word of God.¹⁴⁰ Much more, therefore, should manual labor and other sorts of bodily exercises be given up for preaching and other spiritual works.

3. 2 Timothy 2 says: No soldier for God gets caught up in secular affairs.¹⁴¹ The gloss says: Secular affairs are those things that occupy the mind concerned with making money.¹⁴² But people who work with their hands are concerned with making money, and hence are caught up in secular affairs. Therefore, soldiers fighting for God with spiritual works should not be occupied with manual labor.

Answer: The true answer to this question comes from the answer given to the previous question. We said there that the only people obligated to keep the commandment to do manual labor are those who do not have some other permissible means of survival. Therefore, people engaged in spiritual works who have some permissible means of survival other than manual labor are not required to work with their hands.

Hence, we need to make a distinction among spiritual works. For some spiritual works contribute to the common good, while others only benefit the individual performing them.

People engaged in spiritual works for the common good should be supported by those who benefit from their service. The authority of 1 Corinthians 9 makes this clear: If we have sown spiritual goods among you, it is not too much if we reap your material benefits.¹⁴³ Reason makes it clear as well. For spiritual benefits are more important than temporal ones. Yet people whose service provides temporal benefits to the community are due support in exchange for the work they do to provide such common benefits. This is clear, for instance, in the case of soldiers who defend the state’s peace. Hence 1 Corinthians 9 says: Who ever serves as a soldier at his own expense?¹⁴⁴ Much more, then, can people who promote the common good with spiritual benefits receive support in exchange for their service. Hence, such people are not bound to work with their hands.

Now there are four spiritual works that provide benefits to the community, in exchange for which payment is due.

The first is the occupation of people issuing ecclesiastical judgments. For Romans 13 says this about the secular power that exercises secular judgment: And so you also pay taxes, for they—viz. judges—are ministers of God, serving this very purpose, viz. yours.¹⁴⁵ For the same reason in his book The Work of Monks, Augustine says that they ought to take up manual labor to the extent that they have time free of ecclesiastical occupations. Hence he excuses himself from manual labor because of the ecclesiastical judgments occupying him, saying: Although we say: Who ever serves as a soldier at his own expense, etc.?, nevertheless I call the Lord Jesus as a witness for my soul, that as far as my own preference is concerned, I would much rather spend certain hours of each day—as many as well-governed monasteries have established—doing some work with my hands, and having the other hours free to pray and read or do something related to divine literature, rather than having to put up with the most annoying details of other people’s cases involving secular affairs, which I either have to resolve with a judgment or settle in advance through mediation.¹⁴⁶

The second spiritual work that enriches the common good is the work of preaching, which harvests the fruit of people’s souls. Hence, as it says in 1 Corinthians 9: The Lord ordained that those who preach the gospel should live by the gospel.¹⁴⁷ Now this should not be taken only to refer to people with the authority to preach, such as prelates, but also to people permitted to preach by a commission from prelates. For payment is not due for power, but for work and labor. As 2 Timothy 2 says: The hard-working farmer ought to get the first share of the fruits.¹⁴⁸ The gloss says: namely the preacher, who works in the field of the Church cultivating the hearts of his listeners with the hoe of the word.¹⁴⁹ Yet preachers are not the only ones who can make a living by the gospel; those who help them do the work of their office can as well. Romans 15 makes this clear: If the Gentiles have come to share their spiritual goods, they ought to help them with material goods as well.¹⁵⁰ The gloss says: their, namely the Jews, who sent preachers from Jerusalem.¹⁵¹ Hence, even those who send out preachers can make a living by the fruit of the gospel.

The third spiritual work that contributes to the common good is the prayers made during the canonical hours for the salvation of the Church, to turn God’s wrath away from the people. As Ezekiel 13 says: You have not built a wall for the house of Israel, to stand in battle on the day of the Lord.¹⁵² The gloss says: doing battle with prayers to withstand divine judgment.¹⁵³ Hence 1 Corinthians 9 says that those who serve at the altar partake of the offerings from the altar.¹⁵⁴

Augustine discusses these last two works in his book The Work of Monks: If they are preachers of the gospel, then I confess that they have it—viz. the power to live on support from the faithful, which is what he is talking about—if they are ministers of the altar, administering the sacraments, then of course they do not arrogate it to themselves, but rightfully claim such power.¹⁵⁵

