Article 1: Is it permissible for a cleric bound to say the canonical hours to say matins for the next day late at night?

Article 1: Is it permissible for a cleric bound to say the canonical hours to say matins for the next day late at night?

Quodlibet V

There were questions about God, about angels, and about human beings. The questions about God touched on the divine nature and on the assumed nature. The questions on the divine nature were about God’s knowledge and power.

Question 1

There were two questions about God’s knowledge: (1) Does God know the first instant the world could have been created? and (2) Can people foreknown by God merit punishment?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. God seems to know the first instant the world could have been created:

God could have created the world before it was created, but not infinitely before, since then it would be coeternal with God. So, there must be a first instant the world could have been created. Yet God knows everything. Therefore, God knows the first instant the world could have been created.

But to the contrary: God does not know anything prejudicial to divine omnipotence. But it would be prejudicial to divine omnipotence for there to be a first instant the world could have been created, since that would limit divine power to that instant. Therefore, God does not know the first instant the world could have been created.

Answer: There are two ways to say that something is made in a certain amount of space or time. One way presupposes that amount, which is how particular effects are produced in space or time by God or other agents. Another way involves that amount of space and time being produced along with the thing made. This is how the world is brought into existence by God, not in any preexisting space or time but in a space and time produced along with the world.

Hence, there is a difference between saying that God could have created a particular effect like a horse or a human being before it was created or even elsewhere than it was created, and saying that of the world. Saying that of a human being or of a horse means that there is some space or time in which a human being could have been made by God. But saying that of the world does not mean that there is some time before the world or some space outside of it; it means that God could have made a greater amount of space or time in the world.

So, could God have made the world infinitely before it was made? If the question refers to the power of its maker, then clearly God could have made the world infinitely before. For the power of God is eternal, and could not have been increased in any way, as if God might begin making the world sometime after having been unable to do so. But if the question refers to the world, then it could not have been made always to exist, given the truth of the Catholic faith, which holds that at some point the world did not exist. Just as God cannot make something that was the case not to have been the case, as will be explained later,¹ God cannot make something that at some point did not exist never not to have existed. In that sense, God could not have made the world infinitely before it was made.

Realize, however, that there are two senses of infinity. One sense is actual, which is the sense in which God could not have made the world infinitely before it was made—i.e., the world’s duration could not have gone on infinitely before. The other sense of infinity is potential, which is the sense in which God could have made the world infinitely before it was made, since however far before the world is thought to have been made, God still could have made it earlier.

Hence, there is no first instant the world could have been made by God, although there is a first instant it was made, just as there is a farthest point to which the world was made by God, although there is no farthest point beyond which it could not have been made.

That clearly settles the question.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that people foreknown by God cannot merit punishment:

Just as some people are chosen by God from all eternity to have grace, some people are foreknown by God to be left to their own nature. But we do not merit reward or punishment for natural things. Therefore, people foreknown by God do not merit punishment.

But to the contrary: Since God is a just judge, no one is damned by God without meriting such punishment. Yet foreknown people are damned by God. Therefore, they merit punishment.

Answer: God’s knowledge relates to created things like artistry relates to works of art. Now, artistry not only knows about but also produces things made artfully, yet it only knows about mistakes made by deviating from the rules of art. Similarly, God’s knowledge produces and knows about everything good, yet it only knows about evil or sin, which are deviations from God’s eternal law; it does not cause them. Thus, good people, who are justified by grace, are not only foreknown by God from all eternity but also chosen to have grace. But sinners, who are not justified by grace, are not chosen or preordained by God to sin, but only foreknown to be left to their own nature without having grace.

Now, every agent can do things beneath itself, but not things beyond itself. Hence, people left to their own nature cannot perform acts that merit reward, which are beyond the powers of nature. But they can still perform sinful acts that merit punishment, which are beneath our human nature: those who sin fall away from the dignity of their own nature.

Clearly, therefore, people foreknown by God can merit punishment.

So, to the first objection: There are two ways to take the claim that we do not merit reward or punishment for natural things. Taken one way, it means that natural things do not merit reward or punishment, which is true, since things that merit reward are beyond nature, and things that merit punishment are contrary to nature. Taken another way, it means that natural things are not sources of our meriting reward or punishment, which is false. For natural things are aided by grace to be sources of our meriting reward, while left to themselves such things are sources of our meriting punishment, as we have said.

Question 2

The next two questions were about God’s power: (1) Can God restore a fallen virgin? and (2) Can God sin, if God wants to?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that God could restore a virgin:

God’s omnipotence means that with God no word will be impossible, as Luke 1 says.² But this is a word: restoring a virgin after a fall. Therefore, God can restore a virgin after a fall.

But to the contrary: Jerome says: Although God can do other things, God cannot restore a virgin after falling.³ It says the same thing in the Decretum, d. XXXII, q.5.⁴

Answer: There are two things to consider about virginity. One is the integrity of mind and body. In that respect, God can restore a virgin after falling. For God can renew the mind by grace and repair the body by a miracle. The other thing to consider is the reason for that integrity, viz. the fact that a virgin woman has not been known by a man. In that respect, God cannot restore a virgin after falling. For God cannot make a woman that has already been known by a man not to have been known by a man. This point applies to anything that has happened: God cannot make what has happened not to have happened. For God’s power extends to all that exists. Hence, the only thing beyond God’s power is a thing incompatible with the nature of an existent. Yet being and not being such and such at the same time is just such a thing, and is the same sort of idea as what has been such and such not having been such and such. Hence in book XXVI of Against Faustus, Augustine says: Saying, if God is omnipotent, let God make what has happened not to have happened, really amounts to saying . . . let God make things that are true, precisely insofar as they are true, actually false.⁵

So, to the first objection: Since a word is something conceived of by the mind, nothing that implies a contradiction can be called a word, since the mind never conceives of such a thing, as proved in book IV of the Metaphysics.⁶

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. “God can sin, if God wants to” seems false:

Whenever I can say that a person can do something if the person wants to, I can just say that the person can do it. So, if “God can sin, if God wants to” is true, it follows that “God can sin” is true. But the latter is mistaken. Therefore, so is the former.

But to the contrary: Wanting to sin is itself a sin. But if God does sin, then God can sin. Therefore, if God wants to sin, God can sin.

Answer: The conjunction “if” expresses a relationship. In the statement in question, it can express one of two relationships.

One is the relationship of a cause or source, and in that sense the statement is false. For the will of God is the source and cause of created things, but not of things pertaining to the divine nature. Hence we have to say that the Father generated the Son by nature, not by will, as Hilary makes clear in his book On the Councils.⁷ Yet God’s power pertains to the divine nature. Hence, whether God can sin is not subject to the divine will, since otherwise the will of God would be a source of change in the divine nature, which is impossible.

The other is the relationship of implication, and in that sense the statement is true: “If God wants to sin, God can sin.” For it follows unconditionally if we argue from the impossible supposition: “God wants to sin, therefore God can sin.” For everything God wants to do, God can do, but not the other way around.

So, to the first objection: When I say, “If a person wants to run, the person can run,” the antecedent is possible, and therefore the consequent is possible just by itself. But when I say, “If God wants to sin, God can sin,” the antecedent is impossible, and hence the conditional itself can be true, even though the consequent is impossible.

Question 3

The next two questions were on God’s assumed nature: (1) Did all the blood that Christ shed during the passion return to his body at the resurrection? and (2) Which is the greater sign of Christ’s love for us: suffering for us, or giving us his body as food in the sacrament?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. All the blood that Christ shed during the passion seems to have returned to his body at the resurrection:

1. Our resurrection will be like Christ’s resurrection. As that verse of Philippians 3 says: He will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body.⁸ But at the resurrection our body will regain all the parts of true human nature. Yet the blood that Christ shed during the passion is part of true human nature, and called sacred in that verse: with sacred blood anointed, from the body of the Lamb.⁹ Therefore, the blood that Christ shed during the passion seems to have returned to his body at the resurrection.

2. The Word of God never abandoned the parts of our human nature that he assumed, not even when those parts were separated during his passion. But the Word of God assumed not only a body but also the blood of our human nature. Hence, the Word never abandoned that blood, which therefore returned to him at the resurrection.

But to the contrary: Christ’s blood is preserved in some churches even to this day.

Answer: At Christ’s resurrection as much as at our own, all that was part of true human nature is restored, though not what was not part of true human nature. Of course, different people have different opinions about the parts of true human nature. But on every opinion, not all the nutrient blood (i.e., the blood generated from food) is relevant to true human nature. And since Christ ate and drank before the passion, there is no reason why he would not have had some nutrient blood that was not relevant to true human nature, and hence need not have returned to his body at the resurrection.

