Article 2: If a religious knows that his father is in grave need, can he leave without his superior’s permission in orde
Quodlibet III
There were questions about God, about angels, about human beings, and about purely bodily creatures. The questions about God touched on the divine nature and on the assumed nature.
Question 1
On the divine nature, there were two questions about God’s power: (1) Can God make matter exist without form? and (2) Can God make the same body to be located in two places at once?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that God can make matter exist without form:
Matter’s dependence on form for its existence is like an accident’s dependence on a subject. But God can make an accident exist without a subject, as happens in the sacrament of the altar. Therefore, God can make matter exist without form.
But to the contrary: God cannot make contradictory things to be the case at the same time. But the existence of matter without form implies a contradiction, since matter’s existence implies its actuality, which is a form. Therefore, God cannot make matter exist without form.
Answer: The range of a thing’s active power is determined by the state of its essence, since each thing acts to the extent that it actually exists. Hence, if we found something with an unlimited or uncontracted form or nature, its power would extend to all the actions or effects suited to that nature. If heat subsisted in itself, for example, or if something received heat with all its potential, then it would have the power to produce all the actions and effects of heat. But if a subject did not receive heat with all its potential, receiving it with some contraction or limitation instead, then it would not have the active power for all the actions or effects of heat. Now, since God is subsistent existence itself, God clearly possesses the nature of existing infinitely without any limitation or contraction. Hence, God’s active power extends infinitely to everything that exists and everything that can have the nature of an existent. The only things excluded from the range of God’s power are things incompatible with the nature of an existent, not because God’s power is lacking but because such things cannot possibly exist, and hence cannot be made to exist.
Now, existing and not existing at the same time and in the same respect is incompatible with the nature of an existent. Hence, God cannot make something exist and not exist at the same time, nor can God make anything that involves such a contradiction. Yet the actual existence of matter without form is just such a thing. For every actual thing is either an actuality itself or a potential thing participating in actuality. But being an actuality is incompatible with matter’s nature, since matter is a potential existent by its very nature. Thus, it follows that matter can only actually exist by participating in actuality, and an actuality in which matter participates is just a form. Hence, it is the same thing to say that matter exists and that matter has form. Thus, saying that matter actually exists without form amounts to saying that contradictory things are the case at the same time. Hence, God cannot make matter exist without form.
So, to the first objection: An accident depends for its existence on a subject as the cause that sustains it. Yet God can produce all the effects of secondary causes without those secondary causes, which is why God can preserve an accident in existence without a subject. But matter depends on form for its actual existence because form is its very actuality. Hence, the two cases are not analogous.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that God can make the same body to be located in two places at once:
It is more difficult to change this substance into that substance than to change this accident into that accident. But in the sacrament of the altar God’s power turns the substance of bread into the substance of Christ’s body while the dimensions corresponding to the bread’s place remain. Hence, it follows that the same body of Christ is in many places at once, not located in them with its own corresponding dimensions, but sacramentally present in them. Therefore, God can also turn the dimensions of one body into the dimensions of another body, and thus the same body would be located in two places at once.
But to the contrary: Every two places are distinguished from each other by an opposition between places—above and below, before and behind, and left and right. But God cannot make two opposite things to be the case at the same time, since that implies a contradiction. Therefore, God cannot make the same body to be located in two places at once.
Answer: For a body to be located in a place is just for a place to surround and contain a body and its corresponding dimensions, and for a place to contain a body is just for a body to be in that place with no part of itself outside that place. Hence, to suppose that a body is in one place and yet also in another place is to suppose that contradictory things are the case at the same time. Therefore, as was just explained, God cannot make a body to be located in two places at once.
So, to the first objection: It is more difficult to change this accident into that accident than to change this substance into that substance. For two substances share the same material subject, which is an essential part of each, and a substance is individuated by itself. But an accident cannot be individuated by itself; it is individuated by its subject. Hence, it is inconsistent for this accident to change into that accident. Yet even granting that these dimensions turned into those dimensions, it would not follow that the same body was in two places at once, but only in one place. Compare: after the substance of bread is turned into the substance of Christ’s body, there are not two substances there, but only one. Likewise, if the dimensions of one body were turned into the dimensions of another, there would not be two sets of dimensions, but only one, which would not correspond to many places, but only one.
Question 2
The next questions about God touched on the assumed human nature.
There were three such questions. The first was about the soul: (1) Does Christ’s soul know infinite things? The second was about the body: (2) After his death, was Christ’s eye called an eye equivocally or univocally? The third was about the composite of body and soul and its act of eating: (3) After his resurrection, did Christ truly eat by incorporating food into himself?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that Christ’s soul could not know infinite things:
1. Since a created gift is finite, it cannot raise a creature to what is proper to God, which is infinite. But the grace of union is a created gift, and knowing infinite things is proper to God, whose wisdom is beyond numbering.1 Therefore, the grace of union cannot raise Christ’s soul to know infinite things.
2. In chapter 11 of The Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius holds that these three things are proportionate to each other: substance, power, and activity.2 But the substance of Christ’s soul cannot be infinite, and hence its power and activity cannot be infinite either. Therefore, Christ’s soul cannot know infinite things.
But to the contrary: The intellect of Christ’s soul is not less than his will. But Christ’s merit—an act of his soul’s will—is infinite, since it was sufficient to cancel an infinity of sins. For he is the expiation for the sins of the whole world, as 1 John 2 says.3 Therefore, an act of the intellect of Christ’s soul can be infinite as well, and hence can know infinite things.
Answer: This question calls for a number of distinctions.
First, realize that something can be called infinite either in form or in matter. For a thing is called infinite because it is unlimited. Thus, matter is limited by form insofar as matter with its potential for various species is restricted to one species by form, and form is limited by matter insofar as the form of a species, which can be in many individuals, is restricted to an individual by being received in this matter. Hence, just as matter without form is infinite, so form without matter is infinite. Now, the divine nature is not received in any matter, nor is it mixed with any potentiality; it is pure subsistent actuality. Hence, the divine nature is infinite. Moreover, each thing is known by means of its form, and to the extent that it is actual. Hence, infinite matter is unknowable in itself, as it says in book III of the Physics.4 Yet infinite form is most knowable in itself, although it is unknown to us, since it exceeds the limits of our intellect. Now, quantity is a characteristic of matter, and quantity’s infinity refers to the potential to take one part of it after another. Hence, infinite quantity is unknowable in itself, and no intellect can know an infinite quantity by taking it in order—i.e., by counting its parts one after another.
