Article 1: Can a created intellect see God’s essence?
Quodlibet X
There were questions about God, about angels, and about the soul.
Question 1
There were three questions about God. The first was about God’s oneness, the second about God’s judgment, and the third about God’s sacrament.
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. In line with the Master’s opinion, “oneness” seems to indicate something affirmative about God, and not merely a negation:
1. Real things are not composed of privations. Yet numbers are composed of ones.1 And numbers are real things, since they are a species of quantity.2 Therefore, “oneness” does not merely indicate a privation.
2. Numbers result from distinction. Hence, if “oneness” and “number” did not indicate something real about God, then real distinction would not apply to God, which is the Sabellian heresy.
3. Suppose “oneness” and “number” were merely negations about God. Now, “oneness” would only seem to negate number, and “number” would only seem to negate oneness. Hence, each of them would only be the negation of a negation about God. But the negation of a negation only exists in our minds. Hence, oneness and number would not really exist in God, which is unacceptable. Therefore, “oneness” and “number” affirm something about God.
But to the contrary:
1. Every predicate that applies to a thing applies with its own meaning. But the meaning of “one” involves a negation, since “one” means “what is not divided,” as the Philosopher says.3 Therefore, “one” applies to God merely as a negation.
2. In book X of the Metaphysics, the Philosopher says that one and many are opposed to each other like privation and possession.4 But a privation is merely a negation. Therefore, “one” (which corresponds to “privation” in the pair just mentioned) merely indicates a negation.
3. “One” does not add anything real to “existent,” otherwise a thing would not be one by its own essence. Hence, “one” adds something to “existent” in our minds alone. Now, negations and relations are the only things that exist in our minds alone. Yet “one” does not add a relation to “existent,” since “one” is not said in relation to anything. Therefore, “one” seems to add a negation to “existent.”
Answer: “One” in the sense that refers to the principle of numbers necessarily affirms something about that to which it is attributed. For numbers are composed of ones.5 So, if “one” in this sense did not refer to something real, then numbers could not be real things, and hence could not constitute the species of any genus.
So, if the “one” interchangeable with “existent” were the same as the “one” referring to the principle of numbers, then the “one” interchangeable with “existent” would have to add something affirmative to “existent.” Avicenna grants as much. Hence he claims that the “one” interchangeable with “existent” adds something to “existent” about the genus of measure.6 But that is impossible. To see why,7 suppose that the “one” interchangeable with “existent” were attributed to something. Now, the thing that “one” in this sense adds to “existent” would itself have to be one. Yet it will either be one by an additional oneness, which would lead to an infinite regress, or it will be one by its own essence. But if it is one by its own essence, then we might as well have said that from the beginning—viz. that an existent is one by its own essence and not by some additional thing.
Therefore, in line with the opinion of Aristotle and his Commentator,8 the “one” that is interchangeable with “existent” adds nothing real to “existent.” It merely adds the negation of division. Accordingly, “one” in this sense both affirms something insofar as its meaning includes “existent” and merely indicates a negation insofar as it adds to “existent.” Whereas the “one” that refers to the principle of numbers adds something to “existent” about the genus of measure. Yet this “one” and the resulting numbers only apply to things that have dimensions, since such numbers result from dividing a continuum.9 The numbers that result from dividing a continuum are the subject matter of arithmetic, as even Avicenna recognizes.
Now, characteristics proper to bodily things cannot be attributed to God or to any other spiritual substances. For this reason, the “one” and “number” contained in the genus of quantity are not attributed to God or to other non-bodily substances; only the “one” interchangeable with “existent” and its opposite “many” are attributed to them. Hence, the “oneness” attributed to God merely indicates a negation insofar as it adds to “existent,” although it affirms something insofar as it includes “existent,” since “one” means “an undivided existent.”
1. So, to the first objection: That argument only works for the “one” that refers to the principle of numbers.
2. To the second objection: That argument would work, if “one” and “number” did not affirm anything real about God. But they do affirm something real (whether distinct or not distinct) insofar as the meaning of “one” includes “existent,” as we have said.
3. To the third objection: The meaning of “many” includes the negation of a thing, but the meaning of “one” includes the negation of a thing and its negation. The following makes this clear. “One” means “what is not divided.” But the “one” interchangeable with “existent” has to negate the sort of division involved in every division, which is the division by affirmation and negation. Hence, the meaning of “one” is based on the negation of such division. For “one” means “what is not divided by a division that makes it both this and not this.” Hence, since this “one” negates both an affirmation and its negation, this “one” means the negation of a thing and its negation. But the meaning of “many” includes just such a division, since things are many when they are divided in such a way that one of them is not the other.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that Christ will not come down to earth to judge:
1. The gloss on the verse The Lord is in his holy temple, etc., of the Psalms says that God judges the good and the bad from heaven.10 Therefore, the judgment will not be on earth, but in heaven.
2. A judge’s honor requires those to be judged to go to the judge, not the other way around. But Christ is the most honorable judge, and his place is in heaven. Therefore, human beings will go up to heaven to be judged; Christ will not come down to earth to judge them.
3. If the judgment were going to be on earth, then it would have to be in the Valley of Josaphat, as Joel 3 says.11 But that place could not hold so many people, and hence the judgment will not be there. Therefore, the judgment will not be anywhere on earth.
But to the contrary:
1. 1 Thessalonians 4 says: The Lord himself will come down from heaven with a command, with the cry of an archangel, and with the trumpet of God.12 Therefore, the judgment will not be in heaven.
2. The judgment will include not only the elect, but also the reprobate, whose bodies will be large and heavy, and thus not fit for a heavenly place, but for an earthly one. Therefore, the judgment will not be in heaven, but on earth.
Answer: The point of judgment is to deal out rewards, and since our reward is twofold, viz. of soul and of body, God’s judgment is correspondingly twofold. With one judgment God blesses or damns human beings in their souls. This judgment happens all the time. With another judgment God rewards or punishes human beings in their bodies. This judgment will happen after the resurrection at the end of time. Now, the first judgment suits Christ because of his divinity, whereas the second suits him because of his humanity. As Augustine says in his comments on John, the Word of God gives life to souls, but the Word made flesh gives life to bodies.13 Hence John 5 says: And gave him power to pass judgment, because he is the Son of Man.14 Accordingly, the last judgment will be in a place fit for Christ because of his humanity—namely on earth where he was born and died and performed his other human activities. This is why it says that the judgment will be in the Valley of Josaphat, since that valley is beneath the Mount of Olives, where Christ went up to heaven. Thus, the one who comes down to judge will be recognized as the same one who went up to reign. As Acts 1 says: He will come in the same way you have seen him going up into heaven.15
1. So, to the first objection: That gloss is talking about the first judgment, which suits Christ because of his divinity. His divinity is also why heaven is assigned as his place, not because his divinity is enclosed in that place, but because the signs of his divine majesty are especially clear among the other created bodies in heaven. Hence heaven is called the place of God and of the saints who enjoy God.
2. To the second objection: Going up to the place of the judge—i.e., going up to heaven—is a reward based on judgment, and hence ought to follow judgment, not precede it. But in the case of human judgment, going up to the place of the judge is not a reward. So, the two cases are not analogous.