Yet this question is specifically about the blood that Christ shed during the passion to redeem the human race, which does all seem to have returned to his body at the resurrection, and for three reasons. The first is based on Christ’s age when he suffered. For he suffered the passion at the most perfect age, when the things about a human being seem most relevant to true human nature, having reached their greatest perfection. The second reason is based on the merit of his passion. As Augustine says in book XXI of The City of God, the body parts with which the holy martyrs endured their suffering for Christ will have a special brilliance at their resurrection.¹⁰ Much more, then, should the blood that Christ shed to save the human race be restored at his glorious resurrection. The third reason is based on the power of Christ’s passion. For the blood that he shed during the passion sanctified the human race. As the last chapter of Hebrews says: Jesus suffered outside the gate in order to sanctify the people with his own blood.¹¹ Now, Christ’s humanity had its sanctifying power because of the Word united to it, as Damascene says in book III.¹² Hence, since the blood that Christ shed during the passion was most sanctifying, it was clearly united to his divinity, and thus had to be joined to the other parts of his humanity at his resurrection.

But the blood of Christ that is shown in some churches is supposed to have flowed miraculously from a pierced image of Christ, or else from Christ’s body at some other time.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. Christ seems to have shown us a greater sign of his love by giving us his body as food than by suffering for us:

The charity of our heavenly homeland is greater than the charity of our earthly journey. Yet the good that Christ did for us by giving us his body as food is more like the charity of our heavenly homeland, where we will enjoy God fully; whereas the suffering that he endured for us is more like the charity of our earthly journey, where we are in danger of suffering for Christ. Therefore, Christ giving us his body as food is a greater sign of his love than suffering for us.

But to the contrary: John 15 says: Greater love has no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends.¹³

Answer: The most powerful thing of each kind is the measure of everything else of that kind, as the Philosopher makes clear in book X of the Metaphysics.¹⁴ Now, the most powerful kind of human love is the love that people have for themselves; so that love must be the measure of all their love for others. Hence in book IX of the Ethics, the Philosopher says that friendly relations with others come from friendly relations with oneself.¹⁵ Yet loving oneself means wanting good for oneself. Hence, how much more people love others is proven by how much more they forgo the good they want for themselves for the sake of their friends. As that verse of Proverbs 12 says: The one who disregards a loss for the sake of a friend is just.¹⁶ Now, people want three particular goods for themselves: soul, body, and external things. Hence, it is a sign of love to suffer the loss of external things for another. But it is a greater sign of love to suffer a bodily loss by enduring labors or lashes for a friend. Yet the greatest sign of love is to lay down one’s soul by dying for a friend.

Accordingly, Christ laying down his soul by suffering for us was the greatest sign of love for us, whereas giving us his body as food in the sacrament involves no loss for him at all. Thus, the former is clearly the greater sign of Christ’s love. Hence, the sacrament is a memorial and a representation of Christ’s passion. Yet the truth surpasses its representation, and the reality its memorial.

So, to the first objection: The gift of Christ’s body in the sacrament shows something of the charity with which God loves us in our heavenly homeland, while his passion is about God’s love calling us back home from perdition. Yet God’s love is no greater in our heavenly homeland than it is here.

Question 4

Article 1

The next question was about angels: Is Lucifer the subject of the aevum?

It seems so:

Just as the subject of time is the first simplest temporal thing, the subject of the aevum is the simplest aeviternal thing. But that is Lucifer, who was created the highest angel by nature. Moreover, the aevum is not a matter of grace, but of nature, otherwise the heavenly bodies could not be measured by the aevum, since they cannot receive grace. Yet their natural endowments remained intact after the demons sinned, as Dionysius says in chapter 4 of The Divine Names.¹⁷ Therefore, Lucifer is the subject of the aevum.

But to the contrary: The aevum is a participation of eternity. But the blessed angels participate in eternity more than Lucifer, who is deprived of blessedness. Therefore, the subject of the aevum is not Lucifer, but rather the highest of the blessed angels.

Answer: Ignorance of Greek has made it common for people to distinguish the aevum from eternity, which would be like distinguishing “anthropos” from “homo.”¹⁸ For what Greek calls “aevon,” Latin calls “aeternitas.” Hence Dionysius uses “eternity” and “aevum” with the same meaning in chapter 10 of The Divine Names.¹⁹ But words should be used as the majority use them.²⁰ So, if we have to distinguish the two, the aevum will just be a participation of eternity. Hence, the essence of eternity is attributed to God, while the aevum is attributed to the spiritual substances above time as a sort of participated eternity. But the essence of a thing is always the measure of the participation of that thing. Hence, the first measure of every aeviternal thing can be said to be the very eternity of God, just as the measure of every substance is the substance of God, as the Commentator says in book X of the Metaphysics.²¹

For those who prefer to have a homogenous measure (i.e., a measure of the same kind), some people say that there is not one common measure but, rather, each aeviternal thing has its own aevum. But these people do not know what they are talking about. If what they said were true, then all aeviternal things would be equal, since one of them would not be the measure of another. Yet that is not true: among angels there is a first, middle, and last, not only between the different hierarchies and ranks, but also between different angels of the same rank, as Dionysius makes clear in chapter 10 of The Celestial Hierarchy.²² Moreover, the simplest thing of each kind is always the measure of that kind, as it says in book X of the Metaphysics.²³ Hence, the duration of the simplest aeviternal thing must necessarily be the aevum of every aeviternal thing, and thus the simplest aeviternal thing is the subject of the aevum.

But realize that the aevum measures not only the nature of spiritual substances but also their own proper activity. Hence the Book on Causes says that they exist in a moment of eternity by nature and activity.²⁴ Hence, the subject of the aevum must be the angel not only with the simplest nature but also with the simplest activity. But that is the highest of the good angels, whose activity is most united with the one God. Therefore, the highest of the good angels is the subject of the aevum, not Lucifer.

So, to the first objection: Some people hold that Lucifer was not the highest angel, but rather the first of those set over the earthly order, as Damascene says.²⁵ Yet even if we hold with Gregory that Lucifer was the highest angel of all,²⁶ his activity still turned away from the one first thing and toward the many lower things over which he wanted supremacy; that is how the demons fell from the highest simplicity of the aevum. Hence in chapter 4 of The Divine Names, Dionysius says that demons are called evil because their natural activity is diminished.²⁷

Question 5

The next questions were about human beings. The first touched on things common to all human beings. The second touched on things related to the states of certain human beings.

There were four sorts of questions on such common things. The first related to human nature, the second to the sacraments, the third to the virtues, and the fourth to the commandments.

There were three of the first questions. The first was on human persons: (1) If Adam had not sinned, would all the same people that are saved now still have been saved? The second was on the intellect: (2) Is a mental word an intelligible species? The third was on the will: (3) Are things done out of fear voluntary?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. If Adam had not sinned, it seems that not all the same people that are saved now would have been saved:

1. If Adam had not sinned, only the elect would have been born. Hence, the sinners who are reprobated in the end would not have been born, which means that their children would not have been born: if the parents are not the same, the children are not the same. But many people are saved now whose parents were reprobated. Therefore, if Adam had not sinned, not all the same people who are saved now would have been saved.

2. According to the Philosopher, seed is excess food.²⁸ But if Adam had not sinned, men would have eaten different food in paradise than they eat now. Therefore, they would have had different seed, and hence different children.

But to the contrary: In book IV of his Morals, Gregory says: If the rot of sin had not infected our first parent, he would never have generated children of hell; only those who are chosen by the redeemer to be saved now would have been born.²⁹

Answer: As with other animals, in the generation of a human being the father’s seed is the agent, while the mother provides the matter for the seed to act on and form into a human body. Hence, it is impossible for the same child to be born of a different mother or a different father, just as one and the same seal cannot be made out of different wax or with the use of a different signet to stamp the wax. And even though the seed is excess food, as the Philosopher says, different food is not enough to make the children born of that seed different. For that food only becomes seed by being turned somehow into the father’s substance.

Now, some people follow Anselm and say that if the man had not sinned at that first temptation, then he and all his descendants would have been immediately confirmed, so that all those born after him would have been elect.³⁰ But many people are saved now whose parents were sinners, as the first argument pointed out. Hence, the parents of those to be saved would have been different, and thus their children would have been different.

But this position does not seem true. As Augustine says in book XIV of The City of God, the state of the human body directly corresponds to the state of the soul.³¹ As long as people have a natural body requiring food and capable of dying and not dying, they also have a soul capable of sinning and not sinning. Yet people have a natural body as long as they remain in the state of generation, which would have followed that first temptation even if the man had not sinned. That means that he or one of his descendants could have sinned afterward, as Hugh of St. Victor says.³² Hence, a difference in parents does not follow from the fact that there are sinners now but would not have been then.

