Article 1: Does the empyrean heaven have an influence on other bodies?
Quodlibet VI
There were questions about God, about angels, about human beings, and about purely bodily creatures.
Question 1
Article 1
There was one question about God: Is the one divine essence counted in addition to each one of the divine persons?
It seems not:
There are three divine persons. So, if the one divine essence were counted in addition to each one of the divine persons, then God would be a quaternity, which is heretical. Therefore, the one divine essence is not counted in addition to each one of the divine persons.
But to the contrary: If the one divine essence were completely identical to each one of the divine persons, and not counted in addition to each, then we could attribute the latter to whatever we attributed the former. But we attribute the one divine essence to the three persons, since we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God. Hence, we could also attribute one person to them, saying that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one person, which is obviously false.
Answer: Each thing is one insofar as it exists. Hence, existent and one are convertible.1 Yet each thing exists through its form. Hence, each thing is one through its form. That is why the comparison of form to form is the same as the comparison of one to one. Now, God is formally God through the divine essence, whereas the proper character of each divine person is like a form constituting that person, which is really distinct from every other person because of their relative opposition. Yet the proper character of each divine person is not really distinct from the divine essence; otherwise, God would be composite and would have accidents, since everything outside a thing’s essence is accidental to it. Instead, the difference between the proper character of each divine person and the divine essence is a matter of how we think and speak about them. For we talk about the divine essence absolutely, but about the proper character of each person in a relative way. Clearly, then, the one divine essence is not counted in addition to each one of the divine persons as if they were distinct in reality, but only in the way that we think about them.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
1. The first objection is based on making a real distinction, which does not apply to the one divine essence and each one of the divine persons. Hence, God is not a quaternity.
2. The second objection is based on the difference in our way of thinking and speaking about them, which is how we can say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, but not one person.
Question 2
The next two questions were about angels. The first was about their action: (1) Do they do whatever they do by a command of their will? The second was about their location: (2) Can they be on the top of the empyrean heaven (which was also asked about glorified bodies)?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. An angel does not seem to do whatever it does by a command of its will:
1. The will is related in the same way to things near and far. So, if an angel acted by a mere command of its will, then when an angel did something, it would make no difference whether the thing it affected was near or far. Thus, it would never need to come down from heaven to earth in order to do things here, which is contrary to the tradition of sacred scripture.
2. One or many makes no difference to the will: a person can want to move one thing, and can want to move many things, or even the whole universe. So, if an angel acted just by a command of its will, then it could even move the whole universe. But that is impossible, since an angel is part of the universe. Therefore, an angel does not act just by a command of its will.
But to the contrary: Every action is performed with some power. But an angel’s only powers are intellect and will, and the intellect only acts because of the will. Therefore, an angel performs every action by a command of its will.
Answer: Every action that a thing performs derives from the form of the thing’s nature. Even when accidental forms are the source of a thing’s actions, the actions still trace back to the agent’s specific form as their first source. The action of fire’s heat, for instance, traces back to the substantial form of fire as its first source; that is the source of all the proper accidents of fire. Hence, there must be a difference between the actions of a thing with a simple nature, and the actions of a thing with a composite nature. If a thing had a simple nature, then all of its actions would be proper to it and performed in its nature’s own way, which is not true of a thing with a composite nature. Every action of fire is proper to the nature of fire, but a knife set on fire has an action that is unrelated to the proper nature of fire, namely cutting.
The same point applies to spiritual substances as well. For the human soul is not wholly intellectual; it has an intellect by participation. Hence, it has powers and actions unrelated to its intellectual nature, which is especially clear with the powers and actions related to the vegetative soul. But an angel has a wholly intellectual nature, and thus all its actions must be intellectual. Hence in chapter 4 of The Divine Names, blessed Dionysius says that angels have intellectual natures and powers and activities.2 But the intellect only acts by means of the will, since the movement of the will is an inclination that follows upon the intellect’s awareness of a form. Hence, an angel must do whatever it does by a command of its will.
Notice, however, that a thing’s power goes between its essence and its activity, and hence its power and activity must be proportional to its essence. So, a higher angel with a more excellent essence will also have greater power, not only to think but also to affect external things. That is why an angel’s action is limited to certain effects, since its power and essence are limited.
1. So, to the first objection: The action of an angel’s will is rooted in its essence, which is the source of its power and activity. But a mover must be together with the moveable thing that it moves, as shown in book VII of the Physics.3 Hence, an angel’s substance must somehow be joined with the things that it moves.
2. To the second objection: Since the action of its will is limited by the state of its essence, an angel does not have to be able to do everything it wants.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems that an angel cannot be on the top of the empyrean heaven:
1. Anselm says that nothing can be in nothing.4 But there is nothing outside the empyrean heaven. Therefore, an angel cannot be on the top of the empyrean heaven, since it would then be outside the empyrean heaven.
2. It seems that a glorified body cannot be there either. For every body has to be in a place, and there is no place outside the empyrean heaven. Therefore, a glorified body cannot be outside the empyrean heaven.
But to the contrary: If an angel and a glorified body cannot be there, that is either because they cannot go up there, or because they cannot get as deep as the empyrean heaven, or because they need a place to contain them, or because they need some external support. But all of these obstacles are removed by the perfection of the glorified body, and much more so by the state of angels. Therefore, an angel and a glorified body can be on the top of the empyrean heaven.
Answer: To see the answer to this question, consider the two most probable opinions about place among the ancients. One of these opinions was that place is a certain space or set of dimensions existing in their own right. If this opinion were true, then a body would require a place, since a body is a thing with dimensions, and must then occupy some dimensions. But the Philosopher disproves this opinion about place in book IV of the Physics.5 The other opinion is his own, which is that place is the surface of the body that contains a thing. Of course, it is not the surface of the body that directly contains a thing. Otherwise, a body at rest would not always be in the same place, for example if a man stood in a constantly flowing river and there was always a new surface of water surrounding him. Instead, the surface of the body that directly contains a thing constitutes a place by its relationship to the first container. Hence, a place is considered the same when it has the same position relative to the first container, which is why place is unmovable, according to the Philosopher.6
Now, on this second opinion, which is true, a body’s need to be in a place comes from its dependence on the first container. (That is why the first container is not itself in a place, except incidentally and with respect to its parts, as the Philosopher says in book IV of the Physics.7) But an angel does not depend on the first container, nor does a glorified body, which is perfected by a soul blessed by the enjoyment of God. Hence, a glorified body and an angel have no need of any bodily place, which is why nothing prevents a glorified body or an angel from being on the top of the empyrean heaven.