3. To the third objection: During the judgment, neither Christ nor the elect will be on earth; only the reprobate will be. For Christ and the elect will be in the air. As 1 Thessalonians 4 says: We shall be caught up in the clouds to meet Christ in the air.16 And the reprobate will not only be in that valley, but in the surrounding area as well. Hence, they will be able to see Christ and the elect by virtue of their elevation and brightness.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. The outward appearances of wine that remain in the sacrament after the consecration seem unable to be mixed with another liquid:
As the Philosopher says in book I of On Generation and Corruption, mixable things exist in a mixture potentially, not actually.17 So, if the outward appearances of wine were mixed with another liquid, they would not actually remain there after the mixing. Yet when the outward appearances cease to be there, Christ’s body or blood ceases to be there as well. Hence, Christ’s blood would not remain there after the mixing. But that is unacceptable. As the Philosopher says, mixable things are also separable.18 Hence, after being mixed with another liquid, those outward appearances could still be separated out again. And once they were separated out again, Christ’s body or blood would be there again as well, since Christ’s body or blood is present under those outward appearances for as long as the appearances are themselves present. Hence, Christ’s blood would begin to be there anew under the outward appearances of wine by some means other than the consecration, which is unacceptable. Hence, the assumption from which it follows is equally unacceptable. Therefore, the outward appearances of wine cannot be mixed with another liquid after the consecration.
But to the contrary: The form of a mixture is an accidental form. Yet the introduction of an accident does not destroy a subject. Hence, the outward appearances would still remain there after being mixed with another liquid, and thus the unacceptable consequences just mentioned would not in fact follow.
Answer: Some people say that there is no way for any liquid to be mixed with those outward appearances without Christ’s blood immediately ceasing to be present under the whole of those outward appearances. They say this because Christ’s true blood does not remain there after the outward appearances have been replaced, and adding liquid would replace the quantity that serves as the subject of the sacrament’s other accidents, since a greater quantity would take its place. Thus, Christ’s blood would not remain there.
But this does not seem true. For the sacrament’s outward appearances remain and are destroyed after the consecration in exactly the same way as the previously existing substances whose outward appearances remain. We can see for ourselves that such outward appearances burn, for instance, and change in other ways exactly as the substance of bread and wine before the consecration. Now, mixing in one drop of water obviously would not have destroyed the wine as a whole. Hence, doing so after the consecration would not destroy the whole of those outward appearances either. Nor do those outward appearances have to be replaced because their quantity increases. For such addition does not destroy the essence of those dimensions; it simply varies their determination. In fact, their determination is varied not only by addition but also by division. Hence, if such variation were enough to make Christ’s body or blood cease to be present under those outward appearances, then dividing those outward appearances would also make them cease to be there, which is obviously false.
So, sometimes mixing in another liquid makes Christ’s blood cease to be present under the whole of those outward appearances, and sometimes it does not, only making it cease to be present under part of those appearances. Suppose the substance of wine were there, and a large amount of another liquid were mixed into it. If a different kind of liquid were mixed in, the wine as a whole would be destroyed and would cease to be wine, and if the same kind of liquid were mixed in, the wine would cease to be this wine. Yet if only a small amount of another liquid were mixed in, the liquid would not be able to mix with the whole wine, but only with part of it. If the liquid were of a different kind, which was not wholly lost in the mix, then part of the wine would vary in kind, and if the liquid were of the same kind, then part of the wine would vary in number. Otherwise the liquid would be wholly lost in the mix, like a drop of water put into a jug of wine. Therefore, if those outward appearances were mixed with a foreign liquid after the consecration, and if that liquid would have been enough to destroy the substance of wine if it had been there, then Christ’s blood would cease to be present under the whole of those outward appearances. But if that liquid would not have been enough to do so, then Christ’s blood would cease to be present under part of those appearances. For even though the added liquid could be changed into that kind of wine, it could not be turned into the blood of Christ.
So, to the first objection: If those outward appearances were fully mixed with another liquid, they would not remain the same in kind or number, in whole or in part. And, accordingly, Christ’s blood would not remain present under those outward appearances in whole or in part, although the substance of wine would do so. Nor would Christ’s blood be present again if those appearances were separated out again. When mixable things are separated out again from their mixtures, the things that return are not numerically the same but, rather, of the same kind.
To the objection made to the contrary: The form of a mixture can be taken in two senses. In one sense, it means the form that makes a mixed body a member of its species, which is its substantial form. This is the sense in which the form of a stone is called the form of a mixed body. But in another sense, the form of a mixture is an intermediate quality resulting from the intermixed qualities.
Now, the objection claims that an accidental form does not destroy a subject. One could grant this and yet note that such a form still destroys accidents. Hence, since the sacramental appearances are accidents, they would not remain after the mixing. Yet that reply is not based on the truth. For the form of a mixture is an intermediate quality, and hence can only replace the simple qualities that compose it. Yet the sacramental appearances are not destroyed by having just any of their qualities vary. If the smell or color of the wine changed, for instance, that would not make Christ’s blood cease to be there. It would only be made to do so by the destruction of the essence of the dimensions that serve as the subject of the other accidents, supporting them in their substance’s place. And that destruction can only happen as it would happen to the substance of wine itself if it were still there.
Instead, one should reply that an accident does not destroy a subject as an efficient cause, but as a disposing cause. The form of air, for instance, is removed by the quality that necessarily disposes air for the form of fire, viz. the greatest heat. And the form of a simple body is likewise expelled by an intermediate quality that necessitates the form of a mixed body.
Question 2
Article 1
The next question was about angels: Does an angel’s duration have a before and after?
1. With anything whose duration does not have a before and after, its existing is the same as its having existed. Hence, if an angel’s duration lacked a before and after, an angel’s existing would be the same as its having existed. Yet that is impossible, since then God could not make an angel not exist, since God could not possibly make an angel not to have existed. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that an angel’s duration lacks a before and after.
2. No creature is actually unlimited. But an angel’s duration is unlimited in that it never ends. Therefore, its duration does not actually exist all at once, and thus it has a before and after.
3. The measure ought to fit the thing measured. But an angel’s actual existence is limited. Therefore, the aevum (the measure of its existence) is also limited, which leads to the conclusion of the previous argument.
4. The idea of eternity amounts to existing all at once. As Boethius says, eternity is the complete possession of unlimited life all at once.19 Therefore, if the aevum (an angel’s duration) lacked a before and after, it would seem no different from eternity.
But to the contrary:
1. As the Philosopher says in book IV of the Physics, the before and after of time results from the before and after of change, since time is the measure of change.20 But an angel’s existence does not involve change, nor is it subjected to change. Therefore, the aevum (the measure of an angel’s existence) lacks a before and after.
2. Time is just the numbering of before and after.21 Therefore, if the aevum had a before and after to number, it would seem no different from time.
Answer: We can talk about a thing in two ways: in one way as it is in reality, and in another way as it is in our consideration of it. Talking in the first way, we have to take a substance along with all of its characteristics and activities, since a substance is never found without them in reality. But talking in the second way, we can take a substance without its characteristics, since considering a substance does not require us to consider its characteristics.
So, if we are talking in the first way about the measure of a thing’s duration, then only God has a duration that exists all at once; no creature has such a duration. For only God is unchangeable both in essence and in everything to be considered in connection with that essence, whereas every creature is variable either in its substance or in some of its characteristics or activities. That is why Augustine holds that all creatures are in time—even angels—in question 21 of his dialogue with Orosius.22
But if we are talking in the second way about the measure of an angel’s duration, and thus only considering its substance absolutely, then its measure is the aevum, and not time.