Yet there is another reason to think that there would be a difference in parents. In the original state, a man would not have had more than one wife, nor would any children have been born as a result of fornication or adultery, which happens now even among those who are saved. Many children born of the same father but of different wives are saved, as is clear with the sons of Jacob.³³ And many born as a result of fornication or adultery are saved; otherwise, it would be pointless to give them the sacraments of salvation. Therefore, many people who are saved now would not have been born and thus would not have been saved if the first man had not sinned. Yet that does not mean that God’s predestination was mistaken, since God predestined human beings with a knowledge of future events.

But what Gregory says is certainly true: if the first man had not sinned, he would never have generated children of hell.³⁴ For then he would not have passed on to his children original sin, which is why people are born children of wrath.³⁵ When Gregory adds that only those to be saved now would have been born,³⁶ the pronoun should be taken as a simple demonstrative, since only those chosen would have been born,³⁷ which is about the nature of their origin; it should not be taken as a personal demonstrative, since there would have been different human persons who were saved.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. A mental word seems to be an intelligible species:

1. A mental word is the means by which our intellect sees. Yet the means by which our intellect sees is an intelligible species. Therefore, a mental word is an intelligible species.

2. Intellection arises from sensation. But our senses perceive by means of a sensible species. Therefore, the mental word by means of which our intellect thinks is an intelligible species.

But to the contrary: An internal mental word is what an external word signifies. But an external word does not signify an intelligible species. Therefore, an internal word is not an intelligible species.

Answer: As Augustine says in book XV of On the Trinity, a mental word is something that proceeds from the mind or the intellect.³⁸ Now, something proceeds from the intellect by being constituted by an act of intellect. But, as the Philosopher says in book III of On the Soul, the intellect has two acts.³⁹ One act is called the apprehension of indivisibles, by which the intellect forms within itself a definition or a concept of something simple. The other is the intellect’s act of combining and dividing, by which it forms a proposition. Each of the things constituted by these acts of intellect is called a mental word. The first is signified by a simple term, and the second by a statement.

Now, clearly every act of intellect proceeds from the intellect because it has been actualized by an intelligible species, since nothing acts except by being actual.⁴⁰ Hence, an intelligible species is a source of intellectual acts, and must therefore differ from a mental word, which is itself formed by such acts. Of course, that word could be called an intelligible form or species, but one constituted by the intellect itself, just as the form invented by an artist’s intellect is called a sort of intelligible species.

1. So, to the first objection: There are two ways that our intellect thinks by some means. It does so in one way formally, which is how it thinks by means of an intelligible species that actualizes it. It does so in another way by using something as an instrument to think of something else, which is how the intellect thinks by means of a word, since it forms a word in order to think of a thing.

2. To the second objection: External sensation occurs by sensible things simply affecting our senses, which then perceive by means of the form impressed on them by sensible things. The external senses do not form any sensible form for themselves. But the imagination does, and its form is in some ways similar to the intellect’s word.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. Things done out of fear do not seem voluntary:

Necessary is the opposite of voluntary, as it says in book V of the Metaphysics.⁴¹ But things done out of fear are done out of necessity. Therefore, such things are not voluntary.

But to the contrary: Everything done for the sake of an end is voluntary. Yet things done out of fear are done for the sake of an end, viz. to avoid the bad thing feared. A ship’s cargo is thrown overboard, for instance, in order to avoid sinking.⁴² Therefore, such things are voluntary.

Answer: Since good is the object of the will, things are voluntary in the same way that they are good. Now, things can be good in general and yet turn out bad in particular circumstances. Having children, for instance, is good, but having children out of wedlock is bad. Likewise, things can be bad in general but become good in particular circumstances. Killing people, for instance, is bad just by itself, but killing people who endanger the populace is good. Yet actions always concern particular things. Hence, actions are judged good or bad, and therefore voluntary or involuntary, absolutely speaking, within their particular circumstances, but they are judged so in a qualified sense in general.

In general, therefore, things done out of fear are bad and involuntary, but in particular circumstances they are good and voluntary. By itself, for instance, throwing cargo overboard is bad and not voluntary, but in such a situation it is good and voluntary. Hence in book III of the Ethics, the Philosopher says that such things are a mix of voluntary and involuntary: voluntary absolutely speaking, but involuntary and done out of necessity in a qualified sense.⁴³

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 6

The next questions related to the sacraments. The first were about the sacrament of the Eucharist. The second were about the sacrament of penance. The third were about the sacrament of marriage.

There were two questions about the Eucharist: (1) Is the form of bread annihilated? and (2) Should a priest give an unconsecrated host to an unexposed sinner who asks him to do so?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. The form of bread seems to be annihilated in the sacrament of the Eucharist:

1. What ceases to exist and turns into nothing is annihilated. But after the consecration, the form of bread ceases to exist and yet does not turn into anything. It does not turn into the matter of Christ’s body, nor into its form (i.e., his soul), otherwise Christ’s soul would be present there by the sacrament’s power. Therefore, the form of bread is annihilated.

2. In his comments on John 17, Augustine says: Glorify me, Father, etc. Now if we think about it carefully, a human being would vanish in God, if its human nature were turned into the Word.⁴⁴ Yet to vanish is to be annihilated. Therefore, if bread is turned into the body of Christ, it would seem to be annihilated.

But to the contrary: As Augustine says in his book of Eighty-Three Questions, God does not cause any tendency toward nonexistence.⁴⁵ Yet God causes the sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore, nothing is annihilated in that sacrament.

Answer: Annihilation is a sort of change, and every change is designated by its endpoint. Hence, the endpoint of annihilation is nothingness. But the sacrament’s consecration of bread does not end with nothingness but, rather, with the body of Christ; otherwise, there would be no way for the body of Christ to begin to be present in the sacrament (it does not begin to be there by changing place, since it would then cease to be in heaven). Therefore, the consecration of bread is not an annihilation, but a transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ.

1. So, to the first objection: With natural generation, neither the form nor the matter is generated or corrupted but, rather, the whole composite. So, too, with the sacrament of the altar, there is no asking what the form or the matter separately turn into: the whole bread turns into the whole body of Christ, precisely as that body. Hence, if there had been a consecration during the three days that Christ was dead, his soul would not have been present but, rather, his un-ensouled body, just as it lay in the tomb.

2. To the second objection: Human nature would vanish if it were turned into the Word because it would cease to be, which is a matter of its starting point. But it would not be annihilated, which is a matter of its endpoint.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to an unexposed sinner who asks him to do so:

1. A priest should not expose a hidden sin, which he would do by giving someone an unconsecrated host while giving others a consecrated one. Therefore, a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to an unexposed sinner who asks him to do so.

2. When a priest holds out a consecrated host to one of the faithful, it is adored by others nearby. Hence, if a priest presented an unconsecrated host instead of a consecrated one, he would be doing what he can to make people commit idolatry, which is a grave sin. Therefore, a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to an unexposed sinner who asks him to do so.

But to the contrary: A priest is a doctor of souls.⁴⁶ But wise doctors avoid danger for the patients in their care as much as possible. Yet a sinner in a priest’s care would be in great danger by receiving the body of Christ in a state of mortal sin. For he that eats and drinks unworthily, eats and drinks judgment upon himself, as 1 Corinthians 11 says.⁴⁷ Therefore, it is good for a priest to avoid such danger by giving the sinner an unconsecrated host.

Answer: Nothing false should be connected with the truth, since light has no fellowship with darkness, as the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 6.⁴⁸ That is how Augustine proves in his book of Eighty-Three Questions that Christ’s body was not imaginary, since Truth itself—i.e., Christ—could not deceive. Hence, nothing false should be done with the Church’s sacraments, least of all the sacrament of the altar, which contains the whole Christ. Yet something false would be done by giving someone an unconsecrated host instead of a consecrated one.

Furthermore, such a priest would be doing what he can to provide the occasion for people to commit idolatry. Of course, they would not be guilty of idolatry, since they would reasonably suppose that the host is consecrated. But by presenting them with an unconsecrated host to adore, the priest himself would be guilty of the sin of idolatry.

Hence, under no circumstances should an unconsecrated host ever be presented to anyone as if it were consecrated.

Therefore, a priest should tell an unexposed sinner to repent first and then approach the sacrament. And if the sinner does not want to repent, the priest should discreetly prevent the sinner from mixing in with other public communicants. But if the sinner does mix in with them, the priest should give the sinner a consecrated host.

Hence, we grant the first two arguments.

To the objection made to the contrary: It would be foolish for doctors to put themselves in greater danger in order to avoid less danger for their patients, for example, by drinking poison themselves so that their patients will not do so. Yet it is a much greater sin for a priest to do something false with the sacrament of Christ than for a sinner to receive it unworthily. Hence, it would be foolish for a priest to sin more gravely by doing something false with the sacrament of truth in order to avoid someone in his care sinning.