Next, realize that something can be infinite in each of these ways both absolutely and in a certain respect. If a body were infinite in length, for instance, but not in width, then it would only be infinite in a certain respect. But if a body were infinite in every direction, then it would be absolutely infinite. Similarly, if the form of a species did not exist in matter (as the Platonists thought was the case), then it would be infinite in a certain respect—namely with respect to the individuals of that species—although it would still be absolutely finite because of its restriction to a certain genus and species. But the divine essence is absolutely infinite, since it is absolutely free of the confines of every genus and species.
Finally, realize that knowledge is of two kinds. One is called the knowledge of vision, which involves knowing things that are, that will be, or that have been. The other is called the knowledge of simple awareness, which involves knowing things that can be, rather than things that are, that will be, or that have been.
Now, since God comprehends the divine essence, by knowing the divine essence God knows absolutely infinite things with the knowledge of simple awareness. For God knows all the things that God can make. Nevertheless, God does not know them by taking them in order—i.e., by taking them one after another. Rather, God knows them all at once. But Christ’s soul does not comprehend the divine essence, and thus does not comprehend the divine power. Hence, Christ’s soul does not know all the things that God can make, and thus does not know absolutely infinite things. But Christ’s soul does comprehend all the power of creatures, and the power of creatures extends to infinite things—not to absolutely infinite things (since the power of creatures does not extend to all the things that God can make), but to infinite things of a certain kind—such as a continuum, for instance, which has the potential for infinite divisions. Hence, with the knowledge of simple awareness Christ’s soul knows infinite things in a certain respect—namely the things to which the power of creatures extends.
That makes the reply to the objections clear, since the first two objections are about the knowledge of absolutely infinite things.
To the objection made to the contrary: The will of Christ’s soul is an absolutely finite power, as is his intellect. Christ’s merit gets its infinity from the excellence of his person, since it is the merit of both a human being and God.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that Christ’s eye was not an eye equivocally after his death:
1. Christ’s body and each of its parts are supported by the subsisting subject of the divine Word. Yet the subsisting subject of the divine Word remained united to Christ’s body and its parts after death. Hence, Christ’s whole body and all of its parts were the same in substance both before and after death. Therefore, Christ’s eye was not an eye equivocally after his death.
2. The philosophers only knew how to talk about mere human beings. But Christ was not a mere human being: he was both human and divine. So, when the Philosopher says that the eye of a dead human being is an eye equivocally,5 that does not apply to Christ.
But to the contrary: Christ is a human being in the same sense as other human beings, and his death was a true death like that of other human beings. But any dead human being’s eye is called an eye equivocally. Therefore, Christ’s eye was called an eye equivocally after his death.
Answer: A word is called univocal or equivocal based on whether or not it has the same definition. Now, the definition of each kind of thing comes from its specific form, and a human being’s specific form is the rational soul. Hence, with the rational soul gone, there can no longer be a human being univocally, but only equivocally. And, as it says in book II of On the Soul, the same thing that applies to the whole has to apply to the parts. For just as the soul relates to the whole body, so part of the soul relates to part of the body—as, for instance, sight relates to the eye. Hence, just as a human being is only so called equivocally after the separation of the soul from the body, so an eye is only so called equivocally as well.6
It makes no difference whether we suppose that the rational soul is replaced in the body by another substantial form (which some people hold) or not (which seems more consonant with the truth). For whenever any of its essential principles are removed, a thing’s specific definition no longer remains the same, and hence the word for it no longer applies univocally. So, the only way that the human body and its parts could retain the same specific definition after the soul’s departure would be if the soul were not united to the body as its form. But that would imply that the soul’s union with the body is not a case of substantial generation, and its separation from the body is not a case of corruption. Yet to hold that about Christ’s body is heretical. As Damascene says in book III: The word “corruption” signifies two things. It signifies human suffering: hunger, thirst, exertion, piercing with nails, death (the separation of the soul from the body), and any other such things. . . . But “corruption” also signifies the complete destruction and dissolution of the body into its constituent elements. . . . Now the Lord’s body did not experience corruption in this second sense, as the prophet says: You will not let your holy one see corruption, i.e. destruction. But it is impious to say with the fool Julian and Galanus that the Lord’s body was incorruptible in the first sense of “corruption” even before his resurrection. For if his body was incorruptible, then it was not consubstantial or of the same substance with ours . . . and then what the gospel says happened did not really happen . . . and we are not really saved, but only appear to be.7
So, because of the separation of his soul from his body, during the three days he was dead Christ was not called a human being univocally, but a dead human being. So, too, during the three days he was dead Christ’s eye was not an eye univocally, but equivocally—a dead eye. The same goes for all the other parts of his body.
1. So, to the first objection: There are two senses of “substance.” Sometimes it stands for a subsisting individual. In that sense, it is true that Christ’s body continued to be supported by the subsisting individual of the divine Word. For death did not break the Word’s union with his soul or his body. Accordingly, Christ’s body remained absolutely numerically the same in subsisting individual or subject, which is the person of the Word. But in another sense, “substance” means an essence or nature. In that sense, Christ’s body is supported by his soul as its form, not by the Word, since the Word is not united to the body as its form. To say otherwise is heretical, as with the heresy of Arius and Apollinaris, who held that the Word took the place of a soul in Christ.8 It would also imply that God’s union with the human being was natural, which is part of the heresy of Eutyches.9 Therefore, after his death Christ’s body was absolutely the same in substance taken as subsisting individual, but not the same in substance taken as essence or nature. Yet whether a word is univocal or equivocal is not a matter of the subject, but of the essence or nature, which is what its definition signifies.
2. To the second objection: Although Christ is not a mere human being, he is still a true human being, and his death was a true death. Hence, everything true of a human being precisely as a human being, and of a human being’s death, is also true of Christ and his death.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that after his resurrection Christ truly ate by incorporating food into himself:
As Augustine says in his book of Eighty-Three Questions: If it deceives, then it is not the truth.10 Hence, no deception befits Christ, who is himself the Truth. Yet it would have been deceptive for Christ to appear to eat without truly incorporating food into himself. Therefore, Christ truly ate by incorporating food into himself.
But to the contrary: In book III, Damascene says that even though Christ tasted food after his resurrection, it was not by a law of nature . . . , but for our benefit, in order to convince us of the truth of his resurrection, and that it was the very same flesh that suffered and rose again.11
Answer: Something is called true in two senses: in one sense, by virtue of the truth of its signification; and in another sense, by virtue of the truth of its natural kind. For example, a voice is true by the truth of its signification when it signifies the existence of what exists. But the truth of a thing’s natural kind depends on the principles of that kind of thing, not on its effects or any of its other consequences. Hence, a voice is called true by the truth of its natural kind when it is produced with the right organs and projected by the mouth of an animal in connection with an act of its imagination,12 even if nothing is there to hear it, which is one of the consequent effects of voice.