1. So, to the first objection: That saying of Anselm should be read with the force of an affirmation: it is not possible for something to be in nothing as in a container. But that reading lends no support to the intended conclusion.
2. To the second objection: That argument only works for a body that depends on the first container.
Question 3
The next questions were about human beings. The first were on spiritual matters. The second were on bodily ones. The first questions on spiritual matters were about sacraments, the second were about virtues, and the third were about sins.
The questions on sacraments were both about baptism. The first was about the necessity of baptism: (1) If a boy is born in a waterless desert, and dies without being baptized, can he be saved by his mother’s faith? The second was about an impediment to marriage stemming from baptism: (2) If a Christian man baptizes a Jewish woman, whom he had promised to marry if she were baptized, does he then consummate marriage if he knows her in the flesh afterward?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems that a boy who is born in the desert can be saved by the faith of his parents without being baptized:
1. Faith is no less efficacious in the time of grace than in the time of natural law. But children were saved by the faith of their parents in the time of natural law, as Gregory says.8 Therefore, the same is true now in the time of grace.
2. Christ has not narrowed the way of salvation for human beings, since he says in John 10: I came that they might have life and have it more abundantly.9 But some children were saved by the faith of their parents before Christ came. Therefore, the same is true, and much more so, now that Christ has come.
But to the contrary: In John 3, the Lord says: Unless a man is born of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of heaven.10
Answer: No one can be liberated from the damnation the human race incurred for the sin of our first parent except by being incorporated into Christ like a member into its head, since he alone is free of that damnation.
Now, this incorporation can happen in three ways. The first way is by receiving baptism. As Galatians 3 says: All of you who were baptized in Christ have put on Christ.11 The second way is by shedding blood for Christ’s sake, since that conforms a person to Christ’s passion, which is where baptism gets its power. Hence Revelation 7 says that martyrs have washed their robes in the blood of the lamb.12 The third way is by faith and love. As Proverbs 15 says: By mercy and faith sins are cleansed.13 And as Acts 15 says: He cleansed their hearts by faith.14 For Christ dwells in our hearts by faith, as Ephesians 3 says.15 Hence baptism is called the sacrament of faith. Accordingly, there are three kinds of baptism: by water, by the spirit, and by blood. The latter two have the force of baptism by water, as long as one intends to receive such a baptism, and is only kept from doing so by necessity, and not by contempt for religion.
Now, children who are not yet able to use their reason clearly cannot be moved by faith and love, nor can they intend to receive baptism. Hence, they can only be saved by the baptism of blood, if they are killed for Christ’s sake, which not only makes them Christians, but also martyrs, as Augustine says of the Holy Innocents.16
Clearly, then, the boy who dies in the desert without being baptized does not achieve salvation.
1. So, to the first objection: According to some people, just having parents moved by faith was not enough for children to be saved in the time of natural law; their faith also had to be declared externally with a sensible sign. Hence, on this opinion, the requirements for salvation then were no different than they are now, except that now the sensible sign has been specified, whereas before the sensible sign was left unspecified and could thus be chosen at will. But other people are of the opinion that just being moved by faith in connection with the child’s salvation was enough for the child’s salvation. And though the power of faith has not now decreased, the degree of salvation has increased. For Christ now leads those who are saved immediately into the kingdom of heaven, which was not the case then. Hence, it is not inappropriate for this to require something more, namely baptism, as John 3 says.17
2. To the second objection: Christ has widened the way of salvation for human beings by opening for them the door to eternal life, which had been closed by the sin of the first human being.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. Marriage does not seem possible between a Christian man and a Jewish woman whom he baptized and then knew in the flesh after promising to marry her:
Cause XXX, q.1 of the Decretum says that a priest’s son cannot take a girl that his father baptized as his wife.18 Much less, then, could he have her as his wife if he baptized her himself. Therefore, if a Christian man baptized a Jewish woman, he could not take her as his wife.
But to the contrary: By law, when people unite in the flesh after promising to contract marriage with words in the future tense, they are presumed married by a presumption of law, which does not admit of counter-evidence.19 But that is exactly what happened in the case in question. Therefore, they are truly married.
Answer: Spiritual affinity impedes the contracting of marriage and dissolves a marriage already contracted. Now, when a Christian man baptizes a Jewish woman, they clearly contract a spiritual affinity, since she becomes his spiritual daughter. Hence, they are not married thereafter, even if they explicitly contract marriage with words in the present tense, and even if they unite in the flesh afterward.
That makes the reply to the contrary objection clear. For that presumption of law is only meant to apply when there are no intervening impediments to marriage.
Question 4
The next questions were about virtues. The first was about faith: (1) Is the certain adherence of a heretic or of a bad Catholic an act of the virtue of faith? The second related to religion or worship. The third related to charity.
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. The certain adherence of a heretic or of a bad Catholic seems to be an act of the virtue of faith:
1. As the Philosopher says in book III of the Ethics, there are three things in the soul: powers, feelings, and dispositions.20 Now, adhering with certainty cannot be attributed to a power, since such adherence merits reward or punishment, whereas powers cannot merit either. Yet it cannot relate to feelings, since they are a matter of our sense-appetite, which cannot reach out and grasp divine truth. Hence, it must relate to a disposition. But the disposition to which certain adherence relates is the virtue of faith. Therefore, the certain adherence of a heretic or of a bad Catholic is an act of faith.
2. Whatever acts like something else seems to act in virtue of the same thing as it does. But heretics who adhere to their beliefs with certainty act like those with faith. For they believe that they have right faith to the extent that their adherence is certain. Therefore, they act in virtue of that same faith, and thus their certain adherence seems to be an act of the virtue of faith.