Question 7

The next two questions were about the sacrament of penance: (1) Should a superior remove a subordinate from his position because of something he heard from him in confession? and (2) Does a man who dies while going on crusade die in a better state than a man who dies while coming back?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that a superior could remove a subordinate from his position because of something he heard from him in confession:

What is established for the sake of charity does not militate against charity.⁴⁹ But the seal of confession was established for the sake of charity, and hence does not militate against charity. Yet charity obligates superiors to seek the salvation of their subordinates, and sometimes holding a position is contrary to a subordinate’s salvation—for instance, when it is an occasion for him to slide back into sin. Therefore, the seal of confession notwithstanding, a superior should remove such a subordinate from his position.

But to the contrary: Nothing prejudicial to confession should be done. But it would be prejudicial to confession for a subordinate to be removed from his position because of a sin that he confessed to his superior, since that would discourage others from confessing. Therefore, a superior should not remove a subordinate from his position because of a sin confessed to him.

Answer: Nothing heard in confession should ever be made known in any way, not by word or sign or nod, not even by doing something that could lead one to suspect the sin.

So, if removing a subordinate from his position could lead to a sin that he confessed being made known, or even being reasonably suspected, then his superior should not remove him from his position. For example, if it were customary at a monastery only to remove priors who were at fault, then a sin that he confessed would be made known by removing the prior from his position. Hence, his abbot would sin just as gravely by removing him as if he had revealed his confession. But his abbot could charitably urge him in private to resign immediately, if he thought that it would serve his salvation.

But if removing him from his position would not make his sin known in any way—for example, if it were customary at a monastery for the abbot to remove men from positions as often as he wished, then at some other opportunity he could remove a subordinate who had confessed to him from his position, and indeed he ought to do so, but with due caution, if the position would be a danger to the subordinate in the future. Yet even in that case it would still be better to get him to resign.

But if there is no fear of such danger in the future, he does not have to remove him from his position because of a past sin that has been erased by penance. As Augustine says in his book On Adulterous Marriages: Why should we still consider them adulterers . . . when we believe they have been healed by penance?⁵⁰ Indeed, sometimes the repentant are better than the innocent.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. A crusader who dies while going on crusade seems to have a better death than a crusader who dies while coming back:

A man who dies while going on crusade dies keeping his vow to risk his life for Christ, and thus dies a martyr. But a man who dies while coming back from crusade does not die with the intention of risking his life for Christ, and thus dies a confessor. Yet the state of martyrs is greater than the state of confessors. Therefore, a man who dies while going on crusade dies in a better state than a man who dies while coming back.

But to the contrary: A man who dies while coming back from crusade has already fulfilled his vow. But a man who dies while going on crusade has not yet fulfilled his vow; he is just beginning. Yet the complete is better than the incomplete, and the end is better than the beginning. Therefore, a man who dies while coming back from crusade seems to have a better death than a man who dies while going on crusade.

Answer: The more reward that people merit at death, the better their death is. Yet people merit reward not only for what they are actively doing, but also for what they have already done, which they have entrusted to God, as 2 Timothy 2 says: I know whom I have believed and I am certain that he is able to keep what I have entrusted to him.⁵¹ Now, other things being equal, a man who dies while coming back from crusade clearly merits more reward at death than a man who dies while going on crusade: he merits reward for undertaking the journey and yet also for following through with it, which may have involved a great deal of suffering. Therefore, other things being equal, a man who dies while coming back from crusade has a better death than a man who dies while going on crusade, even though going on crusade merits more reward than coming back, given the nature of the actions.

So, to the first objection: The man coming back from crusade also had the intention of risking his life for Christ when he went on crusade, for which he continues to merit reward, as long as he has kept himself free from sin.

Question 8

The next two questions were about marriage: (1) If a man promises to marry a woman using words in the future tense, and then knows her in the flesh, not meaning to consent to the marriage, but only wanting to have sexual intercourse with her, and then later contracts marriage with another woman using words in the present tense, is the second woman his wife? and (2) If a man accuses his wife of committing adultery in secret, is the woman bound to confess her sin in court?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that a man who knew a woman in the flesh whom he had promised to marry using words in the future tense could not marry another woman with whom he later contracted marriage using words in the present tense:

A man is compelled by a judgment of the Church to marry the first woman he knows in the flesh. The Church can even make people contract marriage who are not legally permitted to do so. Therefore, it seems that such a man could not contract marriage with another woman, and hence the second woman with whom he contracted marriage using words in the present tense is not his wife.

But to the contrary: Human error is not prejudicial to the truth of marriage. But the judgment of the Church that compels a man to marry a woman he knows in the flesh after contracting marriage using words in the future tense is based on the human error of presuming that consent to marriage accompanies uniting in the flesh. Therefore, that error is not prejudicial to the truth of the second marriage, which was rightly contracted using words in the present tense.

Answer: As Pope Nicholas says, marriage is caused by consent expressed with words in the present tense,⁵² without which everything else including intercourse is null.⁵³ But removing a cause removes its effect.⁵⁴ Hence, the first marriage was obviously not a marriage, since it did not involve such consent. Yet providing a cause provides its effect.⁵⁵ Hence, the second marriage was a marriage, since it involved mutual consent expressed with words in the present tense by people who were free to marry.

So, to the first objection: The Church is involved with the things related to marriage in three ways. The first way is by judging such things. Since people look on the outward appearances, as 1 Kings 16 says,⁵⁶ ecclesiastical judges have to judge by appearances based on the testimony of the parties, and suitable witnesses, and other legal documents, in which the truth can often lie hidden. This is especially true with the contents of the heart, which cannot be proven by human testimony, although conjectures about them can be made based on certain external signs. Hence, when the truth lies hidden, the judgment of the Church about things related to marriage does not impede marriage from being contracted or dissolve one that has already been contracted.

The Church is involved in a second way by forbidding and punishing such things, which does impede marriage from being contracted, although it does not dissolve one that has already been contracted. For example, the punishment imposed by the Church for murdering one’s own wife is having to refrain from marrying again. But a marriage that has already been contracted is not thereby dissolved.

The Church is involved in a third way by establishing such things, which is only done by the authority of the supreme pontiff. This is the reason certain people are not legally permitted to marry, so that even if they contract marriage, their marriage is dissolved. This is clearly the case with people at certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, or with an adulteress, when a man has promised to contract marriage with her or has plotted the death of his own wife.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. A woman accused of adultery does not seem bound to confess her sin in court:

No one is bound to reveal a secret fault. But her adultery is supposed to have been secret, and confessing it in court would mean revealing it. Therefore, a woman accused of adultery is not bound to confess her sin in court.

But to the contrary: The woman has to take an oath to tell the truth, and cannot swear a false oath. Therefore, she has to tell the truth and confess her sin.

Answer: We need to make a distinction here. If the woman’s adultery is entirely secret, then she does not have to confess her sin in court, nor should she be made to do so by an oath to tell the truth, since hidden things are reserved for the judgment of God, as 1 Corinthians 4 says: Do not judge before the time, until the Lord comes, who will bring to light the things hidden in darkness.⁵⁷ But if her adultery is already widely known or there are clear indications that would make one strongly suspect it, or if it is more likely than not, then she is bound to confess it, and should be made to do so by an oath to tell the truth.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 9

The next two questions were about the virtues. The first was about justice: (1) If a man is ambushed by thieves and promises them money for his release, which he borrows from a friend, is he bound to repay it? The second was about abstinence: (2) Can one sin by fasting or keeping vigil too much?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. A man who borrows money for his release from thieves does not seem bound to repay it:

1. As Augustine says, in time of need all things are common property.⁵⁸ Yet, as Ambrose says, we should not treat what is common as if it were our own, which d. XLVII of the Decretum states as well.⁵⁹ But the man ambushed by thieves was in the greatest need, given that his life was in danger. Hence, what belonged to the other man was common property for him. Therefore, he is not bound to repay it as if it were the other man’s own.

2. No one is bound to compensate others for fulfilling their obligations. But the man who lent the money was obligated to free his neighbor from the danger of death. As Proverbs 24 says: Rescue those being led to death.⁶⁰ Therefore, the man who was released does not seem bound to repay him the money he borrowed.

But to the contrary: In Matthew 7, the Lord says: Everything you want men to do to you, do also to them.⁶¹ But the man who was released by thieves would want to be repaid if he had lent someone something. Therefore, he ought to repay what he borrowed.

Answer: It is an act of justice to give others their due. Hence, given the good-faith contract between lender and borrower, repayment is due. Thus, the man who borrowed money is bound by a commandment of justice to repay the lender, and that much more so, the more he needed the lender’s help.

1. So, to the first objection: The time of need in which all things become common property is when people cannot provide for themselves. It would be ridiculous for hungry people who do not want to eat their own bread to say that they took someone else’s as common property. But, as the Philosopher says in book III of the Ethics, what we can do by means of our friends, we can do in a sense by ourselves.⁶² And the man ambushed by thieves could free himself by borrowing money from his friends. Hence, all things did not become common property for him.

