Article 1: Are all the saints canonized by the Church in glory or are some of them in hell?

Article 1: Are all the saints canonized by the Church in glory or are some of them in hell?

Quodlibet IX

There were questions about Christ the head, and about the members of his body.

The questions about Christ were of three sorts. First, there was a question about his divine nature. Second, there were questions about the union of his human and divine natures. Third, there was a question about the outward appearances under which he is contained in the sacrament of the altar.

Question 1

Article 1

Here is the first question: Can God make an actual infinity of things?

It seems not:

God can make something greater than anything God makes, since the work of God does not equal the power of God, as Hugh of St. Victor says.¹ Yet nothing can be greater than something actually infinite. Therefore, God cannot make something actually infinite.

But to the contrary: God can do more than human beings can speak or think of. As Luke 1 says: With God no word will be impossible.² But we can speak and think of something actually infinite. Indeed, some philosophers even held that there is such a thing, as we read in book III of the Physics.³ Therefore, God can make something actually infinite.

Answer: When we say that God cannot make something, it is not because God’s power is lacking, but because the thing cannot possibly be made, which happens for one of two reasons. Something cannot be made for one reason because of what it means to be made. For instance, we say that God cannot make a creature that preserves itself in existence, because from the very fact that a thing has such a maker, it also needs such a preserver, since the cause of a thing’s existence is the same as what preserves it in existence. Something cannot be made for another reason because of what is to be made. For instance, we might say that God cannot make a horse rational. Of course, something rational can be made, given what it means to be made, since some rational things are made. But a horse cannot be made rational, given what a horse is, since a horse is nonrational by definition.

Now, some people say that God cannot make something actually infinite because such a thing cannot possibly be made, given what it means to be made. For it is contrary to the nature of a creature to be equal to the creator. But if there were an infinite creature, then we would have to hold that a creature is equal to the creator, they say, since one infinite thing is not greater than another.

But what these people say seems unreasonable. For there is no reason why something infinite in one way cannot be less than something infinite in many ways. If there were a body infinite in length, for instance, but finite in width, it would be less than a body infinite in both length and width. So, supposing that God made an actually infinite body, it would certainly be infinite in the quantity of its dimensions, but as a material thing, it would necessarily have a limited existence and a nature limited in kind. Hence, it would not be equal to God, whose existence and essence are infinite in every way.

Other people say that one sort of infinite thing can be made, given what it means to be made, and given what is to be made—viz. an actual existent—but another sort of infinite thing cannot be made an actual existent. This is the opinion of Al-Ghazali, who distinguishes between two sorts of infinities: the essentially infinite and the accidentally infinite.

To understand this distinction, notice that being infinite applies principally to quantity, as the Philosopher says in book I of the Physics.⁴ Now, an infinite quantity is called essentially infinite if it contains a number of parts that depend on each other and have a definite order, so that every one of that number of parts is essentially required. Take, for instance, a stick moved by a hand, which is moved by muscles and nerves, which are moved by the soul. If this went on infinitely—the soul being moved by something else and so on infinitely, or the stick moving something else and so on infinitely—the number of these moving and moved things would be essentially infinite. But if an infinite quantity arises from a number of things in the same order, and that number is only required accidentally, then the quantity is only accidentally infinite. Suppose a craftsman were making a little knife, for instance, and needed many hammers to do so, because of breaking one after another, and replacing one after another in the same order. If that number grew to infinity, it would be called accidentally, rather than essentially, infinite. For an infinite number of hammers is accidental to the craftsman’s work, since he could equally have completed it with just one hammer, if it had lasted, as he could with an infinite number of them.

So, these people say that something essentially infinite cannot be actual. For when things are ordered essentially, it takes the action of all the previous ones to provide the last one. Hence, if there were something essentially infinite, the ordered influence of an infinity of things would be required to provide one thing, which could then never be provided, since an infinity cannot be traversed. But something accidentally infinite can be actual, they say, since the parts of that number of things do not depend on each other, and hence there is no reason why they cannot be actually infinite. For instance, Al-Ghazali says in his Metaphysics that the rational souls of the dead are actually infinite, since he held that people have been reproducing from eternity and that their souls survive the death of their bodies.⁵

So, according to this opinion, God could make an actual infinity of things or something actually infinite, even if nothing actually infinite occurs in nature.

But on the contrary, in book II of the Metaphysics, the Commentator says that neither the essentially infinite nor the accidentally infinite can be actual, although the accidentally infinite exists in potentiality, while the essentially infinite does not.⁶ So, according to him, there is no way that something infinite can be actual.

And this position seems nearer the truth. For there cannot actually be a real thing that is unspecified—i.e., related equally to different species. Even though our intellects have a concept of animal that is not specified by the difference rational or nonrational, there cannot actually be an animal that is neither rational nor nonrational. Hence, nothing is in a genus without being in one of its species, as the Philosopher says.⁷ But every quantity is specified by a definite limitation of quantity. The species of number, for instance, are two and three and so on; those of extension are two cubits and three cubits or some other determinate measure. Hence, it is impossible to find any actual quantity that is not fixed in its proper limits. But infinity applies to quantity by removing its limits. Hence, it is impossible for something infinite to be actual. That is why the Philosopher says in book III of the Physics that the infinite is like matter that is not yet specified, existing as a privation, and thus more of a part and contained than a whole and containing.⁸

Therefore, just as God cannot make a horse rational, God cannot make an actual existent infinite.

Hence, we grant the first argument, since its conclusion is true. But it does not prove its conclusion correctly. Supposing that God made something infinite in one order, God could still make something else infinite in another order. If God made an infinity of human beings, for instance, God could still make an infinity of lions. For even though nothing in one order can be greater than something infinite in the same order, there is no reason why something in one order cannot be greater than something infinite in another order. The even numbers are infinite, for instance, and yet the even and odd numbers together are greater than the even numbers alone.

To the objection made to the contrary: A word is not just something verbally expressed but also something mentally conceived. Yet our minds cannot conceive of something self-contradictory, since no one can think that contradictory things are true at the same time, as proved in book IV of the Metaphysics.⁹ So, given that something infinite cannot possibly be actual, this cannot be conceived: “Something infinite is actual.” Hence, it does not follow that God can make something actually infinite, and the philosophers who held that there is such a thing did not know what they were talking about.

Question 2

The next questions were about the union of Christ’s human and divine natures.

There were three such questions: (1) Is Christ only one subsisting individual? (2) Does Christ have only one existence? and (3) Does Christ have only one sonship?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Christ seems to be more than one subsisting individual:

1. The union of body and soul is presupposed by the assuming of humanity or human nature, since humanity is the form of the whole, and thus composed of body and soul. When a body and soul are united, however, they produce a subsisting individual (a human being). Thus, a subsisting individual with human nature is presupposed by the assuming of humanity. Yet everything presupposed by the assuming of humanity is itself assumed thereby. Hence, the Word (a subsisting individual) assumed a subsisting individual (a human being). But, according to Boethius, the assumer is not the assumed.¹⁰ In Christ, then, the Word (a subsisting individual) is not the subsisting individual assumed (the human being). Therefore, Christ is two subsisting individuals.

2. The assuming of humanity presupposes that a body can be assumed. But a body cannot be assumed without being united to a soul: no one would say that a body without a soul can be assumed. Therefore, the assuming of human nature presupposes the union of body and soul, which leads to the conclusion of the first argument.

3. Union presupposes a means of union, and the means of the union of human nature with the divine person is grace. Hence we say, “the grace of union.” Thus, their union presupposes grace. But grace only exists in the soul, and the soul only exists after being united to the body, since it is infused by being created and created by being infused.¹¹ Therefore, the union of human nature with the divine person presupposes the union of body and soul, which leads to the conclusion of the first argument.

4. Humanity is a substantial form, and every substantial form needs something to inform. But a created form cannot inform an eternal subject or subsisting individual. Hence, in Christ there must be a created subject or subsisting individual for humanity to inform. Therefore, Christ is two subsisting individuals: the Word (a subsisting individual) and the human being (another subsisting individual).

But to the contrary:

1. Unrelated things are only attributed to each other if they belong to one and the same subject. We say that something white is sweet, for instance, because one subject is both. Now, human nature and divine nature are totally unrelated natures. Yet we attribute them to each other when we speak concretely. We say, for instance, “God is a human being” and “A human being is God.” Therefore, only one subject and one subsisting individual is both.

2. If you say that humanity and divinity are attributed to each other because they belong to one person, but not to one subject or subsisting individual, I reply to the contrary: The word “person” only adds something accidental to “subject” or “subsisting individual,” viz. a proper rank. So, if Christ were one person, but not one subject or subsisting individual, then humanity and divinity would only be united in something accidental to him, which is false.

Answer: The second opinion given by the Master in the Sentences, book III, distinction 6 is that Christ is only one subject and one subsisting individual, just as he is only one person.¹² This is the common opinion nowadays and by far the safest and nearest the truth.

For our faith teaches and requires us to hold that Christ is one thing subsisting in two natures, one divine and one human. Otherwise we could not affirm that there is one Lord Jesus Christ, as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 8.¹³ Hence Nestorius was condemned for presuming to divide Christ by making him into two persons.