3. The stability of the whole spiritual edifice depends upon faith. As Matthew 7 says: The floods came, and the winds blew, but they could not move it, for it had been founded on a stable rock—namely faith.21 But adhering with certainty is a matter of spiritual stability. Therefore, it is an act of the virtue of faith.
But to the contrary: What does not exist cannot act. But the virtue of faith does not exist in a heretic or in a bad Catholic. Therefore, their adherence with certainty cannot be an act of the virtue of faith.
Answer: It is a mistake to treat something common to many things as if it were proper to one of them. Yet adhering with certainty is not proper to the virtue of faith. First, because it applies to all intellectual virtues—wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. Second, because it applies not only to true faith, but also to false faith. Like an opinion, faith is either true or false, and a person does not cling any less firmly to falsehood than to truth, as the Philosopher says in book VII of the Ethics.22 Third, because adhering with certainty does not always arise from a disposition. A person can firmly assent to truth or falsehood at will before having a disposition to do so. Fourth, because adhering with certainty does not only apply to well-formed faith (which is a virtue), but also to unformed faith (which is not a virtue).
Therefore, the certain adherence of a heretic is an act of false faith, and that of a bad Catholic is an act of unformed faith. Thus, neither is an act of the virtue of faith.
1. So, to the first objection: That division of things in the soul is about the sources of its activities. For each of the soul’s activities derives either from a feeling, or a disposition, or a bare power. Now, adhering with certainty cannot derive from a feeling. In the case of a bad Catholic, however, it derives from the disposition of unformed faith, and in the case of a heretic it derives either from the disposition of bad faith, or from a bare power, which is the case at the beginning before such a disposition is acquired. For we cannot say that bad faith is an infused disposition.
As for powers not meriting reward or punishment, if all that means is that we do not merit reward or punishment just by having powers, then it is true. But if it means that a bare power cannot be a source of meriting reward or punishment, then that is true of meriting reward, which is impossible without grace, but it is not true of meriting punishment, otherwise a person would not merit punishment by beginning to sin before acquiring the vicious disposition to do so.
2. To the second objection: There are two ways for one thing to act like another. One way is by being truly like it, in which case the one truly acts like the other in virtue of the same thing as it does. But another way is by merely appearing to be like it, in which case the one only appears to act in virtue of the same thing as the other does. That is the case with heretics. Hence, a heretic’s certain adherence is an act of merely apparent faith, not of true faith.
3. To the third objection: Just as the stability of the spiritual edifice depends upon true faith, the stability of the diabolical edifice derives from false faith.
Question 5
The next four questions were about worship or religion.
The first was about celebrating feasts: (1) Are we allowed to celebrate the feast of our Lady’s conception? The second was about discharging duties: (2) If a cleric at a school has a benefice with or without the responsibility to care for souls, is he bound to say the office of the dead? The third was about distributing benefices: (3) Is a bishop bound to give a benefice to the better man? The fourth was about tithing: (4) Is a poor person bound to give tithes to a rich priest?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. We seem allowed to celebrate the feast of our Lady’s conception:
If we are not allowed to do so, that could only be because she was conceived in original sin. But she was not conceived in original sin, it seems, since the blessed Virgin was made the dwelling place of God in a unique way.23 Hence, she had to be uniquely prepared for this. But she was not uniquely prepared in her body, which was conceived by sexual intercourse. Nor was she uniquely prepared in her soul, since other people are supposed to have been sanctified in the womb as well. Hence, it follows that she was uniquely prepared by being kept free from original sin. Thus, we are allowed to celebrate her conception.
But to the contrary: Only Christ had the privilege of being conceived without original sin. Hence, the blessed Virgin was not so conceived. Thus, we should not celebrate her conception.
Answer: There are two questions here, the main one and a related one, which has to be answered first—namely, was the blessed Virgin conceived with original sin?
Realize, then, that each person contracts original sin from having been in Adam by the seminal principle, as Augustine says in his Literal Commentary on Genesis.24 Now, everyone who not only received their flesh from him, but also descended and originated from him in the natural way, was in Adam by the seminal principle. Yet that is how the blessed Virgin descended from Adam, since she was born of sexual intercourse just like everyone else. Hence, she was conceived with original sin, and is included in the universal judgment the Apostle makes in Romans 5: In whom all sinned.25 Christ is the only exception to that universal judgment, since he was not in Adam by virtue of the seminal principle. If that applied to anyone other than Christ, they would not need to be redeemed by Christ. Yet we should not give the mother anything that would take away honor from the son, who is the savior of all men, as the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 4.26
Now, even though the blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin, she is still believed to have been sanctified in the womb before birth. Hence, different ecclesial customs arose around the celebration of her conception. The Roman Church and many others, considering that the Virgin was conceived in original sin, do not celebrate the feast of her conception. But other churches, considering that the Virgin was sanctified in the womb, yet not knowing quite when, do celebrate her conception. For she is believed to have been sanctified right after her conception and the infusion of her soul. Hence, that celebration should not refer to her conception because of her conception, but because of her sanctification.
Accordingly, our Lady’s conception should not be celebrated because she was conceived without original sin, since that undermines the fact that she was uniquely prepared by receiving the very richest gift of grace in her sanctification. For she was not only cleansed from original sin, but also kept free from all sin (both mortal and venial) for her whole life, as Anselm says.27
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. A cleric with a benefice who lives at a school seems bound to say the office of the dead:
A person who receives someone else’s temporal goods is bound to pay them back with spiritual ones. But such a cleric receives goods that belonged to the dead. Therefore, he is bound to say the office of the dead for them.
But to the contrary: A person who receives less, is bound less. But a cleric who lives in a school receives less than those who reside in a church and receive daily offerings. Therefore, he is not bound to say the office of the dead as they are.