Now, even though angels had no need to eat, the scriptures say that they did so, as did Christ after his resurrection. And in both cases it was true eating, as Augustine says in book XIII of The City of God.13 But each was true in its own way. In the case of the angels, it was true by the truth of its signification. As Augustine says in the same place, the angels ate, not because they needed to, but because they wanted to and were able to, in order to blend in with human beings by the human form of their ministry.14 But in Christ’s case, the eating was true by the truth of its natural kind, since it was done with the natural organs aimed at that activity; and it was also true by the truth of its signification, since it signified the true human nature of Christ’s risen body.
Yet food’s being changed into the body is a consequence of eating it. Hence, even in our case, if food is not changed into our body, but immediately vomited up instead, our earlier eating of it was still true eating. But it was not appropriate for food to be changed into Christ’s body, which had transcended the state of generation and corruption. Hence, rather than being changed into his body, Christ’s food was resolved into its prior matter by his power. Nevertheless, his eating of it was still true eating and free of deception.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Question 3
The next questions were about angels.
There were three such questions: (1) Does an angel cause the rational soul? (2) Does an angel influence the human soul? and (3) Does an evil angel (i.e., the devil) substantially inhabit human beings during each of their mortal sins?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. An angel seems to cause the rational soul:
Whenever things are made equal in nature, and yet one of them is prior to the other in the order of nature, the prior one causes the posterior one. Now, an angel and a soul are made equal in nature, for an angel and a human being are equal in nature, yet unequal in office.15 But since an angel is simpler, it is prior to the human soul in the order of nature. Therefore, an angel causes the rational soul.
But to the contrary: The rational soul is brought into existence by being created. But creating something takes infinite power, and hence can only be done by God. Therefore, an angel cannot cause the rational soul.
Answer: It is impossible for something produced by being created to be caused by anything but the first cause of everything.
Here is the reason why. As the Platonists say, the causality of a higher cause extends to more things. Hence, an effect common to many things must be traced back to a higher cause. Now, in the order of essential principles, a posterior form is obviously more contracted and extends to fewer things, while a prior form that is nearer to its first subject extends to more things. Hence, it follows that posterior forms come from lower agents, while prior and more common forms come from higher agents. That means that the first subsisting thing of each kind must come from the first cause of everything. Hence, every cause other than the first has to act upon a preexisting subject, which is an effect of the first cause. Thus, no cause can create anything except the first cause—i.e., God—since creating a thing means producing it without a preexisting subject. Hence, things that can only be produced by being created can only be caused by God.
Now, since such things are subsistent, they either lack the composition of matter and form, and are just forms that subsist in their own existence, such as angels; or they are composed of matter and form, but their matter only has the potential for one form, such as the heavenly bodies. It is not possible to produce either of those things without producing the first substance of its kind. But there are other things that it is possible to produce without producing the first subject of its kind. These include things composed of matter and form whose matter has the potential for different forms, so that different forms can follow each other in the same matter. They also include forms that do not subsist in their own existence. Such forms are not said to exist because they themselves have existence, but because their subjects have a certain way of existing on account of them. Hence, such forms are not said to come to exist or cease to exist in their own right but, rather, insofar as their subjects come to be actual or not actual with respect to them.
Now, the rational soul subsists in its own existence, otherwise it could not perform an activity without the involvement of matter. Hence, it follows that the rational soul can only be produced by being created. Therefore, there is no way that an angel can cause the rational soul; only God can do so.
So, to the first objection: That first premise seems to involve a contradiction. If an angel and a soul are made equal in nature, then an angel is not prior to a soul in the order of nature, unless being made equal in nature means sharing the nature of a genus, but not that of a species.
Yet even when things share the nature of a genus or species, the prior thing does not have to cause all the others. In fact, within the same species, one thing cannot be prior to another in the order of nature, at least not properly speaking. For a species applies equally to all of its individuals, as it says in book III of the Metaphysics.16 But that is not true of a genus. Among the species in a single genus, one species is naturally prior to and more perfect than another. Yet among the individuals in a single species, one individual can be prior to another in time, and a prior individual can cause a posterior individual, as for instance a father causes a son (which was touched on by the objection). But this is not universally true: not all past people cause all future people. Likewise, among the species in a single genus, a prior species might be the source and cause of the others. This is the case, for instance, with change in place and other changes, with the number two and other numbers, and with a triangle and other rectilinear shapes. But this is not universally true either: a human being (the most perfect kind of animal) does not actively cause other kinds of animals. Hence, an angel does not have to efficiently cause the soul.
This objection is based on the opinion of those who hold that God causes things by natural necessity, and that one simple cause can only directly cause one thing, which then causes another thing, and so on down to the last things. But we hold that God causes everything by the divine wisdom, which establishes the order among things. Hence, God can produce things at different levels by directly creating them.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that an angel cannot influence the human soul:
When two things stand at a distance, one of them can only influence the other through an intermediary. Now, an angel and a soul stand at a distance from one another, and yet there is no intermediary through which an angel can have an influence on a soul. Therefore, an angel cannot influence the soul.
But to the contrary: As Dionysius says in chapter 8 of The Celestial Hierarchy, angels purify, illuminate, and perfect human beings.17 But angels could not do so without influencing human beings. Therefore, an angel can influence the human soul.
Answer: Every agent acts in a way that accords with its nature. So, if the state of a thing’s nature is unknown, its way of acting must also be unknown. Now, we do not know the state of an angel’s nature as it is in itself, since in this life we cannot know what angels are. But we can still come to know something about them based on their likeness to sensible things, as Dionyisus says in chapters 1 and 2 of The Celestial Hierarchy.18 Hence, we can only come to know about their way of acting based on their likeness to sensible agents. In the case of sensible agents, however, we find that what is actual acts upon what is potential, and that an agent has to be in the same position as what it acts upon by making bodily contact with it. Now, the higher an intellectual nature is, the more actual it is, since it is that much more like God, who is pure actuality. Hence, higher angels can act upon lower angels and upon our souls, as what is actual acts upon what is potential. This sort of action is called an influence. Moreover, order plays the same role among spiritual things that position plays among bodily ones, since position is the order among bodily parts in a place. Hence, the mutual order among spiritual substances is enough for one of them to influence another; they have no need of a bodily or spatial intermediary, since their actions occur outside the space and time that bodies occupy.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that the devil always substantially inhabits human beings whenever they commit mortal sin:
Mortal sin is the opposite of grace. But the Holy Spirit always inhabits human beings that have grace. As 1 Corinthians 3 says: You are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you.19 Therefore, an evil spirit always inhabits human beings that commit mortal sin.
But to the contrary: The devil inhabits human beings by causing their sin. But not every sin comes from the devil; some come from the flesh and the world. Therefore, the devil does not always inhabit human beings that commit mortal sin.