Now, something that subsists in a nature is an individual or singular thing. Hence, we should use words for singular things when we talk about the union of Christ’s two natures. But some words for singular things signify any kind of singular thing whatsoever, such as the words “singular” and “particular” and “individual.” This whiteness right here, for instance, is a singular, and individual, and particular thing. For every kind contains universals and particulars. But other words for singular things only signify a singular substance. “Subsisting individual,” for instance, signifies an individual substance and “person” signifies an individual substance of a rational nature. The words “subject” and “thing with a nature” are similar. So, even though this whiteness is a singular thing, none of these words apply to it, since all of them signify something subsisting in itself, and accidents like whiteness do not subsist. These words do not even apply to the parts of substances, in spite of the fact that they share the nature of subsisting things. For such parts do not subsist in themselves; they exist in other things. Hence we would not call this hand right here a subsisting individual, or a person, or a subject, or a thing with a nature. But we could call it an individual, or particular, or singular thing—words that even apply to accidents.

Now, Christ’s human nature does not subsist in itself, nor do any of its parts. For that would run counter to the union of Christ’s two natures, unless we took them to be united in a qualified sense rather than absolutely. Stones in a heap, for instance, are united in a qualified sense. Love unites two people in a qualified sense as well, as does some sort of resemblance between them. We call all of these things one in a qualified sense, but not absolutely one. For something absolutely one subsisting in itself does not contain anything actually subsisting in itself, although it might contain something with the potential to do so. To preserve the true union of Christ’s two natures, therefore, we have to take him to be one subsisting individual, one subject, and one thing with two natures, just as we take him to be one person. But there is no reason why we cannot call Christ’s human nature an individual, or singular, or particular thing. The same goes for the parts of his human nature, such as his hands and feet and bones. Each of these parts is an individual thing, but not in the sense that applies to the whole, since none of them is an individual subsisting in itself. In the sense that applies to Christ, there is only one singular, or particular, or individual thing subsisting in itself. Hence, although we cannot say that Christ is more than one individual, or singular, or particular thing, we can say that he contains more than one individual, or singular, or particular thing. But we cannot say that Christ is more than one subject or subsisting individual.

1. So, to the first objection: The union of body and soul constitutes both humanity and a human being, although the two differ in the following way. Humanity is signified as a part, since “humanity” signifies that by which a human being is a human being. Hence, “humanity” exclusively signifies the essential principles of the species that place this individual in such a species. That is why humanity is like a part, since things with that nature contain much more than these essential principles. A human being, on the other hand, is signified as a whole, since “human being” signifies something having humanity or subsisting in humanity, without excluding whatever else it contains in addition to the essential principles of the species. For when I say, “something having humanity,” I do not mean to exclude its having color and quantity and the like.

So, according to the second opinion mentioned earlier, the union of the divine and human natures presupposes the union of body and soul insofar as it constitutes humanity, but not insofar as it constitutes a human being. For the union of the divine and human natures presupposes what the body and soul constitute, and the body and soul only constitute part of the whole thing that subsists in itself. So, what they constitute cannot be signified as a human being, but only as humanity. In the union of the divine and human natures, therefore, the human being in Christ is thought to begin (so to speak) when the assuming of human nature ends, for only then can it begin to be thought of as a complete thing existing in itself. In this respect, the second opinion differs from the other two opinions.

The first opinion holds that the assuming of human nature presupposes the union of body and soul, not only insofar as it constitutes humanity but also insofar as it constitutes a human being. For the first opinion says that a human being was assumed.

The third opinion holds that body and soul are not even united when the assuming of human nature is thought to end, neither insofar as they constitute humanity nor insofar as they constitute a human being. For the third opinion says that only the matter of human nature was assumed. That is, when we say that human nature was assumed by the Word, the third opinion takes this to mean that the parts of human nature—viz. body and soul—were assumed. Clearly, then, this opinion does not really hold that Christ is a human being, nor that he truly has a human nature. Thus, it should be condemned as heretical.

2. To the second objection: The assuming of human nature presupposes that body and soul are united, but united insofar as their union constitutes humanity, not insofar as it constitutes a human being.

3. To the third objection: Dispositional grace is not meant as a means of union that comes before the union of human nature with the divine person, since it is not a means that causes their union or their ability to be united. Rather, such grace is a means of making their union congenial, just as fine clothing makes the union of spouses at a wedding congenial. In that sense, Christ’s knowledge and all his other qualities can be called the means of union, and his dispositional grace can be called the grace of union. But I think it would be better to use “the grace of union” to refer to the gracious will of God that effects the union freely (i.e., without any previous merits), or even better, the gift freely given to human nature to exist in a divine person. If the union of body and soul is presupposed by this assuming of humanity, then the previous response will apply.

4. To the fourth objection: Humanity is not the form of a part, which is called a form because it informs some matter or subject; rather, it is the form of the whole, in which a subject with that nature subsists. Hence, an uncreated subsisting individual does not have to be informed by humanity; it only has to subsist in it.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. Christ seems to have more than just one existence:

1. In book II of On the Soul, the Philosopher says: life is the existence of living things.¹⁴ But Christ has more than just one life. For he has a created life—the life that his body lives by virtue of his soul—which he lost at death, and he has an uncreated life—the life that the Word lives by virtue of itself. Therefore, Christ has more than one existence.

2. Existence relates to a subject in the way that its activity does. But Christ’s being one subject does not keep him from having more than one activity. Therefore, it does not make him have just one existence either.

3. Generation is coming into existence.¹⁵ Now, Christ had a temporal generation. As Matthew 1 says: The generation of Christ took place in this way.¹⁶ But it cannot have been a coming into eternal existence. Hence, it must have been a coming into temporal and created existence. Yet he clearly has an uncreated existence as well. Therefore, Christ must have two existences.

4. Existence is attributed to everything about which it makes sense to ask, “Does it exist?” But it makes sense to ask, “Does it exist?” about Christ’s human nature. Hence, Christ’s human nature has its own proper existence. Yet his divine nature has its own existence as well. Therefore, Christ has two existences.

But to the contrary: Distinct existences make for distinct subjects. But Christ is only one subject. Therefore, Christ has only one existence.

Answer: There are two senses of existence, as the Philosopher makes clear in book V of the Metaphysics,¹⁷ as does the gloss of Origen on the beginning of John.¹⁸ One is the sense of existence expressed by the verbal copula signifying the composition of a proposition formed by the soul. Hence, existence in this sense is not something in reality, but only in the soul’s act of combining and dividing. Thus, existence in this sense is attributed to everything about which we can form a proposition, whether it is an existent or the privation of an existent—for we say that blindness exists. In another sense, existence is the actuality of an existent precisely as an existent—i.e., that in virtue of which we call something an actual existent in reality. Existence in this sense is only attributed to things contained in the ten categories. Hence, existents recognized as such because of existence in this sense are divided into the ten categories.

But existence in this sense is attributed to things in two ways. It is attributed in one way because the thing properly and truly has existence or exists. Existence is only attributed in this way to a substance that subsists in itself. Hence in book I of the Physics, it says that a substance is what truly exists.¹⁹ In another way, however, existence is attributed to a thing, not because it has existence in such a way that it truly exists but because something is such and such in virtue of it. Existence is attributed to whiteness, for instance, not because it subsists in existence but because something is white in virtue of whiteness. Existence is attributed in this way to everything that does not subsist in itself but, rather, exists in and with something else, whether it is an accident or a substantial form or any sort of part. Thus, existence is only properly and truly attributed to a thing that subsists in itself.

Yet there are two sorts of existence attributed to a subsisting thing. One is the subject’s proper substantial existence, which results from the things that make it one whole. But besides the things that make it whole, there is another existence attributed to a subject, viz. an additional or accidental existence. Whiteness, for instance, is an accidental existence attributed to Socrates when we say, “Socrates is white.”

Now, Christ is only one subsisting thing, which is a whole that also includes humanity, since it is one subject that has both natures. As such, Christ has only one substantial existence (the existence attributed properly to a subject), although it is one because of the subject, not the natures. But if Christ’s humanity were separated from his divinity, his humanity would have an existence of its own other than the divine existence. For the only reason that Christ’s humanity lacks its own existence is that it does not subsist in itself. If a box were a natural individual, for instance, the whole box would have only one existence. But if its parts were separated from the box, each of them would have an existence of its own.

Clearly, then, according to the second opinion mentioned earlier,²⁰ Christ has only one substantial existence (the existence proper to a subject), although he has many accidental existences.

1. So, to the first objection: Life refers to a certain kind of existence specified by a certain source of existing, which is why distinct lives follow from distinct sources of life. But existence has more to do with the subsisting subject.

2. To the second objection: A subject’s activity is not part of what makes it one whole; rather, its activity follows from its being one. Hence, one subject has many activities because of its different sources of activity. A man, for instance, does different things with his tongue and with his hands. But existence is fundamental to what makes a subject one thing, and hence multiple existences prevent it from being one thing.

3. To the third objection: Temporal generation is not about the eternal subject’s existence in the sense that it makes him begin to exist absolutely, but in the sense that he begins to exist as a subject of human nature.

4. To the fourth objection: This argument is about the existence that consists of an act of the soul. But that sense of existence even applies to things that only exist in the soul, since the question, “Does it exist?” can even be asked about blindness.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. Christ seems to have more than one sonship:

1. Multiplying a cause multiplies its effect.²¹ But birth is the cause of sonship, and Christ has two births. Therefore, Christ has two sonships.

2. One and the same thing cannot possibly be destroyed and yet also remain. Now, if the blessed Virgin had died before Christ, the sonship referred to by calling him his mother’s son would have been destroyed, yet the eternal sonship referred to by calling him the son of the Father would have remained. Therefore, Christ is called his mother’s son and the son of the Father by reference to different sonships.

3. If you say that Christ has different relationships, but not different sonships, I reply to the contrary: Sons are relatives not only in our language but also in existence. And, as the Philosopher says in the Categories, the existence of such relative things is their being related to something else.²² Hence, the existence of sonship is the existence of the relationship referring to something else. Therefore, if Christ has more than one such relationship, he has more than one sonship.

