Article 1: Is the whole quantity of Christ’s body contained under the outward appearances of bread?
Quodlibet VII
There were three sorts of questions. The first were about spiritual substances, the second about the sacrament of the altar, and the third about the bodies of the damned.
The first questions on spiritual substances were about their knowledge, the second about the enjoyment of Christ’s soul during the passion, and the third about the plurality found among spiritual substances.
Question 1
There were four of the first questions: (1) Can a created intellect see the divine essence directly? (2) Can a created intellect think about more than one thing at a time? (3) Can an angelic intellect know about singulars? and (4) Is the knowledge that Augustine calls the mind’s “offspring”1 an accident or not?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that no created intellect can see the divine essence directly:
1. Since a created intellect is equally related to all intelligible things, it cannot know anything determinately without being made determinate by its object. But the divine essence is not an object that can make the intellect determinate, since it is the highest and most general existent—in no way determinate. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see the divine essence.
2. In order for the intellect to know something, it has to be actualized: for nothing acts insofar as it is potential, but rather insofar as it is actual. Now, the intellect is only actualized by having something intelligible inform it. But the divine essence cannot itself inform the intellect so as to formally actualize it. Hence, if the intellect is to know the divine essence, that essence will have to inform the intellect with a likeness of itself in order to make itself known. Thus, the divine essence can only be seen by means of a likeness of itself.
3. In order for a created intellect to see the divine essence, it has to be perfected by the light of glory. But the light of glory is an intermediary distinct from the intellect and from the divine essence, since the divine essence is uncreated blessedness, whereas the light of glory is created blessedness. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see the divine essence directly.
4. As the Philosopher says in book III of On the Soul, the intellect must be related to the intelligible as the senses are related to the sensible.2 But in order to perceive its object, the sense of sight requires two intermediaries: a species (a likeness of the thing seen) and light. Hence, the intellect’s sight of the divine essence requires the same things, and thus the intellect will not see the divine essence directly.
But to the contrary:
1. 1 John 3 says: We shall see him as he is.3
2. In order for the intellect to know something, nothing else seems required except for an intelligible thing to be actualized and joined to the intellect. But the divine essence is actually intelligible in itself, since it is immaterial. And it is present to the intellect, since God is closer to each thing than it is to itself, as Augustine says.4 Therefore, a created intellect will be able to see the divine essence directly.
Answer: We have to hold without a doubt that the glorified intellect in heaven sees the divine essence directly.
To understand why, realize that the intellect’s sight can involve three intermediaries. One is that under which the intellect sees, which disposes it to see. In our case this is the light of the agent intellect, which relates to the possible intellect as sunlight relates to the eye. The second intermediary is that by which something is seen. This is the intelligible species, which makes the possible intellect determinate and relates to the possible intellect as the species of a stone relates to the eye. The third intermediary is that in which something is seen, which is a thing through which we come to know about something else. In an effect, for instance, we see the cause, and in one of two similar or opposite things we see the other of the two. The intellect relates to this intermediary as bodily sight relates to a mirror in which it sees something. Now, the first and second intermediaries do not make sight indirect. I am said to see a stone directly even though I see it by means of light and by means of a species of the stone received in my eye. For these intermediaries are not visible objects of sight; rather, by means of them sight has one visible object outside the eye. But the third intermediary does make sight indirect. The mirror is the first visible object of sight, by means of which sight receives the species of the object it sees in the mirror. Similarly, when the intellect knows about a cause in its effect, the effect is the first intelligible thing the intellect knows, from which it goes on to know about the cause.