The fourth spiritual work that enriches the common good is the elucidation of sacred scripture. So, even people who keep their time free to study sacred scripture in order to educate others can make a living by this spiritual work. As 1 Timothy 5 says: Let the presbyters who rule well be held worthy of a double honor, especially those who labor in preaching and teaching.¹⁵⁶ The gloss on worthy of a double honor says: worthy of being listened to in spiritual things, and of being supported in external ones.¹⁵⁷ And on those who labor in preaching it says: in exhorting the knowledgeable.¹⁵⁸ And on teaching it says: namely the ignorant.¹⁵⁹ Jerome says it even more clearly in his work Against Vigilantius: This custom has continued in Judea up to the present day, not only among us, but also among the Hebrews, that people who meditate upon the law of the Lord day and night, and have no father on earth but God alone, are maintained by support from all the synagogues of the world.¹⁶⁰

Clearly, then, people who keep their time free for spiritual works that contribute to the common good are not bound to work with their hands.

Now as for spiritual works that do not contribute directly to the common good but, rather, to the good of the individual performing them, such as private prayers, fasts, and so on, we need to make a distinction. For people in the religious state who are occupied with such works either had some means of survival in the world or they did not.

Those who did are not bound to work with their hands once they enter the religious state. Hence in his book The Work of Monks, Augustine says: If they at least had some worldly means of easily sustaining their lives without working, and if they distributed those means to the poor when they converted to God, then we should accept and tolerate their weakness. For such people are usually raised to be inactive and cannot handle bodily labor.¹⁶¹

But if they were workers in the world, making a living by manual labor, then there are two reasons they might give up manual labor when they enter the religious state. One reason is that they are lazy and prefer to live idly, which is a sin. This is what Augustine says in the book just cited: Many enter the state of professed service to God from the condition of slavery and the life of peasants, and from the practice of work and common labor.¹⁶² And later he adds: Such people cannot excuse themselves from any work due to bodily weakness, seeing that the custom of their past life convicts them.¹⁶³ And just before that he says: It is not clear whether they entered the service of God for that very purpose, or just to flee a life of poverty and labor.¹⁶⁴ Another reason they might give up manual labor is out of divine love, which continually lifts them up to the work (so to speak) of contemplation. Since such people are driven by the spirit of God, they do not sin. For where the spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom.¹⁶⁵ Hence Gregory comments on Ezekiel: The contemplative life is a matter of maintaining your love for God and neighbor with your whole heart, refraining from external actions, with your only desire being to adhere to the creator, and doing nothing anymore.¹⁶⁶ A certain gloss on the verse The field was made over, etc., of Genesis 23 says the same thing: The contemplative life is utterly divorced from all activity.¹⁶⁷ The gloss on the verse Consider the birds of the air, etc., of Matthew 6 says the same thing: Holy men are compared to birds since they seek heaven, having withdrawn from the world so much that they no longer do anything on earth, not even work, but instead spend all their time in contemplation in heaven.¹⁶⁸

1. So, to the first objection: That gloss comes from Augustine’s book The Work of Monks, which he wrote against certain monks who claimed that the servants of God are not permitted to work with their hands, and thus interpreted the Apostle’s words Anyone who does not want to work, let him not eat, etc.,¹⁶⁹ as speaking about spiritual work. Augustine disproves their interpretation in a number of ways in his book. Hence, we should take the Apostle’s words Anyone who does not want to work, let him not eat, etc., as speaking about manual work. Nevertheless, it does not follow that everyone is obliged to fulfill this commandment, since the Apostle himself was not obliged to do so. Hence he says just before: It is not as though we did not have the power, viz. of receiving support and living without doing manual labor. Clearly, then, that gloss is not relevant to the current question.

2. To the second objection: In the case of each work mentioned by this objection, we need to make a distinction. For the works can either be public or private, so to speak. And Augustine is talking about spiritual works that are private works. For he is thinking of private prayers and songs, not those solemnly celebrated in church. This is clear from the fact that he says they can sing divine songs while they work with their hands, which would be inappropriate if he were thinking of the canonical hours. Likewise, when he mentions readings, he is talking about people who keep their time free to read solely for their own benefit, as monks do in monasteries. He is not talking about people who dedicate their lives to the study of scripture in order to educate themselves and others. For there is no doubt that manual labor would get in the way of such study. Again, when he mentions preaching, he does not mean people who preach publicly but, rather, those who offer some words of encouragement to the people who come to them, as the holy fathers used to do in the desert. This is clear from the very words quoted by the objection. Hence he says: If speaking has to be assigned, etc.¹⁷⁰ As the gloss on the verse My speaking and preaching of 1 Corinthians 2 says: Speaking is what was done in private, but preaching is what was done in public.¹⁷¹