4. A relation involves nothing but a relationship and the cause or ground of that relationship (as one quantity, for instance, is the ground of the relation of equality). But the relationships referring Christ to the Father and to his mother are different, and have different grounds or causes—viz. the births—since sonship is a relation of origin. Therefore, Christ has more than one sonship.

But to the contrary: Sonship is a personal relation, and Christ is only one person. Therefore, Christ has only one sonship.

Answer: Christ has only one sonship in reality, though he has many relative relationships in our minds.

To see why, realize that relations differ from other kinds of things in the following way. The very nature of other kinds of things makes them something. Just because of what quantity is, for instance, quantity is something, and the same goes for other kinds of things. But the nature of relations does not make them something; it makes them related to something. Hence some relations are nothing in reality, but exist only in our minds—which is not the case with other kinds of things. Yet even though the nature of relations does not make them something, it does not make them nothing either, since then no relations would be something real, and relation would not be one of the ten categories. Instead, what makes a relation something real is its cause. When something about one thing directs it to another thing and makes it depend upon the other thing, then the one thing is really directed to, related to, or depends upon the other thing. Equality is a real relation, for instance, because of the one quantity that causes the equality. Yet since the same cause is responsible for a thing existing and being one, whether there is one real relation depends on the relation’s foundation or cause. For instance, since it is only one quantity that makes me equal to many things, I have only one real relation of equality relating me to many things. Similarly, since I became the child of my mother and my father by one birth, I am called the son of both by reference to one real sonship, even though there is more than one relationship between us.

But we cannot say that Christ is related to the Father and to his mother by a sonship with one cause, since he has two totally unrelated births. Hence, if there were something for temporal sonship to inhere in, we would have to hold that Christ has more than one sonship. But sonship is the sort of relation that can only inhere in the subject itself. And the only subject in Christ’s case is the eternal one, in which no temporal relations can inhere. For whatever temporal relations we attribute to an eternal thing are only relations in our minds, not in reality. Hence, the sonship that relates Christ to his mother is only a relation in our minds, not in reality (as is true of all the other relations to creatures that we attribute to God). For sonship cannot inhere in this eternal subject on account of his human nature or one of its parts (which is how Christ is the subject of death and his passion), since then human nature or a part of it would be the first thing that sonship inheres in and refers to, whereas sonship only ever refers to the subject itself and cannot inhere in anything else. Yet that does not prevent Christ from having other real relations to the Virgin. We attribute such a relation to him, for instance, when we say, “Christ’s body originated from the Virgin.” But that relation does not have the nature of sonship, unless we hold that Christ is a created subject in addition to an uncreated one, like the first opinion mentioned earlier.²³

1. So, to the first objection: Christ’s temporal birth only gives rise to sonship in our minds, not in reality. Nevertheless, Christ is still really the Virgin’s son. Compare: God is really Lord of creation, even though lordship is not a real relation in God. God is called a real Lord because of having real power. Similarly, Christ is really the Virgin’s son because of having a real birth.

2. To the second objection: The relationship involved in a relation depends on what the thing is related to. Hence, when what the thing is related to is destroyed, the relationship between them disappears. Nevertheless, the real sonship that relates Christ to the Father remains even if his mother dies.

3. To the third objection: In that description, the Philosopher uses “existence” to refer to the nature of what exists, as when he says that a thing’s definition is the phrase signifying what its existence is.²⁴ Hence, a relation does not get real existence from its relationship but, rather, from the cause of its relationship. Nevertheless, a relation does get the nature proper to its genus or species from its relationship.

4. To the fourth objection: Even though the relationships of sonship are different, and their causes are different, Christ cannot have two sonships for the reason just given.

Question 3

Article 1

The next question was about the outward appearances under which Christ is contained in the sacrament of the altar: Do those accidents exist there without a subject?

It seems not:

1. God cannot make contradictory things true at the same time, which would be the case if a thing lost what it has by definition. Yet existing in a subject is something an accident has by definition, since the existence of an accident is existing-in.²⁵ Therefore, it seems that God cannot make an accident exist without a subject.

2. If a definition is attributed to something, so is what it defines.²⁶ But “existing in itself” is the definition or description of a substance. Hence, if the accidents in the sacrament of the altar exist in themselves, and not in a subject, it follows that they are substances, which is absurd.

3. A substance cannot be generated from accidents. But we see that worms and ashes are generated from those outward appearances—they are certainly not generated from the body of Christ. Therefore, those accidents do not exist there without a subject.

4. If you say that they are generated miraculously, I reply to the contrary: The point of miracles is to build up our faith. But our faith is not built up by worms being generated from those outward appearances; it is scandalized thereby. Therefore, they are not generated miraculously.

5. There should be nothing disordered about the sacrament of truth. But it runs counter to the order that God has established in things for an accident to exist without a subject. Therefore, those accidents do not exist there without a subject.

But to the contrary: In book II of On the Soul, the Philosopher says that our senses are not mistaken about their proper objects.²⁷ Yet in the sacrament of the altar we sense color, and flavor, and the like. Hence, those accidents are really there. But they do not exist in the body of Christ or in the surrounding air, since it is not in their nature to be affected by such accidents. Therefore, those accidents exist there without a subject.

Answer: Without a doubt, the accidents in the sacrament of the altar exist there without a subject.

To see how this is possible, consider what the Philosopher says in the Book on Causes.²⁸ In every ordered causal series, he says, the first cause brings about the second cause’s effect more powerfully than the second cause itself. Hence, the first cause does not withdraw its action from the effect even after the second cause has done so, as he says in the same place. But God is the first and universal cause of things—not only of substances but also of accidents, since God is the creator of both. Yet things come forth from God in a certain order. Accidents, for instance, are produced by means of a substance’s principles. Hence, in the natural order accidents depend upon a substance’s principles, and thus cannot exist without a subject. But that does not prevent God, as the first cause, from being able to preserve accidents in existence without a substance.

That is how accidents miraculously exist without a subject in the sacrament of the altar, viz. by God’s power holding them in existence.

1. So, to the first objection: The saying “the existence of an accident is existing-in” (or however else a subject features in the definition of an accident) is a definition by addition, as discussed in book VII of the Metaphysics.²⁹ A definition by addition is a definition that includes something besides the essence of the thing defined, as the definition of “snub,” for instance, refers to a nose. Accidents are defined by addition because of their natural dependence upon a subject. But that does not prevent God from being able to preserve them in existence without a subject. Nor does it follow that contradictory things are true at the same time, since a subject is not part of an accident’s essence.

2. To the second objection: As Avicenna says in his Metaphysics, existence is not included in the definition of any genus or species, because all the particular things in a genus or species share that one definition but the genus or species does not exist with one existence in all of them.³⁰ So, these are not the true definitions of a substance and an accident: “A substance is something that exists in itself” and “An accident is something that exists in something else.” Rather, those are abbreviations for the true descriptions, which are: “A substance is a thing whose nature is due existence not in something else” and “An accident is a thing whose nature is due existence in something else.” Clearly, then, even if an accident miraculously exists not in something else, it still does not gain the definition of a substance, since it does not become something whose nature is due existence not in something else. Nor does it lose the definition of an accident, since its nature still remains one that is due existence in something else.

3. To the third objection: There are two fairly probable opinions about the things generated from those outward appearances, such as worms and ashes and the like. One opinion says that the substance of bread returns again so that such things can be generated from it. But unless it is understood correctly, this opinion seems unacceptable, for two reasons.

The first reason is that the substance of bread cannot exist there again. For if the substance of bread exists there again, it either does so while the outward appearances remain, or after they have been destroyed. But it cannot exist there again while the outward appearances remain, since the body of Christ remains in the sacrament as long as the outward appearances do. So, if the substance of bread existed there while the outward appearances remained, at some point the substance of bread and the body of Christ would exist there at the same time, which cannot be maintained. Yet the substance of bread cannot exist there after the outward appearances have been destroyed either, since the substance of bread would then exist without the proper accidents of bread, which is also unacceptable.

The second reason this opinion seems unacceptable has to do with the word “return.” When something has been turned into something else, it cannot return unless what it was turned into is turned back into it. But the substance of bread is not annihilated; it is transubstantiated into the body of Christ. Hence, the substance of bread cannot return unless the body of Christ is turned back into bread, which is absurd.

Hence, for this first opinion to be maintained, the substance of bread has to be taken as the matter of bread. Yet the previous matter cannot return when those outward appearances are destroyed. Instead, God must provide some new matter, either by creating it or in some other way. Then from this matter the bodies of such things can be generated.

The second opinion is clearer. It says that when God’s power makes those accidents subsist in themselves, it also makes them do and become whatever the substance of bread would have done and become if it had remained. By this power those outward appearances nourish our bodies, and worms or ashes are generated from them as well.

4. To the fourth objection: The point of the miracle is our faith, viz. so that our faith does not lose its merit by the hidden mystery of the sacrament being detected.

5. To the fifth objection: When something is well ordered in view of the general order of things, there is no reason why its contrary cannot be well ordered for a special reason. In the same way, although God rightly orders accidents to exist in a subject in the general order of things, there is no reason why God cannot rightly order accidents to exist without a subject in the sacrament of the altar, so that our faith can have merit because of what lies hidden in the sacrament.

Question 4

The next questions were about the members of the body of Christ. The first questions were about angels. The second were about human beings.

