Article 2: Is it possible to prove demonstratively that the world is not eternal?
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. Parish priests and archdeacons seem to be more perfect than religious:
1. In his Dialogue, Chrysostom says: Even if you brought me a monk of such quality that I could exalt him and call him Elijah . . . he still would not compare to one who has been devoted to the people and made to bear the sins of many, and has remained steadfast and strong.108
2. Just after that he says: If someone asked me to choose whether I would prefer to gain recognition in the office of a priest or in the solitude of monks, there is no comparison: I would choose the former. I have never stopped praising and declaring the blessedness of those who are able to discharge the duties of that office well. And I would certainly not avoid what I have so enthusiastically praised and declared blessed, if I found myself fit for such an office.109
3. Later in the next chapter he says: Your warning is well-taken, my friend. But there is no need to think of such people—viz. the worldly—when the priesthood is in question. If a man in contact with so many people can preserve the brilliance of complete holiness, the splendor of continence, and the other goods of a monk, untroubled, unspoiled, and unshaken, then he is better than everyone else.110 Given all that, parish priests and archdeacons who live well in the Church’s service seem better than everyone else, even religious.
4. In the same book, Chrysostom says: But if you compare his—i.e., a monk’s—exertions with those of a well-discharged priesthood, you will find that they differ as much as a commoner differs from a king.111 But it is much greater for a king to perform his duties well than for any commoner to do so. Therefore, it is much greater for a parish priest or an archdeacon to perform his duties well than for a religious to do so.
5. Bishops are in a more perfect state than religious, otherwise it would be impermissible to leave the religious life to become a bishop. But parish priests and archdeacons are more like bishops than religious. Just as a bishop is responsible for the care of souls in his diocese, so is a priest for those in his parish and an archdeacon for those in his archdeaconry. Therefore, parish priests and archdeacons are in a state of greater perfection than religious.
6. A public good takes precedence over a private good,112 the active life is more fruitful than the contemplative life,113 and no sacrifice to God is more pleasing than zeal for souls.114 But archdeacons and parish priests pursue a good common to many, out of zeal for the salvation of souls, in a fruitful active life. Therefore, they take precedence over religious, who pursue their own salvation in a contemplative life of service to God.
7. People that God has entrusted with more also merit more, if they manage it well. Yet priests and archdeacons seem to have been entrusted with more, since more will be required of them at judgment. Therefore, they will also merit more, if they manage it well.
But to the contrary: Cause XIX, q.2, c. Two of the Decretum says: If a man retains a congregation in his own church under a bishop, and lives a worldly life, but is then inspired by the Holy Spirit to want to save himself as a monk or a canon regular, there is no reason he should be prevented from doing so by public law, since he is led to do so by private law.115 Now, private law, which is the law of the Holy Spirit (as it says in the same place), never leads one from a more perfect state to a less perfect state; rather, it leads to ascents in the heart, as the Psalm says.116 Therefore, the religious state is more perfect than the state of parish priests.
Answer: The perfection of the spiritual life depends upon charity, without which we are spiritually nothing, as 1 Corinthians 13 says.117 This is the perfection we refer to when we call a person perfect, absolutely speaking. Hence Colossians 3 says: Above all . . . have charity, which is the bond of perfection.118
Now, love has a transformative power, which in a certain sense transports the lover to the beloved. Hence in chapter 4 of The Divine Names, Dionysius says: Divine love causes ecstasy, so that the lovers belong not to themselves, but to their beloved.119 And the whole and the perfect are the same, as it says in book III of the Physics.120 Hence, the people whose charity is perfect are the people whose love transports them wholly to God, as they set aside themselves and all they have for God. Hence in book XIV of The City of God, Augustine says that just as the city of Babylon practices love of self to the point of contempt for God, so the city of God practices love of God to the point of contempt for self.121 And in his book of Eighty-Three Questions, Augustine says that the perfection of charity is having no lustful desires.122 And in his comments on Ezekiel, Gregory says that when people offer God some of what they have, but not all of what they have, it is a sacrifice. But when they offer almighty God all that they have, all that they live and all that they breathe, it is a holocaust, which means “wholly burnt” in Latin.123 Thus, perfect people are the people whose mind has been so deeply affected that they disregard themselves and all they have for God. As the Apostle says in Philippians 3: What was once gain to me, I have counted . . . as excrement, that I may gain Christ.124 This applies to all people—religious or secular, cleric or lay, even married. After all, Abraham was married and rich, and the Lord said to him in Genesis 17: Walk before me and be perfect.125 And Ecclesiasticus 31 says: Blessed is the rich man who is found blameless and does not go after gold.126 And a bit later it adds: He has been tested by it and found perfect.127
Notice, however, that there is a difference between being perfect and being in a state of perfection. There are some people in a state of perfection who are not yet perfect; indeed, some are even sinners. And there are some people who are perfect but are not in a state of perfection.
Of course, “state” means lots of things (straightness, firmness, and other such things). But when we say that people are in a state of perfection, we are using “state” to mean condition. We call freedom and slavery states in this sense, for instance, as we usually say that a mistake about a person’s identity or condition or state impedes marriage, while a mistake about the person’s wealth or character does not. This is how “state” is used in C. II, q.6 of the Decretum: If and when an intervention is made in a case where life or state is at stake, it must not be made by procurators—i.e., representatives—but by the people themselves.128 Taking “state” in this sense, we say that people are in a state of perfection, properly speaking, when they subject themselves to the slavery of performing the works of perfection. Now, slavery is obviously the opposite of freedom, and the freedom to do as one pleases is lost by making a vow, since a vow is voluntary and necessary to fulfill, as we have said. Hence, those who obligate themselves to do something by a vow, deprive themselves of freedom, and make themselves a kind of slave, insofar as they subject themselves to necessity. So, if people obligate themselves to perform some work, they make themselves a kind of slave—not absolutely speaking, but in a qualified sense—with respect to what they have obligated themselves to do. But if people dedicate their whole life absolutely to God by a vow to perform all the works of perfection for God’s sake, they make themselves a slave absolutely speaking, and thereby enter the state of perfection. Hence we say that they make a holocaust, as Gregory puts it, since they offer their whole self to God.129
Now, at their consecration, bishops offer their whole lives for such perfection when they make the profession that obligates them to care for the flock they receive. As the last chapter of 1 Timothy says: Fight the good fight of faith; take hold of the eternal life to which you were called when you made the good confession before so many witnesses—at ordination or when preaching, as the gloss says.130 Yet at their profession, religious offer their whole lives to God for such perfection as well. Hence both of them are called slaves. As 2 Corinthians 4 says: We preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ . . . , and ourselves as your slaves for Jesus’s sake.131 Of course, that is about bishops, but religious are called slaves or servants as well, as Dionysius says in chapter 6 of The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.132 Thus, religious are in a state of perfection just as much as bishops are. Hence each of them receives a solemn blessing when entering that state, as Dionysius makes clear in chapters 5 and 6 of The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.133
But archdeacons and parish priests do not offer their whole lives for the care of their flocks. Hence their institution does not involve anything like the blessing that monks receive for the perfection they take on, as it says in chapter 6 of The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.134 So, when they receive the care of a parish or archdeaconry, they assume a certain office, but they do not enter a state of perfection. Otherwise they would be apostates for leaving their parishes and accepting prebends in cathedral churches without the responsibility to care for souls. For no one can leave the state of perfection without apostatizing and committing mortal sin.