Now, on the way to heaven we know the divine essence in its effects, and thus do not see it directly. But in heaven we shall see it directly. Hence, such an intermediary will be completely absent. The second intermediary (a species of the divine essence informing our intellect) will not be there either. For when we see a thing directly by means of a species of it, that species has to represent the thing with the complete existence of its kind. Otherwise we would not be seeing the thing directly but, rather, a shadow of it, as when a likeness of light is produced in the eye in the form of color, which is shadowed light. But everything received in a thing is received with the receiver’s way of existing. Hence, a likeness of the divine essence that represents its whole nature completely cannot possibly be received in a created intellect. So, if we saw the divine essence by means of such an intermediary, we would not be seeing it directly but, rather, a shadow of it. Thus, it follows that our sight in heaven will only involve the first intermediary, viz. the light of glory, which will perfect our intellect so that it can see the divine essence. As the Psalm says: In your light we shall see light.5
Nevertheless, we will not need this light to make anything potentially intelligible actually intelligible (which is why we need the light of the agent intellect now), since the divine essence is separate from matter, and thus actually intelligible in itself. Instead, we will only need this light to perfect our intellect (which the light of the agent intellect does now as well). And the light of glory will be enough to perfect our intellect so that it can see the divine essence, since the divine essence is wholly intelligible light. Hence, the light of glory that it shines into our intellect will do for the divine essence in our intellect what both the species of the thing known and the light together do for other intelligible things, which are not just light. If sensible light existed in itself, for example, the light from it perfecting our eye would be enough for us to see it, even without an additional likeness.
1. So, to the first objection: There are two ways for something to be determinate: by way of limitation, and by way of distinction. Now, the divine essence is not determinate in the first way, but in the second. For a form is only limited by being received in another, and thus made equal to the other’s way of existing. But in the case of the divine essence, nothing is received in another, since its existence is the divine nature itself subsisting, which is not true of anything else. Hence, everything else has a received, and thus limited existence. Thus, the divine essence is distinguished from everything else by not being received in another. If there were a whiteness that did not exist in a subject, for example, that alone would distinguish it from any whiteness existing in a subject, even though as whiteness it would not be received, and thus not limited. Clearly, then, the divine essence is not a general existent, since it is distinct from everything else; instead, it is a general cause, since what exists of itself is the cause of everything that does not exist of itself. Hence, existence subsisting in itself is the cause of every existence received in another. That is how the divine essence is an intelligible thing that can determine the intellect.
2. To the second objection: The light of glory actualizes the created intellect so that it can see the divine essence, and that is enough, as we have said.
3. To the third objection: Although its essence is distinct from the divine essence and from the intellect, the light of glory still does not make sight indirect, as what we have said makes clear.
4. To the fourth objection: Since visible things are not just light, sight’s determination with respect to them involves not only light, but also a species of the thing seen. But the divine essence is purely light. Hence, it does not require a species in addition to its own light in order for it to be seen, as what we have said makes clear.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that a created intellect can think about more than one thing at a time:
1. As material, a sensitive power is more limited than an intellective power. But a sense can sense more than one thing at a time. For instance, when the common sense recognizes the difference between white and sweet, it senses both of them at the same time. Much more, then, can the intellect think about more than one thing at a time.
2. Many intelligible things can be thought about at the same time insofar as they are all one. But all intelligible things are one insofar as they are intelligible. Therefore, all intelligible things can be thought about at the same time.
3. The intellect as a disposition relates to the intelligible as a disposition in the way that the intellect as actual relates to the intelligible as actual. But the intellect as a disposition can think about more than one intelligible thing as a disposition at a time. Therefore, the intellect as actual can think about more than one thing at a time.
4. The existence of a thing’s intelligible species in the intellect is enough for the intellect to think. But intelligible species do not prevent each other from being in the intellect at the same time, since they are not opposed to each other, thanks to their separation from matter. Therefore, nothing keeps the intellect from being able to think about more than one thing at a time.
5. The intellect has a greater capacity than any body. But certain bodies can contain more than one species—and even opposite species—at the same time. For instance, the species of two visible things clearly exist in the single point of air at the intersection of the two straight lines from each visible thing to each viewer. Much more, then, can many species actually exist in the intellect at the same time, and thus the intellect can think about more than one thing at a time.