Answer: There are two ways to understand the devil inhabiting human beings: either by inhabiting their souls or by inhabiting their bodies.
The devil cannot substantially inhabit human beings by inhabiting their souls, since only God can enter our minds. Nor can the devil cause sin in the way that the Spirit causes grace. For the Holy Spirit affects us internally, whereas the devil suggests things to us externally through our senses or imagination. But the devil can be said to inhabit people’s state by causing their wickedness, not only in the case of sins committed at his suggestion but in every mortal sin. For every mortal sin enslaves people to the devil’s service.
The devil can also inhabit human beings by inhabiting their bodies, which is obviously the case with possession. But this has more to do with punishment than with sin. For the bodily punishments of this life are not always in response to a sin of the person punished. Sometimes they are not inflicted on sinners, and sometimes they are inflicted on people who are not sinners, as John 9 says about the man born blind.20 This happens in accordance with God’s judgments, which are beyond our comprehension. Therefore, the devil does not substantially inhabit human beings whenever they commit mortal sin, not even by inhabiting their bodies.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Question 4
The next questions were about human beings. The first related to human beings of a higher status, viz. teachers and religious. The second related to human beings of a lower status, viz. the laity. The third related to all human beings generally.
There were two questions about teachers of sacred scripture: (1) Is it permissible for a man to seek his own license to teach theology? and (2) When people hear different masters of theology with contrary opinions, are they excused from sin if they follow the false opinions of their masters?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It does not seem permissible for any man to seek his own license to teach theology:
1. Teachers of sacred scripture exercise the ministry of the word of God, as do prelates. But no one is permitted to seek a prelature. Rather, as Gregory says in the Register, positions of honor in the Church should be conferred on those who avoid them, and denied to those who seek them.21 Therefore, no man is permitted to seek a master’s chair to teach sacred scripture.
2. In book XIX of The City of God, Augustine says: It is inappropriate to desire the superior position necessary for a people to be ruled, even if it is administered appropriately.22 Hence, it is also inappropriate to seek such a position. Therefore, it is inappropriate to seek a master’s chair, which is a superior position.
But to the contrary: In his Pastoral Rule, Gregory says that the position of teachers is dangerous, while the position of students is safe.23 But it seems to be a matter of perfection to expose oneself to danger for the sake of some good. Therefore, it seems praiseworthy for a man to desire a master’s chair and to seek one for himself.
Answer: In order to answer this question, we need to note three differences between a master’s chair and a bishop’s chair. The first is that receiving a master’s chair does not involve receiving a superiority one previously lacked; it just involves receiving the opportunity to share the knowledge one already possessed. For a license does not give a man knowledge; it gives him the authority to teach. But receiving a bishop’s chair involves receiving a superior power that one previously lacked, although lacking it makes one no different from anyone else. The second difference is that the superior knowledge required for a master’s chair is a matter of one’s own personal perfection, whereas the superior power of a bishop’s chair is a matter of the relationship between one person and another. The third difference is that being exceedingly charitable is what makes a man fit to hold a bishop’s chair. Hence, as the last chapter of John says, before the Lord committed the care of his sheep to Peter, he asked him: Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?24 On the other hand, having enough knowledge is what makes a man fit to hold a master’s chair.
With those differences noted, it is obviously praiseworthy to desire something related to one’s own perfection. Hence, the desire for wisdom is praiseworthy. As Wisdom 6 says, the desire for wisdom leads to an everlasting kingdom.25 But the desire for power over others is vicious. As Gregory says: It is unnatural pride for one person to want to rule over another.26 Hence, if the license to hold a master’s chair gave one a superior wisdom, as the elevation to a bishop’s chair gives one a superior power, then such a license would be worth pursuing in itself, although seeking superior power would still be shameful. But since receiving the license to hold a master’s chair only involves receiving the opportunity to share what one already possesses, there does not seem to be any shame in seeking such a license, considered in itself. For it is praiseworthy and charitable to share one’s knowledge with others. As Wisdom 8 says: What I have learned without deceit, I share without envy.27 And as 1 Peter 4 says: As each has received a gift, use it for one another.28
Yet there can be some shame in seeking such a license presumptuously, which would be the case if someone unfit to teach sought the office of a teacher. But seeking a license to teach is not as presumptuous as seeking to be a bishop, since a man can know with certainty that he possesses knowledge, which makes him fit to teach, but he cannot know with certainty that he possesses charity, which makes him fit for the office of a pastor. Hence, it is always vicious to seek to be a bishop. But it is not always vicious to seek a license to teach, although it would be better for someone else to seek it on a man’s behalf, unless he happened to have some special reason for seeking it himself.
That makes the reply to the first two objections clear.
To the objection made to the contrary: One who does not avoid danger obviously disregards what might be lost to such danger. Now, it is praiseworthy to disregard bodily goods for the sake of spiritual goods, and thus praiseworthy to expose oneself to bodily danger for the sake of spiritual goods. But it is exceedingly vicious to disregard spiritual goods, and hence exceedingly blameworthy to expose oneself to spiritual danger. Now, those in the position of teachers face spiritual danger. But a man with a pastor’s chair can avoid the danger such teachers face by means of knowledge with charity, which a man cannot know with certainty that he possesses. Whereas a man with a master’s chair can avoid the danger such teachers face by means of knowledge, which a man can know that he possesses. Hence, the same rule does not apply in each case.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. When people hear different masters holding differing opinions, they seem excused from the sin of error if they follow the false opinions of their masters:
In Matthew 23, the Lord says: The scribes and Pharisees sit on the chair of Moses. Keep and do everything they tell you.29 Much more, then, should people keep what teachers of sacred scripture tell them. Therefore, people who follow their opinions do not sin.
But to the contrary: Matthew 15 says: If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit.30 But to the extent that they are in error, those in error are blind. Therefore, anyone who follows the opinion of a master in error falls into the pit of sin.
Answer: If the differing opinions of teachers of sacred scripture do not bear on faith and good morals, then their hearers can follow any of their opinions without danger. The Apostle makes room for this in Romans 14, where he says: Let everyone abound in their own judgment.31
In matters that bear on faith and good morals, however, no one is excused from sin for following the erroneous opinion of any master. For ignorance does not excuse one from sin in such cases, otherwise the followers of the opinion of Arius, or Nestorius, or other heresiarchs would be free from sin. Nor can a hearer’s lack of intelligence serve as an excuse for following an erroneous opinion on such matters. For one should not give assent lightly to doubtful things. Rather, as Augustine says in book III of On Christian Doctrine, everyone should consult the rule of faith, which is found in the clearer passages of scripture and in the authority of the Church.32 Hence, people cannot be excused from the sin of error for assenting to the opinion of any master against the clear testimony of scripture or the public teaching authority of the Church.