3. To the third objection: The Decretum is talking about clerics who do not make enough from offerings and alms given to them by the faithful, or from the Church’s resources. For the same rule applies to those who live on the Church’s resources and to those who live on alms given particularly to them, since the Church’s resources are alms given to support the poor. Hence the gloss on the verse And the spoil of the poor is in your house of Isaiah 3 says: The spoil of the poor is in the houses of princes, while the Church’s resources are hoarded and wasted on luxuries, in spite of being given to support the poor.¹⁷² This is what C. XII, q.1 is about.¹⁷³ And it is why C. I, q.2, c. 9 says that a priest charged with the responsibility of distribution praises the piety of the people who give him things to distribute, and faithfully distributes the things they give him. For he has either left all of his own possessions with his parents, or given them to the poor, or added them to the Church’s possessions. And out of love for poverty he has joined the ranks of the poor, so that his motivation to serve the poor also motivates him to live voluntarily as the poor.¹⁷⁴ Clearly, then, clerics who live on the Church’s possessions have the same rule to follow about their use as those who live on resources they lack which are given to them as alms.

4. To the fourth objection: That gloss does not make it necessary for those who have abandoned what they own to work with their hands. Rather, it points out something good that those who abandon what they own can do—viz. engage in manual labor to provide for themselves and give alms. Nor does it deny that they would do well by not working with their hands, leaving time free for spiritual alms, which are more important than bodily ones.

5. To the fifth objection: The first premise of that argument is false. Doing something against a statute of the pope does not make a person a heretic, unless the person also happens to believe that the pope does not have to be obeyed. Hence in the chapter quoted it says: Anyone who tries to deny the privilege given to the Roman Church by the highest head of all the churches, without a doubt falls into heresy.¹⁷⁵ The privilege mentioned here consists in all Christians owing the Roman Church their obedience. Likewise, the minor premise is false as well. It is not against a statue of the Church for people to beg or enter the state of poverty, although it is against a statute of the Church if those who hold the Church’s resources do not provide for their needs. Hence the quoted chapter actually says: They—viz. the Church’s possessions—ought to be used by bishops and their other distributors to provide everything necessary to those who wish to live a common life, precisely so that they may better do so, and no one may be found in need among them.¹⁷⁶

6. To the sixth objection: People who abandon everything and keep nothing for themselves, but do not work with their hands, do not thereby put themselves at risk. For they rightly expect so much devotion from the faithful, and know from experience that their needs are provided for. Nor do they tempt God. For God has promised to move the hearts of others to provide for their needs, as Matthew 6 makes clear.¹⁷⁷ As a certain gloss on Luke 10 says: The preacher ought to have so much trust in God that even if he does not provide himself with support for the present life, he still knows most certainly that he will not lack it, lest the occupation of his mind with temporal things keep him from preaching about eternal ones.¹⁷⁸ Compare: if you were with people who would defend you, and you dropped your weapons for some reason, you would not be tempting God. If you were alone, then of course you would seem to be tempting God, unless some internal inspiration had assured you of receiving divine assistance. As blessed Martin said: When I break through enemy lines, I am not assured by the protection of a shield or a helmet, but by the sign of the cross.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, you would seem to be tempting God if you did not provide yourself with the necessities of life while among unbelievers or inhospitable people. Hence the gloss on the verse Let him who has a purse take it, etc., of Luke 22 says: This example shows us that sometimes, for a pressing reason, we can loosen our strict way of life without guilt. For example, when we are traveling through an inhospitable region, we are permitted to carry more provisions with us than we keep at home.¹⁸⁰ And yet some people in the desert are supported without doing manual labor with bread sent by God, as we read in the lives of the fathers.¹⁸¹ But the privileges of the few do not establish common law.¹⁸²