Now, there are two opinions about the aevum. Some people say that the aevum has a before and after, yet unlike the before and after of time: for time’s before and after involve new occurrences, whereas the aevum’s before and after do not. But that makes no sense. For two parts of a duration cannot possibly be simultaneous unless one of them includes the other, as a month includes a day. Hence, a day and a month can be simultaneous, but two days or two months cannot. So, whenever a duration has two parts, one of which is before and the other of which is after, the one has to go while the other comes newly about. Thus, every duration with a before and after has to involve new occurrences. Moreover, a duration’s measure cannot involve new occurrences unless what the duration measures admits of new occurrences. But an angel’s existence involves no new occurrences. For its existence has continued unchangeably from its beginning, since it does not involve change, nor is it subject to any change, as the existence of corruptible things is subject to the motion of the heavens.
So, if we are talking about the measure of an angel’s duration with only its substance in view, then it does not have a before and after, since its existence is measured by the aevum. The same goes for our talk of the measure of an angel’s duration with a view to the activity essential to its blessedness, which is a participation in eternity. But if we are talking about the measure of an angel’s duration in light of its other activities or states, then its measure does have a before and after. For in that case it is measured by time. As Augustine says in book VIII of his Literal Commentary on Genesis, God moves spiritual creatures through time.23
1. So, to the first objection: There are two ways to attribute something to an eternal or aeviternal thing. One way is by virtue of itself. But only existing is attributed that way to such a thing; having existed or going to exist is not. For the past and future imply a before and after, while the present does not. Another way to attribute something to such a thing is by virtue of a measure adjoined or subjected to it—i.e., by virtue of time. Having existed is attributed that way to such a thing because of its accompanying a past time, and going to exist is attributed to such a thing because of its accompanying a future time. For the moment of eternity is present to all times.24 Hence Augustine says that God was, since God never failed to be, and God will be, since God will never fail to be.25 Thus, God cannot make an angel not to have existed, since God cannot possibly make a past time not to have been simultaneous with an angel’s existence. But God can make an angel not exist, since God can make an angel’s existence not simultaneous with the time that is present now or that will be in the future. Thus, the difference has more to do with our way of speaking about the thing than with its own nature.
2. To the second objection: Something can be called unlimited in two senses, one of which is a privative sense. Now, only things with extension or quantity are called unlimited in this sense, since only they have a limit by nature. Thus, the aevum is not unlimited in this sense, since it has no extension, except for the extension we take it to have because of its relationship to a measure subjected to it—namely time. And no creature is actually unlimited in this sense. Yet something can also be called unlimited in a negative sense, that is, because it does not have a limit. In this sense, even indivisible things such as a point and oneness are called unlimited, since they are not limited. Thus, the aevum is also unlimited in this sense, since it is not limited. In that sense, then, nothing stands in the way of a creature being actually unlimited in a certain respect.
3. To the third objection: An angel and the aevum are unlimited in the same sense.
4. To the fourth objection: We can offer three differences between eternity and the aevum. The first difference is based on what we said earlier. For eternity measures an eternal substance as it is in reality—i.e., with all of its attributes—whereas the aevum does not, as we have said. Another difference is that eternity measures an existence that stands on its own. Hence, eternity is the same as an eternal substance. But the aevum measures a created existence, which does not stand on its own, since no creature’s existence is its substance. A third difference is that the aevum is not limitless in the direction of its beginning, even though it is limitless in the direction of its end, whereas eternity is limitless in both directions.
Question 3
The next questions were about the soul. The first touched on its nature, the second on grace, the third on sin, and the fourth on glory. The questions on the soul’s nature were about its substance and its activity.
There were two questions about its substance: (1) Is the soul its powers? and (2) Is the substance of the soul incorruptible?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. The soul seems to be its powers:
1. The book On Spirit and Soul says that the soul is something it has, viz. its powers, and is not something it has, viz. its virtues.26
2. In his book On the Trinity, Augustine says that memory, intelligence, and will are one life, one essence.27 And in book I, distinction 3, of the Sentences, the Master says that these three are three powers of the soul.28 Therefore, the soul’s powers are its very essence.
But to the contrary:
1. In chapter 11 of The Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius divides higher substances (angels) into three—namely their substance, power, and activity.29 Yet a soul is no simpler than an angel. Therefore, the soul’s substance is not its power either.
2. When things are the same, if one of them is multiplied, so is the other. Now, the soul has multiple powers. Hence, if the soul were the same as its powers, it seems that it could not have just one essence.
Answer: There are two ways for us to talk about the soul.
One way is based on its being a substance. As such, the soul cannot possibly be its own powers, for two reasons.
One reason has to do with something proper to the soul—namely the impossibility of one and the same thing serving in the same respect as the natural source of many and distinct or, rather, opposite things. With its distinct powers, the soul is the source of distinct and opposite kinds of acts. Hence, the soul’s one essence cannot possibly be the direct source of them all. In addition to its substance, therefore, the soul must have natural powers that serve as the direct sources of these acts.
The other reason has to do with something common to the soul and every created substance. For no created substance is the same as its activity, since that is true of God alone. Now, a thing’s essence is the source of its existence, whereas its power is the source of its activity. Hence, since only one thing comes naturally from one thing, no substance but the divine substance is its own power. Yet this does not threaten the potential of matter, even granting that its essence is that very potential, since matter’s potential is not for activity, but for existence.
Another way of talking about the soul is based on its being a potential whole. As such, the soul’s distinct powers are its parts, and thus the soul can be predicated in a loose sense of its powers, and vice versa, much like an integral whole is predicated of its parts, and vice versa. Yet the sense is looser with an integral whole than with a potential whole, since the substance of a potential whole is present in each of its parts, which is not true of an integral whole.
That makes the response to the objections clear.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. The rational soul seems to be corruptible:
1. According to Damascene, no substance can exist without its proper activity.30 Now, the rational soul’s proper activity is thinking, which requires a body, since thinking does not occur without a mental image, as the Philosopher makes clear in book III of On the Soul.31 Therefore, when the body is destroyed, the substance of the rational soul does not remain.
2. Something with the power to exist always does not exist at one time and not at another (for a thing exists as long as its power demands).32 Hence, anything that exists at one time and not at another lacks the power to exist always. But everything that begins to exist, exists at one time and not at another. Hence, nothing that begins to exist has the power to exist always, and thus nothing that begins to exist can be incorruptible. Yet the rational soul begins to exist. Therefore, the rational soul cannot be incorruptible.
3. A human being composed of body and soul has a certain existence. Now, the soul either has another existence in addition to this existence or it does not. If it had another existence, then the soul’s composition would come after that existence is complete. But then such composition would be incidental to the soul, which would make a human being an incidental existent rather than an existent in its own right, which is absurd. Yet if the soul does not have another existence in addition to the composite’s existence, then the soul cannot exist after the composite has ceased to exist. And the composite ceases to exist at bodily death. Therefore, the soul does not remain after the body’s death.
4. The soul is the form of the body.33 Now, that is either because of the soul’s own essence or because of something accidental to it. If it were because of something accidental to the soul, then the composition of body and soul would be accidental, like clothing to a human being. But if it is because of the soul’s own essence, then the soul seems unable to remain after the body’s death, since a form, precisely as a form, cannot exist without matter.
