Article 3: Should a master make more use of reason or of authority when settling theological questions?
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that a man can go on crusade against his wife’s will even if he is afraid that she will not remain continent:
One should not forgo one’s own salvation for the salvation of someone else. But a man can achieve his own salvation by going on crusade, thereby receiving the forgiveness of all his sins. Therefore, a man should not forgo a crusade in order to provide for the salvation of his wife.
But to the contrary: Augustine says: If you are abstinent without your wife’s consent, you give her license to fornicate, and your abstinence is then responsible for her sin.49 But going on crusade prevents a man from paying the marriage debt. Therefore, the man is responsible for his wife’s sin if she does not remain continent.
Answer: Necessary things should not be forgone for the sake of elective things. Hence in Matthew 15, the Lord condemns the Pharisees for teaching people to forgo the commandment to honor their parents in order to make certain elective sacrifices to God.50 Now, it is necessary for a man to care for his wife, since the head of a woman is her husband, as 1 Corinthians 11 says.51 But going on crusade is elective. Hence, if a man is afraid that his wife will not remain continent, and there is a legitimate reason that she cannot go with him, then he should not decide to leave his wife and go on crusade. But things are different if the wife has voluntarily chosen continence, or if she is willing and able to go with her husband.
So, to the first objection: A man’s own salvation involves seeing to the salvation of his wife, who is the man’s responsibility.
Question 8
The next questions were about human acts. The first were about acts relating to superiors and prelates. The second were about acts relating to everyone.
Now, it is especially for superiors and prelates to dispense from the commandments, to excommunicate people who rebel against the commandments, and to bestow ecclesiastical benefices. Hence, there were four of the first questions. The first was about obeying a superior’s commands: (1) Is a religious bound to obey a superior who commands him to reveal a brother’s secret fault to him out of obedience? The second was about dispensations: (2) Can the pope grant a dispensation for bigamy? The third was about excommunication: (3) Are we bound to avoid excommunicated people if opinions on their excommunication differ even among experts, some of whom say that they are excommunicated and others that they are not? The fourth was about bestowing benefices: (4) Is a prelate of the Church allowed to give a benefice to his own suitable relative if a more suitable man occurs to him just as easily?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. A subordinate does not seem bound to obey a superior who commands him to reveal a secret fault:
No one is bound to obey a superior about something outside the superior’s jurisdiction. But secret faults do not fall under a human being’s jurisdiction; they fall exclusively under God’s jurisdiction. Therefore, no one is bound to obey a superior’s command to reveal such faults.
But to the contrary: The superior in charge of a religious can command anything that a secular or ecclesiastical judge can require of people under oath. But a secular or ecclesiastical judge can require people under oath to reveal what they know about a secret, as a certain decree on purgation says.52 By the same token, therefore, the superior in charge of a religious can also command him to tell him what he knows about a secret fault, especially out of obedience.
Answer: There are two ways for a sin to be secret.
One way is for it to be an absolute secret, meaning that there is no way for others to find out about it. This sort of secret sin only hurts the one who commits it. Hence, a religious who knows that a brother has committed such a secret sin only has to pursue the offending brother’s own salvation. That is why the Lord established the order of fraternal correction: first correct a brother who has committed a secret sin between you and him alone, after that take two or three witnesses, and only then, if he still will not listen, tell the church.53 A superior who violates this order with a command to tell him a brother’s secret sin should not be obeyed. Such a command is itself a sin, since we ought to obey God rather than men.54
But if a brother’s sin is not secret enough for others not to suspect it and find out about it, then it will scandalize others, in which case the sin hurts not only him but others as well. Yet the good of many takes precedence over the good of one. Hence, his superior ought to investigate the matter and uncover the truth in order to put the scandal to rest, either by punishing or by pardoning the sinner. Thus, in such cases a superior can command a religious who knows about a brother’s fault to disclose it to him, and the religious is then bound to obey his superior’s command. For in that case the fault falls under the superior’s jurisdiction, since it is not entirely secret. This is the sort of secret spoken of by that decree on purgation, not the first sort.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that the pope cannot grant a dispensation for irregular bigamy:
The pope cannot dispense anyone from things that have been divinely established, as Bernard says in his book On Precept and Dispensation.55 But the Apostle teaches that a bigamist may not be elevated to the episcopacy, as seen in 1 Timothy 3 and in Titus 1.56 And this teaching is divinely proclaimed. As the Apostle says in the last chapter of 2 Timothy: Do you want proof that Christ is speaking in me?57 Therefore, the pope cannot grant a dispensation for bigamy.