Answer: By virtue of being a cleric, and especially by having received holy orders, a cleric is bound to say the canonical hours. For such men are particularly charged with the praise of God. As Isaiah 43 says: Everyone who calls upon my name, I have created for my praise.28 Furthermore, when a cleric has a benefice in a particular church, he is bound to say the office in that church’s own way. Sometimes the office of the dead is part of the ordinary office said in a church. For instance, the whole Church says the office for the dead on All Souls’ Day. Beyond that, any given church has its own particular customs, perhaps saying the office of the dead ordinarily once a week or at whatever other set time. Thus, a cleric with a benefice in a church is bound to say that office for the dead, even while living at a school. That is how he repays the dead whose goods he receives. Yet sometimes an extraordinary office of the dead is said in a church for some special reason, such as praying for a particular person or something like that. But a cleric living at a school is not bound to say that office of the dead.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. It seems to be a sin for a bishop to give a benefice to a good man, if he passes over a better one:
Those who act against their conscience pave their way to Gehenna.29 But the bishop who passes over a better man acts against his conscience. Therefore, he commits a mortal sin, thus paving his way to Gehenna.
But to the contrary: By law, it is sufficient to give a benefice to a good man, if he is fit to serve in the Church.30
Answer: A man can be better in two ways. One way is to be better absolutely speaking—namely by being holier and thus having more charity. Another way is to be better for something. Now, sometimes a man can be better absolutely speaking, and yet not be better for a benefice, perhaps because another man could better assist the church with his wise judgment, or with the help of his strength, or because he has served in that church before. Accordingly, a bishop is not always bound to give a benefice to the better man absolutely speaking; rather, he is bound to give it to the better man for that benefice. Yet he cannot prefer one man to another without a reason. If his reason has to do with the honor of God and the good of the church, then the man is in fact better for the benefice. But if his reason has nothing to do with such things, then he is showing preferential treatment, which is even more serious when it is done in divine matters. Hence the gloss of Augustine on the verse Have a seat here, etc., of James 2 says: If we apply the difference between sitting and standing to honors in the Church, I do not consider it a trivial sin to show preferential treatment while holding the faith of the Lord of glory. Who can stand to see a rich man given a seat of honor in the Church, while a holier and more knowledgeable poor man is passed over?31
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 4
We turn, then, to the fourth question. A poor person does not seem bound to give tithes to a rich priest:
1. Tithing was established to support the Church’s ministers. But a rich priest has other means of support. Therefore, such a priest should not be given tithes, especially not by a poor person.
2. In many places people do not tithe at all, which their prelates would surely correct if people were bound to tithe by the necessity of divine law. Therefore, poor people especially do not seem bound to give tithes to rich priests.
But to the contrary:
1. In Matthew 23, the Lord says: You ought to have done these things—viz. justice and truth—without failing to do those—viz. the things related to paying tithes.32
2. In Luke 18, the Pharisee says: I pay tithes on all that I possess.33
Answer: As the Philosopher says in book V of the Ethics, with justice the mean is determined not only relative to us, as with other virtues, but also by the thing itself.34 With other virtues we take account of the various conditions that people are in, which can change the mean for them. A lot of food for one person, for instance, is a little or a moderate amount for someone else. But with justice the mean does not change with the various conditions that people are in; it is only determined by the amount of the thing itself. A person who buys something, for instance, only has to pay what the thing is worth, whether the person selling it is rich or poor. Paying debts is an act of justice as well. Hence, paying people what they are owed does not depend on whether they are rich or poor.
Now, tithes are generally owed to priests according to natural law. For natural reason dictates that those who work for the people’s spiritual welfare should receive stipends for their support from the people. That is why the divine law ordains this in the New Testament as well. As 1 Corinthians 9 says: The Lord commanded that those who proclaim the gospel should live by the gospel.35 Now, a judicial commandment of the Old Law fixed the amount for the people to give to God’s ministers—namely a tithe—and a statute of the Church requires the Christian people to give the same amount. Hence, priests are owed tithes both under natural law and under divine law, and also by a statute of the Church. Therefore, even if a priest is rich, a poor person is still bound to give him tithes.
1. So, to the first objection: First, one could say that tithing was not only established to support the Church’s ministers, but also to support the poor, who ought to be provided for by the house of God. Hence Malachi 3 says: Bring in all the tithes, that there may be food in my house.36 Thus, a priest needs tithes, no matter how rich he is, since he has to provide not only for himself, but also for the poor. Second, one could say that the need to support ministers was indeed the reason that the Church established tithing, but when something is owed to a man by a statute of the Church, it is still owed to him, even if he is rich.
2. To the second objection: It was praiseworthy of Paul not to exact the payment that he was owed for preaching the gospel in order to avoid hindering the gospel or scandalizing Christ’s faithful. And it was not a sin for people not to make the payment the Apostle was owed and had forgiven. Similarly, it is praiseworthy of the Church’s prelates not to exact tithes in places where they are afraid it would cause scandal because of being uncustomary. And it is not a sin for people not to give tithes in places where it is not customary. But it would still be a sin for people to obstinately refuse to give tithes when they are exacted. That is why priests do not exact tithes in such places, in order to prevent that sin.
Question 6
The next questions were about acts of charity.
The first was about obedience: (1) Is it more meritorious to obey a religious superior or to do something at a brother’s request? The second related to alms.
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems more meritorious to obey a superior than to do something at a brother’s request:
Being more demeritorious is the opposite of being more meritorious. But disobeying a superior is more demeritorious than declining a brother’s request. Therefore, obeying a superior is more meritorious than agreeing to a brother’s request.
But to the contrary: Where there is greater humility, there is greater merit, since God gives grace to the humble, as James 4 says.37 But it seems humbler for a man to submit to an equal by doing what he requests, than to submit to a superior by obeying him. Therefore, it seems more meritorious to do something at a brother’s request than to obey a superior.
Answer: An act can be more meritorious in two ways.
It can be more meritorious in one way because of the kind of action it is. An act is more meritorious in this way when it relates to a more excellent virtue. Now, clearly worship (serving God) is a more excellent virtue than beneficence (attending to our neighbor), just as loving God is more meritorious than loving our neighbor. Yet doing something at a brother’s request relates to friendship or beneficence (the love of neighbor), while obeying a superior as God’s minister relates to religion (the worship and love of God). Therefore, it is more meritorious to obey a religious superior or to keep a vow than to do something at a brother’s request.