But to the contrary: In book II of the Topics, the Philosopher says: It is possible to know many things, but only to think about one.6
Answer: The intellect can think about something in one of two ways, viz. primarily or consequently. It can certainly think consequently about more than one thing at a time, insofar as the things are related to one primary intelligible thing. This happens in two ways. It happens in one way because of the one thing thought about when many intelligible things are thought about by means of one species. The divine intellect, for instance, sees everything at once by its one essence, and a created intellect that sees the divine essence can see everything at once by seeing the divine essence. It happens in another way because of the one thing thought about when many things are thought about as one. For in that case, the one thing is primarily thought about, and the many are consequently thought about within the one. When the intellect thinks about a line, for instance, it thinks at the same time about the parts of the line, as it says in book III of On the Soul.7 Likewise, when it thinks about a proposition, it thinks at the same time about the subject and the predicate. And when it thinks about the similarity or difference between things, it thinks at the same time about the things that are similar or different. But it is impossible for the intellect to think primarily and principally about more than one intelligible thing at a time.
The reason is that the intellect as actual is altogether—i.e., completely—the thing thought about, as it says in book III of On the Soul.8 Of course this should not be taken to mean that the essence of the intellect becomes the thing thought about or its species. Rather, it means that the intellect is completely informed by the species of the thing thought about when it actually thinks about it. Hence, the intellect actually thinking primarily about more than one thing at a time is just like one thing being many things at the same time. Yet we see in the case of material things that numerically one thing cannot actually be many things at the same time. But one and the same thing can be many things potentially or dispositionally. For instance, one and the same air is potentially water and fire at the same time, and air can be disposed toward both fire and water at the same time as well—for instance, when one part of air is being heated and another part is being condensed. But it is impossible for air to actually be fire and water at the same time. It is likewise impossible for something to actually be stone and iron (disparate rather than opposite things) at the same time. Now, given the very nature of its power, the intellect is potentially all intelligible things at the same time. The same is true of the power of sense with respect to all sensible things. The sensitive power is then actualized by the likenesses of sensible things in two ways. It is actualized in one way incompletely, as a disposition. This happens when sensible species exist in the sensitive power as dispositions, which Avicenna calls existing in storage.9 The sensitive power is actualized in another way completely. This happens when sensible species actually inform the sensitive power, which Avicenna calls the apprehension of sense, thus distinguishing the apprehending sensitive powers from those in which sensible forms exist in storage.10 Similarly, the likenesses of intelligible things exist as dispositions in the intellect as a disposition. But when they are actually thought about, they exist in it as completely actualizing forms, and then the intellect altogether becomes the thing thought about.11 This happens by an intention joining the intellect to the intelligible thing and the senses to the sensible thing, as Augustine says.12 Clearly, then, just as one material thing cannot actually be many things at the same time, one intellect cannot think primarily about more than one thing at a time. This is what Al-Ghazali says: just as one body cannot be shaped by more than one shape at a time, one intellect cannot think about more than one thing at a time.13
Nor can it be said that the intellect is completely informed by many intelligible species at the same time in the way that one body is informed by shape and color at the same time. For shape and color are not forms of one and the same kind, nor are they received in the same order, since they do not aim to complete the existence of one and the same nature. But all intelligible forms, as such, are of one and the same kind, and relate to the intellect in the same order, insofar as they complete the intellect’s actual existence. Hence, many intelligible species are like many shapes or many colors, which cannot actually be in the same thing in the same respect at the same time.
1. So, to the first objection: The same thing should be said about the sensitive power, viz. that it cannot primarily sense more than one thing at a time. But it can do so consequently insofar as it takes many things as one, as for instance when different sensible things are united in one difference, or many sensible parts are united in one whole. When the whole is sensed, its many parts are sensed consequently at the same time. Yet the sense’s intention is not directed primarily to any of the parts, but to the whole. If it were directed to one of the parts as its primary sensible object, then it would not sense the others at the same time. Similarly, even though the common sense is one power in essence, in a way it is still multiplied in existence, insofar as it is joined to different proper senses, as one center is joined to many lines. Hence, the changes in all the senses terminate simultaneously at the common sense, as motions along all the lines would terminate simultaneously at the center. But the intellect is not multiplied in many powers in that way. So, the two cases are not completely alike.
2. To the second objection: Cognizable things that are cognized at the same time have to be taken as numerically one cognizable thing. But all intelligible things, as such, are one in kind, not in number. Thus, that argument’s conclusion does not follow.