Hence in The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Dionysius only attributes perfection to bishops as those who perfect, and to monks as those who are perfected; while he attributes illumination to priests as those who illuminate by administering the sacraments, and to the holy people as those being illuminated; and he attributes purification to deacons as those who purify, and to the ranks of the unclean as those being purified.135
First, then, in response to all those passages of Chrysostom, one could briefly say that he is not talking about a parish priest but about a bishop, who is referred to as a priest by antonomasia, because he is like the highest priest. It is a very common way of speaking to call bishops priests. And this response seems to fit the book’s purpose, which was for Chrysostom to console Basil about his promotion, since they had both been elected bishops.
But we should respond to each objection individually.
1. So, to the first objection: Given the context of those words, they lend no support to that conclusion. Just before them Chrysostom says: Those who live in seclusion and avoid conversing with most people show praiseworthy patience, but not sufficient proof of any true skill. But a man tossed by the waves who can lead his ship out of the storm provides everyone the proof of being an excellent steersman.136 Then he concludes: Hence, even if you brought me a monk of such quality that I could exalt him and call him Elijah, since he is untroubled and free of grave sin while he is alone, since of course he has nothing to bother and irritate him, he still would not compare to a man who has been devoted to the people and made to bear the sins of many, and has remained steadfast and strong, for he steers himself through both the calm and the storm.137 He is obviously not comparing two states, but two ways of being sinless. For a cloistered monk who does not sin offers no proof of virtue compared to a priest or bishop or any public leader who avoids sin in the midst of trouble, just as a steersman who sails safely through tranquil seas is no proof of great skillfulness compared to one who sails through stormy seas. Nevertheless, a sailor’s skillfulness also involves avoiding stormy seas. Hence, the words quoted there can only show that the state of those who care for souls is more dangerous than a monk’s, and preserving one’s innocence in greater danger is proof of greater virtue. Hence, greater virtue is required to keep oneself free from sin among the general population than in the religious life. But it is even more virtuous to avoid danger by entering the religious life. For the more people love their own salvation, the more they will avoid dangers to their salvation.
2. That makes the reply to the second objection clear. Chrysostom does not say that he would prefer to have the office of a priest over the solitude of monks; he says that he would prefer to gain recognition in the former rather than the latter.138 Of course, all wise people would prefer to have so much virtue that they can remain secure even amid danger rather than having just enough virtue to be safe out of danger. But it would be presumptuous to think that one has so much virtue that one can stay safe even amid danger. Thus, it is more virtuous to keep oneself out of danger. Hence he adds: I would certainly not avoid what I have so enthusiastically praised and declared blessed, namely the duties of overseeing a church, if I found myself fit for such an office.139 So, it was prudent for him to avoid that office, since it would have been proud for him to claim to have enough virtue to be fit for it.
3. The reply to the third objection is clear as well. If a man in contact with so many people can preserve the brilliance of complete holiness, the splendor of continence, and the other goods of a monk, untroubled, unspoiled, and unshaken, then he is better than everyone else.140 For it is a sign of greater virtue for people to preserve their purity perfectly even amid the dangers to purity rather than to preserve it without such dangers. But people who do not avoid the dangers to purity prove that they do not love their purity very much, since it is extremely difficult and rare to preserve every sort of purity amid such dangers. Blessed Agnes had the greatest purity: she preserved the purity of her virginity even in a brothel. And yet, because she loved purity, she would never have chosen to display her virtue in a brothel. The purer her mind, the more she would have wanted to avoid a brothel herself. And the same goes for everyone else.
4. To the fourth objection: That passage is not about the perfection of their lives, but about the difference in their ranks. That is how a private person differs from a king: by lacking his superiority. But the current question is not whether someone with the responsibility to care for souls has a greater rank or superiority over a religious who lacks that responsibility.
5. To the fifth objection: There is a difference between bishops and parish priests. Bishops are the ones principally responsible for caring for the people; parish priests and archdeacons serve under them as their assistants. Hence C. XVI, q.1 of the Decretum says: Every priest, deacon, and other cleric should realize that they cannot do anything without their own bishop allowing it. A priest cannot even say mass in his own parish without his bishop’s authorization; he cannot baptize or do anything else without his permission.141 And the gloss on 1 Corinthians 12 says that helpers are those who help superiors, as Titus helped the Apostle or as archdeacons help bishops, while administrators are administrators of subordinates, such as priests.142 Rightly considered, then, parish priests and archdeacons relate to bishops in ecclesiastical government like stewards and wardens relate to the king in temporal government. Hence, just as a king is crowned and anointed in a kingdom, while stewards and wardens are not, so a bishop is crowned in the Church, while archdeacons and parish priests are not. That is why bishops constitute an order in relation to the mystical body of Christ, while parish priests and archdeacons do not; they only constitute an office. Therefore, archdeacons and parish priests are like bishops as their servants and assistants, whereas religious are like bishops in their perpetual obligation, which constitutes the state of perfection.
6. To the sixth objection: Any two works—good or evil—can be compared in multiple ways. One way is to compare their kind. We say, for instance, that the continence of virginity is better than the continence of widowhood, or that murder is worse than stealing. This is how the active life is more fruitful than the contemplative life. But the contemplative life is more meritorious than the active life, as Gregory says in book VII of his Morals.143 Yes, zeal for souls is the most pleasing sacrifice to God,144 but only if it is pursued in the right order: taking care of one’s own salvation first, and then that of others. Otherwise it does not profit a man, if he gains the whole world, but forfeits his soul, as it says in Matthew 16.145
Another way of comparing two works is not in themselves, but in relation to another act. Abstinence, for instance, is better than eating, and yet eating with someone out of charity is better than abstinence. Again, adultery is worse than stealing, but stealing a sword to kill someone is worse than adultery. The third way one work can be better or worse than another is by the will of the one performing it: the more willingly something is done, the better or worse it is.
So, if we compare the works of parish priests or archdeacons to the works of religious in the third way of comparing them (i.e., how willingly they are done), then we cannot say for sure, since whoever works with more fervent charity performs more meritorious works. But if we compare them in the second way of comparing works (in relation to another work), then the works of religious are incomparably greater than the works of parish priests and archdeacons. For everything that religious do stems from the root of devoting their whole lives to God. Hence, it is not about what they do but about how they devote themselves to whatever they do. So, in a sense religious compare to those who perform particular good works like the infinite compares to the finite. Those who give themselves to another to do everything that the other commands, give themselves to the other infinitely more than those who give themselves to do a particular work for the other. Hence, even granting that the religious life requires religious to perform a work equal in itself, it still counts for more because of its relationship to their first obligation of giving themselves completely to God.
But if their works are compared in themselves (in the first way of comparing them), then some of the particular works that parish priests and archdeacons do are greater than some of the particular works that religious do. It is greater to seek the salvation of souls than to fast, for instance, or to keep silent and other such things. But if all of their works are compared together, then the works of religious are much greater. Even though, generally speaking, pursuing the salvation of others is greater than only seeking one’s own salvation, still not just any way of seeking the salvation of others is better than any way of seeking one’s own salvation. For those who seek their own salvation totally and completely are much greater than those who perform lots of particular works for the salvation of others but only seek their own salvation just enough, rather than completely.
7. To the seventh objection: Managing things well can be more or less meritorious. If those entrusted with more manage it that much better, then there is no doubt that they will merit more. But if those entrusted with less do much more than those entrusted with more, then even if the latter do well, the former will still merit more. We see this even in human affairs: a man who earns a small benefice, but serves more, ought to be treated accordingly. Hence, even though those with the responsibility to care for souls have been entrusted with more as far as their rank is concerned, religious still perform greater works (as we just explained), and thus merit more.
Question 7
The next questions related to the laity.