So, to the first objection: First the Lord says: The scribes and Pharisees sit on the chair of Moses.33 Then he adds: Keep and do everything they tell you.34 Hence, what he adds is meant to refer to matters relevant to Moses’s chair, which do not include things contrary to faith and good morals.
Question 5
The next questions related to religious. The first were about entering the religious life. The second were about living the religious life.
There were four of the first questions: (1) Is it permissible to lead young people to enter the religious life through the obligation of an oath or vow? (2) Can people obligated by such an oath or vow remain in the world without thereby sinning? (3) Is it permissible to lead sinners into the religious life? and (4) Is it a sin to make a person swear an oath not to enter the religious life?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems impermissible to lead young people into the religious life by having them take an oath or vow:
1. It is impermissible to do something that the Church forbids. But in a letter addressed to religious, Innocent IV forbids making such a vow.35 Therefore, it is a sin for anyone to attempt to obligate people to enter the religious life by taking an oath or vow.
2. Chapter 1 of On Regulars and Those Entering the Religious Life, from the Decretals, says: People should only be tonsured at the legitimate age and of their own will.36 But when young people are received into the religious life under the obligation of an oath or vow, they are not tonsured at the legitimate age and of their own will, but of necessity, due to the obligation of their oath or vow. Therefore, having them take such an oath or vow seems impermissible.
3. It is more necessary to lead people to the Christian faith than to the religious life. But people should not be led to the Christian faith by necessity, but by their own will. As the chapter On Jews from d. XLV of the Decretum says: They should not be persuaded to convert by force, but by their own free will and volition.37 Much less, then, should people be led into the religious life by the imposed necessity of an oath or vow.
4. This seems contrary to the respect due to the religious life, since young people leave the religious life just as readily as they enter it, and it seems disrespectful to the religious life for people who leave it so readily to be received into it so readily.38 Therefore, it seems inappropriate for young people to be received into the religious life.
5. Good things should not be done when they have evil consequences. But the good of leading young people into the religious life has many evil consequences, since they apostatize and contract illegitimate marriages and do many other impermissible things.39 Therefore, young people should not be called to enter the religious life.
6. In Matthew 23, the Lord says: Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, for you cross land and sea to get a single convert, and when you get one, you make him twice as much a child of hell as yourselves.40 This seems to apply to the case in question. People who enter the religious life in this way are made children of hell twice over. First, their entering is evil, since the Church forbids it. Second, their leaving is evil, since it is apostasy. Therefore, those who lead people into the religious life this way incur God’s condemnation.
7. This seems to be contrary to the necessary testing. For 1 John 4 says: Do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are of God.41 But it does not seem to be of God for young people to enter the religious life, since they so often leave after entering it. As Acts 5 says: If this plan and undertaking is of men, it will fail; but if the plan is of God, you will not be able to overthrow them.42 Therefore, those who lead young people into the religious life seem opposed to God.
But to the contrary:
1. Those who can bind themselves to the devil can also bind themselves to God. But children can bind themselves to the devil by sinning, as it says in the chapter On Children from The Sins of Children in the Decretals.43 Therefore, they can also bind themselves to serve God in the religious life by taking an oath or vow.
2. Cause XX, q.1 of the Decretum says that the profession of virginity will be sure once a girl has reached adulthood and would usually be considered ready for marriage.44 Therefore, at the same age people can obligate themselves to enter the religious life by taking an oath or vow.
Answer: Since cases can differ so much, it is not possible to make a universal judgment about human actions. But if something turns out to be evil in a particular case, then for that very reason it should be considered absolutely impermissible.
So, cases could arise in which it was impermissible for certain young people to obligate themselves to enter the religious life, or for them to be received into it. This would be the case, for instance, if their inconstancy were certain or believed likely, or if something similar were recognized, after a well-established religious community had diligently looked into the matter.
But saying that it is impermissible for any young people to be received into the religious life is diabolical. As the gloss of Origen on the verse Moses and Aaron, why are you calling the people away from their work? of Exodus 5 says: Today, too, if Moses and Aaron—i.e., prophetic and priestly preaching—call souls away from this world to serve God, abandon all their possessions, and meditate on the law and the word of God continuously, then you will also hear Pharaoh’s many friends saying together: See how they lead people astray and corrupt the youth. And later: That is what Pharaoh said then, and that is what his friends say now.45 It also goes against the command of Christ. As Matthew 19 says: Then children were brought to him so that he might lay hands on them and pray. And the disciples rebuked them. But Jesus said to them: Let the little children come to me, and do not hinder them.46 Origin explains this text in his comments on Matthew, saying that before Jesus’s disciples learned the nature of justice . . . they rebuked those who . . . brought children and babies to Christ. But the Lord urged his disciples to consider the good of the children. . . . Therefore, we ought to listen to his words, so that the value we place on higher wisdom . . . does not make us look down on the Church’s little ones, as if we ourselves were great, . . . and prevent children from coming to Jesus.47
But before children are capable of using reason, it is impermissible to draw them to the religious life without their parents’ consent. It is not that children cannot be received into the religious life before the age of puberty even with their parents’ consent. For even babies can be given to a monastery by their parents, as it says in the Decretum, C. XX, q.1, cc. You added and Monks and Whoever.48 The reason for saying this is, rather, that children who have not yet reached the age of discretion are under their parents’ control by natural law. Hence, just as the children of nonbelievers cannot be taken and baptized against their parents’ will, so neither can children be given to the religious life. But once children are capable of using reason, their free will gives them control over themselves in matters bearing on the salvation of their souls. Hence, they can then be baptized and led into the religious life even against their parents’ will. Now, the apostles established the practice of baptizing the children of willing parents so that their children could be raised on the things of God and have no other life than the contemplation of the things of God, as Dionysius says in the last chapter of The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.49 For the same reason, parents can offer their babies to monasteries, as we just said.
But this question is also about the obligation of an oath or vow, which still needs to be addressed. Realize, therefore, that the right thing to do in such cases depends on the character of the young people themselves, which can differ. If they are stable enough to raise no fear of them abandoning their intention to enter the religious life, then there is no need to obligate them to do so with an oath or vow. The same is true if they are so changeable that there is no believing that they will be capable of stably keeping such an oath or vow. But most people will readily change their own intentions, and yet perfectly fulfill the obligations of an oath or vow. Hence, it is more beneficial for them to obtain the fruits of a better life by the obligation of an oath or vow. As Augustine says in his letter to Armentarius and Paulina: Do not regret your vow. Be glad that you are no longer allowed to do what you had been allowed to do in spite of its disadvantage to you . . . What a happy necessity to be compelled to do something better.50
1. So, to the first objection: In the letter addressed to religious that begins, Not only in favor, Innocent says: On the advice of our brothers, by virtue of obedience and under pain of excommunication by the authority of the present letter we strictly forbid you from receiving anyone for profession in your order or for the renunciation of the world before completing a year of testing, which was established as a rule chiefly to aid human frailty.51 But he never forbids young people from being received for such testing, or from being obligated to enter the religious life by taking an oath or vow (without prejudice to the time of testing).