There were five questions about angels. About their nature: (1) Are they composed of matter and form? About the knowledge of their intellect: (2) Can they actually have morning and evening knowledge simultaneously—i.e., can they know things in their own specific nature and in the Word simultaneously? About the merit of their will: (3) Can they merit the enjoyment of God and enjoy God by one and the same act of charity? About their motion: (4) Do they move in an instant? And about their effects: (5) Can they affect or do anything to bodies here below?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Angels seem to be composed of matter and form:

1. In The Miracles of Sacred Scripture, Augustine says: Out of the unformed matter that was first created, the omnipotent God made the various kinds of bodily and non-bodily things, sensitive and non-sensitive things, intellectual and non-intellectual things.³¹ But angels are non-bodily and intellectual things. Therefore, they have matter as a component.

2. In his book On Unity, Boethius says: Some things are one through the conjunction of simple things, such as angels and souls, both of which are one through the conjunction of matter and form.³² This leads to the conclusion of the first argument.

3. Everything in a genus has a genus and a difference. Yet according to Avicenna in his Metaphysics, a thing’s genus is taken from the nature of its matter, and its difference is taken from the nature of its form.³³ Thus, everything in a genus is composed of matter and form. But angels are in the genus of substance, since they are substances with a limited species. Therefore, angels are composed of matter and form.

4. If you say that an angel’s difference is not taken from its form but, rather, from something formal—viz. its existence—I reply to the contrary: Each thing’s difference is part of its essence and included in its definition. But no creature’s existence is its essence, nor is it included in its definition, as Avicenna says.³⁴ Therefore, an angel’s difference cannot be taken from its existence.

5. Consider the reason why there cannot be many highest goods. They would have to be alike somehow, since each is a highest good, but they would also have to be different somehow, otherwise there would not be many of them. Hence, they would have to be composite. Now, the same reasoning applies to angels. Since there are many angelic essences, they have to be alike somehow and different somehow. Hence, they have to be composite. But matter and form are the components of an essence. Therefore, angels are composed of matter and form.

But to the contrary: In his Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius, Boethius says: The nature of a non-bodily substance does not rest upon any material foundation.³⁵ But angels are non-bodily. Therefore, angels have no matter.

Answer: Some people hold that angels are composed of matter and form. But the nature of angels cannot be so composed because of two things about them.

First, they cannot be so composed because angels have intellects. If angels had matter as a component, then everything in them would have to exist in a material way, since everything that exists in another does so with the other’s way of existing, as it says in the Book on Causes.³⁶ Hence, every form that exists in matter has a particular and material existence. So, if angels were composed of matter, then the forms by which they understand (whatever they are) would have to have a material existence in them. But then something impossible would follow: angels would only know about particular things. For a form received in a particular way cannot be a source of knowledge of universals, as is clear from the case of our senses. Nor can this impossibility be avoided by suggesting that angels are composed of matter with a different nature than bodily matter. For whatever that other matter is, it would still receive an angel’s substantial form in a particular way, otherwise the angel would not be a particular thing. Hence, that other matter would still be like bodily matter in receiving forms in a particular way. Thus, it is impossible for an angel or any intellectual substance to be composed of matter, since the intellect and prime matter receive forms in different ways, as we have said, and as the Commentator says in book III of On the Soul.³⁷

Second, angels cannot be composed of matter and form because they are non-bodily. For anything composed of matter has to be like matter in the following respect. Considered just in itself, matter lacks every sort of distinction, since it lacks form. But, supposing that matter is one thing, it is impossible for one matter to receive contrary and unrelated forms unless it receives them in distinct parts of itself: one and the same matter cannot receive the form of an angel and the form of a stone in the same part of itself. Yet matter cannot have distinct parts unless it is divided into them, and it cannot be divided into them unless it has dimensions, since a substance without quantity is indivisible, as it says in book I of the Physics.³⁸ Hence, everything composed of matter must have dimensions, and thus nothing non-bodily can be composed of matter.

Nevertheless, an angel’s substance is not its existence, since only God has existence of himself rather than from something else. Hence, in an angel we find its substance or nature, which subsists, and its existence, by which it subsists—i.e., the act of existing in virtue of which it is said to exist, as a thing is said to run in virtue of its act of running. Thus, an angel is composed of what exists and that by which it exists, or as Boethius puts it, of what exists and existence.³⁹ Moreover, considered just in itself, an angel’s substance only potentially exists, since it receives existence from something else. Hence, since existence is an angel’s actuality, an angel is composed of actuality and potentiality. In this sense, we could grant that an angel is composed of matter and form, insofar as every actuality is called form and every potentiality is called matter. But this is not the sense of matter and form relevant to this question. For unlike form, existence is not an actuality that is part of an angel’s essence, and unlike matter, an angel’s substance or nature subsists in itself.

1. So, to the first objection: In his Literal Commentary on Genesis, Augustine gives his reading of the unformed matter that God first created.⁴⁰ He says that this unformed matter is signified by the words “heaven and earth” when it says: In the beginning God created heaven and earth.⁴¹ The word “earth” signifies the unformed matter of visible things, he says, and the word “heaven” signifies the angelic natures that had not yet been formed by turning to the Word. So, the nature of angels is called their matter, so to speak, and the gifts of grace or glory are called their form. Hence, the passage cited by the first objection is inconclusive.

2. To the second objection: That book is not in fact by Boethius, so it does not have to be taken as authoritative. If it is so taken, however, then we can say that it uses “form” and “matter” in the broad sense to refer to actuality and potentiality, as we mentioned earlier.

3. To the third objection: There is a sense in which an angel’s substance relates to its existence as matter relates to form, as we have said. Moreover, if the essence of matter could be defined, its substance would be its genus, and its relationship to form would be its difference. Similarly, the genus of angels is taken from the nature of their substance, and their specific difference is taken from the relation of their substance to existence. Hence, angels differ in species insofar as the substance of one contains more or less potentiality than the substance of another. But Avicenna was talking about composite substances anyway.

4. We grant the fourth argument, since an angel’s difference is not taken from its existence but, rather, from the disposition of its substance to existence.

5. To the fifth objection: There is no dividing up the highest good because in its case what exists and existence are one and the same, which is enough to keep there from being more than one of them. But the composition found in angels is enough to allow there to be many of them, as what we have said makes clear.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that an angel cannot know things in the Word and in their own specific nature simultaneously:

1. One power cannot perform two of the same acts simultaneously. The intellect, for instance, cannot think and think simultaneously. But an angel’s intellect sees things in the Word and in their own specific nature by two of the same acts. Therefore, it is impossible for it to see things in the Word and in their own specific nature simultaneously.

2. If you say that an angel’s intellect sees things simultaneously in the Word and in their own proper nature in the same way that our intellect sees an eclipse and its cause simultaneously, I reply to the contrary: When our intellect sees an eclipse and its cause simultaneously, it takes the cause as its reason for thinking of the eclipse. Therefore, it takes the eclipse and its cause as one intelligible thing, and hence performs only one act.

3. One thing can only have one final end. One side of a line, for instance, can only end at one point. But the final end of a power is its activity. Therefore, one power cannot perform two activities simultaneously, which leads to the conclusion of the first argument.

4. A power is related to its act as an act is related to its object. But one act cannot have two objects. Therefore, one power cannot perform two acts simultaneously, which leads to the conclusion of the first argument.

But to the contrary: Angels see things in the Word because of their blessed vision, which is continuous rather than interrupted. So, if they could not see things simultaneously in the Word and in their own proper nature, then they would never see things in their own proper nature at all. This is especially true of Christ’s soul, which has seen the Word and things in the Word from the moment it was created.

Answer: An angel or a human soul can see things in the Word and in their own proper nature simultaneously.

This answer can be gathered straight from what Augustine says in book IV of his Literal Commentary on Genesis, where he states that the six days of creation, and their mornings and evenings, are only ordered by nature, not by succession.⁴² Hence, the first and second day are simultaneous, as are their mornings and evenings. Thus, the vision of things in the Word and in their own proper nature is simultaneous as well.

Just how this is possible, however, can be shown as follows. First, notice that activities are not properly attributed to powers, but to the subsisting things that act by means of those powers. Our intellective power, for instance, is not the agent that thinks but, rather, the source of that activity. And just as a substance’s intellective power is the source of its act of thinking, so an intelligible species is the source of its power to think. Now, one substance can perform distinct acts simultaneously by means of distinct powers. Our soul, for instance, both wants and thinks simultaneously. So, too, one intellective power can give rise to distinct acts simultaneously if it is perfectly united to distinct intelligible species. That is why Al-Ghazali considers it impossible to think about more than one thing at a time, since it is impossible for the intellect to be actually and completely informed by more than one species at a time, just as it is impossible for a body to have more than one shape at a time.⁴³ Now, an angel’s vision of things in their own proper nature occurs by means of an intelligible species that inheres in it (a species either co-created with it or infused into it). But an angel’s vision of things in the Word occurs by means of the species or essence of the Word itself, which does not inhere in it, but is, rather, united to its intellect as an intelligible object. Moreover, an angel’s intellect can be united to the Word while a created species inheres in it as well, because that species does not have the same nature as whatever intellectual perfection serves as the quasi-material basis for the angel’s union with the Word. Hence, two activities issue simultaneously from an angel’s intellect: one by reason of its union with the Word (the activity by which it sees things in the Word), and one by reason of the intelligible species that informs it (the activity by which it sees things in their own proper nature). Nor does its attention to the former activity weaken the latter; rather, the former strengthens the latter as the reason for it, just as seeing something with our own eyes strengthens our ability to imagine it. For the activity that constitutes their blessedness is the reason for all the other activities that the blessed perform.