The first was about marriage: (1) Can a woman who has contracted marriage in the Church after making a vow of continence unite in the flesh with her husband without sinning? The second was about usury: (2) Are people allowed to keep things acquired by doing legitimate business with money made by usury?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. A woman who contracts marriage with a man in the Church after making a vow of continence seems able to unite with him in the flesh afterward without sinning:
Things done on the Church’s authority are done without sinning, since they are done on Christ’s authority. As the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 2: For whatever I have forgiven, if I have forgiven anything, I did for your sake in the person of Christ.146 But just by contracting marriage in the Church, the woman described receives the power to perform the marriage act—i.e., uniting in the flesh—on the Church’s authority. Therefore, it is not a sin for her to unite in the flesh with her husband.
But to the contrary: A vow of continence is much greater than a vow of abstinence, since no price is worthy of a continent soul, as Ecclesiasticus 26 says.147 But it is a mortal sin to break a vow of abstinence (which one would do, for instance, by breaking a fast on Friday after vowing always to fast on Fridays). Much more, then, is it always a mortal sin for a person to break a vow of continence by uniting with another person in the flesh.
Answer: There are two vows of continence: simple and solemn. A solemn vow impedes a marriage to be contracted and dissolves one already contracted148—i.e., a marriage is not really contracted after a solemn vow. Clearly, therefore, people are not excused from sin if they in fact contract marriage in the Church and then unite in the flesh after a solemn vow. But a simple vow impedes a marriage to be contracted, yet does not dissolve one already contracted.149 For such a vow does not nullify the subsequent marriage; it just makes contracting the marriage a mortal sin. Once she is married, however, the wife does not have power over her own body, but the husband does; and likewise for him.150 And no one can deny others what is theirs. Hence, even after taking a simple vow, a married woman cannot deny her husband the use of her body, especially not after consummating the marriage by uniting with him in the flesh. Yet no one can sin by doing what ought to be done. Hence, everyone generally says that once a woman has consummated a contracted marriage by uniting with her husband in the flesh, it is not a sin for her to pay him the marriage debt. But there is some doubt about whether it is a sin for her to exact that debt. Some people say that she can exact the debt without sinning, since otherwise the burden of marriage would be intolerable for her. Yet it seems nearer the truth to say that it is not a sin for her to pay the debt, since doing so is a matter of necessity, but it is a sin for her to exact the debt, since doing so is a matter of her own will, which is bound strictly by the obligation of her previous vow.
The reason for this difference is that a solemn vow involves promising something while also handing it over, whereas a simple vow only involves promising something, without handing it over yet. (Hence, a vow of continence only becomes solemn when people receive holy orders, which actually surrenders them to the worship of God, or when they profess an established rule and take the habit of the professed, since that also actually surrenders people to the service of God in the religious life.) Clearly, then, after people have not only promised someone something under their power but also handed it over, they cannot later give it to someone else. If they try to give it to someone else afterward, they will not succeed in giving it a second time. Hence, once people have made a solemn vow, not only promising God their body but also handing it over to live a celibate life, they cannot later hand it over to a spouse, to whom they would then be bound by necessity to pay the marriage debt. However, when people promise someone something, but have not yet handed it over, they can actually hand it over to someone else later. Of course, that would break the pledge they made by their promise, but they would still succeed in giving it a second time, so that the recipient could then use the gift at will. Therefore, people who make a simple vow, promising to give God their body and lead a celibate life, can actually hand the power over their body to a spouse later by consummating marriage. They would certainly sin by breaking the pledge of their vow, but their gift would still hold and their spouse would then have the power over their body. Therefore, it would not be a sin for them to pay the marriage debt.
Hence, we have to reply to both arguments.
So, to the first objection: A woman who has made a vow of continence and then contracts marriage in the Church does not receive the power to unite in the flesh on the Church’s authority. If the Church were aware of the vow she had made, it would prevent the marriage. But if the Church knew about her simple vow of continence and dispensed her from it by the Apostle’s authority, then it would not be a sin for the woman to exact or pay the marriage debt.
To the objection made to the contrary: The same thing that applies to a vow of continence applies to a vow of abstinence. If people hand the power over themselves to a spouse after making a simple vow of continence, they can pay the marriage debt by uniting in the flesh without sinning. So, too, if people hand the power over themselves to another by entering the religious life after making a vow of abstinence, they can break a fast out of obedience to their superior or to their religious observance without sinning, since that solemn vow absolves them from their other vows.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. People seem bound to return any profit they make with money from usury:
In Romans 11, the Apostle says: If the root is holy, so are the branches.151 Conversely, if the root is infected, so are the branches. Now, the root of such profit is infected by usury, and so the whole of it is infected by usury. Therefore, people are not allowed to keep such profit.
But to the contrary: People are allowed to keep what they acquired legitimately, and sometimes people legitimately acquire something with money made by usury. Therefore, they are allowed to keep it.
Answer: The answer to this question can be seen by considering why charging interest is a sin. For it is not a sin just because it is forbidden, but because it is contrary to natural reason, as even the Philosopher says in book I of the Politics.152
To see why, notice that there are certain things for us to use whose use does not involve their consumption; and if they happen to deteriorate and get consumed by use, that is accidental. Such things include a house, a shirt, a horse, a book, and the like: using a book does not destroy it; using a house does not demolish it. Hence, when it comes to such things, there is a difference between letting someone use it and letting someone have the thing itself. That is why agreeing to let someone use such a thing does not transfer ownership of it. It is also what makes it possible to sell the use of such a thing while retaining ownership of it. This is obviously what happens with renting and leasing, which are legitimate contracts. But there are other things whose use just is the consumption of the things themselves. Such things include money (used by spending it), wine (used by drinking it), and any other things whose use just is their consumption. Hence, when it comes to such things, agreeing to let someone use the thing also transfers ownership of it. But since the use of such a thing cannot be separated from the thing itself, whoever sells the use of such things, while requiring a share to be returned, clearly sells the same thing twice, which is contrary to natural justice. Thus, charging interest is unjust in itself.
Therefore, people are bound to return what they get beyond their share, since they got it unjustly, thus forfeiting their claim to it. But since the use of money from usury just is the money itself (as we have explained), it clearly follows that people are not bound to return anything for the money’s use when they return the money made by usury. Yet people are bound to return the profit they make with someone else’s house or horse or anything like that, even after they have returned the thing itself, since in that case both the thing itself and its use have value.
So, to the first objection: Money from usury does not relate to the profit made with it like a root, but only like matter. For a root has the power of a sort of active cause, since it transmits nourishment to the whole plant. Hence, in the case of human actions, the will and the intention relate to them like roots, so that if they are evil, the act is evil. But that is not necessarily true of matter, since sometimes a person can use an evil thing well.
Question 8
The next questions related to all human beings generally. The first were about the soul, the second about the body, and the third about human actions.
There were three questions about the soul. The first was about its substance (whether it is composed of matter and form), the second about its knowledge, and the third about its punishment.
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. The soul seems to be composed of matter and form:
The human intellect differs from higher intellectual substances by its distance from simplicity. But everything distant from simplicity has some sort of composition, and the first sort of composition is that of matter and form. Therefore, the human soul is composed of matter and form.
But to the contrary: In book III of On the Soul, the Philosopher says that the species of material things are not actually intelligible in the things themselves because they exist there in matter; instead, they are actually intelligible in the human intellective soul.153 Therefore, they do not exist there in matter, and hence the human soul is not composed of matter and form.
Answer: If “matter” refers to everything that is potential in any way at all, and “form” refers to every actuality, then we have to hold that the human soul, and every other created substance, is composed of such matter and form, since every created substance is composed of potentiality and actuality. Clearly, God alone is his own existence—existing essentially, so to speak—since God’s existence is his very substance, which cannot be said of anything else. For there can only be one subsistent existence, just as there could only be one subsistent whiteness. Hence, every other thing must exist by participation, meaning that the substance that participates in existence is other than the existence in which it participates. But every participator relates to that in which it participates as a potentiality to an actuality. Hence, the substance of each created thing is related to its existence as a potentiality to an actuality. Thus, every created substance is composed of potentiality and actuality—i.e., of what exists and existence, as Boethius puts it in his book On the Hebdomads,154 just as a white thing is composed of what is white and whiteness.