2. To the second objection: The legitimate age is the time of puberty, as the chapter quoted makes clear. That is when most people begin to be able to make free use of their reason about matters relating to their own salvation. But realize that necessity is of two kinds. One excludes the will—namely the necessity of coercion. But another does not exclude the will, since it is caused by a voluntary obligation. That is the kind of necessity involved in the obligation of an oath or vow. Hence, people should not be coerced to accept the faith or enter the religious life, but there is no reason they cannot obligate themselves to do so by taking an oath or vow. That is the necessity Augustine is talking about: What a happy necessity to be compelled to do something better.52
3. That makes the response to the third objection clear.
4. To the fourth objection: Like judgments about natural things, judgments about voluntary things should not be based on what happens in a few cases, but on what happens for the most part. Yet the cases of people who enter the religious life and then leave are relatively few. In most cases those who enter it stay rather than leave, as experience shows.
5. To the fifth objection: “Good things should not be done when they have evil consequences.” If the word “consequences” here is taken causally, then this is absolutely true. It would be a sin for someone to intend to lead people to enter the religious life so that they will apostatize later. But if the word “consequences” is taken sequentially, then we could never do anything good, since there are hardly any human goods that are not sometimes followed by evils. Hence Ecclesiastes 11 says: The one who watches the wind will not sow, and the one who looks to the clouds will never reap.53 Something good should only be avoided because of evil consequences when the evil consequences are much greater than the good itself and occur more frequently. The Lord did not avoid choosing twelve disciples even though one of them would become a devil, as John 6 says.54 And the apostles did not avoid choosing seven deacons because one of them (Nicholas) would be lost. Much less, then, should religious avoid saving so many people because a few of them will apostatize.
6. To the sixth objection: People who enter the religious life under the obligation of an oath or vow do not do anything forbidden by the Church, as was just shown. Hence, their entering does not make such people children of hell; it makes them children of the eternal life the Lord promises in Matthew 19 to those who abandon temporal things for his sake.55 Of course, leaving after their profession does make such people children of hell, but that is nothing against those who received them, unless they corrupted them by their bad example. Hence the significance of the Lord saying: You make him twice as much a child of hell as yourselves.56 As Chrysostom says, being led by the example of bad teachers, he became worse than the teachers themselves.57
7. To the seventh objection: This argument smacks of the heresy of the Manicheans. They used this argument to draw two mistaken conclusions. First, that no corruptible bodies are of God. For if they were of God, they said, then they would not be destroyed. And second, that once charity has been acquired it can never be lost, so that a person who sins mortally never had grace at all. For if the person had grace, they said, then it was a work of God, and thus would never have been destroyed. This same argument suggests that if people do not persevere in the religious life, then their intention to enter the religious life was not of God. Realize, therefore, that those words were not meant to show that the things that are of God remain forever and cannot be destroyed; they were meant to show that God’s providence is infallible. For God’s providence cannot fail. Hence the significance of it saying not that the work of God cannot be overthrown but that the plan of God cannot be. In God’s providence, some people are given the gift of grace to be righteous at present, but not the gift of perseverance, as Augustine makes clear in his book On the Good of Perseverance.58
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. People who are obligated to enter the religious life by taking an oath or vow do not seem bound to enter it:
1. Every action of Christ instructs us.59 Yet the Lord did not impose any necessity upon people but, rather, left things up to their free will. Hence, as Matthew 19 says, he said to one man: If you would enter into life, keep the commandments.60 And then: If you would be perfect, go and sell all you have and give to the poor.61 And in 1 Corinthians 7, the Apostle says: Now concerning virgins, I have no command from the Lord, but I give counsel.62 Therefore, people do not seem bound by necessity to enter the religious life because of an oath or vow.
2. People cannot be obligated by an oath or vow to do something that diminishes their perfection. But entering the religious life diminishes people’s perfection, since their observance of the religious life keeps them from visiting the sick and giving alms and other works of piety, which are the heights of the Christian religion, as Ambrose says in his comments on that verse of 1 Timothy 5: Piety is of value in every way.63 Therefore, people who have taken an oath or vow to enter the religious life are not bound to do so.
3. In book II of On the Contemplative Life, Prosper says: We ought to abstain or fast without being subject to the necessity of fasting or abstaining.64 But people in the religious state abstain or fast out of the necessity of their vow or obedience, which makes it less meritorious. Therefore, people cannot be obligated to enter the religious state by an oath or vow.
4. Virtue is about what is difficult and good.65 But it is more difficult to live well in the world than in the religious state, and hence doing so is more virtuous. Therefore, people cannot be obligated to enter the religious state by an oath or vow.
5. The common good is more important than a private good.66 But it harms the common good for people to enter the religious life. If we all entered the religious life, then there would be no one to care for ordinary people, and thus the populace would lack leaders. Therefore, it is better for people not to enter the religious life than to enter it.
But to the contrary:
1. The Psalms say: Make a vow to the Lord your God and fulfill it.67 The gloss there says that making a vow depends on the will, but once a vow has been made, its fulfillment is a matter of necessity.68 Again, Ecclesiastes 5 says: If you have vowed something to God, do not delay in paying it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases him.69
2. In his letter to Armentarius and Paulina, Augustine says: Now that you have made a vow, now that you have obligated yourself, you are not permitted to do something else. Before you were indebted by your vow, you were free to be inferior, but there is nothing praiseworthy about freedom from having to pay a debt that is more profitable.70
Answer: Saying that people who are obligated to enter the religious life by an oath or vow are not bound to enter it is clearly heretical. For anyone who says that something against a commandment of God is not a sin is a heretic. For instance, anyone who says that simple fornication is not a mortal sin is a heretic. For such fornication is against the commandment: You shall not commit adultery,71 as the saints explain it.72 For the commandments of the first tablet aim at the love of God, and are thus far greater than the commandments of the second tablet, which aim at the love of neighbor. Hence, anyone who says that something related to the commandments of the first tablet can be disregarded without thereby sinning is clearly a heretic. Now, fulfilling a vow relates to divine worship. Hence, anyone who says that a vow does not have to be fulfilled clearly contradicts the first commandment of the first tablet, which is about the kind of worship due to God alone. And anyone who says that an oath does not have to be fulfilled contradicts the second commandment of the first tablet, which says: You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.73 Hence, anyone who says that is clearly a heretic.