An act can be more meritorious in another way because it is done out of greater charity, even if it is less meritorious in kind. There is no denying that doing something at a brother’s request can be more meritorious in this way.
Thus, we grant the first argument.
To the objection made to the contrary: A man who does something at a brother’s request still does it of his own accord. Hence, it seems less humble than obeying a superior as such.
Question 7
The next questions were about alms.
The first was about alms given by clerics. The second was about alms given on behalf of the dead.
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. It seems to be a mortal sin for clerics not to generously give away their superfluous things as alms:
1. The gloss on the verse He who has two coats, should give to him who has none of Luke 3 says: This is a commandment to divide up two coats. Dividing one of them would leave both the giver and the receiver naked, since no one can be clothed with half a coat.38 But giving away one such coat means giving away the things that are superfluous to the necessities of life, as the same gloss makes clear.39 Hence, giving away superfluous things is a commandment. But violating a commandment is a mortal sin. Therefore, it is a mortal sin for a man not to give his superfluous things to the poor.
2. Commandments are more obligatory than counsels. Now, giving away everything you have is only a counsel. But you are still obligated to give away everything in cases of dire need. So, even without such dire need, a man is bound to give his superfluous things to the poor, since doing so is a commandment. Therefore, not giving them away is a mortal sin.
3. Anyone who uses up someone else’s things is bound to replace them. But the goods of clerics belong to the poor, as is made clear by the gloss on that verse of Isaiah 3: The spoil of the poor is in your house.40 Therefore, clerics who use up the Church’s goods unnecessarily are bound to replace them for the poor from another source, if they have one.
4. It is a mortal sin for people to make themselves incapable of fulfilling their obligations. But superfluous spending makes clerics incapable of helping the poor, which they are obligated to do. Therefore, such spending seems to be a mortal sin.
But to the contrary: Not giving away their superfluous things is the prevailing custom of the majority.
Answer: Things seem different with inherited goods and with the Church’s goods.
Like any person, a cleric is the true owner of the goods that he inherits or legitimately acquires. Hence, as far as their status goes, he can do with such things as he pleases; sin does not come into it on their account. But sin can come into it because he uses them in a disordered way. He can do too much with them, uselessly using up his goods for unnecessary purposes; or he can do too little with them, not even employing them for necessary purposes. Virtue is lost in either way, as it says in book II of the Ethics.41
But clerics are not the true owners of the Church’s goods; they are their stewards. As 1 Corinthians 9 says: I have been entrusted with a stewardship.42 But stewards have to be faithful in their use of the things entrusted to their stewardship. As 1 Corinthians 4 says: Now it is required of stewards that they be found faithful.43 With such goods, then, sin can arise in two ways. It can arise in one way due to the status of the things themselves, as when a cleric usurps something to be employed for others and puts it to his own personal use as if it were his own. It can arise in another way because he makes disordered use of the things that are for him, as we just explained about his own things.
But, as we just said, the stewardship of such things is entrusted to the steward’s faith. Hence, if he makes use of the Church’s goods in good faith, only taking for himself what his own state and personal condition call for, and giving to others what in good faith seems best to him, then he does not commit mortal sin, even if he happens to make more personal use of something than he should. For such things cannot be determined with absolute certainty, since the judgments about them concern particulars. Hence, as long as it is not excessive, such overuse is compatible with the steward’s good faith. But if the overuse is excessive, then it cannot escape notice, and thus belies the steward’s good faith. And if he makes use of such things without good faith, then he commits mortal sin.
1. So, to the first objection: In his book On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Augustine says that the commandments the Lord gives in Matthew 5 (If anyone strikes you on one cheek, turn the other to him as well,44 etc.) are intended to be about mental preparation, meaning that you ought to be prepared to do such things when necessity requires.45 Hence, it is not always a mortal sin not to do them. Rather, it is a mortal sin not to do them when they seem necessary. The same is true of the commandment: He who has two coats, should give to him who has none,46 and others like it. Hence, it is not always a mortal sin not to give superfluous things to the poor, but only when it is necessary to do so. Nor is it possible to give a rule determining when the necessity that obligates under pain of mortal sin obtains; that is left to the steward’s good faith and prudence. Hence, if he gives such things in good faith when it seems right to him to do so, then the steward is free of sin; otherwise, he commits mortal sin.
2. To the second objection: The very same things that are counseled fall under commandments about mental preparation. There is no greater counsel than for a man to give up his life for his brothers. Yet doing so also falls under a commandment about mental preparation. As 1 John 3 says: And we ought to lay down our life for our brothers.47 Similarly, giving away everything you have to the poor falls under a commandment about mental preparation, meaning that you ought to be prepared to do so if need be. Of course, it takes less need to give away superfluous things than to give away everything. But this cannot be completely determined by a universal rule; it is left to prudence, as we just said.
3. To the third objection: The Church’s goods are not only to be used for the poor but also for the Church’s ministers. Hence, canon law says that they should be divided in such a way that one part is used for the poor and another is used for the Church’s minsters and worship.48 But there is a difference between those goods of the Church that are allocated primarily for the needs of the poor and only secondarily for the needs of ministers (the goods of hospitals and so on), and the goods that are allocated primarily for the needs of the Church’s ministers (clerical prebends and so on). In the case of the first goods, sin is committed not only because of their misuse, but also because of the status of the things themselves, as when one uses someone else’s things. As a robber of someone else’s things, such a man is bound to replace them. But in the case of the second goods, sin is only committed because of their misuse, as we explained earlier about inherited goods. Hence, such a man is not bound to replace them, but only to do penance.