3. To the third objection: As what we have said makes clear, the intellect as a disposition does not relate to intelligible things as dispositions in the same way that the intellect as actual relates to intelligible things as actual. Intelligible things as dispositions exist in the intellect as dispositions, whereas intelligible things as actual exist in the intellect as its final and complete actualizations.
4. To the fourth objection: It is not only impossible for a thing to actually be many opposite things at the same time; it is also impossible for it to be many disparate things at the same time, as what we have said makes clear. Hence, even though intelligible forms are not opposites in the intellect, the intellect still cannot possibly think about more than one thing at a time, as what we have said makes clear.
5. To the fifth objection: Since sensible species are in flux in the medium that conveys them, they exist there as dispositions, not as final and complete actualizations. Hence, the two cases are not alike.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that an angelic intellect cannot know about singulars:
1. If it knows about them, then it does so either by means of an acquired species or by means of a co-created species. But it does not know about them by means of an acquired species. For such a species would either be particular, and hence material, in which case it could not exist in an angel’s immaterial intellect; or it would be universal, in which case it could not serve as the means of knowing about singulars. Yet it does not know about them by means of a co-created species either. For an angel would have possessed a species co-created with it from the beginning of its creation, and the existence of a thing’s species in an intellect is sufficient for it to know about it. So, if an angel can know about a present particular by means of a co-created species, then it would have known about it at the beginning of its creation while it was still future. But that cannot be, since only God knows the future. As Isaiah 41 says: Tell us what is to come in the future and we will know that you are gods.14 Therefore, an angel cannot know about singulars.
2. If you say that co-created species produce knowledge of present things, but not of future things, I reply to the contrary: New knowledge cannot be produced without a new change in the knower. But when a future particular becomes present, no new change occurs in an angel’s intellect, since it receives nothing from the external thing. Therefore, if it did not know about it before when it was future, it will not be able to know about it when it becomes present.
3. If you say that in spite of receiving nothing, the intellect applies the form it contained to the particular for the first time, which is something new, I reply to the contrary: The intellect cannot apply one thing to another without already knowing both the thing applied and the thing to which it is applied. For the comparison of one thing to another presupposes knowledge of the two in themselves. Therefore, the application in question would come after the knowledge of singulars, and so cannot be its cause.
4. If an angel knows about singulars, it either does so by one species or by many. But it does not know about them by many species. For then it would have to have an infinity of species, since particulars are infinite, at least potentially. Yet it does not know about them by one species either. For then an angelic intellect would equal the divine intellect, which knows many things by one, viz. its own essence. Therefore, an angelic intellect cannot know about singulars.
5. If you say that it does not know everything by means of one species, but knows about every individual of the same species—yet not others—by means of one species, I reply to the contrary: That one species is not related to one individual any more than to another. But an intelligible species has to make the intellect determinate for a determinate knowable thing. By that one species, therefore, its intellect cannot know about this determinate particular.
But to the contrary: Hebrews 1 says: Are they not all ministering spirits, etc.15 Yet that could not be the case unless they knew about singular human beings.
Answer: Without a doubt an angel knows about singulars.
To see how this is possible, note that in order for a singular thing to be known about, a likeness of it precisely as particular has to exist in the cognitive power. But of itself every form is common.16 Hence, adding a form to a form cannot make it individual. No matter how many forms are put together at a time—white, curly, two-cubits long, and so on—they still will not constitute a particular, since they can all be found at the same time in many things, as much as in one. Instead, a form is individuated by matter, which restricts the form to this indicated thing.17 Hence, in order for a particular to be known about, not just a likeness of its form but also a likeness of its matter has to exist somehow in the knower.
Now, there are two ways for a thing’s likeness to exist in a knower. One way is for it to be there as caused by the thing, as is the case with things known by means of a species abstracted from things. Another way is for it to be there as a cause of the thing, as is the case with an artist that knows a work of art by means of the form used to make it. Now, since it is not totally freed from material conditions, the species that a sensible thing causes in our senses is the likeness of a form as it exists in matter. Hence, we know about a particular precisely as particular by means of that species. But when our intellect receives a sensible thing’s species, that species is totally freed from material conditions. Hence, our intellect cannot know about a particular directly by means of that species; instead, it knows about it by a certain reflecting of the intellect back to the sensitive powers from which intelligible species are abstracted. Now, a thing can be known about this way by means of a form that causes the thing, since that form is its cause. But human artists do not produce matter with their artistic form; they presuppose the matter on which they impose their artistic form. So, the artistic form in their mind is only a likeness of their artwork’s form. Hence, they cannot know their artwork as particular by means of that likeness; they can only know it as such by receiving the form of their artwork through their senses. But the uncreated artist—God—produces not only form but also matter. Hence, the ideas existing in God’s mind are effective not only for knowing universals but also for God to know singulars.