7. To the seventh objection: The fact that the Apostle labored, although he could have lived by the gospel, was supererogatory, as 1 Corinthians 9 makes clear.¹⁸³ Hence, other preachers are not bound to imitate him in this respect. Nevertheless, sometimes a preacher would do well not to accept support from the people to whom he preaches, and to live by doing manual labor instead. This is the case in those circumstances in which the Apostle was laboring—viz. to avoid scandalizing the people to whom he was preaching, whose envy made giving him support burdensome for them. This is the reason he gives in 2 Thessalonians 3: Working night and day, that we might not burden any of you.¹⁸⁴ He was also laboring to set an example that would call people back from idleness. Hence he adds in the same place: Not as though we did not have the power, but to give ourselves to you as a pattern for you to imitate.¹⁸⁵ He also did so to rebuke the rapacity of false apostles. Hence he says in 2 Corinthians 9: But what I do, I will continue to do, so that I might undermine the opportunity of those who want the opportunity, on the subject of their boasting, to be regarded as we are.¹⁸⁶ Sometimes, however, a preacher would not do well to get involved in manual labor—viz. if such labor would take him away from preaching. Hence the gloss on Luke 10 says: A preacher should beware lest the occupation of his mind with temporal things keep him from preaching about eternal ones.¹⁸⁷ Thus, in the book we keep mentioning, Augustine says that while the Apostle was in Athens, where he had to preach every day, he did not work with his hands, although he did do so after going to Corinth, where he only preached to the Jews on the Sabbath day.¹⁸⁸ For preachers require time free of occupations not only to preach but also to study, since their knowledge is not infused like the Apostle’s but, rather, acquired by continual study. Hence in his Pastoral Rule, where he explains the verse The poles shall always be in the rings, etc., of Exodus 25, Gregory says: The poles, it says, shall always be in the rings, since it is most necessary for those with the office of preaching to be vigilant, not to let their study of the sacred writings slip.¹⁸⁹

8. To the eighth objection: Action does not just mean manual labor, but everything included in the active life, and the concern that preachers show for the people to whom they preach is included in the active life.

I grant the arguments made to the contrary. But the last of them misses the meaning of the gloss. The gloss says that secular affairs are the things done to make money other than manual labor, such as trade and the like,¹⁹⁰ from which the servants of God should completely refrain.

*This reply in fact addresses objection 6. The Latin text contains no reply to objection 5.

†This reply in fact addresses objection 7.

¹ Augustine, On the Trinity IX, 12, 18.

² Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 4 (429a16–18).

³ 1 John 3:2.

⁴ Rather, Pseudo-Augustine, On Spirit and Soul, 14. Cf. Augustine, Confessions III, vi, 11.

⁵ Psalms 35:10.

⁶ Aristotle, Topics II, 10 (114b34–35).

⁷ Rather, Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul III, 23.

⁸ Aristotle, On the Soul III, 7 (431b16–17).

⁹ Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul V, 6.

¹⁰ Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul V, 6.

¹¹ Aristotle, On the Soul III, 7 (431b16–17).

¹² Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity XI, 4, 7.

¹³ Cf. Al-Ghazali, Metaphysics I, 3, 4.

¹⁴ Isaiah 41:23.

¹⁵ Hebrews 1:14.

¹⁶ Albert, Commentary on the Sentences II, d.3A, a.4, arg. 8.

¹⁷ Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics III, 58.

¹⁸ Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 12.

¹⁹ Cf. Book on Causes, Prop. 9 (10).

²⁰ Augustine, On the Trinity IX, 12, 18.

²¹ Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity IX, 4, 5.

²² Augustine, On the Trinity IX, 4, 5.

²³ Augustine, On the Trinity X, 10, 13.

²⁴ Rather, 1 John 5:7.

²⁵ Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 1, 3 & c. 2, 2; The Divine Names, c. 4, 2 & c. 7, 2.

²⁶ Boethius, On the Trinity, 2.

²⁷ Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 1, 3 & c. 2, 2; The Divine Names, c. 4, 2 & c. 7, 2.

²⁸ Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity VI, 6, 8.

²⁹ Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity, 2.

³⁰ Cf. Augustine, Against Faustus XXVI, 5.

³¹ Rather, Matthew 26:26.

³² Aristotle, Physics VI, 3 (234a7–8 & 10).

³³ Cf. Aristotle, Physics V, 2 (226a26–27).

³⁴ Aristotle, Metaphysics II, 2 (994b5–6).

³⁵ Aristotle, Physics VI, 3 (234a7–8 & 10).

³⁶ Cf. Aristotle, Physics VI, 6 (237b3–22).