But to the contrary:
1. In book II of On the Soul, the Philosopher says that the rational is set apart from other things as the perpetual from the corruptible.34
2. In book X of the Ethics, the Philosopher shows that the happiness of contemplation exceeds the happiness of political activity by lasting longer.35 But the happiness of political activity lasts only until death. Therefore, the happiness of contemplation lasts even after death, and hence the soul remains even after the body’s death as well.
Answer: We have to hold that the substance of the rational soul is incorruptible.
For if it were corrupted, it would be corrupted either in its own right or incidentally. But the soul could not be corrupted in its own right without being composed of matter and form with their opposition. Yet the soul could not be so composed unless it were an element or composed of elements, as it was taken to be by the ancient philosophers whose views are disproven in book I of On the Soul.36 But the soul cannot be incidentally corrupted either, unless one were to deny that the soul exists in itself, holding that it only exists with something else. Such is the case with other material forms, which lack a subsisting existence, and only exist because of the existence of the subsisting composites whose parts they are. That is why they are incidentally corrupted when their composites are corrupted. Yet the same cannot be said of the rational soul. For what does not exist in itself cannot possibly act by itself. That is why other forms do not themselves act; it is the composites that act with such forms. But the rational soul has an activity of its own, viz. thought, which it performs without the mediation of any bodily organ, as the Philosopher proves in book III of On the Soul.37 For the soul could not know about the forms of all sensible things unless it were itself devoid of all sensible forms (or unless it were actually all of them), since nothing can receive what it already has. Hence, if the soul thought of things by means of an organ, its organ would have to lack all sensible forms, since the soul naturally thinks about all sensible forms (compare how the pupil of the eye lacks all colors so that its sight can be aware of all colors). Yet it is impossible for a bodily organ to lack all sensible forms.
It follows, therefore, that the substance of the intellective soul is incorruptible. Hence in book I of On the Soul, the Philosopher says that the intellect seems to be a certain substance, and not capable of being corrupted.38
Now, some people hold that this incorruptible intellect is external to human beings, while the soul that is part of human beings is corruptible and connected to this separate intellect in one of two ways. One way is through illumination, which is proposed by those who hold that the agent intellect is separate and incorruptible while the possible intellect is joined to the soul and corruptible. The other way is through the intellect’s connection to mental images, which is proposed by those who hold that the possible intellect is separate and incorruptible as well.
But the first of these ways is impossible. For if our only powers were material, then we could only receive the light of the agent intellect materially, since receivers receive things with their own way of existing. But then we would not receive that light in an intelligible way, and thus would not be capable of intellection. The second way is impossible as well. For our mental images are caused by our own activity, which results from our substantial existence. Thus, our specific kind of human existence would not be a matter of being rational, since being rational requires being joined to an intellect.
It follows, therefore, that the human soul, which is the form of the body, is itself an incorruptible intellect.
1. So, to the first objection: There are two respects in which the soul needs something bodily for its activity. First, the soul needs something bodily to serve as an organ with which to act, as, for instance, it needs an eye with which to see. But the soul does not need an organ in this respect to think, as we just explained. If the soul needed such an organ with which to think, then it would be corruptible, since it would not be capable of acting by itself. Second, the soul needs something bodily to serve as an object for its act, as, for instance, it needs a colored body to see. This is the respect in which the rational soul needs mental images to think, since mental images are like sensible things for the intellective soul, as it says in book III of On the Soul.39 Now, an activity that requires something bodily in this respect cannot be performed without such a body from the start, but it can be performed without such a body afterward. For instance, the sensitive soul cannot perform any activity without first being affected by sensible things outside the soul, but its act of imagination remains even after such sensible things are gone. The same is true of the destruction of its mental images: the soul’s intellective activity can remain thereafter.
2. To the second objection: This argument is the Philosopher’s proof in book I of On the Heavens that every generated thing is corruptible.40 But it applies to things that come to exist and cease to exist by nature: their lack of power explains why they cannot always have existed and will not always exist. The argument does not apply to things that come to exist by creation: God gives such things the power to exist always, although they cannot exist before being given that power.
3. To the third objection: The soul shares its own existence with the body, an existence which the soul acquires in the body in a way that makes it accordingly capable of subsisting, which is not true of other forms. Thus, the soul’s existence becomes the composite’s existence, which the soul then retains even after the body is destroyed.
4. To the fourth objection: The soul is the form of the body by virtue of its own essence. Hence, after the body is destroyed the soul retains that by virtue of which it is its form; it merely ceases to act as its form.
Question 4
The next questions were about the soul’s activity.
There were two such questions: (1) Does the intellective soul know everything it knows in the First Truth? and (2) Does the soul perform acts with its sensitive powers while separated from the body?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. The soul seems to know whatever it knows in the First Truth:
1. In book XII of the Confessions, Augustine says: If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true—where, I wonder, do we see it? I do not see it in you, and you do not see it in me, but rather we both see it in the unchangeable Truth above us.41 Accordingly, the soul sees every truth it knows in the First Truth.
2. Truth is a matter of what exists becoming clear. Hence, the First Truth is the means of everything becoming clear. But the means of something becoming clear must itself be the most clear, as we see with the principles of demonstration and with the bodily light that causes our sight to see bodies. Therefore, the First Truth is most clear to every mind, and thus everything is known in it, not merely because of it.
But to the contrary:
1. Many people who have never considered the First Truth still know the truth of the conclusions they demonstrate. Therefore, not every truth is known in the First Truth.
2. In his book On Free Choice, Augustine says that no one judges the First Truth and no one judges rightly without it.42 But if the First Truth is not judged, then it is not known, and hence other things are not known in it.
Answer: As a certain gloss on the verse The true have vanished, etc., of the Psalms says, the one First Truth is reflected by many truths in our minds, just as one person’s face is reflected by many faces in a broken mirror.43 Now, this manifold reflection of the one First Truth involves two things. One is the light of our intellect, of which the Psalms speak: The light of your face, O Lord, is signed upon us.44 The other is the first principles (simple or compound) that we naturally know. For we are only able to know the truth because of these first principles and the light of our intellect, and they are only able to make the truth clear to us because they resemble that First Truth, which makes them to a certain extent unchangeable and incapable of misleading us. While we are still on the way to heaven, therefore, we do not see everything in the essence of the First Truth, since travelers on the way to heaven do not see its essence. Rather, we see every truth in an image of the First Truth—namely a truth that is an example of it.
That is how two people see the same truth: the same First Truth is reflected by a truth that is an example of it in the mind of each, which is the way to take what Augustine says.
1. That makes the reply to the first objection clear.
2. To the second objection: There are two ways to act or move by some means. One way is to act or move by means of the formal source of the activity or movement. Yet nothing requires a mover’s movement or an agent’s action to affect this means of its action: fire does not heat the heat by means of which it heats. Another way to act or move by some means is to act or move by means of an instrument. Now, a mover’s movement does affect this means of its movement, as, for instance, a hand that moves a stone by means of a stick also moves the stick. Hence, the instrumental means of our knowledge we first have to know in themselves. That is how we know conclusions by means of the principles we naturally know, which are like instruments of our agent intellect, as the Commentator says in book III of On the Soul.45 But we do not have to know the formal means of our knowledge. The eye, for instance, does not have to see the light with which it is joined, or the species by means of which it sees. Hence, we do not need to understand the intellect by means of which we understand or the intellect’s light in order for us to understand something.