And just as these ideas flow out to produce things in their natural existence, in which each particular thing subsists with its form and matter, so they also proceed into angelic minds to serve as the source of their knowledge of things with the whole existence in which they subsist. Thus, by means of species that flow into them from God’s artistic knowledge, angels know not only universals but also particulars, as God does.
But there is a difference between the two. First, the ideas in God’s mind are forms that produce things, and not just sources of knowledge. But the species received in an angel’s mind are only sources of knowledge; they are not productive, although they are patterned on productive forms. Second, the higher and more penetrating the intellect, the more it can know many things by one source. And since the divine intellect is the highest, it knows all things by means of its one simple essence. Nor does it have multiple ideal forms, except for the different relationships between the divine essence and the things known. But what is really one in the divine mind is really multiplied in a created intellect. Hence, the latter cannot know all things by means of one source. Yet the higher the created intellect, the fewer forms it needs in order to know many things. This is what Dionysius says in chapter 12 of The Celestial Hierarchy—namely that higher ranks have more universal knowledge than lower ones.18 And the Book on Causes says that higher intelligences have more universal forms.19 Note, however, that the lowest angels have forms so universal that they know about all individuals of the same species by means of one form. That species becomes the proper likeness of each particular by the different relationships it has to particulars, as the divine essence becomes the proper likeness of singulars by its different relationships.
But the human intellect, which is on the lowest rank of intellectual substances, has forms so particularized that it can only know one thing by means of one species. Hence, the likeness of a species existing in our intellect is not sufficient for it to know about many singulars. That is why the human intellect is joined to the senses, by which it grasps singulars.
1. So, to the first objection: An angel does not know about singulars by means of an acquired species at all. It does not do so by means of a species it receives from things, since then things would affect its intellect, which is impossible. And it does not do so by means of new species that flow into the angel from God revealing something new to it, since the species an angel has co-created with it are sufficient for it to know all knowable things. But when a higher light elevates an angel’s intellect, it can go from these species to higher conceptions. This is comparable to the way the light of prophecy helps a prophet’s intellect receive knowledge from the same species and mental images that the agent intellect’s natural light was insufficient for. It follows, therefore, that an angel knows about singulars by means of co-created species. And just as it can know different individuals by means of one co-created species, so also and much more can it know all of an individual’s features by means of one species. So, an angel does not need different species to know the color and the smell of one apple. Rather, when it knows about this apple, it simultaneously knows about all of the apple’s features, both essential and accidental. Now, the existence of an effect in its cause only allows the effect to be known in its cause when the cause is determined to that effect. This is the case with necessary causes, whose effects are known when they are known. But a contingent cause is only determined to its effect when it actually produces it. Hence, the existence of an effect in a contingent cause only allows the effect to be known when it has actually been produced. So, an angel that knows the universal causes of all contingent singulars by means of a co-created species does not know about the effects of these causes by its natural knowledge before they actually exist, although it does know about them immediately when they actually exist.
2. To the second objection: When something begins to be present, an angel knows about it newly, but not with any new change in the angel itself. Rather, the change is in the knowable thing, in which something exists that did not exist before, which is known the same time the thing is known.
3. To the third objection: That application should be understood in the sense in which God applies ideas to things known—i.e., not as the application of one knowable thing to another, but as the application of a means of knowledge to the thing known. Otherwise the application would not serve its purpose, as the objection showed.
4. To the fourth objection: An angel’s intellect does not know all things by one species, and it does not have as many species as there are individual things, as what we have said makes clear.
5. To the fifth objection: That one species becomes the proper reason for knowing about each individual by its relationship to it, as what we have said makes clear.