But to the contrary: In d. L of the Decretum it says that the pope granted a dispensation to a certain bigamist.58
Answer: The pope has complete power in the Church, which means that he can dispense with anything that the Church or the Church’s prelates have established. Such things are called matters of human law or positive law. But the pope cannot dispense with matters of divine law or natural law, since their force comes from being divinely established. Now, divine law relates to the Old or New Law. The difference between the two is as follows. The Old Law determined many things, both with its ceremonial commandments related to divine worship and with its judicial commandments related to maintaining justice among human beings. But the New Law is the law of freedom, and therefore does not determine such things. Instead, it consists of the moral commandments of natural law and of the articles of faith and the sacraments of grace. Hence it is called the law of faith and the law of grace, because of the determination of the articles of faith and the effect of the sacraments. Other things related to the determination of human judgments or to the regulation of divine worship have been left free by Christ (the legislator of the New Law) for the Church’s prelates or the rulers of the Christian people to determine. Hence, the pope can dispense with all such determinations of human law; it is only those of natural law and the articles of faith and the sacraments of the New Law that he cannot dispense with, since he could not possibly do so for the truth, but only against the truth.59
Now, the fact that a bigamist may not be elevated to the episcopacy is obviously not a matter of natural law, nor does it relate to the articles of faith or to the necessary conditions for the sacrament itself (shown by the fact that if a bigamist were ordained, he would receive the sacrament of holy orders). Instead, it relates to the regulation of divine worship. Hence, the pope can dispense with it, just as he could dispense a priest from having to wear sacred vestments to consecrate the body of Christ. But he should only do so for a grave and evident reason. The same goes for everything else of human establishment.
So, to the first objection: The Apostle’s teaching is of two kinds. Some of it proclaims divine law, as for instance what he says in Galatians 5: If you are circumcised, Christ will profit you nothing.60 There are many other teachings of this kind, none of which can be dispensed with by the pope. But the Apostle teaches other things on his own authority. Take, for instance, what he says in 1 Corinthians 11: The rest I will settle when I come.61 Or take his command later in chapter 16 that the collections for the saints are to be taken up on the first day of the week.62 These are not matters of divine law. The same is true of what he says about a bigamist not being elevated to the episcopacy. That is not a matter of divine law, but something that he himself established by the human authority granted to him by God.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that we do not have to avoid excommunicated people if experts hold differing opinions on their excommunication:
By law, a bishop cannot revoke a benefice that he has granted to a cleric without sin.63 But a believer has as much right to be included in the community of believers as a cleric has to a benefice that a bishop has bestowed on him. Therefore, no one should be excluded from the community of believers without sin. But when there is doubt about the merits of a case, a good man’s mind ought to be eager to interpret it in the best light. So, when there is doubt about people’s excommunication, we ought to presume that they are not excommunicated, and thus we do not have to avoid them.
But to the contrary: If a man is struck down in war and dies, and the identity of the one who struck him down is unknown, that doubt puts everyone who participated in the war in an irregular position under the law. Thus, the same seems true of the doubt about whether people are excommunicated, and hence we should avoid them out of greater caution.
Answer: Doubt about people’s excommunication can arise either before or after judges have issued a verdict.
If it arises before judges have agreed and declared them excommunicated, then the people are not to be avoided, until a certain judgment has been made. For in that case it is true that we ought to interpret things in the best light. Hence Deuteronomy 27 says: If you sense that a case before you is too difficult and doubtful to judge . . . and you see that the judges within your own gates say different things . . . then go to the priests . . . and to the judge . . . and ask them . . . and do whatever they say.64
But if the uncertainty arises after the unanimous determination of judges, then the verdict of the judges ought to be upheld instead, and for two reasons. First, because judges who look into a matter very carefully are better able to uncover the truth about it (even without being experts) than those who consider it carelessly and haphazardly. Second, because it would do great harm to the common good of human life if verdicts were not upheld, and anyone who wanted to could undermine them at will: that would make litigation interminable. Thus, the verdict of the judges ought to be upheld in such cases, unless it happens to have been suspended because of an appeal.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 4
We turn, then, to the fourth question. It seems that a prelate of the Church cannot entrust a church to the care of his own relative, however suitable, if it means passing over a better man:
1. A father seeks the most suitable husband possible for his daughter, and a husband seeks the most faithful guardian possible for his wife. But a prelate relates to a church under him like a father relates to a daughter or like a husband relates to a wife. Therefore, he ought to provide the church with the best and most suitable man possible.