2. To the second objection: People are obligated to free their neighbor from death in a way suited to their own state, which the man did by lending his friend money. For he was obligated to give it in the event that his friend could be freed by means of a loan.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the next question. It seems that one cannot sin by fasting or keeping vigil too much:

One cannot love God too much, and the proof of love is action, as Gregory says in a homily.⁶³ Therefore, it seems that one cannot sin by fasting or keeping vigil too much for God.

But to the contrary: Bernard confesses that he sinned by weakening his body too much by fasting and keeping vigil.⁶⁴

Answer: As the Philosopher says in book I of the Politics, an end is judged differently from things aimed at an end.⁶⁵ Something pursued as an end is to be pursued without limit, but the use of things aimed at an end should be limited in proportion to that end. A doctor, for instance, produces as much good health (a doctor’s end) as possible. Yet a doctor does not give as much medicine as possible, but only as much as is needed to produce health.

Now, realize that in the spiritual life the love of God is pursed as an end, while fasts and vigils and other such bodily exercises are not. As Romans 14 says: The kingdom of God is not food and drink.⁶⁶ Rather, such things are used as necessary for that end—i.e., in order to subdue the concupiscence of the flesh. As the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 9: I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, etc.⁶⁷ Hence, such things should be used within the limits of reason, viz. so that concupiscence is subdued without the body being destroyed. As Romans 12 says: Present your bodies as a living sacrifice.⁶⁸ Then it adds: your reasonable service.⁶⁹

Therefore, it is certainly a sin for one to weaken the body’s power so much with fasts and vigils and other such things that one is unable to do what one ought to do, as for example a preacher ought to preach, a teacher teach, a singer sing, and so on. The same is true of a man who abstains so much that he renders himself incapable of paying his wife the marriage debt. Hence Jerome says: One who afflicts the body with an excessive want of food or an immoderate lack of sleep offers a stolen sacrifice; and again: one who prefers fasting to charity, or keeping vigils to the integrity of the senses, has lost the dignity of a rational human being.⁷⁰

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 10

The next two questions were about the commandments: (1) Are the commandments prior to the counsels in the order of nature? and (2) Are sins against the commandments of the second tablet more serious than sins against the commandments of the first tablet?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. The commandments seem to be prior to the counsels in the order of nature:

What nature first prompts us to is prior in the order of nature. But nature first prompts us to the commandments, not the counsels, since the commandments are dictates of natural reason. Therefore, the commandments are prior to the counsels in the order of nature.

But to the contrary: Something can be naturally prior in three ways. The first is the way that the imperfect is prior to the perfect. But the commandments are not prior to the counsels in this way, since perfect charity consists especially in keeping the commandments. The second is the way that a cause precedes its effect in time. But the commandments are not prior in this way either, since it is not necessary to fulfill the commandments before the counsels. The third is the way of origination, when a thing’s source is temporally simultaneous with it, like the light of the sun and its ray. But the commandments are not prior in this way either, since it is not necessary for those who keep the commandments to keep the counsels. Therefore, the commandments are not naturally prior to the counsels in any way.

Answer: To answer this question, we need to consider two things: first, what it means to be prior in the order of nature; and second, what the commandments and the counsels are. With these things clear, the answer will be easy to see.

As to the first thing, realize what the Philosopher says in book V of the Metaphysics: prior and posterior apply in each order by reference to the principle of that order.⁷¹ They apply to place, for instance, by reference to the principle of place, and to disciplines by reference to the principle of disciplines. Accordingly, something is prior in the order of nature by refence to the principles of nature, which are the four causes. Hence, what is closer to each kind of cause is prior in the order of nature. Now, although there are four causes, three of them (viz. the efficient, formal, and final cause) coincide. Hence, there are two orders of nature. One is that of the material cause, in which the imperfect is prior to the perfect, and potentiality prior to actuality. The other order of nature is that of the other three causes, in which the perfect is prior to the imperfect, and actuality prior to potentiality. Hence in book V of the Metaphysics, the Philosopher says that some things are prior in potential, others in perfection.⁷² But form is nature more than matter, as proved in book II of the Physics.⁷³ Hence, it is more appropriate to say that actuality is naturally prior to potentiality. For actuality is prior in substance and in kind, as it says in book IX of the Metaphysics,⁷⁴ while potentiality in one and the same thing is prior in generation and in time. Hence in book II of On Interpretation, the Philosopher says that among things that can be actual and potential, the actual are naturally prior but temporally posterior.⁷⁵

Now, as to the second thing (i.e., the nature of the counsels and commandments), realize that a commandment implies something due. Yet something can be due in two senses. It can be due in one sense for its own sake, which is how the end of each activity is due. A doctor, for instance, ought to pursue health for its own sake. Yet something can be due in another sense for the sake of something else—i.e., as necessary to achieve an end. That is the sense in which a doctor ought to prescribe a diet necessary for a patient’s health. But things aimed at an end by making the end better or easier to achieve do not have the character of something due, if there is some possible way to achieve the end without them.

Now, the spiritual life has two ends, at which the divine law is aimed. Its primary end is for us to adhere to God with charity. Hence 1 Timothy 1 says: The end of our commandment is love.⁷⁶ Its secondary and (as it were) disposing end is our purity and uprightness of heart, which consists of internal acts of the other virtues. Hence in Romans 6, the Apostle says: The fruit you have is sanctification.⁷⁷ This is like natural generation, the end of which is both a substantial form and the final disposition for that form.

Clearly, then, the commandments are primarily about the love of God and neighbor, as Matthew 22 shows,⁷⁸ but secondarily about our internal sanctification, as 1 Thessalonians 4 says: This is the will of God, your sanctification.⁷⁹ Everything else in the spiritual life is aimed at these two ends, but in one of two ways. Some things are necessary for these ends, and hence fall under commandments such as: You shall have no other gods, You shall not steal, etc.⁸⁰ Other things are not necessary for these ends, and hence do not fall under commandments, but instead make these ends better or easier, and hence are given as counsels, such as poverty, virginity, and other such things. This is like a man commanded to be in Rome on a certain day: the command requires him to go to Rome, but it does not require him to go on horseback, since it is possible to get to Rome without a horse; and yet he would be counseled to take a horse, since that end is better and more easily achieved on horseback.

With those things clear, it is now easy to see the answer to this question.

If we compare the counsels to the final commandments, which are about the love of God and neighbor and about internal purity of heart, it is clear that the commandments are naturally prior to the counsels in the order of perfection, just as actuality is naturally prior to potentiality, and an end is prior to things aimed at an end. But the counsels are naturally prior in the order of generation and time, since the counsels are how we achieve perfect purity of heart and perfect love of God and neighbor.

Yet if we compare the counsels to the other commandments, which are necessary for these ends, then there are two ways to consider them. For the counsels necessarily include the commandments. Those who abandon all things do not take anyone else’s, and those preserving their virginity do not commit adultery, just as all who go on horseback travel, though not all who travel go on horseback.

One way to consider them is by comparing the counsels to the commandments absolutely considered. Considered this way, the commandments will be prior to the counsels in the order of nature, and the counsels will be naturally posterior to the commandments, just as a genus is naturally prior to its species, and species are naturally posterior to their genera, as the Philosopher makes clear in book I of the Physics.⁸¹ For a genus relates to its species as potentiality to actuality, and the commandments absolutely considered relate like a genus to their observance with or without the counsels. This is how not committing adultery, for instance, relates to not doing so as a virgin or as a married person, just as traveling is common to traveling on horseback and on foot.

The other way to consider them is by comparing the counsels to the commandments observed without the counsels, which is like comparing going on horseback to going on foot. That is how a virgin or a continent person compares to someone using marriage, and how the poor for Christ’s sake compare to those who retain their own things in the world. Considered this way, the counsels are absolutely prior to the commandments in the order of nature, as the perfect is prior to the imperfect. Nor do the commandments so considered have to come before the counsels in the order of generation and time. Those who want to be continent or preserve their virginity do not have to get married first, nor do those who want to be poor for Christ’s sake first have to live a secular life retaining all their wealth. Those who want to go to Rome on horseback do not have to go first on foot and then on horseback, since it is better to go on horseback from the beginning.

That makes the replies to the objections clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. Sins against the commandments of the second tablet seem more serious than sins against the commandments of the first tablet:

1. Sinning against the commandments of the second tablet involves showing contempt for the unchangeable good in pursuit of a changeable good, as is clear with stealing and adultery and other such things. But contempt for the unchangeable good is a sin against the commandments of the first tablet, which are about reverence for God. Hence, sins against the commandments of the second tablet include sins against the commandments of the first tablet, plus something more. Therefore, such sins are more serious.