4. To the fourth objection: The moderate use of wealth and a steward’s good faith are clearly lost by a cleric who knowingly spends superfluously on sumptuous meals and any other superfluous things. There is no doubt that he commits mortal sin. Hence Matthew 24 says: If that wicked servant says to himself, “My master is delayed,” and begins to beat his fellow servants—which is about overbearing and cruel leadership—and eats and drinks with drunkards—which is about superfluous and sumptuous meals—the master of that servant will come on a day he does not expect and at an hour he does not know, and will separate him—i.e., from the company of the saints—and put him with the hypocrites—i.e., in hell, hence it adds: where there will be wailing and gnashing of teeth.49 But if his spending is not excessive, a cleric who wants to maintain the propriety of his status in the customary way that he eats can do so in good faith.
Question 8
The next questions were about alms given on behalf of the dead.
There were two such questions: (1) Do the dead suffer any loss if the alms required in their wills are delayed by their executors? and (2) Are executors allowed to delay the distribution of such alms so that the belongings of the deceased can be sold at a greater price in the future?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. The dead do not seem to experience any loss from a delay with the alms they ordered to be given:
It is the executor’s negligence that causes such delay. But one cannot be held responsible for another’s negligence. Therefore, the dead do not suffer any loss from such delay.
But to the contrary: Such delay postpones the prayers and sacrifices that would have been made for the soul of the deceased, which would have been a great help. Therefore, the deceased suffer a loss from such delay.
Answer: This question calls for two distinctions.
The first distinction applies to the loss. We need to distinguish between two kinds of loss. One kind of loss is a matter of suffering punishment. As 1 Corinthians 3 says: If any man’s work burns up, he shall suffer loss.50 Another kind of loss is a matter of lacking relief. The second distinction applies to the alms. For we can consider both the merit of the alms and their effect.
As for the merit of the alms, the deceased suffer no loss from such delay, especially not if they took as much care as possible to ensure that their alms were given quickly. For merit depends chiefly upon one’s will and intention. As for the effect of the alms, however, the deceased do suffer loss. But they are not being punished for such delay. There is just no relief for them during the deferral of the suffrages, which would have been a great help.
So, to the first objection: One is not held responsible for another’s negligence by being punished for it. But such negligence can still affect one’s lack of relief, since one can get help from another.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. It seems executors ought to delay the distribution of such alms so that the belongings of the deceased can be sold at a greater price:
Doing so would allow more alms to be given on behalf of the deceased, which would help the deceased more. Therefore, it seems praiseworthy and faithful to defer such alms.
But to the contrary: Delaying such alms postpones the relief, which the deceased may need. Therefore, such delay seems to hurt rather than help the deceased.
Answer: Delaying for a short time does not seem very dangerous. Hence, if executors defer such alms for a short time in order to sell the belongings of the deceased at a greater price, and thus give more alms, that is praiseworthy. But if executors defer the distribution of alms for a long time, and yet not to give much more alms, that does not seem innocent. For the deceased could have perhaps been freed from purgatory, where the relief due to suffrages was most needed. Such things require the judgment of a prudent executor, who should consider the span of time and the condition of the person (who could be freed sooner or later), and even the increase in the amount of alms, and then do what seems best for the deceased.
Question 9
The next questions were about sins.
There were three such questions. The first was about original sin: (1) Do baptized people transmit original sin to their offspring? The second was about actual sin in general: (2) What comes first, turning away from God or turning toward a changeable good? The third was about lying in particular: (3) Which is worse, lying with words or with deeds?
Article 1
We turn, then, to the first question. Baptized people do not seem to transmit original sin to their offspring:
There are three things to consider about the child of baptized people: its body, its soul, and the union of the two. The child does not contract original sin in its body, which it draws from its parents, since its parents were completely cleansed of original sin. Nor does the child do so in its soul, which is created directly by God, who is free of sin. Hence, it follows that the child cannot contract original sin from the union of its soul and body either. Therefore, the child of baptized people has no way to contract original sin.
But to the contrary: Remedies are only given to the wounded. Yet baptism is a medicinal remedy for the wound of original sin, and it is given to the newborn children of baptized people in the common custom of the Church. Therefore, the newborn children of baptized people are born with original sin.
Answer: The sin originating with the transgression of our first parents, and passed down to all their descendants, is only abolished by the grace of Christ, who for sin condemned sin in the flesh, as Romans 8 says.51 But it is abolished in a particular order. First, in this present life, the sacraments of Christ’s grace remove the stain of original sin from the soul. As a result, baptized people no longer count as guilty, although the corrupt urges of original sin still remain in their flesh. Hence in Romans 7, the Apostle says: I myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin,52 given that the flesh lusts against the spirit.53 Thus, baptized people live the new life of the Spirit in their mind,54 but retain the old Adam in their flesh. Hence, just as spiritual generation (being born again through the gospel) produces children in Christ without sin, bodily generation produces children in the old Adam with original sin.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Article 2
We turn, then, to the second question. In actual sin, the turn away from God seems to come before the turn toward a changeable good:
Turning away means retreating from a point, whereas turning toward means advancing toward a point. With bodily motion, however, the retreat from a point comes before the advance toward a point. With the spiritual motion of sin, therefore, the turn away comes before the turn toward.
But to the contrary: As Dionysius says in chapter 4 of The Divine Names: No one does anything intending evil, but rather intending good.55 Therefore, desire turns the sinner’s mind toward a changeable good before it turns it away from God.
Answer: As Augustine says, sin consists chiefly in willing.56 But with willing, what is principally intended comes first. Now, in the case of sins such as extravagance, greed, and the like, the enjoyment of a changeable good is what is principally intended. Hence, in their case, the turn toward such a good comes naturally before the turn away from the unchangeable good. For the turn away from that good is not principally intended; it is an unintended consequence of the disordered turn toward a changeable good. But with sins like faithlessness, hopelessness, and the like, the turn away from the unchangeable good comes first, and then comes the turn toward a changeable good. This is clear in the case of those who despairing, give themselves over to licentiousness, as Ephesians 4 says.57
So, to the first objection: Even though with bodily motions the retreat from a point is the first thing accomplished, the advance toward a point is still the first thing intended, and it is the intention in which sin chiefly consists.