2. John was the most suitable evangelist, but because he was related to Christ by flesh and blood, Peter was chosen to lead the Church instead. Likewise, therefore, if a prelate has an equally suitable relative, he should not provide any more for him by giving him a church than he provides for another man equally suitable, much less if his relative is less suitable.
But to the contrary: The right order of charity requires us to love our own relatives more. But when charity requires us to love people more, we ought to provide them with more of what will increase their merit. And the good stewardship of a church increases the merit of the man who oversees it well. Therefore, a prelate ought to provide more for his own relatives than for others, even if his own relatives are less suitable.
Answer: Things are different if the prelate’s relative is equally suitable and if he is less suitable.
If he is equally suitable, then a prelate can give preference to his own relative (unless it happens to give rise to scandal, or it is taken as a bad example, meaning that it could reasonably be assumed that other prelates would follow the example by giving churches even to less worthy relatives). The reason is that providing for an equally suitable relative makes no difference to the good of the church involved, while also fulfilling natural love, which is not contrary to charity but, rather, informed by charity. That is the significance of Genesis 48, where Pharaoh tells Joseph about his brothers: If you know of any hardworking men among them, put them in charge of my cattle.65
But if the prelate’s relative is less suitable, then he should not give him preference for the care of a church, if it means passing over a better man, for two reasons. First, because it seems contrary to the faithfulness that the Lord requires of a good steward. No lord’s business would be faithfully done by a steward who could do it better but refrains from doing so for the sake of his own relatives. Second, it seems to involve preferential treatment, which consists in acting on the basis of a person’s irrelevant status. Suppose, for instance, that a judge ruled in someone’s favor because of being rich, not because of being in the right, which is the relevant factor there. Now, being someone’s relative is not a factor relevant to the care of a church, which is not obtained by any rights of birth but, rather, by the gift of God. Yet it would be a factor relevant to the distribution of inherited goods. Hence, if a bishop provided his less suitable relative with more inherited goods, that would not be preferential treatment. But if he provided him with more of the inheritance of the Crucified One because of being his relative, then he would commit the sin of preferential treatment.
Augustine says this very thing about the distribution of ecclesiastical ranks when he explains that verse of James 2: Do not give preferential treatment as you hold the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ.66 Jerome says so as well, as quoted in C. VIII, q.1 of the Decretum: Moses selected an outsider from another tribe . . . in order to show that leadership of the people should not be granted on the basis of birth, but of character. And yet now we see many granting it as a favor. Rather than choosing men to serve as pillars of the Church that they know would benefit the Church more, they choose men they love, or whose servile flattery has charmed them.67
Question 9
The next questions were about human acts related to everyone. The first were about acts relating to our intellective power. The second were about acts relating to our appetitive power.
There were three of the first questions: (1) Can a person desire to know magic without sinning? (2) Is a proposition that is once true, always true? and (3) Should a master make more use of reason or of authority when settling theological questions?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that a person can desire to know magic without sinning:
It is not a sin to desire anything that turns the intellect toward what is best. But any kind of knowledge turns the intellect toward what is best, since knowledge is about truth, and truth is the good of the intellect, as it says in book VI of the Ethics.68 Therefore, it is permissible to desire any kind of knowledge, and thus a person can desire to know magic without sinning.
But to the contrary: Only impermissible things are forbidden. Yet knowledge of magic is forbidden. Therefore, it is impermissible to desire to know magic.
Answer: There are two reasons to call a human act good: because of its kind and because of its circumstances.
A human act is called good in kind because it falls under some due matter. Now, the due matter of desire is some good. Hence, the desire for anything good is itself good in kind. Yet all knowledge or awareness is something good, otherwise God (who does nothing evil) would not know everything (both good and evil). Hence, the desire for any knowledge or for knowledge of anything (good or evil) is good in kind.
But the addition of various circumstances can make it good or evil. The end intended especially makes a difference. The desire to know magic in order to use it is evil, but the desire to know it in order to refute and disprove it is good and permissible. A person’s state can make a difference as well, as can the way the person desires such knowledge. If the person desires it to the point of preferring it to better things, then the desire for such knowledge is disordered. Or if the person has no business knowing such things, then the desire to do so is disordered.
So, to the first objection: All knowledge turns the intellect toward a good of its own, since every truth is a good of the intellect. Yet not all knowledge turns the intellect toward what is best; only knowledge of the First Truth does so. But the art of magic is not true knowledge anyway; it is the fallacy of demons.