But if “matter” is used properly for what only exists potentially, then it is impossible for the human soul to be composed of such matter and form.
Two things make this clear. The first is the fact that the soul is an intellectual substance. For, clearly, the intellect actually understanding something is that thing actually being understood, and a thing is actually understood insofar as it is immaterial. For a thing is perfectly knowable to the extent that it is actual, not to the extent that it is potential, as it says in book IX of the Metaphysics.155 So, given that matter is what exists potentially, a form existing in matter cannot be perfectly known by being actually understood. Hence, it follows that no intellective substance is material, since its perfection is a thing actually being understood, and a thing’s perfection must be proportional to its perfectibility.156
The second thing that makes this clear is the fact that the soul is a form. For a form is an actuality, and something that exists potentially cannot be an actuality. Hence, it is impossible for the whole of a thing composed of matter and form itself to be a form. Suppose, then, that the soul were composed of matter and form. In that case, part of the soul would be a form—i.e., an actuality no part of which is matter—and hence part of it would not be matter: and that is what we would call the soul that is the actuality of the living body.
So, to the first objection: Potentiality and actuality are first principles in the genus of substance, whereas matter and form are first principles in the genus of changeable substance. Hence, not every sort of composition in the genus of substance has to be that of matter and form; that is only necessary for changeable substances.
Question 9
The next questions were about the soul’s knowledge.
There were two such questions: (1) Does the soul separated from the body know about any other separated soul? and (2) Is it permissible to ask a dying person to disclose their state after death?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. The soul separated from the body does not seem to know about the soul of anyone else it knew in this life:
1. All knowledge occurs by means of some likeness. But one soul does not have the likeness of another soul impressed upon it in this life, which it could then retain after death. Therefore, one separated soul cannot know about another.
2. In book I of On the Soul, the Philosopher says that the soul does not remember anything after the body has perished.157 Therefore, it does not recognize the soul of anyone else it knew in this life.
But to the contrary: The soul of the rich man in hell recognized the soul of Lazarus in the bosom of Abraham, as Luke 16 says.158
Answer: No substance lacks its own proper activity. Hence, given that the intellective soul remains in existence after death, we have to hold that it knows things in some way, and we have to attribute one of three ways of knowing to it. Either the soul knows things by abstracting intelligible species from things, just as it does now while united to the body; or it knows things by means of intelligible species which it acquired in the body and retains after death; or it knows things by means of species that were created with it, or infused into it from above in some way.
Some people say that the separated soul knows things by abstracting intelligible species from things. But that is impossible. The abstraction of intelligible species from things occurs through the mediation of the senses and imagination, whose activities are performed with bodily organs, and thus cannot be attributed to the separated soul.
Hence, other people disagree, saying instead that the separated soul does not even know things by means of species that it acquired from sensible things while it was in the body. Such people follow Avicenna in holding that the possible intellect only retains intelligible species while it is actually thinking about something, whereas the imagination and memory only retain particular species of sensible things, to which the possible intellect turns while it receives a new inflow of intelligible species from the agent intellect.159 But since memory and imagination are powers of bodily organs, they perish when the body itself perishes. Hence, after death the soul has no way of knowing things by means of any species that it received from sensible things. Thus, according to these people, the separated soul knows things by means of species that were created with it, just as angels do.
But this position seems irrational, given both of its claims.
Its claim that the possible intellect does not retain its intelligible species runs counter to reason. For whatever is received in something exists in it with the receiver’s way of existing, and the possible intellect has a stable and unchangeable existence. Hence, the intelligible species that it receives must exist in it stably and unchangeably. Its claim that the possible intellect does not retain its intelligible species also runs counter to Aristotle. In book III of On the Soul, he says that when the possible intellect becomes each thing—i.e., when it receives the species of each thing—it does so like a man who knows—i.e., it is like what happens to a man who has knowledge, when he is said actually to do so. This happens when he is now able to perform the activity by himself. Hence, this is still a sort of potentiality, although it differs from the sort that preceded his learning or discovery.160 These words make it clear that intelligible species exist as dispositions in the possible intellect even when it is not actually performing its activity.
This position’s other claim—that the human soul has intelligible species that were created with it—is also unreasonable. If the soul were able to use such species while it was united to the body, then it would follow that a human being could know something that was not received from the senses. A blind man, for instance, would then be able to grasp colors, which is patently false. On the other hand, if its union with the body totally prevented the human soul from being able to use the intelligible species that were created with it, then it would follow that the soul’s union with the body is unnatural. For nothing natural to a thing can totally prevent it from doing what is natural for it to do, otherwise it would be pointless for nature to include one of the two.
Hence, we should say that the separated soul knows things by means of intelligible species that it acquired from things through the senses while it was still in the body. But this way of knowing things is not sufficient, since the separated soul knows about lots of things that we do not know about in this life. Moreover, it seems very inappropriate for the souls of those who die in their mother’s womb not to know anything after death, since they might never have used their intellect, and thus might never have acquired any intelligible species. Hence, we have to add that when the soul is separated from the body, it receives an inflow of intelligible species from a higher nature, viz. God. That follows the natural order we experience: the more the human soul withdraws from the bodily senses, the more susceptible it is of a higher influence. We see this, for instance, in the case of people asleep or out of their minds, who then foresee the future.
Therefore, the separated soul can know about another soul with the knowledge that it acquired of it in this life by means of a likeness of its own effect (i.e., the life of a human being), or it can do so by means of a likeness that flows into it from God’s natural influence upon it.
1. That makes the reply to the first objection clear.
2. To the second objection: The Philosopher is talking about the memory and recognition that is an activity of a sensitive power making use of a bodily organ. Hence, the activity of such a power ceases when the body perishes.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems impermissible to ask a dying person to reveal their state after death:
It is impermissible to ask to know what God wants to remain hidden. As Ecclesiasticus 3 says: Do not seek things too high for you.161 Yet God wants the soul’s state after death to remain hidden. This is clear, given that the rich man’s request to have Lazarus sent to his living brothers was denied, as it says in Luke 16.162 Therefore, it is impermissible to ask dying people to reveal their state after death.
But to the contrary: 2 Maccabees 12 says: It is a holy and salutary thought to pray for the dead.163 But we are motivated to pray for the dead by knowing their needs after death. Therefore, it is permissible and even holy to ask dying people to reveal their state after death.
Answer: Sin goes against nature, as Damascene makes clear in book II.164 Hence, it is not a sin to seek to fulfill a natural desire, unless it is done with some additional disorder, as is clear in the case of consuming food and drink. Now, human beings naturally desire knowledge. Hence, it is not a sin to seek to know things, except perhaps incidentally due to some additional disorder. This would be the case, for example, if people’s study and pursuit of knowledge prevented them from fulfilling their other obligations. A preacher, for instance, might be prevented from his duty to preach by studying geometry instead. It would also be the case if people sought to know things out of pride or presumptuous confidence in their own abilities. And it would be the case given any other disorder of this kind as well. But there does not seem to be any disorder involved in seeking and asking to know a dying person’s state after death—subject, of course, to divine judgment. Hence, there does not seem to be any reason we ought to call this a sin, unless one were asking because one doubted the faith about the future state, as if testing God thereby.