1. That makes the reply to the first objection clear.

2. We grant the second argument, since the two cases are not analogous.

3. To the third objection: The two acts do not serve as the end of an angel’s intellective power by one and the same means but, rather, by means of distinct species.

4. To the fourth objection: There is no intermediary between an act and its object, but there is an intermediary between the intellect and its act, viz. a species. Hence, the two cases are not analogous.

Article 3

We turn, then, to the third question. Angels do not seem to have merited their own blessedness:

1. Being blessed means being complete, whereas meriting something means being as yet incomplete. But one and the same thing cannot be both complete and incomplete simultaneously. Therefore, angels cannot merit blessedness while they have it.

2. Blessed angels are residents of heaven. Yet only travelers on the way to heaven merit anything. Hence, if angels merited blessedness in the first instant they were blessed, they were both residents of heaven and travelers on the way to heaven simultaneously—which is false, since only Christ was both at the same time.

3. According to the Philosopher, blessedness consists in activity, but complete activity.⁴⁴ Similarly, merit consists in activity, but incomplete activity. Yet the activity of angels cannot have been both complete and incomplete simultaneously. Therefore, angels cannot have been blessed and also merited blessedness simultaneously.

But to the contrary: No mere creature has blessedness without meriting it, since blessedness is a reward. Yet angels could only have merited it in the first instant they were blessed, since before that they lacked grace (as some people hold), and thus could not have merited anything. Therefore, angels merited their blessedness in the first instant they had it.

Answer: There are three positions about the creation of angels.

One group of people holds that angels were blessed in the first instant of their creation. But this is unacceptable, since then other angels would have been wretched in the first instant of their creation (which some people are even willing to say), which is absurd and was condemned.

A second group says that all angels were created in a state of grace. Some persevered in this state and thus merited blessedness, while others acted against it and thus became wretched. There are no problems with this position, so I prefer it to the others.

A third group says that angels were created in a state of pure nature, and when some of them turned to the Word, they were given grace and blessedness simultaneously.

This third group divides into three subgroups.

One subgroup says that angels never merited blessedness. But never meriting blessedness only seems true of Christ, since he is the natural Son of God and thus inherits the enjoyment of God without meriting it.

A second subgroup says that angels merit blessedness by the actions they perform among us. But this seems unacceptable, since it has the merit following the reward, whereas merit is the basis for a reward.

A third subgroup says that angels merited blessedness in the first instant of their creation because they turned to the Word. Among these three subgroups, this third position is the most probable.

To see the reason for this answer, realize that merit relates to its reward as motion relates to its end and as a thing’s happening relates to its having happened. Now, in the case of things that happen successively, they are happening before they have happened. But in the case of things that happen immediately, they both are happening and have happened simultaneously. For instance, air is illuminated and has been illuminated simultaneously, and a thing is created and has been created simultaneously. Here is why: The first instant that something has happened is the end of the previous time that it did not exist. Hence, that instant retains something proper to this previous time, since we can say that before that instant this thing did not exist. Now, in the case of things that happen successively, we attribute their happening to this previous time. But in the case of things that happen instantaneously, we can only attribute their happening to the first instant separating their existence from their nonexistence. Hence, in every subsequent instant we can say that they have happened, but in that first instant—and only then—we can say that they are happening and have happened.

Similarly, in the first instant that angelic minds turned to enjoy the Word, they were both blessed because their enjoyment had completely happened, so to speak, and they also merited blessedness because they were turning to the Word—not as though their turning happened after the completion of their blessedness but, rather, while their blessedness was itself happening. After that, however, angelic minds are only blessed, without also meriting blessedness. The same is true of contrition, since the preparation for grace ends in the same instant that grace is infused.

1. So, to the first objection: We do not have to hold that one and the same thing is both complete and incomplete simultaneously. We only have to hold that it is complete and that its incompletion has come to an end simultaneously, at least when it is first complete.

2. To the second objection: Angels merit blessedness, not like travelers far from their destination, but like travelers standing right at the end of the way to their destination.

3. To the third objection: See the reply to the first objection.

Article 4

We turn, then, to the fourth question. An angel seems to move in an instant:

1. The book On Intelligences says that in the case of angelic motion, the extension of space does not make for distance.⁴⁵ But the distance made by the extension of space is the reason things cannot go just as quickly to places near and to places far. Hence, an angel can go just as quickly to places near and to places far. But everything like that moves in an instant. Therefore, an angel moves in an instant.

2. An indivisible mover relates to indivisible and instantaneous motion in the way that a divisible mover relates to divisible or successive motion. But a body (a divisible mover) moves successively in a divisible time. Therefore, an angel (an indivisible mover, since it lacks quantity) moves immediately in an instant.

3. In book IV of the Physics, the Philosopher proves that if something were to move in a vacuum, then it would move in an instant, since the surrounding medium would not offer it any resistance.⁴⁶ But just as a vacuum does not resist a body in motion, occupied space does not resist an angel in motion. Therefore, an angel moves in an instant.

But to the contrary: In book VIII of his Literal Commentary on Genesis, Augustine says that God moves spiritual creatures through time.⁴⁷ Yet an angel is a spiritual creature. Therefore, an angel moves through time, not in an instant.

Answer: Every change has to involve succession and time in some sense, since the endpoints of any change are opposites and do not co-occur, as book I of the Physics makes clear.⁴⁸ Hence, every changing thing must be at one endpoint of change before, and at the other endpoint of change after, which results in succession.

In the case of bodily changes, however, there are two ways of passing from one endpoint of change to the other.

One way is to pass from an instant to an instant. But this is only possible when the change’s endpoints have some sort of middle between them, as there is a middle time between two instants.⁴⁹ This is clear in the case of locomotion, alteration, increase, and decrease. These changes are called continuous because of the continuity of what they pass over, which makes them more and less continuous.

Another way of passing from one endpoint of change to the other is to pass from time to an instant. This happens when the change’s endpoints are a privation and a form, which have no middle between them. Hence, there is no passing from one of these endpoints to the other without being at either of them, as the passage from one instant to another is at neither of them while it is in the middle. These sorts of changes include generation, corruption, illumination, and the like. In their case, we have to call the whole previous time one endpoint and the instant when that time ends the other endpoint. For changes of this sort are themselves endpoints of certain changes. The illumination of the day, for instance, is the endpoint of the sun’s locomotion. Hence, the whole time the sun was moving to some point directly opposite the earth, there was darkness, but the instant the sun arrived at that point, there is light. The same goes for generation and corruption, which are endpoints of alteration. Now, there is no middle between time and an instant, nor is there any instant immediately prior to the last instant of time. Hence, in the case of changes that pass from one endpoint to the other without going through a middle, there is no last instant when they were at the endpoint from which they passed. Rather, there is a last time when they were there, which ends the instant they are at the endpoint to which they passed. That is why changes of this sort are called instantaneous.

Yet this cannot be said about an angel’s motion, since its motion is not the endpoint of any continuous change. So, we have to think of an angel’s passing from one endpoint of motion to another like the passage from an instant to an instant, not like the passage from time to an instant, since time presupposes change. And since an angel does not depend on any change in order to be at the endpoint from which it moves, it does not exist there in time, but in a certain “now.” It exists likewise in another “now” at the endpoint to which it moves. Yet “nows” of this sort are not endpoints of time, since time is the numbering of the motion of the heavens, and an angel’s motion does not depend on the motion of the heavens. Hence, an angel’s motion is not measured by that numbering, nor does it have to extend continuously through a middle time. For the continuity of time results from the continuity of motion, and the continuity of motion results from the continuity of the extension that motion passes over, as shown in book IV of the Physics.⁵⁰ Yet an angel’s activities (the reason it is said to move through different places) have no continuity; they just follow one after the other. Hence, the “nows” that measure an angel’s motion follow one after the other, and there is nothing continuous between them. This plurality of “nows” following one after the other is a sort of time, in which an angel is said to move.

This agrees with the Philosopher’s words in book IV of the Physics, where he says that the same reasoning applies to indivisible motion and to the time composed of “nows.”⁵¹

1. So, to the first objection: The distance of space is not the reason angelic motion takes time; the reason is that the endpoints of its motion do not co-occur—i.e., an angel cannot be in two places at once.

2. To the second objection: The succession of motion does not only result from the division of the mover but also from the division of what the motion passes over. For the before and after of motion corresponds to the before and after of extension, as shown in book IV of the Physics.⁵² So, even though an angel is indivisible, the places it moves are divisible from each other, and hence its motion has to involve some division.

3. To the third objection: Although occupied space does not hinder an angel’s motion, its motion still has to involve distinct “nows” for the reason just given. But the Philosopher’s argument is a reduction to absurdity, not a demonstrative proof, as the Commentator says in the same place.⁵³

Article 5

We turn, then, to the fifth question. It seems that angels cannot act on bodies here below:

1. Action can only occur between things that have something in common. But angels have nothing in common with bodies here below, since there is no genus common to corruptible and incorruptible things, as it says in book X of the Metaphysics.⁵⁴ Therefore, angels cannot act on these bodies.

2. If angels act on bodies here below, then they either do so by command, or by some sort of influence. If they do so by command, then they can act equally on something near and on something far. But that contradicts the words of Damascene, who says that angels are where they act.⁵⁵ Yet if angels act on these bodies by some influence, then their influence has to pass through a medium. But a bodily medium cannot receive a spiritual impression. Therefore, there is no way for angels to act on bodies here below or on our souls.