Therefore, in order for us to know things in it, we need to know part of the truth that is an example of the First Truth in our minds—namely the first principles. But we do not need to know another part of the truth that is an example of it—namely the light of our intellect. Nor do we see the essence of that Truth of which they are examples.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. The separated soul seems capable of performing acts with its sensitive powers:
1. In his book On the Soul, Cassiodorus says that the soul sees, hears, touches, and uses its other senses without the body.46
2. Luke 16 describes the rich man in hell in a way that has to involve acts of his senses.47 Yet only the rich man’s soul was there; his body was not. Therefore, the soul can perform acts with its senses even while separated from the body.
3. An inactive power is useless. Yet the soul retains its sensitive powers after death. Therefore, the soul also performs acts with its senses.
But to the contrary: Sensing is an activity of the composite of body and soul. Hence, once the composite is destroyed, sensing cannot be performed by the separated soul.
Answer: It is impossible for the separated soul to perform any acts with its sensitive powers. The following makes this clear.
The activity of a human being’s sensitive power is accomplished in the same way as that of a brute animal: a human being sees with its eyes in the same way that a horse does. Yet the activity of a brute animal’s sensitive power is not performed by its sensitive soul alone; it also involves the mediation of an organ. If a brute animal’s sensitive soul performed an activity by itself, then its soul would subsist in itself, and would therefore be incorruptible, as we proved of the rational soul earlier.48 Since that will not do, it is impossible for a brute animal’s sensitive power, or for that of a human being, to have an act of its own. Instead, each of its acts is performed by the composite of body and soul, and hence cannot be performed by the separated soul.
Yet some people say that the sensitive soul has two acts: one that it performs with an organ, and thus loses after death; and another that it performs by itself, and thus retains after death. This seems to have been Plato’s opinion about the soul.49 He held that the sensitive soul moves the body by moving itself, so that the activity of moving itself is the soul’s own, whereas the activity of moving the body belongs to the composite. That is why Plato thought that even the souls of brute animals were incorruptible,50 although these people do not grant that.
1. So, to the first objection: We refer to acts of will with words for the feelings of our sense-appetites because the two are similar. Likewise, we refer to acts of intellect with words for the acts of our senses because the two are similar. That is how Cassiodorus is speaking of them.
2. To the second objection: That description of the rich man has to be taken metaphorically, or for the likenesses of such things rather than for the things themselves, as Augustine says.51
3. To the third objection: Some people say that the sensitive soul does not retain its sensitive powers; it only retains their root.52 But if it does actually retain them, then they will not be useless, even though they will be inactive. For they will contribute to the wholeness of its nature,53 as our reproductive organs will do for our resurrected bodies.54
Question 5
The next questions touched on grace.
There were three such questions. The first was about the commandment to honor your parents. The second was about the counsel relating to the vow of obedience. The third was about the counsel relating to the vow of continence.
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. A son who could only support his father with a dowry from a marriage contract does not seem obligated to contract marriage to support his father:
1. Charity has an order to it: a man has a greater obligation to himself than to his father. Yet it would be praiseworthy for a man to risk his life to preserve his virginity. Therefore, a man is not obligated to contract marriage to preserve his father’s life.
2. A commandment cannot contradict a counsel. But there is a counsel to preserve your virginity, as we see in 1 Corinthians 7.55 Therefore, the commandment to honor your parents does not obligate a man to do what would involve losing his virginity.
But to the contrary: A positive commandment only obligates at a certain place and time. But the time to keep the commandment to honor your parents is when your parents are in need. Hence, that is when the commandment obligates. Therefore, a man seems obligated to contract marriage if there is no other way to support his father.
Answer: The case in question hardly seems possible, since contracting marriage could hardly be the only way for a man to support his father; he could at least do manual labor or beg. But if it were the only way to do so, then the same judgment would apply to him preserving his virginity as applies to other works of perfection, such as entering the religious life.
Now, opinions about entering the religious life differ.
Some people say that if a man’s father is in need, he ought to leave him whatever he has for his support, and then he is permitted to enter the religious life, entrusting his parents to the care of our heavenly Father, who even provides for the birds.56
But this opinion seems too harsh. Hence, it would be better to say the following. A man intending to enter the religious life will either see a way to live in the world without committing mortal sin or he will not, at least not very easily. If he is afraid of the danger of mortal sin, then he should not wait to enter the religious life even to support his parents, since he has a greater obligation to see to the salvation of his own soul than to the bodily needs of his parents. But if he does see a way to live in the world without sinning, then we need to make a distinction. If his parents have no way to live without his help, then he is obligated to take care of them and to forgo the other works of perfection; it would be a sin to abandon them. But if his parents have a way to live without his help, even if not very well, then he is not thereby obligated to forgo the works of perfection.
But things are different with a man who has already entered the religious life. For such a man has died to the world by his profession, and is thus dispensed from the law obligating him to give worldly help to his parents, as the Apostle teaches in Romans 7.57 Yet he is still obligated to help them in other spiritual ways—for example, with prayers and the like.
This answer about entering the religious life also applies to the observance of virginity and the other works of perfection.
1. So, to the first objection: Unless he has professed a life of virginity, a man is not obligated to die of hunger before contracting marriage.
2. To the second objection: There is no reason a commandment cannot contradict a counsel in certain cases.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. A religious who has made a vow of obedience seems bound to obey his superior in all things, even matters of indifference:
1. With his vow of chastity, a religious renounces all sexual intercourse. With his vow of obedience, therefore, he renounces his own will in all things.
2. Blessed Benedict says in his Rule that even if his superior commands the impossible, a brother should still try to do it.58 Much more, then, is he bound to obey his superior in matters of indifference.
3. The vow of obedience pertains to the state of perfection. Yet it would not do so if it only required obedience about things in the rule. For any subordinate—even a secular—is bound to obey his superior about things under his superior’s jurisdiction. Therefore, a religious seems bound to obey his superior in all things whatsoever.
But to the contrary:
1. A religious is only bound to do more than a secular to the extent that his vow obligates him to do so. But the vow that a religious makes only obligates him to obey the rule. Therefore, he is not bound to obey his superior by doing more than the rule requires.
2. In his book On Precept and Dispensation, Bernard says: A superior may not command me to do anything I have not promised to do, and may not forbid me from doing anything I have promised to do.59
Answer: On this question, everyone partly agrees and partly disagrees.
Generally everyone says that a religious is not bound to obey his superior by doing things against God’s law or against the rule (when his superior lacks the authority to make exceptions). Everyone also says that a religious is not bound to obey his superior by doing things stricter than the rule requires, although obeying in such cases would be a matter of perfect obedience.
But when it comes to matters of indifference, or to doing things less strict or equal to the rule’s own requirements, there are two opinions. Some people say that obeying in such cases is required by obedience as such, whereas other people say that it is not required by obedience as such but is, rather, a matter of perfect obedience. Now, although these two opinions seem to differ a great deal in how they are expressed, they come to the same thing; they do not really differ. For the rule applies not only to things explicitly stated in the rule but to everything that falls under the rule in any way. It applies, for instance, to everything relevant to the consideration shown among brothers in a community and to the punishment for sins—under which two headings almost all matters of indifference can be made to fall. But if there are things that do not fall under the rule at all, then the truth would seem to be the opinion that obeying a superior by doing such things is not required by obedience as such but is, rather, a matter of perfect obedience, as Bernard clearly says in his book On Precept and Dispensation.60 The reason is that obedience as such only extends as far as the superior’s jurisdiction or authority, which is limited to the rule.