So, to the first objection: God wants many things to remain hidden from us so that we cannot come to know them by our own powers or merit, but God wants to reveal them to those who seek them humbly and piously. As Matthew 11 says: You have hidden these things from the wise and learned, but have revealed them to little children.165 It is no wonder, then, that God did not want to reveal things to the proud brothers of the proud rich man, though God still wants to reveal them to the faithful who seek them humbly and piously.
Question 10
The next questions were about the soul’s punishment.
There were two such questions: (1) Can the soul be affected by bodily fire? and (2) Do the damned in hell rejoice at the punishments of their enemies, who they see being punished along with them?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that the soul cannot be affected by bodily fire:
An agent’s action is proportional to the effect it has on the thing it acts upon. Now, fire is a physical body, so its action is a natural action, which consists in changing things. Thus, nothing can be affected by fire without itself being changed. But the soul does not change. For the soul is indivisible, and nothing indivisible changes, as proven in book VI of the Physics.166 Therefore, the soul cannot be affected by bodily fire.
But to the contrary: As it says in Luke 16, the soul of the rich man in hell says: I am tormented in this flame.167
Answer: As the Catholic faith teaches, the soul suffers the punishment of bodily fire. But such fire does not affect the separated soul by its own nature, but as an instrument of divine justice, as is commonly said.
Notice, however, that an instrument can only act through the power of a higher cause by performing an action connatural to itself, otherwise it would be of no use for its effect. It is by cutting, for instance, that a saw produces a cabinet as the instrument of a carpenter, and it is by cleansing the body that the water of baptism cleanses the soul as an instrument of divine mercy. So, if bodily fire is to act upon the soul as an instrument of divine justice and punishment, it will have to do so with an action connatural to such bodily fire. But fire cannot be said to alter the soul by heating it, or drying it, or burning it. That leaves the way that Augustine adopts in book XXI of The City of God168—i.e., the separated soul or a demonic spirit suffers the punishment of being somehow bound by bodily fire. We already know of cases where a spirit is bound to a body by nature (as the soul, for instance, is bound to the body), and by a higher power (as the art of black magic, for instance, binds lower demons with pictures or rings or other such things by the power of higher demons). Much more, therefore, can demons or souls be bound to bodily fire by the power of God, and thereby punished.
That makes the reply to the first objection clear, since it is based on the action of fire that consists in altering things.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. The damned in hell seem to take joy and comfort in the punishment of their enemies, who they see being punished along with them in hell:
The gloss of Jerome on the verse All the princes of the earth rose up from their thrones of Isaiah 14 says that it comforts the evil to have their enemies as companions in punishment.169
But to the contrary: Every pleasure that one enjoys reduces the pain that one suffers, as the Philosopher makes clear in book VII of the Ethics.170 Yet the suffering of the damned has a finite intensity. Hence, the number of one’s enemies damned to hell could increase to the point that one’s suffering was completely relieved, which is contrary to divine justice.
Answer: There is no reason why the same thing cannot be both gladdening and saddening in different ways, though the predominant way is how the thing is absolutely speaking, while the lesser way is how it is with qualifications. So, when individuals in hell consider the punishment of their enemies, it can make them glad in one way and sad in another. It can make them glad by satisfying the will of the damned for their enemies to suffer evil. For the damned go down to hell with their weapons—i.e., with their depraved desires, as it says in Ezekiel 32.171 But it can make them sad for two reasons. First, because the punishment of their enemies fulfills divine justice, which the damned in hell hate and blaspheme. As Revelation 16 says: The people were scorched with great heat and blasphemed the name of the Lord.172 Second, because of the gnawing worm of their conscience. For the damned retain their depraved desires in a way that makes them suffer at being punished for them rather than being purged of them. As Wisdom 5 says: Doing penance and groaning at the anguish of their spirit.173 Hence, just as penitents in this life suffer and rejoice at their suffering, the damned in hell rejoice at the punishment of their enemies and yet suffer even more at such joy, especially if they were responsible for causing their damnation.
That makes the reply to the first objection clear.
Question 11
Article 1
The next question about human beings touched on their bodily sex: If the first human being had not sinned, would an equal number of males and females have been born?
It seems so:
According to Augustine, in paradise marriage would have been honorable and its bed undefiled.174 Hence, no one would have been abstinent. Rather, everyone would have used marriage to fulfill the command the Lord gave to the first human beings: Increase and multiply and fill the earth, as it says in Genesis 1.175 But in the state of innocence, no man would have had more than one wife, and no woman would have had more than one husband, nor would any men or women have suffered death. Therefore, it follows that an equal number of males and females would have been born.
But to the contrary: In book IV of his Morals, Gregory comments on the verse For now I should have been asleep and silent,176 saying: If the rot of sin had not infected our first parent, he would never have begotten children of hell. Instead only the elect, those to be saved now by the redeemer, would have been born to him.177 But those to be saved now are not made up of an equal number of males and females. Therefore, in the state of innocence there would not have been an equal number of males and females born.
Answer: If Adam had not sinned, and if none of his descendants had either, it seems clear enough that we should grant that an equal number of males and females would have been born, as the first argument proves.
To the objection made to the contrary: The number of the elect is certain to God alone. Hence, it is uncertain whether an unequal number of males and females are saved, or whether an equal number of them are. If one granted, however, that an unequal number of males and females are saved, one could then say the following. When Gregory says, those to be saved now, etc., the pronoun is not being used as a personal demonstrative, but as a simple one. It is like saying: This herb grows in my garden.178 So, all it means is that only those to be saved would have been born to him, since no one would have derived the cause of damnation from being born to him. Nor is it possible to say that numerically the same human beings that are born now would have been born then. For the numerically same human being obviously cannot be born to another father or to another mother, and many men have had more than one wife who gave birth to children that are now saved. So, if men in the state of innocence would not have had more than one wife, it would not have been possible for numerically the same human beings that are now saved to have been born then.
Question 12
The next questions were about acts common to all human beings. The first were about conscience. The second were about penance.
There were two of the first questions: (1) Can conscience be mistaken? and (2) Does a mistaken conscience bind?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that conscience cannot be mistaken:
1. The gloss on Romans 2 says that conscience is the law of our mind,179 which is the natural law. But the natural law cannot be mistaken. Therefore, neither can conscience.
2. Basil says that conscience is a natural judgment.180 But a natural judgment cannot be mistaken, as is clear from the case of the first indemonstrable principles, which human beings know by natural judgment. Therefore, conscience cannot be mistaken.
But to the contrary: In John 16, the Lord says to his disciples: The hour is coming when everyone who kills you will think that they are offering service to God.181 But that is just a mistake of conscience. Therefore, conscience can be mistaken.
Answer: As the word itself indicates, “conscience” means the application of a person’s knowledge or awareness to the person’s own particular acts. Indeed, all of a person’s knowledge can be applied to the person’s own acts. This includes memory, as when a person’s conscience testifies that the person did or did not do something. It also includes universal or particular knowledge, which can make a person aware that something should or should not be done. That is why we say that our conscience impels or impedes us.
Now, if we consider all the different kinds of human awareness, clearly some of them can be mistaken while others cannot. Our natural awareness of first principles (both speculative and practical) cannot be mistaken. Take, for instance, the principle “Every whole is greater than one of its parts” or “No one should be treated unjustly.” But other more particular kinds of awareness can be mistaken in various ways. This includes the awareness of our sensitive part, of our lower reason (which is about human matters), and of our higher reason (which is about divine matters).
Clearly, then, a mistake can arise in the application of various kinds of human awareness whenever any of that awareness is itself mistaken, just as an argument’s conclusion can be false whenever any of its premises is false. Even though there are no mistakes in our awareness of the first principles of natural law, mistakes are still possible about other principles of human or divine law, and thus a person’s conscience can be mistaken accordingly. For instance, heretics whose conscience tells them never to take an oath clearly have a mistaken conscience, since they wrongly believe that every oath is against a commandment of God, but they are not mistaken in thinking that nothing against a divine commandment should ever be done.