3. Angels cannot affect or influence bodies here below in the way that a spring influences a stream—i.e., as if the numerically same thing were first in an angel and then came to be in the bodies here below. For then angels would lose something of themselves when they acted. Yet neither can they create what these bodies receive through their influence, since angels are not creators. Yet neither can they actualize it from the potentiality of bodies, since nature alone suffices for such effects. Therefore, angels have no way to act on bodies here below.

But to the contrary: In book III of On the Trinity, Augustine says that everything God does among bodies is done through the ministry of angels.⁵⁶ And in book IV of the Dialogues, Gregory says that everything bodily is administered by spiritual substances.⁵⁷

Answer: Philosophers have held two opinions about the action of angels on bodies here below. In book XI of the Metaphysics, the Commentator holds that spiritual substances can only affect bodies here below by means of the heavenly bodies above, which (the philosophers say) are moved by non-bodily substances.⁵⁸

But in his Metaphysics and in his book On the Soul, Avicenna holds that angels affect bodies here below in two ways: by the motion of the spheres above, and directly by command.⁵⁹ For the forms of angelic intellects are productive, he thinks, and sensible bodies obey the thoughts of angels more than their own active and passive qualities. So, he thinks, sometimes bodies here below are transformed by the thoughts of higher substances, in addition to the whole order of natural causes.

But this second opinion contradicts Augustine’s words in book III of On the Trinity, where he says that bodily matter does not obey the command of angels.⁶⁰ The opinion is unreasonable as well. We can grant that what exists in matter potentially, exists in spiritual substances actually and more nobly. But the potentiality of bodily matter is not proportioned to the actuality of a spiritual substance’s existence. Yet an agent has to be proportioned to matter in order to actualize its potential. Hence, no created spiritual substance has the power to transform matter directly; it can only do so by means of a natural agent.

Now, although angels cannot make bodily matter obey them by immediately changing its form, they can make matter obey them by naturally changing its place. So, with this power angels can assemble and arrange certain natural agents to produce a certain effect. But only God’s power can do what natural powers cannot, since only it can change the natural order.

Our minds, however, are proportioned to angels and near enough to them to receive their action. Thus, angels can act on our minds in two ways. One way is by reinforcing our intellect, as a hotter body reinforces one that is less hot. Another is like the way angels act on bodies, viz. by having a natural agent act on our intellect. This happens when light from an angel illuminates our mental images so that they can produce more noble thoughts than they could produce by the light of our agent intellect.

1. So, to the first objection: Angels do have something in common with bodies here below—namely the commonality between a mover and what it moves. Angels can move bodies by changing their place, which they can do just as directly with bodies here below as they can with the heavenly bodies above. So, my judgment about the action of angels on these bodies is a middle way between the two opinions of the philosophers mentioned earlier.

2. To the second objection: An angel acts on bodies here below by moving them from place to place by command. But this command comes with active power, which must somehow be present in order to move a body, since a mover and what it moves have to be simultaneous, as proved in book VII of the Physics.⁶¹ But the action that influences our souls by reinforcing our intellect does not have to pass through a bodily medium. As Augustine says, order is to spirits what position is to bodies,⁶² and in the order of nature our souls touch angels (so to speak) just as a lower angel touches a higher one. Hence, there is no need for an intervening bodily medium.

3. To the third objection: Angels do not create anything in our souls or in natural bodies; they only actualize their potential. Even though a natural agent can also actualize their potential, it cannot do so as perfectly as an angel.

Question 5

The next questions related to human beings. The first were about their nature, the second about grace, the third about sins, and the fourth about glory.

There were two questions about human nature: (1) Are vegetative and sensitive souls a result of creation? and (2) Is commanding an act of will or of reason?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that vegetative and sensitive souls are brought to exist by creation:

1. As Augustine says in his book On True Religion, in the order of nature a living substance is greater than a non-living substance.⁶³ But vegetative and sensitive souls are living substances. Hence, they are nobler than all non-living substances. Yet some non-living substances were created directly by God, such as the world’s elements. Therefore, sensitive and vegetative souls are also created directly by God, since the nobility of the product indicates the nobility of its producer.

2. Everything that comes to exist in its own right either comes to exist from something or comes to exist from nothing. Now, sensitive souls come to exist in their own right. But they do not come to exist from something, since they do not have matter as a part. Therefore, they come to exist from nothing. Here is the proof of the minor premise: Everything that has existence in its own right, but has not always existed, comes to exist in its own right. Now, the sensitive soul truly has existence, since it is an acting substance (as it moves the body), and nothing has its own activity without having its own existence. But an animal’s sensitive soul has not always existed. Hence, it comes to exist in its own right. Therefore, it follows that sensitive souls are created.

But to the contrary:

1. In book II of On the Soul, the Philosopher says that the first change of a sensitive thing is produced by what generates it.⁶⁴ But the first change of a sensitive thing is the acquisition of its first actuality, which is the sensitive soul. Therefore, the sensitive soul is produced by generation, not creation.

2. Everything that preexists in an animal or a human being’s seed is a result of generation, not creation. But vegetative and sensitive souls preexist in a human being’s seed, since it is a living thing before it is an animal, and an animal before it is a human being, as the Philosopher says in book XVI of On Animals.⁶⁵ Therefore, even in the case of human beings, vegetative and sensitive souls are a result of generation.

3. God acts in an instant, whereas nature acts successively. So, everything brought to exist by successive action is produced by a natural agent. But vegetative and sensitive souls are made to exist by successive action, since the product of conception is given life and sensation over a set period of time. Therefore, vegetative and sensitive souls are produced by a natural agent, not by creation.

Answer: There are two opinions on this question. Some say that vegetative and sensitive souls are a result of creation, while others say that they are a result of generation.

In fact, this difference applies not only to the opinions of philosophers about these souls but about all substantial forms. For some philosophers, such as Plato and Avicenna, hold that all forms are produced from without.⁶⁶ They were convinced of this by two reasons in particular. The first reason is this: since forms do not have matter as a part, they can only come to exist from nothing, and must therefore be produced by creation. The second reason is this: the only sources of action that these philosophers recognized in the bodies here below were the active and passive qualities of such bodies, which they considered insufficient to produce substantial forms, since nothing acts beyond its own species.⁶⁷

But these philosophers were mistaken about this, since they thought that forms come to exist in their own right, whereas in fact the only things that come to exist in their own right are composites of matter and form, which exist in their own right as well. For forms are not said to exist as subsisting things but, rather, as that by which their composites exist. Hence, forms are not said to come to exist by being produced in their own right but, rather, by their composites being produced, and composites are produced by the transformation of their matter from potentiality to actuality. Hence, just as composites are produced by natural agents, so too are non-subsisting forms. Moreover, the active and passive qualities of bodies produce such substantial forms by the power of substantial forms themselves, which use such qualities as instruments. Fire’s heat, for instance, acts as an instrument of the nutritive soul, as it says in book II of On the Soul.⁶⁸

Now, vegetative and sensitive souls are non-subsisting forms; otherwise they would remain after their bodies are destroyed. Hence, such forms are produced by generation along with their composites, as is true of other material forms as well. Only intellective souls (which exist as subsisting things, since they remain after their bodies) are produced from without by creation.

Now, if a human being’s vegetative, sensitive, and intellective nature were rooted in different souls, then even a human being’s vegetative and sensitive souls would result from generation. But this opinion contradicts the words of the philosophers, who hold that one ensouled thing has only one soul, which is the source of all the soul’s activities. It also contradicts the words of the saints, who deny that there are two souls in one human being, as the book On Church Dogmas makes clear.⁶⁹ Hence, I affirm that a human being has only one soul with vegetative, sensitive, and intellective powers, and I say that a human being’s soul (which supports all these powers) is created by God. Nevertheless, a natural agent produces a human being’s organized body, complete with the powers that actualize its bodily parts.

1. So, to the first objection: Sensitive and vegetative souls are not living substances, nor are they subsisting things; they are sources of life and existence. Nor does a nobler thing have to be created directly by God just because a less noble thing is. God can produce nobler and less noble things however God likes, since the divine power is unlimited and the divine nature does not necessitate God’s actions. For instance, the first brute animals were produced directly by God, but nobler human beings are now generated from seed.

2. To the second objection: Sensitive souls neither exist, nor come to exist, nor act by themselves, since the body shares in all the sensitive soul’s activities. For sensitive souls have two motive powers. One power is appetitive and commands, which cannot be done without the body. The other is commanded, and is joined to the muscles and nerves as the source of their mobility. But the distinction of an animal’s bodily parts means that one of its parts is a mover, and another is moved, which is how animals can move by themselves.

I grant the arguments made to the contrary, except where human beings are concerned. For although vegetative and sensitive souls preexist incompletely in human seed, nevertheless they cease to exist with the creation of the rational soul, which contains completely what they contained incompletely. As Avicenna says, many generations and corruptions occur within the generation of an animal from seed.⁷⁰

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. Commanding seems to be an act of reason:

In book I of the Ethics, the Philosopher says: reason urges them aright and toward the best objects.⁷¹ And he says: in the continent man it obeys reason.⁷² Therefore, commanding and urging and the like are acts of reason.

But to the contrary: A lord commands, and we are the lords of our actions by our will. Therefore, commanding is an act of will.

Answer: Commanding involves two things, one that comes from reason and another that comes from the will. For the will commands and inclines us to do something, since it moves us as an agent; whereas reason directs us to accomplish what the will commands, since directing is its province. As for their order, first the will inclines us to something that we choose, and then when we begin to accomplish it, reason directs us to the things required by our choice. Hence, commanding comes directly from reason, but comes from the will as its first mover, so to speak.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 6

Article 1

The next question was about grace: Is charity increased in essence?