1. So, to the first objection: The vow of continence is about one specific kind of act, whereas the vow of obedience is about all acts in general. Hence, religious need the generality of the latter vow to be made more specific so that they can avoid the disarray that would otherwise result from them all being obligated to do the same thing.
2. To the second objection: He is talking about perfect obedience.
3. To the third objection: The vow of obedience subordinates a religious to his superior in the general ordering of his life, but not in every one of his particular actions; whereas a secular is bound to obey his superior in some specific actions, but not in the general ordering of his life.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that a man who contracts marriage after a simple vow of chastity cannot pay or exact the marriage debt:
1. A simple vow is no less binding before God than a solemn vow, as the canon says.61 But no one can exact or pay the marriage debt after making a solemn vow. Therefore, no one can do so after making a simple vow.
2. Sin does not excuse anyone from sin. But a man who contracts marriage after a simple vow sins when he first pays the marriage debt, since then he can no longer fulfill his vow to enter the religious life. Therefore, after first paying the marriage debt, he continues to sin whenever he pays or exacts it.
But to the contrary: The Church does not make people sin. But the Church does make people pay the marriage debt even after a simple vow of chastity. Therefore, it is not a sin to pay the marriage debt thereafter.
Answer: As for paying the marriage debt, everyone agrees that a man is bound to pay the marriage debt after a simple vow of continence. For a simple vow does not dissolve a contracted marriage.62 And once a marriage has been contracted, the husband does not have power over his own body, but the wife does.63 Hence, a man is bound to pay the marriage debt to his wife when she requests it. As for requesting the marriage debt, however, some people say that the man is bound to fulfill his vow to the extent that he is free to do so, which then makes it a sin for him to request the marriage debt. But others say that if there are clear signs that his wife would like to have the marriage debt paid, and is embarrassed to request it herself, then the husband is obligated to request it, even after a simple vow, especially if he fears that his wife will fall into sin. But this amounts to the first case, since it is a veiled request from the wife, which means that the husband is paying the marriage debt by requesting it for her. That keeps marriage from being too hard on the wife, as it would be if she always had to explicitly request the marriage debt.
1. So, to the first objection: Both vows are equally binding before God in the sense that breaking either one of them incurs the guilt of mortal sin. But they do not both impede marriage with equal force. For a man who makes a solemn vow puts himself at the bodily service (so to speak) of God himself, by either receiving holy orders or entering the religious life. And once such a gift has been given to someone, it cannot later be given to someone else. Hence, after a solemn vow a man cannot put himself under the power of a wife by contracting marriage. But a simple vow is just a promise, and a person can promise someone something and then give it to someone else, although that would break the pledge made with the promise. Hence, a man who makes a simple vow can still contract marriage later, although doing so would be a sin because of the violation of his earlier pledge.64
2. To the second objection: The first act of intercourse excuses the subsequent ones (in which the marriage debt is paid) from sin, not because it is a sin but because it is an act of consummating marriage.
Question 6
The next questions related to sin. The first were about sins opposed to right action. The second were about sins opposed to right faith.
There were three of the first questions. The first was about preferential treatment: (1) Is it a sin to honor rich people because of their wealth? The second was about disregarding one’s own reputation: (2) Is it a sin not to fend off a bad reputation? The third was about expensive clothing: (3) Is it always a sin to wear it?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. Honoring rich people because of their wealth seems to be a sin:
1. The gloss on the verse If a man in fine clothing comes in, etc., of James 2 says: The world spurns the poor and honors the rich, but the faith of Christ does the opposite.65 Yet acting contrary to the faith of Christ is a sin. Therefore, honoring rich people because of their wealth is a sin.
2. As the Philosopher says in book I of the Ethics, honor is due to divine things.66 But there is nothing divine about rich people because of their wealth. Therefore, honor is not due to such people because of their wealth.
3. Based on what the Philosopher says in book I of the Ethics, we can gather that honor is respect shown to people as a witness to their virtue.67 But some rich people are not virtuous, and bearing false witness is a sin, which should not be done to avoid scandal. Therefore, it seems that rich people should not be honored for their wealth, not even to avoid scandal.
But to the contrary: The gloss of Augustine on the verse If a man in fine clothing comes in, etc., of James 2 says: If he is talking about our daily gatherings, then who does not sin on this score? And yet one only sins by judging within oneself that the richer people are, the better they are.68 But one who honors rich people with such public honors need not always judge that they are accordingly better. Therefore, such honor is not always a sin.
Answer: Preferential treatment is the opposite of reasonable treatment. Reasonable treatment involves forming a judgment based on a relevant reason, which is praiseworthy. But preferential treatment involves forming a judgment based on a personal feature that is not a relevant reason, which is blameworthy. Hence, one and the same personal feature can sometimes be the basis of a just judgment and sometimes be a matter of preferential treatment. For instance, if the verdict in a case were given in someone’s favor because of being more learned, that would be preferential treatment. But preferring to give someone else a master’s license on that same basis would not be preferential treatment.
So, if rich people are honored because of their wealth, and their wealth is relevant, that is not preferential treatment. But if their wealth is not relevant, then it is. Now, there are two kinds of honor. One kind is due to people because of who they are, given their own virtue. Such honor includes approval, imitation, and the like. But wealth is not relevant to such honor. So, if people are given such honor because of their wealth, that is preferential treatment. Hence Valerius Maximus says that honors due to virtue, such as triumphs and the like, could not be bought with any money among the ancient Romans.69 Another kind of honor is due to people because of their status in the state, in which case the state is honored through the people. That is why kings and princes and such people are honored. As 1 Peter 2 says: Honor the king.70 Now, rich people have a higher status in the earthly state, and as Augustine says in his book The City of God,71 citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem, like exiles in Babylon, ought to maintain the customs of the people they live with, at least when they are not against God’s law. Thus, they ought to honor rich people, to the extent that such honors relate to their common public life.
1. So, to the first objection: It would be a sin to prefer rich people to poor people in matters related to the faith of Christ, such as the administration of the sacraments and so on. But we have to maintain the world’s customs in matters required by our common life in the world.
2. To the second objection: Because it is good, even wealth is something divine, especially since it gives people the ability to do so much good.
3. To the third objection: That argument only works for the honor shown to people because of who they are.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. Not fending off a bad reputation seems to be a sin:
1. Neglecting one’s reputation is cruel.72 But cruelty is a sin. Therefore, not warding off a bad reputation is a sin.
2. Ecclesiasticus 17 says: And he gave to each one a commandment concerning his neighbor73—namely to help him by word and example. But a bad reputation prevents this. Therefore, everyone is required to fend off a bad reputation.
But to the contrary: Disregarding a bad reputation seems to be an act of humility. Hence, in the lives of the fathers, we read about many holy fathers who put up with bad reputations rather than fending them off.74 Therefore, doing so is not a sin.
Answer: Both—namely disregarding one’s own reputation and taking an interest in it—can be praiseworthy or vicious. People do not need a good reputation for their own sake, but for the sake of encouraging their neighbor. Hence, taking an interest in one’s own reputation for the sake of one’s neighbor is charitable, while interest in it for one’s own sake is vain. On the other hand, disregarding one’s own reputation as far as oneself is concerned is humble, while doing so where one’s neighbor is concerned is lazy and cruel. Accordingly, those whose position or state of perfection obligates them to see to other people’s salvation do commit a sin by not fending off a bad reputation as much as possible. But those with a greater responsibility for their own salvation can look to their humility and disregard their own reputation, whether good or bad. Now, there are two ways to fend off a bad reputation: either by avoiding what gives rise to it or by checking the talk of one’s detractors. Everyone is bound to avoid a bad reputation in the first way, since not doing so would cause active scandal, which is always a sin. But not everyone is bound to avoid a bad reputation in the second way; only those with an obligation to see to the salvation of their neighbors are bound to do so.