1. So, to the first objection: Particular principles get their power to entail a conclusion from the first universal principles. Hence, their conclusion is attributed primarily to those first principles as an effect is attributed to its first cause. In the same way, the power of conscience depends primarily upon the principles of natural law as self-evident and first known. Hence, conscience is called a natural law or a natural judgment for the same reason.
2. That makes the reply to the second objection clear.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. A mistaken conscience does not seem to bind under pain of sin:
1. As Augustine says in chapter 22 of his book Against Faustus, every sin is against eternal law, which is God’s law.182 But sometimes a mistaken conscience forbids something that is not against God’s law. This is clearly the case with heretics whose mistaken conscience forbids them from taking oaths or eating meat or drinking wine. Hence, it is not a sin for them to do such things against their conscience. Therefore, a mistaken conscience does not bind under pain of sin.
2. Sometimes a mistaken conscience tells a person to do something against God’s law. For instance, a heretic’s mistaken conscience tells him to preach against the Catholic faith. But doing something against God’s law is a mortal sin. If it were also a mortal sin to do something against one’s mistaken conscience, then such a heretic would commit sin either way, whether he preached against God’s law or not. But then he would be left with no permissible options, which is unacceptable. For then the way of salvation would not be open to him, although it is supposed to be open to everyone who repents in this life. Therefore, a mistaken conscience does not bind.
But to the contrary: The gloss on the verse Whatever is not done out of faith is a sin of Romans 14 says that those who act against their conscience pave their way to Gehenna.183
Answer: Although an act gets its nature from its object, its nature does not come from its object’s matter, but from its object’s formal aspect. Seeing a stone, for instance, does not get its nature from the stone as a stone, but as something colored, which is the essential object of sight. Now, every human act has the nature of guilt or merit insofar as it is willed, and the object of the will—its proper formal aspect—is an apprehended good. Hence, a human act is judged virtuous or vicious because of the apprehended good at which the will essentially aims, not because of the act’s material object. If a man kills his servant, for instance, but believes that he is killing his father, then he is guilty of the sin of patricide. But if a hunter has done his due diligence, and thinks he is killing a deer, but accidentally kills his father, then he is innocent of the crime of patricide.
So, take something that is not itself against God’s law, such as picking up a stick off the ground or taking an oath. Now, suppose that a person’s conscience mistakenly apprehends it as being against God’s law, and the person’s will then aims at it accordingly. Such a person’s will is clearly aimed at something against God’s law, essentially and formally speaking, even though its matter is not against God’s law, and in fact may even be in accord with God’s law. Hence, such a person clearly shows contempt for God’s law, and necessarily sins as a result.
Accordingly, conscience is always binding, whether it is mistaken or not, and whether it is a question of things evil in themselves or morally neutral. Therefore, it is a sin to act against one’s conscience.
1. So, to the first objection: If such heretics took an oath against the protests of their mistaken conscience, then they would not do anything against God’s law materially speaking, but they would do something against God’s law formally speaking, as we just explained.
2. To the second objection: If a person’s conscience tells the person to do something against God’s law, then the person commits sin by not doing it, and also commits sin by doing it. Ignorance of the law does not excuse one from sin, except when the ignorance is invincible, as is the case with insane and demented people, who are completely excused from sin. Yet it does not follow that the person is left with no permissible options absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect, since the person can still correct the mistake of conscience and avoid sin by obeying God’s law. Nor is it unacceptable for a person to be left with no permissible options in such cases. A priest in a state of sin, for example, under an obligation to say mass, will commit a sin by saying mass, and also by not saying mass. But he is not left with absolutely no permissible options, since he can still repent and say mass without sinning. It is just like syllogisms: grant one unacceptable proposition, and others will follow, as it says in book I of the Physics.184
Question 13
The next questions were about penance.
There were two such questions: (1) If a priest says to a penitent, “Whatever good you do will be for the forgiveness of your sins,” is that satisfaction sacramental? and (2) If a man fails to say the divine office when he is obligated to do so, can another penance be imposed on him for such an omission, or should he be required to redo what he failed to do?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that the satisfaction just described would not be sacramental:
Sacramental satisfaction requires one to do something. But someone whose satisfaction was imposed in the way described would not be required to do anything. Therefore, it seems that such satisfaction would not be sacramental.
But to the contrary: Satisfaction seems to be sacramental when one is not required to do anything else once it has been done. But a penitent whose satisfaction was imposed by a priest in the way described would not be required to do anything else, since the penitent was not told to do anything else. Therefore, such satisfaction would be sacramental.
Answer: Answering this question requires four distinctions. First, realize that sinners owe satisfaction for two reasons: because of what the priest requires of them, and because of the sin committed. Hence, if a priest imposes a satisfaction on a penitent less than the amount required by the sin, then even accounting for the forgiveness granted by the power of the keys and the penitent’s prior contrition, the penitent will still be obligated to do something more, which will have to be done in purgatory if it is not done in this life. On the other hand, if a priest imposes a penance greater than the penitent’s own obligation, again adjusting for the forgiveness granted by virtue of the keys and the penitent’s prior contrition, the penitent is still obligated to do what the priest requires, if possible.
Second, realize that doing what the priest requires helps the penitent for two reasons: because of what the penitent does, and also because of the power of the keys. The satisfaction required by the priest who grants absolution is a part of repentance. Hence, the power of the keys clearly works through it, so that doing such a thing helps a person make up for sins more than if the person had chosen to do the same thing alone. Third, realize that satisfaction helps with two things: it helps sinners make up for past sins, and helps them avoid future sins. When a person fasts, for instance, it serves as a remedy against future concupiscence of the flesh. Fourth, realize that a priest can impose a satisfaction on a penitent either of the priest’s own choosing or of someone else’s.
Now, since a priest can impose a satisfaction on a penitent that someone else chooses, it can also be of the penitent’s own choosing. He might say, for instance: “Do this if you can, but if you cannot, then do that.” It seems the same when the priest says: Whatever good you do will be for the forgiveness of your sins. It seems appropriate enough for the priest to avoid overwhelming the penitent with a heavy burden of satisfaction. Just as a little fire can easily be extinguished by piling too much wood on top of it, the penitent’s little feelings of contrition that have only just been aroused can easily be extinguished by a heavy burden, leaving the sinner totally hopeless. Hence, it would be better for the priest to tell the penitent how much penance the sins require, but only to impose on the penitent something the penitent can manage to bear, so that after doing it the penitent will become able to do the rest, which the priest would not have tried to impose. Then whatever the penitent does beyond that express requirement will have more power to make up for the penitent’s past sins because of the general requirement the priest imposed: Whatever good you do will be for the forgiveness of your sins. (Hence, it is good that so many priests are in the habit of saying this.) But it will not have more power to serve as a remedy against future sins. Therefore, such satisfaction is sacramental, since it makes up for the sin committed, given the power of the keys.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that a man who failed to say the divine office should be required to redo it:
When people are bound to fulfill a specific obligation, they cannot be freed without fulfilling that very obligation. So, if a man is bound to fulfill the obligation to say the divine office, he cannot be absolved without fulfilling that obligation.
But to the contrary: Penances are arbitrary.185 Therefore, a priest can impose any penance he chooses for such a sin of omission.
Answer: All the hours of the divine office have this in common: they are for the praise of God and the suffrages of the faithful. Yet the hours of the office are distinguished from each other by their various times and places, since it is reasonable for God to be praised in various ways suited to various times and places.