It seems not:

1. Since increase is a certain change or variation, something increased in essence is changed or varied in essence. But what is changed or varied in essence is either generated or corrupted. Hence, if charity were increased in essence, it would be corrupted (it could not be generated, since it already exists).

2. Charity’s only quantity is in its power, and its power is its essence. Hence, charity’s quantity is its essence. Thus, charity’s quantity cannot be varied without its essence being varied. Hence, if charity were increased in essence, its essence would have to be generated or corrupted.

But to the contrary: Our essential reward in heaven corresponds to the essence of our charity. But some have achieved a greater essential reward in heaven. Therefore, their charity was increased in essence.

Answer: Charity is increased in essence.

Notice, however, that the preposition “in” expresses various relationships. Sometimes it denotes a subject, as when we say: “He is pale in the face.”⁷³ For his face is the subject of paleness. But sometimes it denotes a form, as when we say: “He is marked in his paleness.” So, when something is said to change in this or in that, this and that can either be taken as a subject or as a form. When we talk about “a change in his hand,” for instance, we are denoting the subject of the change. But when we talk about “a change in place,” we are denoting the specific form of the change.

Accordingly, when we talk about charity increasing in essence, we are denoting the subject of the increase, so that the sense is: “Charity’s very essence is increased.” This is like saying: “The pale man is increased in essence.” But we are not designating the specific form of the change, as if the sense were: “an increase in his essence.” In other words, the increase is a change to its existence or to its essence, but the increase itself is a change of its quantity. And although charity’s quantity, which is its power, is the same as its essence, charity’s essence need not be destroyed by its increase. Even in the case of bodily increases, the essence of quantity is not destroyed by its increase, since it always has indeterminate dimensions, while its change from small to large—its increase—is in the various determinations it receives. So, too, the power of charity is not destroyed in its essence; its determinations just vary. For every form received in a subject gets its determination from the capacity of the receiver. Hence, the more a subject of charity is disposed to charity by turning to God, the more it participates in charity. And in that sense charity is said to increase in essence.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 7

The next two questions were about human sins: (1) Did Peter sin mortally by denying Christ? and (2) Without a dispensation, is it a mortal sin to have more than one prebend without the responsibility to care for souls?

Article 1

We turn, then, to the first question. Peter does not seem to have sinned mortally by denying Christ:

1. A certain gloss says that he sinned by being caught off guard.⁷⁴ But sins committed by being caught off guard are venial, not mortal. Hence our impulses (which catch us off guard) are venial sins. Therefore, Peter sinned venially, not mortally.

2. In his book On Loving God, Bernard says that Peter’s charity was put to sleep, not extinguished.⁷⁵ But mortal sin extinguishes charity. Therefore, Peter did not sin mortally.

But to the contrary: In his Morals, Gregory says that Peter was rescued from the jaws of the devil.⁷⁶ But only mortal sin puts one in the jaws of the devil. Hence, Peter sinned mortally.

Answer: Without a doubt, Peter sinned mortally by denying Christ.

Two things make this clear. First, Peter denied his faith in Christ right when it was put to the test and he was asked to confess it. For confession on the lips leads to salvation, as Romans 10 says.⁷⁷ Hence, a confession of faith is necessary for salvation in such circumstances. And lying about matters of faith in particular is most pernicious, as Augustine says in his book On Lying.⁷⁸

Second, Peter added swearing a false oath and blasphemy to not confessing and lying. As Matthew 26 says: He began to curse and to swear that he did not know the man.⁷⁹ Yet these are obviously grave sins. Hence the gloss says: Third, he began to curse and to swear that he did not know the man, since persevering in sin increases its evil, and those who spurn lesser sins, fall into greater ones.⁸⁰

1. So, to the first objection: There are two senses of being caught off guard. In one sense, being caught off guard is the opposite of deliberating. This is the sense in which our impulses catch us off guard, but it is not the sense in which Peter sinned by being caught off guard. In another sense, being caught off guard is the opposite of choosing. This is the sense in which Peter sinned by being caught off guard. For he did not sin by choice, as though out of set wickedness, but out of fear. Yet being caught off guard in this sense does not excuse one from mortal sin, as is clear from the case of incontinent people, who are overcome by concupiscence and fornicate in spite of their intention to remain continent.

2. To the second objection: Bernard is speaking improperly there. In order to come out true, his words have to be taken in one of two ways. They could be taken to refer to a sort of love between friends, which Peter had for Christ, and which he still had even after denying him. But if they are taken to refer to the charity given by grace, then they have to mean that Peter’s charity was not extinguished from divine predestination, which was preparing his repentance, even though it was actually extinguished in him.

Article 2

We turn, then, to the second question. Without a dispensation, it seems to be a mortal sin to have more than one prebend without the responsibility to care for souls:

1. It is a mortal sin to do something against a statute of a council of the Church. Yet having more than one prebend is against a statute of a general council of the Church. Therefore, it is a mortal sin. Here is the proof of the minor premise: Distinction LXX contains a decree of Pope Urban beginning with the words Holy canons, which says: It is completely forbidden for any man to hold a title in two churches; instead, let each man be a canon in the one church in which he holds a title. Even though a bishop can put one man in charge of multiple churches, one man should only be a canon with a prebend in the one church in which he is enrolled.⁸¹

2. Cause xxi, q.1, contains a decree of the seventh council, which says: From now on a cleric may not be counted in two churches. That is the profit of business and filthy lucre, and is totally foreign to the custom of the Church.⁸² This leads to the conclusion of the first argument.

3. Chrysostom says: What was shameful in the darkness, should be shameful in the light; what was not allowed in figure, I consider forbidden in reality.⁸³ But among the levitical priests, a man with an office in Bethlehem was not allowed to hold an office in Jerusalem. Yet we should be more perfect. Therefore, a man with an office in Tyre should not hold an office in Damascus.

4. Bernard says: A man with many benefices will have many punishments.⁸⁴ Yet a man with more than one prebend has many benefices, and will therefore have many punishments. Hence, having more than one prebend is a very grave sin.

5. It is a mortal sin to put oneself at risk and in danger of mortal sin. Yet a man with two prebends puts himself at risk and in danger of mortal sin. For when a man accepts more than one prebend, he swears to fulfill the statutes of each church giving him a prebend. But sometimes these statutes cannot both be fulfilled, as when elections are held in both churches at the same time, or when there is some business to be done in both churches. This is especially true when a man has obligations to two churches in a legal dispute with each other. Therefore, it seems to be a mortal sin to have more than one prebend.

But to the contrary:

1. The Church would not tolerate something that tended toward danger. Yet the Church does commonly tolerate a man having two prebends. Therefore, there is no danger of mortal sin in having two prebends.

2. A man with patrimony is allowed to accept a prebend. But ecclesiastical benefices have more in common than patrimony and prebends. Therefore, a man with one prebend is allowed to accept another.

Answer: It is dangerous to answer questions about mortal sin unless the truth is clear. For the error of not believing that a mortal sin is a mortal sin does not excuse one from guilt entirely, although it may do so to an extent; and the error of believing that something is a mortal sin when it is not, binds the conscience under pain of sin.

But answering such questions is especially dangerous when the truth is ambiguous, as is the case with this one, since it is a question for theologians insofar as it depends on divine law or natural law, and a question for lawyers insofar as it depends on positive law, and different theologians give contrary answers, as do different lawyers.

The question is not clearly answered by divine law, since no express mention is made of it in sacred scripture. Perhaps an answer can be reasonably inferred from certain parts of scripture, but they still do not point directly to the truth. Considering natural law, however, the answer currently seems to me to be the following. There are many different kinds of human actions. Some actions have an inseparable deformity that makes it impossible to perform them well, such as fornication and adultery and the like. But having more than one prebend does not seem like this kind of action, otherwise no man could ever receive a dispensation to do so, which no one wants to say. Other actions are neither good nor evil in themselves but, rather, neutral, such as picking up a stick off the ground and the like. Now, some people say that having more than one prebend is this kind of action, and they allow it by comparing it to having more than one apple. But this seems false, since having more than one prebend is disordered in a number of ways. No man can serve in more than one of the churches giving him a prebend, yet the purpose of a prebend is to serve as a stipend for those serving God in that place. Giving one man more than one place also results in less worship of God. Sometimes it also results in defrauding the wills and testaments of those who donated their goods to the churches so that a certain number of men could serve God there. It also results in inequality when one man abounds in benefices while another cannot even have one. It is easy to recognize many other results like this. Hence, having more than one prebend cannot be a neutral action. Much less can it be one that is good in itself, such as giving alms and the like.

But there are other actions that are somewhat deformed or disordered when considered in themselves, and yet can still be done well in certain circumstances. Hitting or killing a human being, for instance, is somewhat deformed in itself. But if an evildoer is killed because of justice, or an offender is hit for the sake of discipline, then it is not a sin; it is virtuous. Now, having more than one prebend seems to be this kind of action. Although it is disordered in some ways, those ways can be totally removed by other circumstances that make it honorable. Suppose a man’s service was needed in more than one church, for instance, and that he could serve the church better or just as well while absent as someone else could while present, and that other similar circumstances obtained. A man with the right intention in such circumstances would not sin by having more than one prebend, even without a dispensation—at least if we are only considering natural law. For dispensations do not apply to natural law; they only apply to positive law. But if a man had more than one benefice with the intention of getting rich, or living lavishly, or more easily being promoted to the episcopacy from one of the churches giving him a prebend, then the deformities just mentioned would not be removed; they would be compounded. A man with such intentions is not even allowed to have one benefice, which is not disordered in itself at all. This is the answer that would be given to the question based on natural law, if there were no positive law.