This is what Gregory says in his ninth homily on Ezekiel: We ought to make it our special concern not to arouse the talk of our detractors, so that they will not perish, and when their own wickedness has aroused such talk, we ought to bear it patiently, so that our merit will increase. But sometimes we ought to check it, so that the evil things they say about us will not corrupt the innocent hearts of those who can hear good things from us.75 And later: But those whose life has been given as an example to imitate ought to check the talk of their detractors, if possible, so that those who can hear their preaching will hear it, rather than maintaining their bad morals and neglecting the good life.76
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. Wearing expensive clothing always seems to be a sin:
1. Everything done out of vanity is a sin. Yet expensive clothing is only worn out of vanity. Hence in his homily on the rich banqueter, Gregory says: In fact people only want special clothing because of vanity, i.e., in order to appear worthy of honor from others. No one wants to wear expensive clothing where other people cannot see them, which proves that they only want expensive clothing out of vanity.77 Therefore, wearing expensive clothing is always a sin.
2. 1 Timothy 6 says: Having food and the means to clothe ourselves, with these we are content.78 The gloss says: Anything more is evil.79 But expensive clothing is something more. Therefore, wearing expensive clothing is a sin.
But to the contrary:
1. Seneca tells a certain queen: Dress yourself finely, not for your own sake, but so that the rank of queen will not become worthless.80
2. The gloss on the verse Not with braided hair or gold or pearls or expensive clothing of 1 Timothy 2 says: beyond one’s station.81 Hence, wearing expensive clothing in keeping with one’s station is not a sin.
Answer: The answer to this question differs for public people and private people.
When it comes to public people, we have to consider both the status of their rank and the character of the individual person. These two things ought to be balanced in a way that keeps the authority of their rank from being diminished, while also keeping the person from getting carried away by pride. Hence, both can be praiseworthy—viz. wearing expensive clothing to encourage respect for their rank, and wearing cheap clothing for the sake of their own humility—as long as what they do to safeguard their authority does not degenerate into pride, and they do not guard their humility so much that it weakens their authority to rule, as Augustine says.82 That is why it is praiseworthy for priests to wear expensive vestments during the divine liturgy out of respect for divine worship, but also praiseworthy to refrain from doing so at other times for the sake of humility.
But when it comes to private people, it is virtuous for them to wear even worse clothing than their status requires for the sake of their own humility. Hence in the homily quoted earlier, Gregory says: If wearing cheap clothing were not virtuous, then the Evangelists would not have been so careful to say about John: He was clothed in camel’s hair.83 Even so, it is permissible for such people to wear expensive clothing in keeping with their own station, although it is a sin to do so beyond their station. Yet “expensive” is a relative term, like “large.” What is expensive for one person is not expensive for another. Hence, expensive clothing is always clothing beyond one’s own station. In that sense, wearing expensive clothing is always a sin, as Gregory says.
1. That makes the reply to the first objection clear.
2. To the second objection: Food and clothing means everything we need, as suits our status.
Question 7
The next questions were about sins opposed to right faith.
There were two such questions: (1) Should we consort with heretics? and (2) Should heretics who return to the Church be admitted?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that we should consort with heretics:
1. In the parable about the weeds in Matthew 13, the householder says to the harvesters: Let both grow together until the harvest.84 And the harvest is the end of the age, as it says in the same place.85 Since the weeds stand for heretics, it seems that heretics should not be separated from the community of believers before judgment day.
2. Rulers that kill heretics seem to violate this command of the Lord.
But to the contrary: 2 Corinthians 6 says: Come out from among them and be separate from them.86 Yet “them” clearly refers to unbelievers, given what it says just before: Do not be yoked with unbelievers.87 Therefore, we should not consort with heretics.
Answer: We should not consort with heretics, for two reasons.
One reason is their excommunication. Since heretics are excommunicated, we should not consort with them, just as we do not consort with other excommunicated people.
The other reason is their heresy in particular. First, there is the danger that conversation with them will corrupt us. As 1 Corinthians 15 says: Bad company corrupts good morals.88 Second, we do not want to appear to agree with their perverse doctrines. Hence 2 John says: If anyone comes to you and does not hold this doctrine, do not receive him into the house or give him any greeting. For he who greets him, shares his wicked work.89 The gloss on those verses says: Starting a discussion signals that you are in communion with him; otherwise it is deceptive, which does not befit Christians.90 Third, we do not want our association with them to occasion error among other people. Hence another gloss on the same verses says: Even if you happen not to have been misled yourself, perhaps your association with them will mislead other people, who might think that you approve of them, and believe them accordingly.91 Hence another gloss on the same verses says: The apostles and their disciples showed such caution about religion that they would not even allow verbal communication with any people who had deviated from the truth92—that is, unless we are speaking to such people for the sake of their own salvation.
1. So, to the first objection: There are two points to the householder’s command there. One is to explain the command about the separation of all evil people from all good ones. That comes out of the question of the harvesters, who say: Do you want us to go and gather them?93 This separation will not happen until judgment day.
The second point is to illustrate the command for when evil people cannot be eradicated without endangering good ones. That is clear from the response of the householder, who says: No, lest in gathering the weeds you root up the wheat along with them.94 Now, this could happen in three ways. One way would be by cutting off a person before knowing that the person is evil. Hence the gloss says that the Lord warns us not to pass judgment in uncertainty.95 Another way would be if the person were not obstinately evil. Thus, people are only excommunicated for being obdurate. Hence the gloss on the same verse says: We are warned not to cut off anyone quickly, since a person who errs today may perhaps defend the truth tomorrow.96 Hence the last chapter of Titus says: As for a man who is a heretic, after admonishing him once or twice, have nothing to do with him.97 The third way would be by lumping good people together with evil ones. That is why the gloss of Augustine on that same verse says that a large number of people should not be excommunicated, nor should their rulers.98
But if none of these cases obtains, then evil people should be cut off. As 1 Corinthians 5 says: Drive out the wicked from among you.99
2. That makes the reply to the second objection clear.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that heretics who return to the Church should not be readmitted:
Since heretics have sinned against the faith, which is the foundation of the Church, they should not be used to build up the edifice of the Church. Therefore, heretics should not be readmitted into the Church.
But to the contrary: The Church should not close its heart to anyone. As Christ says of himself in John 6: Him who comes to me, I shall not cast out.100
Answer: People cannot be totally obstinate in sin as long as this state of life lasts; that is how the damned will be after death. Hence, as long as they live this life, people have the chance to repent.101 Thus, people who have failed in matters of faith or morals should be readmitted into the Church in order to repent; to say otherwise is the heresy of the Novatians. But those who are readmitted do not always have to be given their former position, although merciful exceptions can be made for certain people, especially for the good of peace or for some other benefit sought thereby.
To the first objection: As long as heretics lack the foundation of faith, they should not readmitted into the Church, but after they have converted and begin to have that foundation, they should be readmitted.
Question 8
Article 1
The next question related to glory, viz. the vision of God in our heavenly homeland: Can a created intellect see God’s essence?