Unless perhaps they mean to be saying that entering the religious life is impermissible. For oaths and vows to do impermissible things are not obligatory. As Isidore says: In the case of evil promises, break faith.74 But it is just as heretical to say that entering the religious life is impermissible: that flatly contradicts the counsels of Christ.
Hence, anyone who says that people who are obligated to enter the religious life by an oath or vow can remain in the world without thereby sinning is clearly a heretic, at least anyone who obstinately persists in saying so.
1. So, to the first objection: The necessity of an oath or vow does not exclude the will, as we have said.75 People are obligated by common law to keep God’s commandments, and yet keeping them is still voluntarily. Hence the Lord says: If you would enter into life, keep the commandments.76 Likewise, people who take an oath or vow are obligated by a private obligation, and yet fulfilling their oath or vow is still voluntarily. Before their oath or vow, it is permissible for them to do it or not to do it. Hence the Lord says: If you would be perfect,77 and Paul gives the counsel of virginity.78 But after their oath or vow, it is impermissible for them not to fulfill it.
2. To the second objection: This argument contains a condemned heresy—namely that it is better to remain in the world and have time free for pious works than to enter the religious life. This is among the errors of Vigilantius. Jerome has this to say against him: He is faithlessly trying to poison the Catholic faith, attacking virginity, despising chastity, and railing against the fasting of the saints at the banquets of the worldly.79 Then he goes through and refutes each of the claims that Vigilantius made. When he comes to the claim in question, he says: Now he claims that it is better for people to make use of their own possessions and gradually distribute the profits to the poor rather than to sell their possessions and give them to the poor all at once. God’s response—not mine—to this is: If you would be perfect, go and sell all you have and give to the poor, and come follow me. . . . The one you praise is on the second or third level. We accept that one too, but we know that the first are better than the second and third.80 Hence the book On Church Dogmas condemns this error along with others when it says: It is good to employ one’s own means and make distributions to the poor. It is better to give them away all at once with the intention of following the Lord, and to make walking with Christ one’s only concern.81 Not only is the religious state better than the almsgiving of a person in the world; it is also better than the observance of virginity in the world. As Augustine says in his book On Virginity: No one, as far as I know, would dare to say that virginity is better than monasticism.82
3. To the third objection: Doing something because of a vow is more praiseworthy and meritorious than doing it without a vow. The following makes this clear. The more an action derives from a higher virtue, the more praiseworthy and meritorious it is in itself. When an act of justice is done out of charity, for instance, it is more praiseworthy. Now, clearly, when people fast without a vow, they perform an act of the virtue of abstinence. But when people fast in fulfillment of a vow, their act of abstinence is done out of divine worship, which directs us to God, and is thus a more excellent virtue than abstinence or any other virtue that directs us to created goods. That is why Augustine says in his book On Virginity that virginity is not honored because it is virginity, but because it is consecrated to God . . . , vowed and preserved by pious continence.83 So, when Prosper says: We ought to abstain or fast without being subject to the necessity of fasting or abstaining,84 realize that he is talking about the necessity of coercion, which excludes the will. Hence he adds: Otherwise we will be doing a voluntary thing unwillingly rather than devoutly.85 But the necessity of an oath or vow does not exclude the will, as we have said. Furthermore, if people who fast because of a vow do not like fasting in itself, but like fulfilling their vow, then (other things being equal) they merit more than fasting people who enjoy fasting in itself. For it is more meritorious to enjoy an act of divine worship than an act of abstinence.
4. To the fourth objection: There are two kinds of difficulty. One comes from an act itself being challenging, as is the case with preserving one’s virginity and the like. Such difficulty increases virtue. Another kind of difficulty comes from obstacles and threats of danger.86 Such difficulty does not increase but, rather, decreases virtue. For a person who does not avoid such dangers does not seem to be prudent or to love the good of virtue very much. Yet this is the sense in which living well is difficult for those who remain in the world.
5. To the fifth objection: This argument was made by the heretic Vigilantius, as Jerome makes clear in his book Against Vigilantius, where he says: Monks should not be frightened away from their pursuits, even though they suffer the most ferocious stings from your viper’s tongue. With such arguments you say: If we all cloistered ourselves and lived in solitude, then who would fill the churches? Who would help people in the world? Who could call sinners to virtue? If we were all such fools with you, then who could be wise? And virginity would no longer be commendable. If we were all virgins, and no one got married, the human race would disappear. . . . Virtue is rare; it is not desired by the masses.87 This sort of fear is foolish, since the good of the religious life is so difficult and challenging that very few people enter the religious life compared to the many who remain in the world. It is like being afraid to drink any water because the river might dry up.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. It seems that those who are sinners in the world should not be drawn to the religious life:
One ought to gain experience obeying the commandments before going on to follow the counsels, advancing from lesser to greater things. But those who are sinners in the world have no experience obeying the commandments. Therefore, they should not be drawn or received into the religious life, which requires them to keep the counsels.
But to the contrary: The Lord called Matthew the publican to the state of perfection, as it says in Matthew 9.88 Yet every action of Christ instructs us.89 Therefore, we too ought to call those who are sinners in the world and receive them into the religious life.
Answer: It is most beneficial for sinners to enter the religious life.
For sinners need two things to be saved: first, they need to do penance for past sins; second, they need to abstain from future sins. And the religious life is most conducive for meeting both needs.
First, the religious state is a state of such perfect penance that no satisfaction can equal the penance done by religious, who give themselves and all they have completely to God. Hence, entering the religious life cannot be imposed on anyone as a penance for sin, although it can be suggested as a substitution for any other weighty satisfaction. This is clear from C. XXXIII, q.2, c. Admonish of the Decretum, where Pope Stephen directs a man who had killed his wife to enter a monastery and humbly do everything the abbot commands him to do, otherwise the weightiest penance would be imposed on him, should he choose to remain in the world.90
The religious life also avoids sins the most. For it is difficult for those who remain in the world not to be enticed by the things of the world. That is why the Lord says in Matthew 19, as Chrysostom explains it, that it is impossible for a rich man who clings lovingly to his wealth to enter the kingdom of heaven, while it is only very difficult for a rich man who has wealth to do so.91 Hence Ecclesiasticus 31 says: Blessed is the rich man who is found blameless.92 To show how difficult such a rich man is to find, it then adds: Who is he? And we will praise him.93 That is why Gregory says that holy men even forgo what is permissible in order to abstain from what is impermissible.94
Clearly, then, it is not a sin to draw sinners to the religious life; rather, it is praiseworthy. As the Lord says of himself: I have not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance.95
So, to the first objection: That argument runs counter to the teachings of the gospel and of philosophy. It runs counter to the teachings of the gospel since the gospel proposes the counsels as an easier way for people to achieve their salvation. Hence, the secular state is more dangerous than the religious state, and it is foolish to say that those weakened by sinning should not retreat to a safer life. It also runs counter to the teaching of philosophy, which teaches that those prone to vice ought to be pulled back to the opposite extreme, as we do when straightening crooked branches.96
Article 4
We turn, then, to the fourth question. It seems that it would not be a sin for someone to make a person swear an oath not to enter the religious life:
It is permissible to swear to do anything that it is permissible to do. But it is permissible for a secular person never to enter the religious life. Hence, it is permissible to swear never to do so. Therefore, it is not a sin for someone to make a person swear such an oath, since that would not make the person swear to do anything impermissible.