³⁷ Cf. Boethius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories II, 1.

³⁸ Aristotle, Metaphysics II, 1 (993b24–27).

³⁹ Cf. Aristotle, Categories, 6 (4b21–22 & 5a15–37).

⁴⁰ A common adage.

⁴¹ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 7–9 (431a14–15; 431b2; 432a9).

⁴² Wisdom 11:16.

⁴³ 1 Corinthians 15:52.

⁴⁴ Augustine, Enchiridion XXIII.

⁴⁵ Judith 16:17.

⁴⁶ Ordinary Gloss on Luke 13.

⁴⁷ Isaiah 66:24.

⁴⁸ Augustine, The City of God XX, 22.

⁴⁹ William of Auxerre, Golden Summa III, tr. 10, c. 1, q.3.

⁵⁰ Psalms 118:130.

⁵¹ Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis II, 5.

⁵² Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, Letter 9, To Titus.

⁵³ Cf. Aristotle, Topics II, 10 (114b34–35).

⁵⁴ Daniel 12:4.

⁵⁵ Jerome, Letter 53, To Paul, 9.

⁵⁶ Augustine, On Christian Doctrine II, 6, 7.

⁵⁷ Matthew 7:6.

⁵⁸ Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, Letter 9, To Titus.

⁵⁹ Augustine, On Christian Doctrine II, 6, 8.

⁶⁰ Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Hosea I, 1, 3–4.

⁶¹ Daniel 8:5.

⁶² This is not found in Augustine.

⁶³ Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis I, 1.

⁶⁴ Ordinary Gloss, Prologue.

⁶⁵ Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 1, 3.

⁶⁶ Rather, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 4, 3.

⁶⁷ Daniel 2:34.

⁶⁸ Rather, Joshua 4:3.

⁶⁹ Albert, On the Four Coevals, tr. 4, q.35; Commentary on the Sentences I, d.26A, a.3. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, 12 (1037b8–27).

⁷⁰ Gregory, Morals XX, 1, 1.

⁷¹ Psalms 44:2.

⁷² 2 Thessalonians 3:10.

⁷³ Gloss of Peter Lombard on 2 Thessalonians 3:10.

⁷⁴ Augustine, The Work of Monks III, 4.

⁷⁵ Decretum II, C. xi, q.3, c. 41.

⁷⁶ 2 Thessalonians 3:14.

⁷⁷ Romans 5:12.

⁷⁸ Genesis 3:19.

⁷⁹ Ephesians 4:28.

⁸⁰ 2 Thessalonians 3:10.

⁸¹ Matthew 6:25ff.

⁸² Rather, Matthew 19:17.

⁸³ Matthew 19:18.

⁸⁴ Jerome, Letter 125, 11.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ 2 Corinthians 6:5.

⁸⁸ Gloss of Peter Lombard on 2 Corinthians 6:5.

⁸⁹ 2 Corinthians 6:5.

⁹⁰ Acts 20:34.

⁹¹ 1 Thessalonians 4:11.

⁹² Job 5:7.

⁹³ Cf. Aristotle, Parts of Animals IV, 10 (687a6–b4).

⁹⁴ Genesis 2:16.

⁹⁵ Genesis 1:28.

⁹⁶ Porphyry, Isagoge, c. 2.

⁹⁷ Romans 12:4.

⁹⁸ Ephesians 4:28.

⁹⁹ 1 Thessalonians 4:11–12.

¹⁰⁰ 2 Thessalonians 3:11.

¹⁰¹ Ordinary Gloss on 2 Thessalonians 3:11.

¹⁰² 2 Thessalonians 3:12.

¹⁰³ Augustine, Confessions X, xxxv, 54.

¹⁰⁴ Aristotle, On the Soul III, 8 (432a1–2).

¹⁰⁵ Genesis 3:17.

¹⁰⁶ Genesis 3:18.

¹⁰⁷ Genesis 3:16.

¹⁰⁸ 2 Thessalonians 3:10.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. John 12:6 & 13:29.

¹¹⁰ Matthew 6:25ff.

¹¹¹ Augustine, The Work of Monks XXVI, 34.

¹¹² Ordinary Gloss on 2 Thessalonians 3.

¹¹³ Ordinary Gloss on Matthew 6.

¹¹⁴ Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17; Luke 18:20; Romans 13:9.

¹¹⁵ Exodus 20:15; Luke 18:20.