Article 4
We turn, then, to the fourth question. The knowledge that Augustine calls the mind’s “offspring”20 does not seem to exist in the mind like an accident in a subject:
1. No accident exceeds its subject. But knowledge exceeds the mind, since the mind knows not only itself but also other things by means of its knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is not an accident of the mind.
2. No accident is equal to its subject. But knowledge is equal to the mind, otherwise the mind, knowledge, and love would not constitute an image of the Trinity, as Augustine says they do.21 Therefore, knowledge is not an accident of the mind.
3. This does not seem to be the case given the words of Augustine, who says in book IX of On the Trinity that knowledge and love exist in the soul substantially or, that is to say, essentially, not as in a subject like color or shape in a body.22
But to the contrary: The mind’s knowledge is just understanding. But understanding is an accident, since it is the first species of quality. Therefore, knowledge is an accident as well.
Answer: Knowledge can be taken in four senses. In one sense it refers to the cognitive nature itself. In a second sense it refers to the cognitive power. In a third sense it refers to the cognitive disposition. And in a fourth sense it refers to the act of cognition. The same is true of the word “sense,” which sometimes names the sensitive nature itself (for instance, when it refers to what differentiates sensitive things), yet sometimes stands for the power, and sometimes for the act. So, speaking of knowledge in the first sense, it obviously does not exist in the substance of the mind like an accident in a subject; it exists in the mind essentially and substantially, like rationality in a living thing, and life in an existing one. But speaking of knowledge in the other three senses, there are two ways to consider it. We can consider knowledge with respect to the knower, in which case it exists in the knower like an accident in a subject, and does not exceed the subject, since it is only ever found existing in the mind. Or we can consider knowledge with respect to the thing known, in which case it does not exist in the knower but, rather, relates it to something else. Yet the relation to something else does not get the nature of an accident from relating one thing to another, but only from existing in a thing. Hence, only relation (along with substance) continues to apply to God with the same kind of notion, yet without being an accident in God. That is why knowledge considered this way does not exist in the soul as in a subject. Knowledge in this respect also exceeds the mind, since things other than the mind are known by means of its knowledge. Knowledge considered this way also grounds an image of the Trinity, since the divine persons are distinguished by being related to each other. Knowledge in this respect has a kind of equality with the mind as well, since it extends to everything to which the mind itself can extend.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Question 2
Article 1
The next question was about the enjoyment of Christ’s soul during the passion.
That enjoyment seems to have extended all the way to the essence of Christ’s soul:
1. The enjoyment of Christ’s soul was complete. But his enjoyment would not have been complete without extending to the essence of his soul, otherwise it would only have involved one power, viz. his higher reason. Therefore, Christ’s enjoyment extended all the way to the essence of his soul.
2. The enjoyment of Christ’s soul was more complete than the enjoyment of the souls of the saints in heaven. But the enjoyment of the saints in heaven extends all the way to the essence of their souls. Much more, therefore, did Christ’s enjoyment extend to the essence of his soul.
But to the contrary: Nothing is enjoyed without being known. As Augustine says, we enjoy things we know, and our will rests in them, delighting in them for their own sake.23 Yet knowledge does not belong to the essence of the soul, but to one of its powers. Therefore, Christ’s enjoyment did not extend to the essence of his soul.
Answer: Such enjoyment consists in a particular act of seeing and loving God. But acts are only acts of subsisting things. So, properly speaking, neither the powers of the soul nor its essence enjoys things; it is a human being or a subsisting soul that does so. Nevertheless, the powers of the soul are sources of a living thing’s activities, as the essence of the soul is a source of a living thing’s existence. Now, the object of our higher reason is an eternal thing to enjoy. So, we have to acknowledge our higher reason as a source of such enjoyment, viz. that by which our soul enjoys God. This enjoyment can only extend to the other powers of the soul or to its essence by a sort of overflow—i.e., by the enjoyment of our higher reason having an effect on the essence of the soul or on its lower powers. In this sense, Christ’s enjoyment extended to the essence of his soul during his passion in one way, but not in another. If we consider the essence of his soul in its role of actualizing his body, then Christ’s enjoyment did not extend to the essence of his soul, otherwise his body would already have been glorified. Likewise, Christ’s enjoyment did not extend to the essence of his soul considered as the root of his lower powers, since in that case the delight that he enjoyed would have completely eliminated the suffering of his passion, which he experienced with his lower powers. But Christ’s enjoyment did extend to the essence of his soul considered as the root of his higher reason, and since the soul’s essence is simple and whole in each of its powers, Christ’s whole soul enjoyed God as the root of his higher reason, and his whole soul suffered as the actualization of his body and as the root of his lower powers.