Article 3
We turn, then, to the third question. Lying with deeds seems to be a worse sin than lying with words:
The more a person believes a lie, the greater the sin of mistreating that person seems to be. But, as Anselm says in his book On Truth, we believe deeds more than words.58 Therefore, lying with deeds seems to be a more serious sin than lying with words.
But to the contrary: As Augustine says in his book On Christian Doctrine: Words hold a special place among all signs.59 Yet lying with words mistreats the words themselves. Therefore, lying with words seems to be a more serious sin than lying with deeds.
Answer: As Ambrose says in a sermon, lying occurs not only with false words, but also with false deeds.60 But the sin of lying consists chiefly in the intention to deceive. Hence, saying something false but thinking it is true is not lying, whereas saying something true but thinking it is false is the sin of lying. Augustine makes this clear in his book On Lying.61 Now, one who lies with words has the same intention to deceive as one who lies with deeds. Thus, their sins are equal, since the words and deeds are both being used as instruments of deception. Hence, it makes no difference to the sin of lying whether one lies with spoken words, or with written words, or with a nod of the head, or with any other deed, just as it makes no difference to the sin of murder whether one kills a person with a sword or with an ax.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Question 10
Article 1
The next question was about the human body: Can a man naturally or miraculously be a virgin and a father at the same time?
It seems possible miraculously, since a father and a mother are both sources of generation, and a woman has already miraculously been a virgin and a mother at the same time. By the same token, therefore, a man can miraculously be a virgin and a father at the same time. It seems possible without a miracle as well. An incubus demon could steal the seed from a virgin’s nocturnal emission and use it to inseminate a woman, who could then conceive a child by that seed. The child’s father would not be the incubus demon, but the man by whose seed it was generated, since the seed’s power comes from the one who lost it. Therefore, it seems a man could be a virgin and a father at the same time, even without a miracle.
But to the contrary: A woman cannot be a virgin and a mother at the same time without a miracle. By the same token, therefore, a man cannot be a virgin and a father at the same time without a miracle. But such a miracle seems impossible. The Son of God was born of the Virgin miraculously, but if he had taken flesh from any part of the Virgin’s body other than the part a woman naturally uses for conception (a hand or a foot, for instance), then he would not have been the Virgin’s son. Compare: Eve was not Adam’s daughter, even though she was formed from his rib. But it is not possible for a man’s virginity to be preserved while he generates a child with the same part of his body and in the same place he would naturally use for generation. Therefore, it is not possible for a man to be a virgin and a father at the same time, not even miraculously.
Answer: To answer this question, we have to see what virginity requires.
Complete virginity requires three things. As with everything to do with morals, the first requirement is principal and formal, viz. a choice or intention of will. Hence, virginity necessarily requires the unceasing will never to experience the pleasures of sex. The second requirement is material, viz. a feeling of our sense-appetite, and in particular the pleasure experienced during sexual activity. Complete virginity requires the privation of this feeling as its matter: the feelings of sense are what the moral virtues are about. But if one lacks this privation without choosing or willing to do so (for instance, when a man has a nocturnal emission, or when a woman is raped), the virtue of virginity is not lost, as Augustine makes clear in book I of The City of God.62 The third requirement is a sort of accidental concomitant to virginity, viz. bodily integrity. Hence, if the seal of chastity is broken by something other than sexual activity (if a midwife or doctor cuts it open for purposes of health, for instance), virginity is not lost, as Augustine says in book I of The City of God.63
Now, if we take virginity in its complete sense (with all three requirements for virginity), then a woman’s virginity cannot be preserved while being a mother (conceiving and giving birth to a child) without a miracle, since only a miracle could deliver the child without breaking the seal of chastity. That is what happened with the Mother of God. But a woman could perhaps preserve her virginity completely while conceiving a child, even without a miracle. That is supposed to have happened to a girl of age who slept in a bed with her father to preserve her chastity: he had a nocturnal emission, and the girl was accidentally inseminated and then conceived. But a man cannot naturally or miraculously become a father without losing any seed, since he would not be the father of a child formed miraculously from any other part of his body.
Yet if we take virginity more loosely (only requiring the internal choice of mind), then of course it is naturally possible for a woman to be a mother while maintaining her virginity—if, for instance, she were raped and then conceived. It is even more possible miraculously. And it is naturally possible for a man to be a father while preserving his virginity in this sense because of a nocturnal emission, which could in some case inseminate a woman. But it would not work for a man to become a father miraculously in the way that the Virgin Mary became a mother. For the Virgin became a mother miraculously by the Holy Spirit forming a child’s body from her purest blood, as Damascene says.64 But that action of the Holy Spirit would not work with the seed that a man has to lose in order to become a father. Again, in generation, the man acts (as it were), while the woman is affected (as it were). But God only acts; God is not affected. Hence, it works better for God to miraculously provide what is lacking from a man than what is lacking from a woman.
That makes the reply to the objections clear.
Question 11
Article 1
The last question was about purely bodily creatures: Does the empyrean heaven have an influence on other bodies?
It seems not, for every body that naturally influences other bodies influences those near to it before influencing those far from it. So, if the empyrean heaven influenced lower bodies, it would influence the watery heaven nearest to it before influencing the starry heaven. But that seems inappropriate, since the starry heaven is more like the empyrean heaven than the watery heaven. After all, the starry heaven and the empyrean heaven are not made of the four elements, whereas the watery heaven is, since water is supposed to be there to cool the heat given off by the heavenly motion. That is why Saturn (the highest planet) is supposed to be cool. Therefore, the empyrean heaven does not influence lower bodies.
But to the contrary: The book On Intelligences says that everything with an influence on something else either is light or has light,65 and the commentary says that every influence occurs by virtue of light.66 Yet the empyrean heaven has the most light of any other body. Therefore, it has the most influence on other bodies.