¹¹⁶ Rather, Pelagius, Confession of Faith to Pope Innocent I, 21.

¹¹⁷ 2 Thessalonians 3:6.

¹¹⁸ Jerome, Letter 125, 11.

¹¹⁹ 2 Thessalonians 3:10.

¹²⁰ Ordinary Gloss on 2 Thessalonians 3:10.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Augustine, The Work of Monks XVII, 20.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Augustine, The Work of Monks XVIII, 21.

¹²⁷ Rather, Decretum I, d. xci, c.3.

¹²⁸ Decretum I, d. xci, c.4.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Luke 12:33.

¹³¹ Ordinary Gloss on Luke 12:33.

¹³² Decretum I, d. xxii, q.1.

¹³³ Decretum II, C. xii, q.1, c. 16.

¹³⁴ Philippians 3:17.

¹³⁵ 2 Thessalonians 3:7–8.

¹³⁶ Ordinary Gloss on Genesis 23:17.

¹³⁷ Ordinary Gloss on Luke 9:60.

¹³⁸ 1 Timothy 4:8.

¹³⁹ Acts 6:2.

¹⁴⁰ Luke 9:60.

¹⁴¹ 2 Timothy 2:4.

¹⁴² Ordinary Gloss on 2 Timothy 2:4.

¹⁴³ 1 Corinthians 9:11.

¹⁴⁴ 1 Corinthians 9:7.

¹⁴⁵ Romans 13:6.

¹⁴⁶ Augustine, The Work of Monks XXVIII, 37.

¹⁴⁷ 1 Corinthians 9:14.

¹⁴⁸ 2 Timothy 2:6.

¹⁴⁹ Ordinary Gloss on 2 Timothy 2:6.

¹⁵⁰ Romans 15:27.

¹⁵¹ Gloss of Peter Lombard on Romans 15:27.

¹⁵² Ezekiel 13:5.

¹⁵³ Interlinear Gloss on Ezekiel 13:5.

¹⁵⁴ 1 Corinthians 9:13.

¹⁵⁵ Augustine, The Work of Monks XXI, 24.

¹⁵⁶ 1 Timothy 5:17.

¹⁵⁷ Gloss of Peter Lombard on 1 Timothy 5:17.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Jerome, Against Vigilantius, 13.

¹⁶¹ Augustine, The Work of Monks XXI, 25.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ 2 Corinthians 3:17.

¹⁶⁶ Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel II, Homily 2, 8.

¹⁶⁷ Ordinary Gloss on Genesis 23:17.

¹⁶⁸ Ordinary Gloss on Matthew 6:26.

¹⁶⁹ 2 Thessalonians 3:10.

¹⁷⁰ Augustine, The Work of Monks XVIII, 21.

¹⁷¹ Interlinear Gloss on 1 Corinthians 2:4.

¹⁷² Ordinary Gloss on Isaiah 3:14.

¹⁷³ Cf. Decretum II, C. xii, q.1.

¹⁷⁴ Decretum II, C. i, q.2, c. 9.

¹⁷⁵ Decretum I, d. xxii, q.1.

¹⁷⁶ Decretum II, C. xii, q.1, c. 16.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Matthew 6:25–33.

¹⁷⁸ Ordinary Gloss on Luke 10:4.

¹⁷⁹ Sulpitius Severus, The Life of St. Martin, 4.

¹⁸⁰ Ordinary Gloss on Luke 22:36.

¹⁸¹ Cf., e.g., Jerome, The Life of Paulus; Rufinus, The History of Monks, 11; Sulpitius Severus, Dialogues I, 5; The Life of St. Frontonius, 6–9; Palladius, Paradisus Heraclidis, c. 23, The Life of Blessed Posidonius.

¹⁸² Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Jonah I, 7; Decretum II, C. xxv, q.1, c. 16; Decretum II, C. i, q.1, c. 106.

¹⁸³ 1 Corinthians 9:12.

¹⁸⁴ 2 Thessalonians 3:8.

¹⁸⁵ 2 Thessalonians 3:9.

¹⁸⁶ 2 Corinthians 11:12.

¹⁸⁷ Ordinary Gloss on Luke 10:4.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Augustine, The Work of Monks XVII, 21.

¹⁸⁹ Gregory, Pastoral Rule II, 11. Cf. Exodus 25:13–15.

¹⁹⁰ Ordinary Gloss on 2 Timothy 2:4.

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