1. So, to the first objection: Only the loss of something essential stands in the way of a thing’s completion. But the glorification of the body and of the lower powers is a matter of the accidental joy of blessedness. So, even though Christ’s enjoyment did not extend to the essence of his soul as the actualization of his body and as the root of his lower powers, it does not follow that his enjoyment or blessedness was incomplete.
2. To the second objection: In its intensity, the enjoyment of Christ’s soul was more complete than the enjoyment of the souls of the saints in heaven; but in its extension, it was not. For the delight we enjoy in heaven will extend to our lower powers and even to our glorified bodies. But if that had happened to Christ, then he would not have been a traveler on the way to heaven.
Question 3
The next questions were about the plurality found among spiritual substances.
There were two such questions: (1) Is divine immeasurability incompatible with a plurality of divine persons? and (2) Is angelic simplicity compatible with angels being composed of accident and subject?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. Divine immeasurability seems incompatible with a plurality of divine persons:
1. As indeterminate, everything immeasurable remains one. But everything divine is immeasurable. Since there is a divine person, then, it will remain one. Hence, there will not be a plurality of divine persons.
2. If you say that the divine persons remain one in the sense that they are all one divine essence, I reply to the contrary: A divine person is as immeasurable as the divine essence. But the immeasurability of the divine essence makes for just one divine essence. Therefore, the immeasurability of a divine person makes for just one divine person.
3. If you say that a divine person is only immeasurable because of the immeasurability of the divine essence, I reply to the contrary: The thought of a divine person adds something to the thought of the divine essence. But anything thought of as divine is also thought of as immeasurable. Hence, the immeasurability of a divine person is additional to the immeasurability of the divine essence, and thus makes for just one divine person.
But to the contrary: 1 John 4 says: There are three that give testimony in heaven, etc.24
Answer: Immeasurability is only incompatible with plurality if it eliminates determination, which is the source of plurality. Yet, as we have said, there are two sorts of determination: the limiting sort and the distinguishing sort. Now, there is no way for limiting determination to apply to the divine. But distinguishing determination applies in two ways. It applies in one way insofar as the divine essence is distinguished from every creature as the non-limited from the limited. It applies in another way insofar as one divine person is distinguished from another by the relation of origin, which is not a function of any limitation, but of the opposition involved in a relation. Hence, divine immeasurability is not incompatible with the latter sort of distinction, and therefore is not incompatible with a plurality of divine persons.
1. That makes the reply to the first objection clear.
2. To the second objection: Even though a divine person is immeasurable, the immeasurability stems from the divine essence, not from the person, just as a divine person is good because of the goodness of the divine essence. Hence, immeasurability does not make for a lack of distinction among the divine persons, but only within the existence of the divine nature.
3. To the third objection: The thought of a divine person adds something to that of the divine essence, but not as though our mind has to think of something in addition to the divine essence, since then our thought would be wrong. Rather, by thinking of a divine person I necessarily think of the divine essence, but not the other way around. Hence, the objection fails.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. Angels do not seem to be composed of accident and subject:
1. Since accidental existence is caused by substantial existence, accidental composition is caused by substantial composition. But angels lack substantial composition, since they are simple substances, as Dionysius says.25 Hence, angels lack accidental composition as well.
2. In his book On the Trinity, Boethius says that a simple form cannot be a subject.26 But, according to Dionysius, angels are simple forms.27 Therefore, angels cannot be the subject of an accident.