Answer: Some people deny that the empyrean heaven has an influence on other bodies, on the grounds that it was not created for any natural purpose but, rather, to serve as a place for the blessed.67 In fact, at one time this seemed right to me as well.68
But after considering the matter more carefully, it seems instead that the empyrean heaven does influence lower bodies. For the whole universe is united in one order, as the Philosopher makes clear in book XI of the Metaphysics.69 And this one order is realized insofar as bodily things are directed in a certain order by spiritual things, and lower bodies by higher bodies, as Augustine says in book III of On the Trinity.70 Hence, if the empyrean heaven did not influence lower bodies, the empyrean heaven would not be part of this one universe, which is unacceptable. Furthermore, its proper effect seems to be what is everlasting and permanent among lower bodies.
As the Philosopher says in book XI of the Metaphysics, heaven has two main motions.71 One of them (called its daily motion) is from east to west on the poles of the equinox. Since this motion is uniform, it makes the motions and changes below it everlasting. The other motion is from west to east (moving the sun and the other planets) on the poles of the zodiac. This moves the planets toward and away from us, and is thus the proper cause of the differentiation between generation and corruption and the other changes to things here below. Hence, the generation and corruption of things here below will continue for as long as God wants, since its continuation is caused by the first motion, while the contrariety it involves is caused by the second.
Now, just as the uniformity of motion comes before its differentiation, so the unity of rest comes before the uniformity of motion. For moving means being different now than before, while resting means being the same now as before.72 Hence, the unity of rest is pure, while the unity of uniform motion involves diversity. Accordingly, the first heaven (the empyrean) exerts a singular influence by its rest, the second heaven (called watery) does so by its uniform motion, and the third (the starry heaven) does so by its multiform motion. Thus, it is proper to that first body to exert an influence without itself moving, since it is the highest, and in a certain sense borders on the rank of spiritual substances. As Dionysius says in chapter 2 of The Divine Names, the divine wisdom links the first secondary things with the last primary ones.73
So, to the first objection: The empyrean heaven influences the watery heaven more than the bodies below it, since the watery heaven receives more of the empyrean heaven’s influence, as its uniform motion indicates. Hence, because of that uniformity, the watery heaven is more like the empyrean heaven than the starry heaven. But there are two opinions about the heavenly bodies. One is that they are made of the elements. On this opinion, the empyrean heaven would be made of fire, the watery heaven would be made of water or air, and the starry heaven would be composed of both, since part of it is shiny and part of it is transparent. This is the opinion that would have water there as a coolant. The other opinion is that the heavenly bodies are not made of the four elements, but of a fifth kind. On this opinion, not even the watery heaven is made of the four elements. Instead, it is called watery because of its transparency, just as the empyrean (i.e., fiery) heaven is so called because of its light.
We grant the argument made to the contrary, although the book On Intelligences has no authority, and it is not true that every influence occurs because of light, unless “light” is taken as a metaphor for every actuality, since every agent acts insofar as it actually exists. Or it could be true of bodies alone, where “light” properly applies, given that bodily light is the form of the first acting body (heaven), by virtue of which all lower bodies act.
That is enough said for now.
1 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, 2 (1003b22–25).
2 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, c. 4.
3 Cf. Aristotle, Physics VII, 1 (243a22–23).
4 This is not found in Anselm.
5 Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, 1–2 (209a2–210a13).
6 Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, 4 (212a18–21).
7 Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, 5 (212a31–b22); Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics IV, 43.
8 Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences IV, d. 1, c. 8.
9 John 10:10.
10 John 3:5.
11 Galatians 3:27.
12 Revelation 7:14.
13 Proverbs 15:27.
14 Acts 15:9.
15 Ephesians 3:17.
16 Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice II, 23.
17 Cf. John 3:5.
18 Rather, cf. Decretum II, C. xxx, q.3, cc. 1–3.
19 Cf. Decretals IV, tit. 1, c. 30.
20 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, 5 (1105b20).
21 Matthew 7:25.
22 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, 3 (1146b29–30).
23 Cf. Ephesians 2:22.
24 Cf. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis X, 20.
25 Romans 5:12.
26 1 Timothy 4:10.
27 Anselm, On the Virgin Conception, c. 18.
28 Isaiah 43:7.
29 Decretum II, C. xxviii, q.1, c. 14.
30 Cf. Decretals I, tit. 6, c. 32.
31 Ordinary Gloss on James 2:3. Cf. Augustine, Letter 167, 18.
32 Matthew 23:23.
33 Luke 18:12.
34 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V, 4 (1131b32–1132a6).
35 1 Corinthians 9:14.
36 Malachi 3:10.
37 James 4:6.
38 Ordinary Gloss on Luke 3:11.
39 Interlinear Gloss on Luke 3:11.
40 Ordinary Gloss on Isaiah 3:14.
41 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, 7 (1107b8–14).
42 1 Corinthians 9:17.
43 1 Corinthians 4:2.
44 Matthew 5:39.
45 Cf. Augustine, On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount I, 19, 56–20, 66.
46 Luke 3:11.
47 1 John 3:16.
48 Cf. Decretum II, C. xii, q.2, c. 23.
49 Matthew 24:48–51.
50 1 Corinthians 3:15.
51 Romans 8:3.
52 Romans 7:25.
53 Galatians 5:17.
54 Cf. Romans 7:6.
55 Rather, a common adage.
56 Cf. Augustine, On True Religion, xiv, 27.
57 Ephesians 4:19.
58 Cf. Anselm, On Truth, 9.
59 Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine II, 3, 4.
60 Rather, Ninth-Century Anonymous, Sermon VIII, 2.
61 Cf. Augustine, On Lying, 3–4.
62 Cf. Augustine, The City of God, I, 18.
63 Ibid.
64 John Damascene, On Orthodox Faith III, 2.
65 Adam de Puteorum Villa, On Intelligences, Prop. VII, 1.
66 Ibid.
67 E.g., Albert, Commentary on the Sentences II, d.2G, a.6.
68 Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences II, d.2, q.2, a.3; Summa Theologiae I, q.66, a.3, ad 2.
69 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 9 (1075a11–15).
70 Augustine, On the Trinity III, 4, 9.
71 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphyiscs XII, 6 (1072a9–18).
72 Aristotle, Physics VI, 3 (234b5–7).
73 Rather, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, c. 7, 3.