To the objection made to the contrary: The art of magic is forbidden to use. Even if it were forbidden to study because of the danger of using it, it would still only be evil because of being forbidden.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It does not seem necessary for a proposition that is once true, always to be true:
1. If it were the case with other propositions, then by the same token it would be the case with propositions about the future. But it is not the case with the latter. As the Philosopher says in book II of On Generation and Corruption: Someone who is going to go for a walk, might not go for a walk.69 Therefore, it is not necessary for a proposition that is once true, always to be true.
2. A whole remains the same if its parts remain the same. Now, the parts of a proposition are a predicate, a subject, and their union. Hence, a proposition remains the same if its predicate, its subject, and their union remain the same. But when a proposition remains the same that way, it is sometimes true and sometimes false. Take this proposition: “Socrates is sitting.” It is true when Socrates is sitting but false when he is not sitting. That follows what the Philosopher says in the Categories: It is because a thing exists or does not exist that a statement is true or false.70 Therefore, a proposition that is once true is not for that reason always true.
But to the contrary: Take these propositions: “Socrates runs.” “Socrates ran.” “Socrates will run.” They only differ by connoting different times. But having different connotations does not alter a word’s identity, since a word remains the same in all cases and numbers (singular and plural). So, those three propositions are actually one proposition. And if any of them is ever true, the others always have to be true: if it is ever true that Socrates runs, then it was true beforehand that Socrates will run, and it will be true afterward that Socrates ran. Therefore, a proposition that is once true, is always true.
Answer: The force of this question comes from the need to know whether one and the same proposition applies to the present, the past, and the future. If it does, then a proposition that is once true is consequently always true. Granted, there may still be some doubt with propositions about future contingents, but that is another question.71 Yet if different propositions apply to the present, the past, and the future (though the same proposition applies to the present, however things stand), then clearly the same proposition is sometimes true and sometimes false. As the Philosopher says in the Categories, the same statement and opinion is sometimes true and sometimes false.72
To see the answer to this question, note what the Philosopher says in book I of On Interpretation about the order we find among three things: vocal sounds are signs of thoughts, and thoughts are likenesses of things.73 Now, whether significant vocal sounds are the same or different obviously does not depend on whether they signify the same or different things. Otherwise, there would be no equivocal terms, since different things would then have different terms and never the same term. Hence, whether significant vocal sounds (compound or not) are the same or different depends on whether the vocal sound or the thought is the same or different. Now, a vocal sound is only a sign and not something signified, whereas a thought is a sign and something signified as well. Hence, words or propositions can differ either because they merely sound different (as with synonyms, which sound different but signify exactly the same thing) or because their different sounds also indicate different thoughts, whether that is because the thoughts are of different things or because they are different ways of thinking about the same thing. That also happens when they have different connotations, which are a result of different ways of thinking about one and the same thing. This occurs especially with time, which is bound up essentially with our intellect’s act of combining and dividing, as it says in book III of On the Soul.74
So, “Socrates is sitting” is not the same proposition as “Socrates was sitting” or “Socrates will be sitting.” But it is the same proposition as “Socrates is sitting,” since it has the same words and the same way of signifying. Clearly, therefore, the same proposition can be sometimes true and sometimes false.
Hence, we grant the first two arguments.
To the objection made to the contrary: Having different connotations does alter a word’s identity, since inflexions are not words, as the Philosopher says.75 They are called one word, not absolutely, but because they come in the same declension.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that a master should make more use of authority than of reason when settling theological questions:
Questions in any discipline are best settled with the first principles of that discipline. But the first principles of theology are the articles of faith, which are taken on authority. Therefore, theological questions are best settled by authority.
But to the contrary: Titus 1 says: That he may be able to exhort with sound doctrine and refute its deniers.76 But deniers are better refuted with reason than authority. Therefore, questions should be settled with reason rather than authority.
Answer: Each act should be performed in a way conducive to its end. Now, debates aim at one of two ends.
Some debates aim to remove doubt about whether this or that is the case. In theological debates of this kind, most use should be made of the authority accepted by both parties to the debate. In a debate with Jews, for example, appeal should be made to the authority of the Old Testament. With Manicheans (who reject the Old Testament), only the New Testament should be used as an authority. With schismatics like the Greeks (who accept the Old and New Testament but not the teaching of our saints), we have to debate them using the authority of the Old and New Testament and the teachers they accept. With those who accept no authority, however, we have to rely on natural reason alone to convince them.
Other debates involve masters at schools, and are not about correcting errors, but about instructing the audience and helping them understand the truth they already believe. In this case, reason should be used to get at the heart of the truth and enable them to know just how it is true. If the master settles the question by mere authority instead, the audience will certainly be assured that this or that is the case, but they will not acquire any knowledge or understanding of it, thus going away empty.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.