It seems not:
1. There is some proportion between an intellect and an intelligible thing. Yet there is no proportion between a created intellect and the divine essence, since they are infinitely distant. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see the divine essence.
2. There is a greater distance between the uncreated spirit and a created intellect than there is between a created spirit and the senses. Yet the senses cannot cognize a created spirit. Therefore, a created intellect cannot cognize the uncreated spirit.
But to the contrary: The gloss of Gregory on the verse Man cannot see me and live of Exodus 33 says: Some people said that God’s brilliance is seen in that place of blessedness, but God’s nature is not. They were obviously confused by the slight subtlety of the question. For the brilliance of that simple and unchangeable essence does not differ from its nature. Rather, that very nature is its brilliance, and that very brilliance is its nature.102 Therefore, the blessed will see God’s essence.
Answer: We have to hold that the blessed see the divine essence.
For blessedness is the final perfection and completion of our rational nature, and nothing can be finally complete without attaining to its source in its own way. But I should point out that there are two ways for something to attain to the source that is God. One is by similarity, which is the way common to all creatures, whose perfection is a result of how similar they are to God. The other way is by activity (setting aside the way unique to Christ, viz. personal union). But by activity I mean a rational creature knowing and loving God. Now, since the soul is made directly by God, it can only be blessed by seeing God directly—i.e., without any intermediary likeness of the thing known, like a visible species in the eye or in a mirror. Yet it still has an intermediary light to strengthen its intellect, viz. the light of glory. As the Psalm says: In your light we shall see light.103 And that means seeing God’s essence.
Hence, we take a rational creature’s blessedness to consist of the sight of God’s essence, just as those philosophers who thought that our souls flowed out from an agent intelligence took ultimate human happiness to consist of our intellect’s connection with it.
1. So, to the first objection: Proportion has two senses. One is its proper sense, which means a determinate superiority. In that sense, proportion is required between the intellect and an intelligible thing in order for it to cognize it comprehendingly. But a created intellect will never see the divine essence that way. Another sense of proportion is its common sense, which means a certain relationship. In that sense, the infinite can have a proportion to the finite, if it completes it, or if it has some other relationship with it. Such proportion is enough for our intellect to see the divine essence—attaining to it, but not comprehending it.
2. To the second objection: That argument is based on the distance between their proper natures, not on the nature of cognition. For a created spirit is not sensible, but the uncreated spirit is intelligible.
1 Cf. Euclid, Elements VII, def. 2; Boethius, Arithmetic I, 3; Isidore, Etymologies III, 3.
2 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, 6 (4b23).
3 Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1 (1052b15–16).
4 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1 (1054a20–26); Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics X, 9.
5 Cf. Euclid, Elements VII, def. 2; Boethius, Arithmetic I, 3; Isidore, Etymologies III, 3.
6 Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics III, 2–6; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV, 3.
7 Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV, 3.
8 Cf. ibid.
9 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1 (1052b18–24); Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics X, 2.
10 Gloss of Peter Lombard on Psalms 10:5.
11 Cf. Joel 3:2.
12 1 Thessalonians 4:16.
13 Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, Homily 19, 15. Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences IV, d.48, c. 3, n. 2.
14 John 5:27.
15 Acts 1:11.
16 1 Thessalonians 4:17.
17 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, 10 (327b22–31).
18 Ibid.
19 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy V, vi.
20 Aristotle, Physics IV, 11 (219a10–25).
21 Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics IV, 101.
22 Rather, Pseudo-Augustine, Dialogue of Sixty-Five Questions with Orosius, q.21.
23 Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis VIII, 20–26.
24 Book on Causes, Prop. 30 (31).
25 Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, Homily 99, 5.
26 Pseudo-Augustine, On Spirit and Soul, 13.
27 Augustine, On the Trinity X, 11, 18.
28 Peter Lombard, Sentences I, d.3, c. 2.
29 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 11, 2.
30 John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith, c. 37.
31 Aristotle, On the Soul III, 7 (431a16–17).
32 Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens I, 12 (282a4–25).
33 Aristotle, On the Soul II, 1 (412a20).
34 Aristotle, On the Soul II, 2 (413b26–27).
35 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X, 7 (1177a21–22).
36 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul I, 2–5 (403b20–411b30).
37 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, 4 (429a18–29).
38 Aristotle, On the Soul I, 4 (408b18–19).
39 Aristotle, On the Soul III, 7 (431a14–15).
40 Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens I, 12 (282a4–25).
41 Augustine, Confessions XII, 25, 3.
42 Augustine, On Free Choice II, 14, 38.
43 Gloss of Peter Lombard on Psalms 11:2.
44 Psalms 4:7.
45 Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul III, 36.
46 Cassiodorus, On the Soul, c. 4.
47 Cf. Luke 16:23–25.
48 Cf. Quodlibet X, q.3, a.2.
49 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul I, 3 (406b25–28).
50 Cf. Augustine, The City of God X, 30.
51 Cf. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis XII, 32–33; On the Soul’s Nature and Origin IV, 15–21.
52 Cf. Albert, Commentary on the Sentences IV, d.44G, a.43.
53 Cf. Albert, Question on the Glorified Body’s Senses, a.2, §4, ad 2.
54 Cf. Augustine, The City of God XXII, 17.
55 Cf. 1 Corinthians 7:25–40.
56 Cf. Matthew 6:26.
57 Cf. Romans 7:6.
58 Cf. The Rule of St. Benedict, c. 68.
59 Bernard, On Precept and Dispensation, c. 5.
60 Cf. Bernard, On Precept and Dispensation, c. 6.
61 Decretals IV, tit. 6, c. 6.
62 Cf. Decretals IV, tit. 6, c. 5.
63 1 Corinthians 7:4.
64 Cf. 1 Timothy 5:12.
65 Ordinary Gloss on James 2:2.
66 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 12 (1101b10–1102a4).
67 Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics I, l.18.
68 Ordinary Gloss on James 2:2. Cf. Augustine, Letter 167, 5, 18.
69 Valerius Maximus, Nine Books of Memorable Words and Deeds III, c. 4, §8.
70 1 Peter 2:17.
71 Augustine, The City of God XIX, 17.
72 Augustine, Sermon 355, 1, 1.
73 Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 17:12.
74 Cf., e.g., The Life of St. Marina; Rufinus, The Lives of the Saints III, Saint Macarius.
75 Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel I, Homily 9.
76 Ibid.
77 Gregory, Forty Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 40.
78 1 Timothy 6:8.
79 Such a gloss cannot be found.
80 William of Auxerre, Golden Summa III, tr. xxi, c. 5.
81 Ordinary Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:9.
82 Augustine, Letter 211.
83 Gregory, Forty Homilies on the Gospels, Homily 40.
84 Matthew 13:30.
85 Matthew 13:39.
86 2 Corinthians 6:17.
87 2 Corinthians 6:14.
88 1 Corinthians 15:33.
89 2 John:10–11.
90 Interlinear Gloss on 2 John:10–11.
91 Ordinary Gloss on 2 John:10–11.
92 Ibid.
93 Matthew 13:28.
94 Matthew 13:29.
95 Ordinary Gloss on Matthew 13:29.
96 Ibid.
97 Titus 3:10.
98 Ordinary Gloss on Matthew 13:29.
99 1 Corinthians 5:13.
100 John 6:37.
101 Hebrews 12:17.
102 Ordinary Gloss on Exodus 33:20. Cf. Gregory, Morals XVIII, liv, 90.
103 Psalms 35:10.