2. Simony is the greatest sin. But, as a kind of greed, simony is a sin against the commandments of the second tablet. Therefore, sins against the commandments of the second tablet are more serious.

But to the contrary: Sins against the commandments of the first tablet include faithlessness, hopelessness, and other such things, which are the most serious sins. Therefore, sins against the commandments of the first tablet are more serious.

Answer: The formal character of sin consists in turning away from God: a disordered turn toward a changeable good without any turn away from God would not be a mortal sin. Now, the commandments of the first tablet essentially aim people directly toward God, which is why they are said to be about the love of God. Hence, sins against them directly and essentially involve turning away from God. But the commandments of the second tablet essentially aim us primarily at changeable goods. Hence, sins against them essentially and primarily turn us away from such goods, and only consequently turn us away from God. Yet the greatest thing of each kind is what is essentially of that kind. Hence, sins against the commandments of the first tablet are the most serious kind of sins.

1. So, to the first objection: Contempt for God is an essential part of the intention to sin against the commandments of the first tablet, but it is not necessarily included in sins against the commandments of the second tablet. People who fornicate do not intend to do so in order to show contempt for God; they primarily intend to enjoy its pleasures, and consequently show contempt for God, violating God’s commandments apart from their primary intention.

2. To the second objection: Simony is not the absolutely greatest sin; it is the greatest sin committed with monetary contracts. Yet even that is because of the irreverence it shows to sacred things, which relates to sins against the commandments of the first tablet.

Question 11

The next questions related specifically to the states of certain human beings. The first questions related to prelates, the second to teachers, the third to religious, and the fourth to clerics.

There were three of the first questions: (1) Was blessed Matthew called immediately from tax collecting to the state of apostleship and perfection? (2) If a man is canonically elected to the episcopacy, is it better for him to accept his election or to decline it? and (3) If a prelate gives an ecclesiastical benefice to one of his relatives in hopes of elevating and enriching his family, does he commit simony?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Blessed Matthew does not seem to have been called immediately from tax collecting to the state of apostleship and perfection:

In his comments on Ezekiel, Gregory says: No one suddenly becomes the greatest.⁸² But the state of apostleship and evangelical perfection is the greatest state of human life. Therefore, Matthew was not immediately called to the state of perfection and apostleship.

But to the contrary: In his comments on Matthew, Jerome says that the publican suddenly became an apostle.⁸³ And in his comments on Luke, Bede says that the publican was turned into an apostle, the tax collector into an evangelist.⁸⁴ And a gloss on Luke 5 says that he gave no further thought or consideration to this life,⁸⁵ which is characteristic of evangelical perfection. Therefore, he was immediately called to the state of apostleship and perfection.

Answer: This question can be settled by the words of the gospel.

If we are talking about apostleship, the account of Matthew, Mark, and Luke make clear that the Lord called Matthew and then let some time pass before choosing twelve of his disciples to be apostles, one of whom was Matthew.⁸⁶ That makes it clear that at the beginning Matthew was immediately called to be a disciple of Christ, but not an apostle—except in the preordination of Christ, who was preparing him for apostleship, which is what Jerome and Bede should be taken to mean.

But if we are talking about evangelical perfection, then it is clear that at the beginning Matthew was immediately called to the state of perfection. Luke 5 says that leaving everything, he got up and followed him.⁸⁷ For that also relates to being a disciple of Christ. As Luke 14 says: Whoever does not renounce all that he has, cannot be my disciple.⁸⁸

So, to the first objection: The greatest in human life can be taken in two ways.

One way is by comparing state to state, meaning that one state of human life is greater than another, and one is the greatest. Now, there is no reason why someone cannot suddenly become the greatest in this sense—i.e., by entering the greatest state. This is as clear in the spiritual life as in the secular life. There are people who fly immediately from childhood to the religious state—the most perfect—either of their own will (e.g., blessed John the Baptist and blessed Benedict) or by the offering of their parents (e.g., children whose parents offer them to monasteries). For one does not have to experience the secular life before entering the religious life, just as one does not have to experience the lay life before becoming a cleric. Likewise, some people suddenly assume the throne, either as children (e.g., Solomon and Jehoash, kings of Judah) or as adults (e.g., Saul).⁸⁹ As Ecclesiastes 6 says: Because from prison and chains sometimes one comes to the throne.⁹⁰

The other way to take the greatest is by comparing the degrees of a person’s perfection. That is what Gregory means when he says that no one suddenly becomes the greatest.⁹¹ For, as Augustine says in his comments on the epistle of John, charity is not perfected . . . as soon as it is born: to be perfected, it is born; once born, it is nourished; once nourished, it is strengthened; once strengthened, it is perfected.⁹² Nevertheless, sometimes one person can suddenly begin at a higher degree of holiness than the highest degree reached by another person, as was clearly the case with blessed Benedict. In book II of his Dialogues, Gregory says that all those there and thereafter recognized that as a child Benedict received the grace of a life of great perfection.⁹³

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems better for a man to accept his canonical election than to decline it:

In book XXII of his Morals, Gregory says: Power that is not acquired lustfully should be loved.⁹⁴ But a man who obtains the episcopal rank by canonical election does not acquire it lustfully. Therefore, he should love it, and hence not decline it.

But to the contrary: In book XVIII of his Morals, Gregory says that the episcopacy should be avoided with a better intention.⁹⁵

Answer: We need to consider what the man who accepts his canonical election intends. If he intends to gain something temporal, such as honor, or wealth, or freedom from the yoke of the religious life, then his intention is clearly depraved, and it would be better for him not to accept. But if he intends to benefit the Church, then his intention is obviously good. Hence in book XIX of The City of God, Augustine says: In the active life, what is to be loved is not honor or power in this life . . . but the work itself . . . , if it is rightly and usefully done—i.e., to achieve the salvation of one’s subordinates.⁹⁶ And he cites what the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 3: If a man desires the episcopacy, he desires a good work.⁹⁷

Realize, however, that this work requires the greatest suitability. As Gregory says in his Pastoral Rule: The actions of a prelate ought to surpass the actions of his people as much as the life of a shepherd differs from that of his sheep.⁹⁸ Of course, the powers of our frail humanity are not sufficient. As the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 2: Who is sufficient for these things?⁹⁹ But by the help of God’s grace men are made sufficient and suitable. As the Apostle adds later: Who made us suitable ministers of the new covenant.¹⁰⁰ Hence, it is praiseworthy for a man to consider his own shortcomings and decline the office of a prelate out of humility. As Jeremiah said: I do not know how to speak, for I am only a child.¹⁰¹ And it is praiseworthy for him to accept it out of fraternal charity to seek the salvation of his neighbors. As Isaiah said: Here am I, send me.¹⁰² But, as Gregory says in his Pastoral Rule: Carefully observe each case. For the one who declined was not fully opposed, and the one who wanted to be sent, first had himself cleansed with a coal from the altar. So, no one should dare to approach sacred ministries uncleansed, and no one chosen by divine grace should oppose God’s choice under the pretext of humility. Hence, since it is very difficult to know whether one has been cleansed, it is safer to decline the office of a prelate, but not relentlessly, once one realizes that undertaking it is God’s will.¹⁰³

So, to the first objection: Those words of Gregory should not be read as: Power that is not acquired lustfully should be loved. They should be read as: Power that is acquired should not be loved lustfully. For he adds: but, rather, patiently tolerated.¹⁰⁴

To the objection made to the contrary: The intention of those who personally desire to avoid the episcopacy is better as long as the one who imposes such a burden does not make it necessary. Hence in book XIX of The City of God, Augustine says: It is inappropriate to desire the superior position necessary for a people to be ruled, even if it is administered appropriately. For the love of truth seeks holy leisure, while the necessity of love undertakes just activity.¹⁰⁵

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. A prelate who gives an ecclesiastical benefice to one of his relatives or friends in order to elevate his other relatives seems to commit simony:

Simony is the ready will to buy or sell something spiritual or something connected to the spiritual.¹⁰⁶ Yet the case in question seems to involve buying or selling a spiritual thing. For buying and selling applies where generosity applies, and such a prelate hopes to be generously compensated. Therefore, he commits simony.

But to the contrary: Consider the verse of Isaiah 33: Blessed is he who shakes his hands free of all bribes.¹⁰⁷ Gregory comments on it saying that there are three sorts of bribes: of hand, of tongue, and of service.¹⁰⁸ Yet none of them applies to the case in question. Therefore, it does not involve simony.

Answer: Since simony consists of buying and selling, we need to make a distinction here. If the prelate intends to obligate the recipient of the ecclesiastical benefice to provide him or his relatives with temporal compensation, then his intention is to commit simony, since he intends a tacit sale. But if he does not intend such an obligation but, rather, intends for the recipient to provide him or his relatives with temporal compensation voluntarily, then his intention is certainly depraved and carnal, but it is not an intention to commit simony.