Hence, just as we should make sure that the divine office is said in a suitable place, we should make sure that it is said at a suitable time. But we could not make sure of this if we had to require a man to say the hours that he failed to say. For then during compline he might say, Now that the daylight fills the sky, or during Eastertide he might say the office for the Lord’s passion, which is ridiculous. Therefore, it seems that a man who failed to say the divine office should not be required to repeat the same hours; he should be required to say something else in praise of God, such as the seven psalms, or one psalter, or something longer, depending on how much he missed.
So, to the first objection: Since the time for that office has passed, it is impossible to fulfill that obligation at the required time. Thus, since it cannot be done, some other penance should be imposed on him instead.
Question 14
The next questions were about purely bodily creatures.
There were two such questions: (1) Is a rainbow in the clouds a sign that there will not be a flood? and (2) Is it possible to prove demonstratively that the world is not eternal?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that a rainbow in the clouds is not a sign that there will not be a flood:
1. What occurs by natural necessity does not seem to have been instituted to signify anything. But a rainbow arises in the clouds by necessity due to the reflection of sunlight off of moist clouds. Therefore, a rainbow does not seem to signify that there will not be a flood.
2. These sorts of things that appear in the air—rainbows, halos (i.e., circles of sunlight and moonlight), and other such things—are mainly a result of water vapor in the air, which leads to rain, which causes a flood. Therefore, the appearance of a rainbow is more a sign that there will be a flood, than that there will not be a flood.
3. If a rainbow is a sign that there will not be a flood, then it is either a sign that there will never be a flood again or a sign that there will not be a flood for a certain amount of time. If it is a sign that there will never be a flood again, then it only needs to appear once. If it is a sign that there will not be a flood for a certain amount of time, then it must be for a set amount of time, which cannot be determined by the authority of scripture or by human reasoning. Hence, in either case it is pointless to give such a sign.
But to the contrary: Genesis 8 says: I shall set my bow in the clouds, and it will be a sign of the covenant between me and the earth.186 Then it says: And the waters will never again become a flood to destroy all flesh.187
Answer: When it comes to the things said in the Old Testament, the first thing we have to maintain is their literal truth. But since the Old Testament is a figure of the New, many of the things set down in the Old Testament are said in a way that signifies something else figuratively.
Now, many causes of things remain hidden, while their effects lie open. Hence, such effects are used to signify their causes. So, realize that the efficient cause of rain is the sun, and its material cause is the water and water vapor that rises from the earth under the sun’s influence. Now, these two things can be related in one of three ways. Sometimes the sun’s heat overpowers the vapor and dries it out, in which case rain cannot result. Hence it does not rain in Egypt and in other places that hot. Rain is also less frequent in summer, when the sun is nearer, and more frequent in winter. But sometimes the sun’s influence has the opposite effect of increasing the amount of vapor so much that it is unable to dry it out. In that case, there is an overabundance of rain, which is the cause of floodwaters. Yet sometimes they are related in a middle way: the sun’s influence not only raises the vapor, but also conquers it, so that it does not increase the amount of it to the point of causing a flood, and yet does not dry out the vapor so much that rain cannot result either.
Now, this middle relationship or arrangement between vapor and the sun is what causes a rainbow, which does not appear when vapor is completely dried out, or when the air has such an overabundance of it. Hence, a rainbow is a sign that there will not be a flood, since it results from a cause that is incompatible with a flood. That is why scripture uses this way of speaking, since a rainbow signifies Christ, who protects us from spiritual floods.
1. So, to the first objection: A rainbow arises naturally from causes that are incompatible with a flood. Thus, it is appropriate to call a rainbow a sign that there will not be a flood.
2. To the second objection: A rainbow can signify rain, but not the overabundance of rain that causes a flood.
3. To the third objection: When a rainbow appears it signifies that there will not be a flood for as long as vapor and the sun are in that same relationship. Hence, its frequent appearance is not superfluous.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems possible to prove demonstratively that the world is not eternal:
1. If the world were eternal, then we could not possibly count the number of years from the beginning of the world. But this very number is inscribed on the paschal candle. So, if the world were eternal, the paschal candle could not be blessed in church.
2. Epacts are calculated based on the extension of the lunar years beyond the solar years. But such extension could not be calculated if the world were eternal. Hence, the world is not eternal. Therefore, it is possible to demonstrate that the world is not eternal.
But to the contrary: Matters of faith cannot be demonstrated, since faith is of things not seen, as it says in Hebrews 11.188 But it is an article of faith that the world was created with a beginning in time. Hence the prophecies of Moses say: In the beginning God created heaven and earth,189 as Gregory notes in his first homily on Ezekiel.190 Therefore, it is not possible to prove demonstratively that the world is not eternal.
Answer: Things that are up to God’s sheer will are impossible to prove demonstratively, since no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God, as 1 Corinthians 2 says.191 Yet the creation of the world depends on no other cause than God’s will alone. Hence, things about the beginning of the world are impossible to prove demonstratively. Instead, such things are held by faith alone, as they have been revealed prophetically by the Holy Spirit. Hence after the words just quoted the Apostle adds: But God has revealed them to us by his Spirit.192
Moreover, we should be extremely wary of anyone presuming to offer demonstrations of matters of faith, for two reasons. First, because doing so detracts from the excellence of the faith, whose truth surpasses all human reasoning. As Ecclesiasticus 3 says: Many things beyond human understanding have been shown to you.193 Whereas things that can be proven demonstratively do not surpass human reasoning. Second, because many of the arguments offered for them are silly, which gives nonbelievers cause to laugh at us, thinking that we believe the matters of faith for such reasons.
This is clearly illustrated by the first two arguments, which are ridiculous and have no force.
1. The first argument about the paschal candle has nothing but the strength of authority. But arguments from authority are not demonstrative proofs; they only lead to belief or opinion. And, anyway, the authority of sacred scripture is much greater than that of the paschal candle, especially considering that the paschal candle can be blessed without inscribing the world’s years on it. Such an inscription is not necessary for the paschal candle. Hence in many places it is not customary to inscribe anything on the candle.
2. The second argument is ridiculous as well. The extension of the lunar years beyond the solar years is not calculated from the beginning of the world; it is calculated from some fixed point—when the sun and moon are opposed, for example, or when they align, or something like that—just like every other astronomical calculation.
1 Psalms 146:5.
2 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 11.
3 1 John 2:2.
4 Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, 6 (207a25–26).
5 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, 1 (412b17–25).
6 Aristotle, On the Soul II, 1 (412b17–25).
7 John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith III, 28.
8 Cf. Augustine, On Heresies, 55; Gennadius, On Church Dogmas, 2 & 3.
9 Cf. Council of Chalcedon; Pope Leo, Letter to Flavian; Boethius, Against Eutyches and Nestorius, c. 5.
10 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, q.14.
11 John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith IV, 1.
12 Aristotle, On the Soul II, 8 (420b13–32).
13 Cf. Augustine, The City of God XIII, 22.
14 Ibid.
15 Augustine, On Free Choice III, 11, 32.
16 Aristotle, Metaphysics III, 3 (999a12–13).
17 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 8, 1.
18 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 1, 3 & c. 2.
19 1 Corinthians 3:16.
20 Cf. John 9:1–3.
21 Cf. Gregory, Register of Letters VII, 5; Decretum, C. VIII, q.1, c. 9.
22 Augustine, The City of God XIX, 19.
23 Rather, Augustine, Sermons on the Old Testament, Sermon 23.
24 John 21:15.
25 Wisdom 6:21.
26 Gregory, Morals XXI, 15, 23.
27 Rather, Wisdom 7:13.
28 1 Peter 4:10.
29 Matthew 23:2–3.
30 Matthew 15:14.
31 Romans 14:5.
32 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine III, 2, 2.