But to the contrary: The intention to enter the religious life comes from the Holy Spirit, as it says in the Decretum, C. XIX, q.2, c. Two.97 But it is a grave sin to resist the promptings of the Holy Spirit. Stephen criticizes the Jews for doing so in Acts 7, where he says: You always resist the Holy Spirit.98 Therefore, it is a grave sin for anyone to make a person swear not to enter the religious life.
Answer: As we have said,99 absolute judgments about which human acts are permissible or impermissible should not be based on what happens in a particular case, but on what happens for the most part, just as natural things are judged in light of what happens for the most part.
So, there could be a case in which it was not a sin for someone to make a person swear not to enter the religious life. This would be the case, for instance, if a man were married and wanted to enter the religious life without his wife’s consent. And there could be other cases as well.
Absolutely speaking, however, it is a grave sin to make a person swear not to enter the religious life. If a person wanted to enter the religious life, and it was the right time to do so, and all the other circumstances were appropriate, then it would be a grave sin to prevent the person from entering the religious life. Hence in Matthew 23, the Lord threatens woe to the Pharisees, who would not enter the kingdom of heaven themselves or allow others to do so.100 For one who makes a person swear not to enter the religious life prevents the person as much as one can from entering the religious life at any time and under any circumstances (however appropriate), since the universal contains all particulars. Hence, doing so is clearly a grave sin.
To the first objection: Even though it is permissible to refrain from doing a good work, it is still impermissible to prevent oneself or someone else from being able to perform that good work. For instance, it is permissible not to give alms to this poor person, but it is impermissible to make oneself or someone else swear not to give alms to anyone.
The reason for this is that people can refrain from performing an act of virtue without sinning, since the obligation of positive commandments (which are for acts of virtue) does not apply to all times. But preventing a good work is directly contrary to virtue, and hence forbidden by a negative commandment, the obligation of which does apply to all times. Hence, any such oath is impermissible, and not to be kept. In fact, those who swear such an oath are swearing falsely, since an oath cannot obligate one to do anything contrary to the love of God and neighbor.
Hence, even though it is permissible for a person not to enter the religious life, it is still impermissible to prevent oneself or someone else from doing so by taking an oath. For that goes against the perfect life and against the counsel of Christ.
Question 6
The next three questions were about living the religious life: (1) Can religious (who ought not to have anything of their own either alone or together) give alms from the things that other people give them as alms? (2) If a religiousknows that his father is in grave need, can he leave without his superior’s permission in order to help his father? and (3) Is the religious state more perfect than the state of parish priests and archdeacons?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that religious (who have nothing of their own either alone or together) cannot benefit from giving alms:
Giving alms only benefits those who give them in the right way. But religious cannot give alms in the right way. For the right way to give alms is with one’s own things. As Tobit 4 says: If you have much, then give abundantly; if you have little, be sure to share that willingly.101 But religious have nothing of their own either alone or together. Therefore, they cannot benefit from giving alms; and if they give alms with the alms given to them, it benefits the people who gave them the alms.
But to the contrary: Giving alms is the most fruitful of all works. Hence Daniel 5 says: Redeem your sins with alms.102 Hence, if religious could not benefit from giving alms, then their condition would seem worse than other people’s even where spiritual goods are concerned.
Answer: Although religious cannot have anything of their own, they can still distribute things, whether such things are products of their common property or given to them particularly as alms. It makes no difference to this question whether they make such distributions on their own order’s authority or on the authority of a higher superior. Therefore, those who have been entrusted with making such distributions can give alms meritoriously with the goods that have been entrusted to them to distribute, insofar as they have been entrusted to them. Such alms are meritorious both for those who perform the work of mercy and for those whose things are known to have been allocated for such purposes. But if they have not been entrusted with such things to distribute, then it is impermissible for religious to give alms.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. If a religious sees that his father is in need, it seems that he can leave the cloister even without his superior’s permission in order to help his father:
A commandment of God should not be broken for the sake of human traditions. Hence in Matthew 15, the Lord says against certain people: You make void the commandment of God for the sake of your traditions.103 But people are obligated to help their parents by this commandment of God: Honor your father and your mother.104 Such honor is certainly meant to include helping them in their need. Hence, religious observances (which are human customs) notwithstanding, it seems that religious should leave their cloister to help their parents as God commands.
But to the contrary: Spiritual things should always take precedence over bodily ones. Yet religious have obligated themselves to obey their spiritual Father, viz. God, to whom we are more bound. As Hebrews 11 says: Shall we not much more obey the Father of spirits, and live?105 Therefore, religious should not forgo the observances of their order to assist their bodily parents.
Answer: The answer to this question differs for a man who has not yet entered the religious life and for a man who has already made profession in the religious life.
If a man has not yet entered the religious life and sees that his father is in great need with no one else to help him, then he should not enter the religious life; he is obligated to assist his parents, especially if he can remain in the world without the risk of mortal sin. But if someone else can help his parents, then he can enter the religious life if he wants to. Hence Chrysostom explains the verse Let the dead bury their dead,106 saying: It is evil to draw people away from spiritual things, especially when there are others who could assist their parents; for there were others who could perform the burial of that corpse.107
But after a man has already made profession in the religious life, he is dead to the world. Hence, his spiritual death frees him from the obligation to care for his parents, just as his bodily death would do. Therefore, it is not a sin or a violation of the commandment of God for him to remain in the cloister at his superior’s command without assisting his parents. For he has lost the ability to offer them the required assistance without sinning himself. Nevertheless, to the extent that obedience to his order allows, he ought to be diligent about getting his parents help when they need it, whether he helps them himself or someone else does.
So, to the first objection: Religious are bound to do what their religious life involves, not only because of human traditions, but also because of a commandment of God. For the vow they made obligates them to obey their superiors, and fulfilling a vow falls under a commandment of God.