So, to the first objection: As the Philosopher says in book IV of the Ethics, generosity is not about just any use of money, but about giving and taking,¹⁰⁹ whereas simony is about buying and selling.

Question 12

The next two questions were about teachers: (1) Would a teacher who always preached or taught out of vainglory receive a little golden crown after repenting at death? and (2) If a teacher’s teaching draws people away from a greater good, is the teacher required to recant that teaching?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that a teacher who always taught out of vainglory would regain a little golden crown after repenting:

1. Teaching deserves a little golden crown for its fruit, viz. the conversion of believers. As Philippians 4 says: My joy and my crown.¹¹⁰ Yet even the preaching of someone who preached primarily out of vainglory could bear the fruit of such conversions. Therefore, after repenting, such a preacher deserves a little golden crown.

2. Teaching deserves a little golden crown just as virginity does. But when a bodily virgin has been mentally corrupted she can regain her little golden crown by repenting. By the same token, therefore, a preacher who preached out of vainglory can do so as well.

But to the contrary: Repentance does not revive dead works. But the works of a teacher who preached out of vainglory are dead (i.e., sinful). Therefore, repenting does not revive them so as to deserve a reward.

Answer: A little golden crown is a singularly excellent heavenly reward, and therefore necessarily presupposes a golden crown as the comparative presupposes the positive.¹¹¹ That is the significance of Exodus 25 where it says: You shall make . . . around the golden crown . . . another little golden crown.¹¹² Hence, a person who does not merit a golden crown—i.e., the essential reward of heaven—does not merit a little golden crown. Yet people who act out of vainglory do not even merit the essential reward, since they have received their reward, as Matthew 6 says.¹¹³ Hence, they do not merit a little golden crown. Now, repentance restores the merits that a person previously possessed, but it does not confer any merits the person did not possess, except insofar as the act of repenting is itself meritorious. Hence, such a teacher does not merit a little golden crown.

1. So, to the first objection: The conversion of believers deserves a little golden crown if the preacher merits the essential reward of heaven. Otherwise, Matthew 16 applies: What does it profit a man, if he gains the whole world, but suffers the loss of his own soul?¹¹⁴

2. To the second objection: Virginity deserves a little golden crown for the integrity of the body, which remains after repenting. That is why a repentant virgin deserves a little golden crown. But teaching deserves a little golden crown for the very act of teaching, which is passing. That is why a teacher does not deserve a little golden crown after repenting, unless the act is repeated.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. A teacher whose teaching draws people away from a greater good seems required to recant that teaching:

1. Such a teacher causes active scandal with that teaching, since a teacher informs our intellect, which informs our desires and consequently our acts. But everyone is required to undo active scandal. Therefore, such a teacher is required to recant that teaching.

2. The spiritual is more important than the temporal. But, as Augustine says, in temporal matters sin is not forgiven unless what was taken is restored.¹¹⁵ Much more, then, if a teacher causes harm in spiritual matters, the sin is not forgiven unless what was taken is restored, which is done by recanting that teaching.

But to the contrary: Gregory says: Truth should not be denied because of scandal.¹¹⁶

Answer: We need to make a distinction here.

If the teacher’s teaching is false, the teacher is required to recant it completely, especially if it results in spiritual damage. Suppose, for example, that people were being led into a religious community by the teaching of certain errors, such as the claim that whoever enters that religious community would immediately merit as much reward as blessed Peter (given that entering the religious life because of an error is not good).

But if the teacher’s teaching is true, spiritual harm can come to its hearers for one of two reasons.

One reason is the teacher’s own failing, which can happen in two ways. The teacher can present a deep and difficult teaching to unprepared people who are incapable of understanding it, and have their salvation damaged as a result. This is contrary to the example set by the Apostle, who says in 1 Corinthians 3: As infants in Christ I gave you milk to drink, not meat.¹¹⁷ Or the teacher can present the teaching in a confusing and disorganized way, not prioritizing greater things over lesser ones, contrary to what Gregory says in his Pastoral Rule: The highest goods should be praised without disparaging the lowest, and the lowest should be promoted without making them seem sufficient and preventing the pursuit of the highest.¹¹⁸ In such cases, the teacher whose teaching results in spiritual damage is required to repair the damage if possible, at least by explaining the teaching. As Gregory says in his Pastoral Rule: Just as careless speech leads people into error, indiscriminate silence leaves those who could learn in error.¹¹⁹

The other reason is the failing of others.¹²⁰ Hence, the teacher is not drawing people away from a greater good. In such cases, the teacher is not required to abandon the teaching.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 13

The next two questions were about religious: (1) Do religious have to patiently tolerate the insults directed at them? and (2) Is it permissible for a person to enter the religious life after swearing not to do so?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It does not seem that religious have to tolerate those who attack them:

1. An attack on perfect men is an attack on God. Hence in Acts 9, the Lord said to Saul, who was persecuting disciples of Christ: Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?¹²¹ But perfect men do not have to tolerate those who attack God. Therefore, they do not have to tolerate those who attack them.

2. The perfect have to oppose things prejudicial to the state of perfection. Hence in 2 Corinthians 6, the Apostle says: That no fault may be found with our ministry.¹²² But when the perfect are attacked, the state of perfection is disparaged. Therefore, perfect men do not have to tolerate those who attack them.

But to the contrary: Gregory says: We are not perfect if we cannot bear the disorders of others.¹²³

Answer: Perfect men can be attacked in two ways. One way is for them to be personally attacked, as when personal insults are directed at them. Another way is for their state in life to be attacked, as when things are said or done to disparage the state of perfection. James 2 touches on both ways: Do not the rich oppress you by their power?¹²⁴ That is about personal insults. Do they not blaspheme the good name that is given to you?¹²⁵ That is about the religious life or state.

Now, it befits perfect men to be most patient with personal insults, and always to be ready to suffer more of them. As Matthew 5 says: If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other as well.¹²⁶ But they do not have to put up with their state in life being attacked, if they can counter it, since that amounts to insulting God. Hence Ezekiel 13 says of such people: You have not gone up to face the enemy, nor have you built a wall for the house of Israel.¹²⁷

That is why the Lord patiently tolerated the insults directed at his humanity, as when the Jews said: Behold the man is a glutton and a drunkard, as it says in Matthew 11,¹²⁸ or when the devil said to him: Throw yourself down,¹²⁹ which was a personal insult. But he did not tolerate insults to God. Hence in Matthew 12, he harshly rebuked the Pharisees who said that he had cast out demons by Beelzebub,¹³⁰ which was an insult to the Holy Spirit. He did the same when the devil said to him: All these will I give you, if you will fall down and adore me,¹³¹ which was an insult to God. He immediately repelled him, crying: Begone, Satan! as Matthew 4 says.¹³² Here, Chrysostom comments: His example teaches us . . . to bear our own insults nobly, but never to put up with hearing . . . insults to God. For being patient with insults to oneself is praiseworthy, but ignoring insults to God is exceedingly impious.¹³³

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It does not seem permissible for a person to enter the religious life after swearing not to do so:

Every permissible obligation should be fulfilled. Yet it is permissible for a person not to enter the religious life. Therefore, given the obligation of the oath not do so, it seems that such a person should not enter the religious life.

But to the contrary: No obstacle to spiritual progress comes from God. But an oath comes from God. Hence, an oath cannot prevent the spiritual progress of entering the religious life.

Answer: The obligation of an oath can take three forms. Sometimes the obligation is impermissible and the obligatory thing is impermissible, as for instance with an oath to fornicate. A person does not have to fulfill such an oath; it is not even permissible to do so. Sometimes the obligation is permissible and the obligatory thing is permissible, as for instance with an oath to give alms. It is not permissible to break such an oath. Sometimes, however, the obligation is impermissible although the obligatory thing is permissible, as for instance with an oath not to do something good that does not have to be done, such as fasting or giving certain alms or entering the religious life. For in that case the thing that the oath obligates one to do is permissible, but obligating oneself to do it is impermissible, since it involves doing what one can to set oneself against the grace of the Holy Spirit, which makes one prepare ascents in the heart.¹³⁴ Hence, it is impermissible for a person to fulfill such an oath by refraining from doing the good that does not have to be done. Nor does having sworn such an oath force the person to fulfill it. In order for an oath to be obligatory it has to have three attendants, judgment, justice, and truth, as Jeremiah 4 says.¹³⁵ But such an oath lacks the judgment of discretion, since it tends toward a worse outcome by drawing the person away from a greater good.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 14

Article 1

The last question was about clerics: Is it permissible for a cleric bound to say the canonical hours to say matins for the next day late at night?