33 Matthew 23:2.
34 Matthew 23:3.
35 Cf. Pope Innocent IV, Non solum in favorem (June 17, 1244).
36 Decretals III, tit. 31, c. 1.
37 Decretum I, d. xlv, c. 5.
38 Cf. Gerard of Abeville, A Twofold Question, q.1; John Peckham, On Offering Children.
39 Cf. Gerard of Abeville, A Twofold Question, q.1 & q.2.
40 Matthew 23:15.
41 1 John 4:1.
42 Acts 5:38–39.
43 Cf. Decretals V, tit. 23, c. 1.
44 Decretum II, C. xx, q.1, c. 1.
45 Ordinary Gloss on Exodus 5:4.
46 Matthew 19:13–14.
47 Origen, Commentary on Matthew, tr. 15, 7–8.
48 Cf. Decretum II, C. xx, q.1, cc. 2–4.
49 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, c. 7.
50 Augustine, Letter 127, 8.
51 Pope Innocent IV, Non solum in favorem (June 17, 1244).
52 Augustine, Letter 127, 8.
53 Ecclesiastes (Sirach) 11:4.
54 John 6:71.
55 Cf. Matthew 19:29.
56 Matthew 23:15.
57 Rather, Pseudo-John Chrysostom, Unfinished Work on Matthew, Homily 44.
58 Cf. Augustine, On the Good of Perseverance, c. 22.
59 Gerard of Abbeville, A Twofold Question, q.2.
60 Matthew 19:17.
61 Matthew 19:21.
62 1 Corinthians 7:25.
63 Rather, 1 Timothy 4:8.
64 Rather, Julianus Pomerius, On the Contemplative Life II, 24, 1.
65 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, 3 (1105a9–10).
66 Decretum II, C. vii, q.1, c. 35.
67 Psalms 75:12.
68 Gloss of Peter Lombard on Psalms 75:12.
69 Ecclesiastes (Sirach) 5:3.
70 Augustine, Letter 127, 8.
71 Exodus 20:14.
72 Especially Augustine, Questions on the Heptateuch II, q.71, 4. Cf. Ordinary Gloss on Exodus 20:14.
73 Exodus 20:7.
74 Isidore, Synonyms II, 58.
75 Cf. Quodlibet III, q.5, a.1, ad 2.
76 Matthew 19:17.
77 Matthew 19:21.
78 Cf. 1 Corinthians 7:25.
79 Jerome, Against Vigilantius, 1.
80 Ibid., 14.
81 Gennadius, On Church Dogmas, 38.
82 Augustine, On Holy Virginity, 46. But Augustine says “martyrdom,” not “monasticism.”
83 Augustine, On Holy Virginity, 8.
84 Rather, Julianus Pomerius, On the Contemplative Life II, 24, 1.
85 Ibid.
86 The Latin text here is incomplete. Instead, see Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q.184, a.8, ad 6.
87 Jerome, Against Vigilantius, 15.
88 Cf. Matthew 9:9.
89 Gerard of Abbeville, A Twofold Question, q.2.
90 Decretum II, C. xxxiii, q.1, c. 8.
91 Cf. Matthew 19:23–24; John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, Homily 63.
92 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 31:8.
93 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 31:9.
94 Gregory, Dialogues IV, 12.
95 Luke 5:32.
96 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, 9 (1109b4–7).
97 Decretum II, C. xix, q.2, c. 2.
98 Acts 7:51.
99 Cf. Quodlibet III, q.5, a.1.
100 Matthew 23:13.
101 Tobit 4:9.
102 Rather, Daniel 4:24.
103 Matthew 15:6.
104 Matthew 15:4; Exodus 20:12.
105 Hebrews 12:9.
106 Matthew 8:22.
107 John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, Homily 27.
108 John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood VI, 7.
109 Ibid., 7.
110 Ibid., 8.
111 Ibid., 6.
112 A common adage.
113 Cf. Cicero, On Duties I, xx, 70; Decretals I, tit. 9, c. 10, §11.
114 Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel I, Homily 12, 30.
115 Decretum II, C. xix, q. 2, c. 2.
116 Psalms 83:6.
117 1 Corinthians 13:2.
118 Colossians 3:14.
119 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, c. 4, 12.
120 Aristotle, Physics III, 6 (207a13–14).
121 Augustine, The City of God XIV, 28.
122 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, q.36, 1.
123 Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel II, Homily 8, 16.
124 Philippians 3:7–8.
125 Genesis 17:1.
126 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 31:8.
127 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 31:10.
128 Decretum II, C. II, q. 6, c. 40.
129 Cf. Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel II, Homily 8, 16.
130 Gloss of Peter Lombard on 1 Timothy 6:12.
131 2 Corinthians 4:5.
132 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, c. 6.
133 Ibid., c. 5 & c. 6.
134 Ibid., c. 6.
135 Ibid., c. 5, 3 & c. 6, 1–3.
136 John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood I, 3.
137 Ibid., VI, 6.
138 Ibid., VI, 7.
139 Ibid., VI, 7.
140 Ibid., VI, 8.
141 Decretum II, C. xvi, q.1, c. 41.
142 Gloss of Peter Lombard on 1 Corinthians 12.
143 Rather, Gregory, Morals VI, 37, 61.
144 Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel I, Homily 12, 30.
145 Matthew 16:28.
146 2 Corinthians 2:10.
147 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 26:20.
148 Decretals IV, tit. 6, cc. 3–7.
149 Ibid.
150 Cf. 1 Corinthians 7:4.
151 Romans 11:16.
152 Aristotle, Politics I, 10 (1258a38–b8).
153 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 4 (430a5–7).
154 Cf. Boethius, On the Hebdomads, Rules 2 & 7–8.
155 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, 9 (1051a29–33).
156 Cf. Albert, Commentary on Dionysius’s The Divine Names, c. 2; Bonaventure, Commentary on the Sentences I, d.8, p.2, a. un., q.3, fund. 5; Commentary on the Sentences II, d.18, a.2, q.1, fund. 2.
157 Aristotle, On the Soul I, 4 (408b27–28).
158 Cf. Luke 16:22–23.
159 Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul V, 6.
160 Aristotle, On the Soul III, 4 (429b5–9).
161 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 3:22.
162 Luke 16:27–31.
163 2 Maccabees 12:46.
164 John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith II, 4.
165 Matthew 11:25.
166 Aristotle, Physics VI, 4 (234b10–20).
167 Luke 16:24.
168 Cf. Augustine, The City of God XXI, 10.
169 Ordinary Gloss on Isaiah 14:9.
170 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, 14 (1154a26–31).
171 Ezekiel 32:27.
172 Revelation 16:9.
173 Wisdom 5:3.
174 Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis IX, 3.
175 Genesis 1:28.
176 Job 3:13.
177 Gregory, Morals IV, 31, 62.
178 Cf. William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, 5.1.11, q.3; Albert, Commentary on the Sentences IV, d.8C, a.6, q.1, arg. 3, arg. 4, & ad 4.
179 Cf. Romans 2:14–15.
180 Cf. Basil, Homily on the Beginning of Proverbs, 9.
181 John 16:2.
182 Augustine, Against Faustus XXII, 27.
183 Rather, Decretum II, C. xxviii, q.1, c. 14. Cf. Romans 14:23.
184 Aristotle, Physics I, 2 (185a11–12).
185 A common adage.
186 Rather, Genesis 9:13.
187 Genesis 9:15.
188 Hebrews 11:1.
189 Genesis 1:1.
190 Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel I, Homily 1.
191 1 Corinthians 2:11.
192 Rather, before at 1 Corinthians 2:10.
193 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 3:25.