But to the contrary: Augustine holds that spiritual substances fall short of divine simplicity by being composed of accident and subject.28
Answer: Being able to receive a substantial or accidental form implies having some potentiality, since having potentiality means serving as the subject of some actuality, which is called a form. Now opinions differ about angels. Some people say that they are composed of matter and form. Others say that they are composed of existence and what exists, as Boethius puts it.29 But either way an angel must have some potentiality. This is obvious on the first opinion, and it can be made equally obvious on the second. For everything that is not its own existence must receive existence from another, which is the cause of its existing. So, considered just in itself, such a thing is potential relative to the existence it receives from another. At least in that sense, then, an angel must have some potentiality, since it is not its own existence—only God is. Hence, it follows that an angel can be the subject of an accidental form.
1. So, to the first objection: The substantial simplicity of angels is incompatible with the composition of matter and form, but not with the composition of existence and what exists, which composition is at least presupposed by the accidental composition of angels. Likewise, accidental composition is not necessarily caused by substantial composition, even if accidental existence is caused by substantial existence, since there is a way for a simple substance to be the subject of an accident, as we just explained.
2. To the second objection: Boethius is talking about the simple form that is pure actuality with no admixture of potentiality, which is God alone.
Question 4
The next questions were about the sacrament of the altar. There were three such questions: (1) Is the whole quantity of Christ’s body contained under the outward appearances of bread? (2) Are the body of Christ and the bread both there in the same instant? and (3) Can God make whiteness and other qualities exist without any quantity, as God makes quantity exist without a subject in the sacrament of the altar?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. Christ’s whole body does not seem to be contained under the outward appearances of bread:
Two contradictory things cannot be true at the same time, not even miraculously, as Augustine says in Against Faustus.30 Yet that is what would follow if Christ’s whole body were contained under those outward appearances. For if the whole of his body were there under those appearances, then it would not be any larger than those appearances, since it would not extend beyond them. But Christ’s true body is larger than those appearances, since it is two cubits long or longer. Hence, it would be both larger and not larger than the same thing. Therefore, Christ’s whole body cannot be contained under those outward appearances, not even miraculously.
But to the contrary: Unless a body is divided, the whole body is wherever any part of it is. But Christ’s body is not divided, since it is impassible. And part of Christ’s body is there under those outward appearances. As Matthew 16 says: This is my body.31 Therefore, Christ’s whole body must be contained under those outward appearances.
Answer: Without a doubt, Christ’s whole body with its whole quantity is contained under those outward appearances.
To see why, realize that there are two ways for something to be contained in the sacrament of the altar. One way is as a result of the sacrament’s power; the other is as a result of natural concomitance. For example, Christ’s body and blood are contained under the outward appearances of bread, but his body is there as a result of the sacrament’s power, while his blood is there as a result of natural concomitance, since his body does not exist without his blood. Under the outward appearances of wine, however, things are the other way around. Now, as a result of its power, the sacrament contains whatever serves as the endpoint of transubstantiation. That is why Christ’s soul and divinity are not contained in the sacrament as a result of its power, since the bread and wine are not turned into them. Rather, they are there as a result of natural concomitance, since Christ’s soul is inseparably united to his body, as is his divinity to his humanity. Now, the bread’s substance changes while its quantity remains with the rest of its accidents. Hence, the substance of Christ’s body is the direct endpoint of transubstantiation. Accordingly, the substance of Christ’s body is there as a result of the sacrament’s power, while its quantity is there as a result of natural concomitance. Clearly, then, the substance of Christ’s body is directly related to the bread’s remaining dimensions, whereas the quantity of Christ’s body is related to them in a sort of derivative way. But the opposite relation holds between something in a place and that place, since the substance of something in a place is related to that place by means of its own dimensions. That is why the dimensions of something in a place have to be commensurate with the dimensions of the place containing it. But the dimensions of Christ’s body do not have to be commensurate with the dimensions of the bread’s outward appearances. Hence, Christ’s whole body can be under dimensions of bread as small as you like, just as the whole nature of a body’s substance is present in any part of the body you like.
So, to the first objection: It does not follow that Christ’s body is not larger than the outward appearances under which it is contained, since his body is not contained under them as something commensurate with them. Hence, it does not follow that contradictory things are true at the same time.