Now, it is certain that ancient laws forbade having more than one prebend. Yet some people say that custom has repealed those laws. Clearly, then, this custom is contrary to that ancient prohibition, since human laws are repealed by contrary customs. But other people say that this custom does not repeal those ancient laws, citing this decree: Patience tolerates many things that would be found null and void by the force of justice if they were brought before the judge.⁸⁵ This debate should be left to the lawyers. But this much seems true: To the extent that those ancient laws reflect natural law, they cannot be repealed by contrary custom, which is to that extent irrational. To the extent that they only reflect positive law, however, they can be repealed, especially if those who tolerate the contrary custom have the power to change positive law and intend to change those ancient laws by such toleration. Therefore, if the ancient laws prohibiting it remain in force, then contrary custom notwithstanding, it is certain that no man can have more than one prebend without a dispensation—not even in the circumstances that can make it honorable when only natural law is considered. But if the ancient laws have been repealed by custom, then having more than one prebend is allowed in such circumstances even without a dispensation. In any other circumstances, however, it is not allowed, not even with a dispensation. For human dispensations only free us from the obligations of positive law, not of natural law, since human beings establish positive law and can therefore dispense from it.

That makes the reply to the objections clear.

Question 8

Article 1

The next question was about glory: Are all the saints canonized by the Church in glory or are some of them in hell?

It seems that some of those canonized by the Church can be in hell:

1. No one can be as certain about a person’s state as that very person, since no one knows a man’s thoughts except the spirit of the man which is in him, as it says in 2 Corinthians 2.⁸⁶ But not even that person can be certain about being in the state of salvation. As Ecclesiastes 11 says: No man knows whether he is worthy of love or hatred.⁸⁷ Much less, then, can the pope know. Therefore, the pope can err when he canonizes someone.

2. Anyone can err when their judgments are based on fallible sources. But the Church’s judgment about the canonization of saints is based on human testimony (viz. witnesses for the inquiry into their life and miracles), and human testimony is fallible. Therefore, it seems that the Church can err when canonizing saints.

But to the contrary:

1. The Church cannot commit a damnable error. But it would be a damnable error to venerate sinners as saints, since those who discovered their sins or heresy (if it so happened) could be led into error. Therefore, the Church cannot err about such matters.

2. Furthermore, in a letter to Jerome, Augustine says that our faith would waver if any falsehood were admitted in the canonical scriptures, since our faith depends upon them.⁸⁸ But just as we are bound to believe what the sacred scriptures contain, so we are bound to believe what the Church commonly determines. Hence, those who believe things contrary to the determination of the Church’s councils are judged heretics. Therefore, the common judgment of the Church cannot be erroneous, which leads to the conclusion of the previous argument.

Answer: Something judged possible when considered in itself can be found impossible when considered in relation to something extrinsic to it. So, I say, it is possible for those with authority in the Church to err in their judgments about anything you like, provided that we only consider the people themselves. But if we consider divine providence, it is certainly impossible for the universal Church to err in judgments about matters of faith. For the Holy Spirit guides the Church to avoid error about things necessary for salvation. As Christ promised in John 16: when the Spirit comes, he will teach you all truth.⁸⁹ Hence, we should hold more firmly to the pope’s judgment than to the opinion of any wise people about the scriptures, since it is for the pope to make determinations about the faith, which he professes with his judgments. For even though Caiaphas was wicked, he was still bound to prophecy unknowingly since he was the high priest, as it says in John 11.⁹⁰ Yet false witnesses make it possible for the Church to err in judgments about particular actions, as in verdicts on matters of property, crimes, and the like.

Now, the canonization of saints is midway between these two sorts of judgments. But since the honor that we give to the saints is a sort of profession of our faith in the glory of the saints, we should devoutly believe that the Church cannot err in judgments about them either.

1. So, to the first objection: The canonization of saints is the prerogative of the pope, who can become certain about people’s state through the inquiry into their life and the attestation of their miracles, and especially through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who searches everything, even the depths of God.⁹¹

2. To the second objection: In such matters, divine providence preserves the Church from error due to fallible human testimony.

¹ Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments I, Part ii, 22.

² Luke 1:37.

³ Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, 4 (202b36–203b30).

⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, 2 (185b2–3).

⁵ Cf. Al-Ghazali, Metaphysics I, 1, 6.

⁶ Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics II, 6.

⁷ Cf. Aristotle, Topics II, 4 (111a33–b11).

⁸ Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, 6 (206b14–15).

⁹ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, 6 (1011b16–17).

¹⁰ Rather, Alan de Lille, Rules of Heavenly Law, 101.

¹¹ Peter Lombard, Sentences II, d.18, c. 7.

¹² Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences III, d.6, c. 3.

¹³ 1 Corinthians 8:6.

¹⁴ Aristotle, On the Soul II, 4 (415b13).

¹⁵ A common adage.

¹⁶ Matthew 1:18.

¹⁷ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 7 (1017a22–35).

¹⁸ Cf. Ordinary Gloss on John 1:1.

¹⁹ Aristotle, Physics I, 3 (186b4–5).

²⁰ Cf. Quodlibet IX, q.2, a.1.

²¹ A common adage.

²² Aristotle, Categories, 7 (8a39–b1).

²³ Cf. Quodlibet IX, q.2, a.1.

²⁴ Aristotle, Topics I, 5 (101b39).

²⁵ A common adage.

²⁶ Cf. Aristotle, Topics VII, 5 (154a32–b2).

²⁷ Aristotle, On the Soul II, 3 (427b11–12 & 428b18–19). Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, 3 (428b25).

²⁸ Cf. Book on Causes, Prop. 1.

²⁹ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, 5 (1030b14–1031a14).

³⁰ Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII, 4.

³¹ Augustine of Ireland, The Miracles of Sacred Scripture, c. 1.

³² Rather, Dominic Gundissalinus. On Unity.

³³ Avicenna, Metaphysics V, 5.

³⁴ In many places, e.g., Avicenna, Metaphysics I, 7.

³⁵ Boethius, Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius, c. 6.

³⁶ Cf. Book on Causes, Props. 10, 20, & 24.

³⁷ Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul III, 5.

³⁸ Rather, cf. Aristotle, Physics III, 5 (204a9–11).

³⁹ Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 2; On the Hebdomads, Rules 2 & 7–8.

⁴⁰ Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis I, 1.

⁴¹ Genesis 1:1.

⁴² Cf. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis IV, 22–35.

⁴³ Cf. Al-Ghazali, Metaphysics I, iii, 4.

⁴⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 5 (1095b31–1096a2).

⁴⁵ Adam de Puteorum Villa, On Intelligences XLVII, 3.

⁴⁶ Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, 8 (215a24–216a11).

⁴⁷ Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis VIII, 20–26.

⁴⁸ This is a false reading of Aristotle based on an unclear Latin translation.

⁴⁹ Aristotle, Physics VI, 3 (234a7–8 & 10).

⁵⁰ Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, 11 (219a10–14).

⁵¹ Aristotle, Physics VI, 1 (231b18–232a22). Cf. Aristotle, Physics VI, 10 (240b31–241a6).

⁵² Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, 11 (219a16–17).

⁵³ Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics IV, 71–72.

⁵⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 10 (1058b26–29).

⁵⁵ Cf. John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith I, c. 13.

⁵⁶ Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity III, 4.

⁵⁷ Gregory, Dialogues IV, 5.

⁵⁸ Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics XI, 32–35.

⁵⁹ Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX, 5; On the Soul IV, 4.

⁶⁰ Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity III, 8, 13.

⁶¹ Aristotle, Physics VII, 1 (243a22–23).

⁶² This saying is not found in Augustine.

⁶³ Cf. Augustine, On True Religion, xxix, 52.

⁶⁴ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, 5 (417b16–17).

⁶⁵ Cf. Aristotle, Generation of Animals II, 3 (736a35–b5).

⁶⁶ According to Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VII, 31 & XI, 18. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 41a; Avicenna, Metaphysics IX, 5.

⁶⁷ Cf. Albert, On Man, q.17, a.3, arg. 15 & ad 15; Commentary on the Sentences II, d.1A, a.5, arg. 3 & ad 3; d.1C, a.12, arg. 12.

⁶⁸ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, 4 (416a9–18).

⁶⁹ Gennadius, On Church Dogmas, 15.

⁷⁰ Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul V, 7.

⁷¹ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 13 (1102b15–16).

⁷² Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 13 (1102b26–27).

⁷³ Aquinas says “foot,” not “face.”

⁷⁴ Interlinear Gloss on Luke 22:57.

⁷⁵ Rather, William of Saint Thierry, On the Nature and Dignity of Love, 4.

⁷⁶ Cf. Gregory, Morals XXXIII, 12.

⁷⁷ Romans 10:10.

⁷⁸ Cf. Augustine, On Lying, 25.

⁷⁹ Matthew 26:74.

⁸⁰ Ordinary Gloss on Matthew 26:74.

⁸¹ Decretum I, d. lxx, c. 2 (from Pope Urban II’s Council of Piacenza, 1095).

⁸² Decretum II, C. xxi, q.1, c. 1 (from the Second Council of Nicaea, 787).

⁸³ This is not found in Chrysostom.

⁸⁴ This is not found in Bernard.

⁸⁵ Decretals III, tit. 5, c. 18.

⁸⁶ 2 Corinthians 2:11.

⁸⁷ Rather, Ecclesiastes 9:1.

⁸⁸ Augustine, Letter 40, 5.

⁸⁹ John 16:13.

⁹⁰ Cf. John 11:51.

⁹¹ 1 Corinthians 2:10.

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