It seems not:

Ecclesiasticus 21 says: The lustful and imprudent man has no regard for time.¹³⁶ But the cleric who says matins late at night pays no attention to time: since the day begins at midnight, he is saying matins for the next day on the day before. Therefore, doing so seems lustful and imprudent, and hence seems to be a sin.

But to the contrary: God is more merciful than any human being. But no human being would consider a debtor at fault for paying a debt early. Much less, therefore, does God do so.

Answer: We have to consider the cleric’s reason for anticipating the time to say matins, or any other canonical hour. If he does so because of lustfulness—i.e., to have more time for sleep and pleasure—then it is sinful. But if he does so because of needing to do something permissible and honorable (e.g., if a cleric or master needs to see to his lectures at night, or some other such thing), then it is permissible to say matins late at night, and to anticipate the time for the other canonical hours, as is done in solemn churches. For it is better to render God both the praises due and other honorable services than to let one stand in the way of the other.

So, to the first objection: For purposes of contracts and other such things, the day begins at midnight. But for ecclesiastical offices and the celebration of solemnities, the day begins at vespers. Hence, if a cleric has already said vespers and compline, and then says matins, it falls on the next day.

¹ Cf. Quodlibet V, q.2, a.1.

² Luke 1:37.

³ Jerome, Letter 22, 5.

⁴ Cf. Decretum II, C. xxxii, q.5, c. 11.

⁵ Augustine, Against Faustus XXVI, 5.

⁶ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, 3 (1005b23–26).

⁷ Cf. Hilary, On the Councils, 58.

⁸ Philippians 3:21.

⁹ Venantius Fortunatus, “Pange Lingua,” v. 30. This hymn was sung liturgically during Passiontide.

¹⁰ Rather, Augustine, The City of God XXII, 19.

¹¹ Hebrews 13:12.

¹² John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith III, 15.

¹³ John 15:13.

¹⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1–2 (1052b18–1054a19).

¹⁵ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IX, 4 (1166a1–2).

¹⁶ Proverbs 12:26.

¹⁷ Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, c. 4, 23.

¹⁸ Greek and Latin words meaning “human being.”

¹⁹ Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Dionysius’s Divine Names, c. 10, l.3.

²⁰ Cf. Aristotle, Topics II, 2 (110a14–22).

²¹ Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics X, 7.

²² Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 10, 3.

²³ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1 (1052b33–35).

²⁴ Book on Causes, Prop. 30 (31).

²⁵ John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith II, 18.

²⁶ Cf. Gregory, Morals XXXII, 23, 47 & 48; Forty Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 34, 7.

²⁷ Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, c. 4, 23.

²⁸ Cf. Aristotle, Generation of Animals I, 18 (726a26–28).

²⁹ Gregory, Morals IV, 31, 62.

³⁰ Anselm, Why God Became Man I, 18.

³¹ Augustine, The City of God XIII, 20–24.

³² Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments I, Part 6, c. 24.

³³ Cf. Genesis 29:31–30:24 & 35:16–26.

³⁴ Gregory, Morals IV, 31, 62.

³⁵ Cf. Ephesians 2:3.

³⁶ Gregory, Morals IV, 31, 62.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Augustine, On the Trinity XV, 20, 18.

³⁹ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 6 (430a26–28).

⁴⁰ A common adage.

⁴¹ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 5 (1015a26–30).

⁴² This is Aristotle’s example. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 (1110a8–19).

⁴³ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 (1110a8–19 & 1110b3–7).

⁴⁴ Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, Homily 105, 6.

⁴⁵ Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, q.21.

⁴⁶ Cf. Luke 5:31.

⁴⁷ 1 Corinthians 11:29.

⁴⁸ 2 Corinthians 6:14.

⁴⁹ A common adage.

⁵⁰ Augustine, On Adulterous Marriages II, 6, 5.

⁵¹ 2 Timothy 2:12.

⁵² Rather, Peter Lombard, Sentences IV, d. 27, c. 3.

⁵³ Decretum II, C. xxvii, q.2, c. 2.

⁵⁴ A common adage.

⁵⁵ A common adage.

⁵⁶ Cf. 1 Kings (1 Samuel) 16:7.

⁵⁷ 1 Corinthians 4:5.

⁵⁸ This is not found in Augustine.

⁵⁹ Decretum I, d. xlvii, c. 8.

⁶⁰ Proverbs 24:11.

⁶¹ Matthew 7:12.

⁶² Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, 3 (1112b27–28).

⁶³ Gregory, Forty Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 30, 1.

⁶⁴ Cf. William of Saint Thierry, First Life of St. Bernard I, 8, 41.

⁶⁵ Aristotle, Politics I, 9 (1257b25–28).

⁶⁶ Romans 14:17.

⁶⁷ 1 Corinthians 9:27.

⁶⁸ Romans 12:1.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ This is not found in Jerome, but is attributed to him in the Decretum III, d. v, c. 24.

⁷¹ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 11 (1018b9–12).

⁷² Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 11 (1019a6–7).

⁷³ Aristotle, Physics II, 1 (193b6–7).

⁷⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, 8 (1049b4–1050a3).

⁷⁵ Aristotle, On Interpretation II, 13 (23a24–26).

⁷⁶ 1 Timothy 1:5.

⁷⁷ Romans 6:22.

⁷⁸ Cf. Matthew 22:37–40.

⁷⁹ 1 Thessalonians 4:3.

⁸⁰ Exodus 20:3; Exodus 20:15.

⁸¹ Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, 1 (184a16–b14).

⁸² Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel II, Homily 3, 3.

⁸³ Jerome, Commentary on Matthew I, on 9:9.

⁸⁴ Bede, Commentary on Luke II.

⁸⁵ Ordinary Gloss on Luke 5:28.

⁸⁶ Cf. Matthew 9:9–10 & 10:1–5; Mark 2:14–15 & 3:13–19; Luke 5:27–29 & 6:12–16.

⁸⁷ Luke 5:28.

⁸⁸ Luke 14:33.

⁸⁹ Cf. 4 Kings (2 Kings) 11:21; 1 Kings (1 Samuel) 9:21.

⁹⁰ Rather, Ecclesiastes 4:14.

⁹¹ Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel II, Homily 3, 3.

⁹² Augustine, Homilies on the First Epistle of John V, 4.

⁹³ Gregory, Dialogues II, 1.

⁹⁴ Rather, Gregory, Morals XXIV, 25, 55.

⁹⁵ Gregory, Morals XVIII, 43, 70.

⁹⁶ Augustine, The City of God XIX, 19.

⁹⁷ 1 Timothy 3:1.

⁹⁸ Gregory, Pastoral Rule II, 1.

⁹⁹ 2 Corinthians 2:16.

¹⁰⁰ 2 Corinthians 3:6.

¹⁰¹ Jeremiah 1:6.

¹⁰² Isaiah 6:8.

¹⁰³ Gregory, Pastoral Rule I, 7.

¹⁰⁴ Gregory, Morals XXIV, 25, 55.

¹⁰⁵ Augustine, The City of God XIX, 19.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. William of Auxerre, Golden Summa III, tr. 49, c. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Isaiah 33:15.

¹⁰⁸ Gregory, Forty Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 4, 4. Cf. Decretum II, C. i, q.1, c. 114.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, 1 (1119b23–27).

¹¹⁰ Philippians 4:1.

¹¹¹ A common adage.

¹¹² Exodus 25:24–25.

¹¹³ Matthew 6:2.

¹¹⁴ Matthew 16:26.

¹¹⁵ Augustine, Letter 153. Cf. Decretum II, C. XIV, q.6, c. 1.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel I, Homily 7, 5.

¹¹⁷ 1 Corinthians 3:1–2.

¹¹⁸ Gregory, Pastoral Rule III, 36.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. II, 4.

¹²⁰ The Latin text is incomplete here.

¹²¹ Acts 9:4.

¹²² 2 Corinthians 6:3.

¹²³ Cf. Gregory, Morals V, 16, 33; Morals XX, 39, 75; Homilies on Ezekiel I, Homily 9, 22; Forty Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 38, 7.

¹²⁴ James 2:6.

¹²⁵ James 2:7.

¹²⁶ Matthew 5:39.

¹²⁷ Ezekiel 13:5.

¹²⁸ Matthew 11:19.

¹²⁹ Matthew 4:6.

¹³⁰ Cf. Matthew 12:24–32.

¹³¹ Matthew 4:9.

¹³² Matthew 4:10.

¹³³ Pseudo-John Chrysostom, Unfinished Work on Matthew, Homily 5.

¹³⁴ Psalms 83:6. Cf. Quodlibet III, q.6, a.3.

¹³⁵ Jeremiah 4:2. Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Jeremiah I, 69; Decretum II, C. xxii, q.2, c. 2; Decretum II, C. xxii, q.4, c. 23; Peter Lombard, Sentences III, d.39, c. 2.

¹³⁶ Rather, Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 20:7.

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